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In 2020, and in light of the beginning of the third decade, the current situation in 
the world seems increasingly shaped by anxiety, mistrust and a cutback in inter-
national cooperation between nation states and political and economic associa-
tions. This reminds one of the situation of the Cold War, when the atmosphere 
was heavily loaded with mutual accusations and suspicion. Oppositional groups 
were often blamed for secretly supporting the political enemy on the other side 
of the Iron Curtain, be it the United States or the Soviet Union.  
A very similar constellation can be discerned today: the Russian government 
accuses non-governmental organizations of being sponsored by foreign powers 
and hinders their activities. Since 2012, organizations that pursue, or are consid-
ered to be pursuing, “political activities” and which receive funding from abroad 
are required to be registered and labelled as “foreign agents.” Although the Rus-
sian legislation rejects any comparison of this administrative term with Soviet 
times, its semantics sufficiently suggest that the “foreign agent” organisation 
does not act out of an intrinsic motivation, but for another interest, one that 
“stands” behind and supports it.  
On the other side, supporters of the opposition tend to claim that anybody 
who holds a more or less prominent position and openly expresses an under-
standing of the Russian government’s viewpoints “is on Putin’s payroll.” The 
underlying concept of such legal arrangements or rhetorical figures of speech is 
pertinent to the idea of conspiracy which implies that actions or utterances are 
not simply performed straightforwardly; instead, real or relevant interests are 
concealed “behind” them. The mode of conspiracy-thinking is shaped by funda-
mental dualities, which may be characterized by oppositions such as open/secret, 
overt/covert, official/unofficial, simulated/real, dissimulating/sincere, phenome-
nological/ontological, illusive/real or even fictitious/factual.  
With respect to conspiracies and conspiracy thinking (i.e., conspiracy theo-
ry), though, these distinctions are made in the world of human action and behav-
iour or, to put it more generally, in the world of culture. Its roots reach into the 
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fundamental human condition of the opacity of minds and the restrictions of em-
bodied knowledge. Humans neither never fully know what others have in mind 
nor are they able to obtain knowledge about actions that happened in another 
time and in another place. This is especially evident in drama and tragedy—to 
name but a few: Corneille’s Cinna, Shakespeare’s Julius Cesar, Goethe’s Tor-
quato Tasso, Pushkin’s Boris Godunov—have drawn on this irreducible insecu-
rity about the intentionality of others which is the precondition that, firstly, con-
spiracies can be planned and carried out, and that, secondly, a conspiratorial state 
of mind can speculate endlessly about the “real” meaning of other people’s ac-
tions.  
Conspiratorial thinking comes close to paranoia:1 Although this way of 
thinking often seems highly irrational and “mad” in the truest sense of the 
word—especially in severe clinical cases of individual psychopathology—its 
manifestations in the world of culture are often not that easy to rebut, for reasons 
of a lack of clear evidence. Think about the most notorious conspiracy theory 
emanated in Eastern Europe: for ordinary people it was impossible to determine 
whether or not the Protocols of the Elders of Zion2 were authentic. Even after 
their unambiguous falsification, there are still people nowadays—especially in 
Arabic countries—who believe in the probability of a Jewish plot to obtain con-
trol over the world. These convictions are most likely grounded in deep anti-Se-
mitic attitudes that are present in these cultures, but the impossibility of an in-
spection of the situation described—i.e., the blatantly absurd, but at the same 
time unverifiable assumption that once, in days gone by, a world-council of Jews 
met secretly to discuss matters of how to seize power and control mankind—
significantly contributes to the persistence of such beliefs. 
Other than conspiracy theories, conspiracies themselves are also a means of 
struggle against an adversary and are conducted secretly. The deployment of 
conspiracies often indicates an imbalance in power-relations in the social sphere 
                                                           
1  The concatenation of ideology, conspiracy theory and paranoia was introduced in the 
analysis of political culture by Richard Hofstadter in essays written as early as the 
1950s and which were published cumulatively in Hofstadter 1965. For a recent critical 
appraisal of Hofstadter’s assessments see Boltanski 2012: 266–73. 
2  Although it has long been proven that the Protocols are not authentic, the accounts of 
their fabrication and dissemination are not yet fully known and themselves rely on in-
vention and imagination – see the critical account in Hagemeister 2008. There are also 
other English translations of the title of the Protocols such as The Protocols of the 
Meetings of the Learned Elders of Zion or The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zi-
on; in this volume, though, Protocols of the Elders of Zion is used. 
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in which the conspiratorial plot takes place; at the same time, their secrecy im-
plies that either the sought-for goal, or the means applied, will not be met with 
broad acceptance, especially not from the side which is the target of the conspir-
acy. Partitioned Poland is a prominent example of a culture of conspiracy. Polish 
anticolonial insurgency discourse developed on the basis of the question of con-
spiracy, particularly in the years after the Napoleonic Wars and until the early 
1860s: Is plotting a feasible, effective and morally justified means of political ac-
tion? Would the use of conspiracy in the political struggle leave a moral stain on 
Polish society and, therefore, would overt insurrection—although this was prob-
ably more easy to subdue—not be a more noble means of pursuing the interests 
of the nation?  
When one takes a look at history, especially at the history of Eastern Europe, 
one may be tempted to see a correlation between societies’ political constitution 
and the implementation of conspiratorial strategies in the political struggle: the 
more restrictive the access to power and to the throne, and the more despotic the 
exercise of power on the society, the more likely people are to resort to plotting 
and to conspiratorial activities. Examples extend back to the reign of Ivan IV 
(“the Terrible”) in the sixteenth century, to the political upheaval in the Russian 
and Ottoman empires throughout the nineteenth century until the end of World 
War I: the Decembrists in the aftermath of the Russian war against Napoleon, 
the insurrections in Poland in 1830–31 and 1863–64. The Poles invented wallen-
rodism, based on a poem by Mickiewicz, as a strategy of undermining Russia’s 
overwhelming power. The Russian administration, for its part, discovered harm-
less associations of young scholars like the Vilnius “Philomates and Philarets” of 
1823 or the Kievan “Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood” of 1847 to be politically 
dangerous conspirations. The revolutionary terrorism under the tsars Alexander 
II, Alexander III and Nicholas II and the movements of the Black Hand and 
Young Bosnia would not have been possible without clandestine forms of organ-
ization that could be considered conspiratorial. As soon as the political system 
allows for legal access to power, then conspiratorial activities often lose their 
relevance and recede from the political scene.  
Along with conspiracy itself, conspiracy theory can serve as a political 
means as well. The relation of the former to the latter corresponds to the opposi-
tion of secrecy and plainness or concealment and bluntness. Whereas conspira-
cies have to be prepared secretly for the sake of them not being revealed, con-
spiracy theories are discourses that strive for acceptance and social dissemina-
tion. Their realm is publicity, rather than secrecy—conspiracy theories take aim 
at mass-media in order to be spread more swiftly. Communication is necessary 
for conspiring, certainly, but it still has to remain undercover and must not es-
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cape the control of the conspirators who anxiously avoid publicity by applying 
techniques of encryption and exclusivity. 
The strong reliance on publicity and significant dissemination leads to an 
analogy that might seem surprising at first glance—historically, conspiracy theo-
ries were an important tool in the struggle against the authorities, the church, the 
court and against other powerful institutions in late modern Europe.3 In a way, 
the exposure of conspiracies—i.e., the elaboration of theories serving to bring 
real intentions and concealed interests behind political actions to light—was a 
crucial goal of the Enlightenment. It is no accident that many conspirational ide-
as that persist to this very day (the struggle against alleged plots organized by the 
Illuminati, the Jesuits, the Freemasons, the Jews, or the Judeo-Masons…) 
emerged at a time at which the legitimacy of the political and religious author-
ities of ancient regime Europa were being questioned.  
Conversely, the French Revolution itself was seen as the work of a conspir-
acy by many traditionalist intellectuals.4 The printing press was certainly a pow-
erful instrument in this context. It allowed for campaigns to be launched that 
reached large audiences. However, one crucial feature of conspiracy theories 
made itself felt: the high productivity of the conspiratorial mode of thought and 
its inability to limit itself. More often than not, the conspiracies one could read 
about in brochures, pamphlets or newspapers or hear about in gossip and talk of 
the town were not real, but made up—these were no longer real conspiracies, but 
“conspiracy theories” in the contemporary, pejorative and disqualifying sense of 
the term.5 
The conceptual link between conspiracy and conspiracy theories is, there-
fore, not just substantiated by the fact of real conspiracies that boost the sus-
picion that secret forces lurk behind any social phenomenon and influence its 
trajectory.6 Moreover, conspiracies and conspiracy discourse are closely en-
twined: for instance, many people were accused of taking part in huge anti-
Soviet activities during the ill-famed Stalinist trials of the late 1920s and the 
1930s: these charges were deliberately disseminated by the authorities and sig-
nificantly contributed to a Soviet culture of conspiracy that pervaded all spheres 
                                                           
3  See the chapter “Verschwörungstheorien der Aufklärung” in Klausnitzer 2007: 179–
249. 
4  Cf. Hofman 1993. 
5  Cf. “Une théorie du complot est une théorie non seulement fausse mais dangereuse. 
Une théorie paranoïaque” – Boltanski 2012: 274. 
6  This connection is too narrow and does not fully capture the differences between con-
spiracies and conspiracy theories – see Johannsen/Röhl 2010.  
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of society.7 Openly encouraged suspicion of ubiquitous conspiracy was expected 
to contribute to the reduction of privacy and secrecy, which is vital for real con-
spiration. Conspiracy discourse was systematically introduced in order to raise 
anxiety and cautiousness, on the one hand, and to strengthen belief in revealed 
conspiracies (no matter how far-fetched and absurd the accusations might have 
been) on the other. So, by virtue of the necessary publicity, conspiracy theories 
are closer to the official sphere, even being endorsed thereby, whereas conspira-
cies are never organized before anybody’s eyes (or they are dissimulated if they 
are carried out openly).8 
Conspiracy theories can be considered in terms of a specific version of the 
“world” (or at least, of some social phenomenon) and as manifestations of dis-
course (understood here in its Foucauldian sense as socially relevant utterances 
which bear a close relation to institutions of knowledge and power and with par-
ticular truth claims). As such, they are highly indicative of issues and conditions 
in societies and cultures. The political situation in contemporary Poland, for ex-
ample, significantly relates to interpretations and versions of the airplane disaster 
that took place in Smolensk in April 2010, when a Polish Air Force aircraft 
crashed due to a failed landing attempt. 96 people, among them the president and 
his wife, alongside other representatives of Poland’s elite, fell victim to the 
crash. Many people in Poland adhere to the opinion that the crash was concocted 
by Russian secret service; some even suspect Donald Tusk, then prime-minister, 
to have had a hand in it. Cultural memory is particularly relevant in the emer-
gence of this belief: manifold historical experiences, many of them lieing not 
that far in the past as the time of the partitions, seem to have led to an almost en-
demic mistrust of Russia among the Polish people. The plane’s passengers were 
on the way to a remembrance ceremony in Katyń, a place where the NKVD had 
killed about 4,000 detained Polish officers, representatives of the military elite of 
inter-war Poland in early 1940. The truth about what had happened in Katyń was 
carefully hidden from the public, a fact that probably paved the way for the im-
mediate emergence of conspiracy theories after the fatal event and during the pe-
riod of communist rule in Poland. Although the speculations about a malicious 
Russian attack constantly point out some more or less astonishing details in the 
accounts of the crash, they lack either substantial factual evidence or a convinc-
ing motive for such a violent operation on the part of Russia’s secret services. It 
                                                           
7  For a convincing functionalist analysis of the officially endorsed conspiracy thinking 
in the Soviet Union, see Rittersporn 2001 and as well Dentith 2014: 85−90. 
8  For a typology based on the opposition of secrecy/non-secrecy; see also Barkun 2003: 
4−5. 
14 | Deutschmann/Herlth/Woldan  
is safe to say that the suspicion fell on Russia for historical reasons. Given the 
complicated history of Polish-Russian relations and the symbolic density of the 
circumstances—members of the Polish elite fall victim to a catastrophe in the 
immediate vicinity of the spot where thousands of Polish prisoners of war had 
been executed seven decades ago, a crime ordered by Soviet authorities that had 
been officially abnegated for decades—it would, in fact, have been rather sur-
prising had this event not given rise to conspiracy theories. 
Both conspiracies and conspiracy discourse induce remarkable mistrust in 
social and political communication. When one takes for granted that other peo-
ple are substantially non-transparent, at least in their intentions and private 
thoughts, then the mere idea of hidden motives and aspirations easily leads into 
cautious reservations, disbelief and distrust. Over time the other person easily 
falls under the general suspicion of harbouring evil intentions. One extreme con-
sequence of this insecurity and mistrust is that it can lead to paranoia, a mental 
disorder which significantly correlates with social circumstances and positions. 
Those occupying leading positions within a group or society often guess the en-
viousness of the people that surround them and suspect latent conspiracy which 
is directed against them (most peculiarly, historical drama develops this motif). 
At lower positions, people who have some knowledge of secret services and 
their practices are more inclined to fear falseness on behalf of others or to fear 
their uncandid treason.  
A frequent topos that is encountered in the analysis of conspiracy theories is 
information complexity: one might feel inclined to resort to “easy” models of 
explanation when confronted with the impossibility of establishing causal rela-
tions or sound explanations for particular events. A more or less common model 
is the identification of someone who might be—in the long run—responsible for 
the social explicandum. This desire for an explanation is understandable; it fuels 
scientific or scholarly accounts of reality as well as conspiracy thinking. Reduc-
tiveness is not a feature to be encountered solely in conspiracy thinking. Given 
the complexity of the world, any explanation cannot but reduce this complexity 
in relation to the principles of methodology and disciplinary practice.  
Conspiracy theories do not significantly differ from other modes of explana-
tion, be they scientific or not, with regard to complexity and its necessary reduc-
tion. Therefore, the difference cannot be discerned either in the motives—the 
urge to make sense of an event or a sequence of events—or simply in the propo-
sitions given as explanations. A cardinal feature that allows for the discrimina-
tion of conspiracy theories lies in another direction: whereas scientific explana-
tions should be congruent with methods and a disciplinary framework, conspira-
cy theories usually do not dwell on principles and methodology; instead, they put 
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their explanations at the fore. Whereas science is—with regard to its objects—
highly self-referential, conspiracy thinking is nothing but hetero-referential. Its 
truth is always “out there” as something more or less obvious: conspiracy theo-
ries usually only refer to data, co-occurrences, causal relations and “revealed” 
links, thereby creating the illusion of careful empirical examination and rational 
judging, where the necessity of elaborating on the methodology is concerned. 
Apart from that, the discourse of conspiracy theory refrains from revealing the 
theoretical framework informing it. Scholarly explanations do not usually hesi-
tate to pay tribute to their sources and inspirations, something which would often 
be too embarrassing for the promoters of conspiracy-thinking (‘As our premise 
we have taken an evil force behind many phenomena’). The basic assumptions 
behind the “theory” are not reflected upon at all; instead, the “investigation” al-
ways arrives at the detection of conspiracies.  
Contrary to its name, a conspiracy theory is not a theory in a scientific or 
even scholarly sense, but rather a sort of story or narrative pretending to explain 
certain affairs in another way than official accounts do. On behalf of their narra-
tedness, conspiracy theories (manifesting themselves in—nowadays often multi-
media—narratives) are greatly interesting to literary scholars, especially for nar-
ratology. The relevancy of conspiracy theory for scholars of literature must not 
be confused with fictionality as a cardinal feature of literary texts. Conspiracy 
theories claim to be truthful and authentic; it would be misleading, therefore, to 
classify them as fictitious from the outset. The problem resides rather in finding 
a “demarcation line permitting to distinguish … real conspiracies”—and their re-
spective description or “theory”—from “imaginary” ones.9 One may arrive at 
such a distinction after an examination of the conspiracy story narrated.10 How-
ever, immediately qualifying conspiracy narratives as a kind of fiction is hardly a 
proper approach to such an astonishing and manifold cultural phenomenon. 
Moreover, proving or disproving an account of events often demands meticulous 
work and deliberation; in many cases it is impossible to definitively determine 
whether a given conspiracy theory is true or not.  
Beyond a rigid discrimination of true and false (resp. fictitious) “stories,” the 
examination of conspiracy narratives provides access to a society’s problems, 
expectations and worries. Although their factual basis is most often rather ques-
tionable, if not outright nonexistent, conspiracy narratives remain a highly in-
structive indicator for the state of public discourse and collective imagination in 
                                                           
9  Boltanski 2012: 280. 
10  Most likely, a part of the conspiracy story indeed refers to reals persons and events 
whereas a more or less great part of the story is fictitious. 
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a given society. In this respect they are similar to literature and the literary imag-
ination which, free from the constraints of referentiality and truth, can still refer 
to real historical events and real social conditions. At least this would be the case 
for the mimetically oriented poetics of “realist” fiction—the events narrated have 
to be “probable.” “Probability,” whether we like it or not, is also a prerequisite 
for the success of conspiracy theories. 
Literary fiction, in particular, qualifies for the depiction and deployment of 
both conspiracies and conspiracy discourse: discharged from the constraints of 
many other genres of discourse, literary discourse can also construct and repre-
sent plots (e.g., in drama or narratives). Literature can demonstrate ways of hu-
man reasoning and its appropriateness to the “world” (through fictitious intro-
spection into the character’s minds and by describing an entire situation from a 
distanced and omniscient vantage point as well). Furthermore, the act of reading 
literary fiction, or even poetry, generally bears some similarities to reading and 
interpreting the world in a conspiratological way: there is some obvious “first-
hand” meaning, but is there also not another hidden second (or third) meaning 
behind these erratic signifiers? Just as readers of a (literary) text often speculate 
about its more or less plausible interpretations, so too do people often wonder 
about whether particular phenomena could also be assessed in other ways than 
from the ordinary viewpoint. 
For these reasons, this volume contains theoretical texts on conspiracies as it 
deals with accounts of Eastern European social and political issues that usually 
pass for conspiracy narratives. Although the textuality of conspiracy theories and 
narrative accounts of conspiracies converge in some respects, they must not be 
confounded, given that in the first case truth claims are made, whereas literary 
discourse generally refrains from the pretention of explaining the states of affairs 
in the “real” world. The chapters of this book shed some light on a few more or 
less prominent cases of conspiracies and conspiracy thinking in Eastern Europe. 
They do so from a point of view that does not generally aim to solve the puzzles 
of a fragmented reality, but instead by observing the people who are (pre-)occu-
pied with the puzzles and the texts produced thereby. 
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One very common and understandable approach can be discerned when talking 
about conspiracy theories in terms of the following questions: how can it be that 
so many conspiracy theories swirl around? Why do so many people believe in 
them? Aren’t there any means through which to confine their influence in mod-
ern societies? In itself, this approach already presupposes that it is possible to de-
lineate between factual accounts of events that take place in the world and erro-
neous versions spread through conspiracy theories. Although it is highly desira-
ble to distinguish between true and false statements, it is not at all easy to do so. 
This is why conspiracy versions of events arouse so much interest. Conspiracy 
theories propose alternative versions which also vie for plausibility in relation to 
already existing versions of how certain phenomena or events probably hap-
pened.1 Popular books on conspiracy theories are often structured by juxtaposing 
different stories: widely-accepted official accounts are confronted with conspira-
cy versions of the same phenomena.2 More or less complex chains of events are 
represented in the form of “tellable” stories for the general public, making the 
different accounts of events resemble a contest of stories. The narrative nature of 
                                                           
1  As Eva Horn and Anson Rabinbach put it, in a short introduction to the proximity of 
conspiracy theories and fiction, “[c]onspiracy theories take the opacity of reality as a 
point of departure to venture on an alternative interpretation about the order of 
things.” – Horn/Rabinbach 2008: 6. 
2  E.g., Southwell/Twist 2004.  
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the discourse on conspiracies therefore allows for a narratological approach 
which discusses both the most important aspects of the conspiracy narratives and 
their discursive environment. 
 
 
Two Case Stories 
 
According to a binary dichotomy of conspiracy theories,3 there are two kinds of 
theory: cynical and kynical ones (the former being actively directed at certain 
groups which are being blamed for an evil, while the latter are musings about the 
possible reasons for the deplorable state of affairs).4 For instance, speculations 
about the erratic oscillations of prices belong to the group of kynical theories, 
given that they seek explanations for an economic misery. Yet the distinction is 
not as sharp as it might first appear. Take, for example, the linking of the oil 
price development and international politics which Aleksandr Etkind and Ilya 
Yablokov have referred to in a paper on the contemporary Russian adminis-
tration’s inclination towards conspiratological thinking.5 Russia’s economic de-
pendency on oil and gas exports provides fertile soil for conspiracy theories. The 
ruble exchange rate’s obvious dependency on the international price of a barrel 
of oil inevitably leads to readily voiced speculations about secret agreements be-
tween international stakeholders who might want to weaken Russia’s economy 
by deliberately keeping oil and gas prices low. When representatives of the Rus-
sian political elite speculate about the reasons for low prices on oil and gas, it is 
often difficult to determine whether they take a cynical or a kynical stance. For a 
classification as cynical one must qualify the fact that official statements by po-
litical leaders are always ideological (given that they not only yield an explana-
tion alone, but also strive to hold onto power).6 Although the same speculations 
about oil prices can also be made by an ordinary Russian citizen idly wondering 
                                                           
3  Cf. Raab/Carbon/Muth 2017: 179−80 and 186−87. 
4  The distinction goes back to Slavoj Žižek’s use of a distinction made in Peter Sloter-
dijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason (1983). Žižek considers that someone in power who 
knows that his ideological explanations are wrong, but stills applies them without ad-
mitting their falsity, is a cynical person. A kynical person instead ironically points out 
the false ideology of the powers that be; cf. Žižek 1989: 29.  
5  Etkind/Yablokov 2017.  
6  Among the many different meanings of “ideology,” I am referring here to a concept of 
ideology as a complex of uttered ideas serving the legitimization of the powers that 
be; cf. Eagleton 1993: 7. 
 Conspiracy Theories, Discourse Analysis and Narratology | 21 
about the decline of his salary’s purchasing power (which would justify a classi-
fication as kynical), the simple fact that a high-ranked person spreads such spec-
ulations via the media (and, in so doing, at the same time denies any responsibil-
ity for Russia’s economic development) makes it a cynical form of conspiracy 
theory. 
The fluctuations and oscillations of the prices of important goods are always 
subject to certain erratic elements. Economic theory can describe some basic in-
terrelations and influences, but it cannot reliably forecast price developments. 
The opacity of markets excites fantasies about forces operating in the dark, ex-
erting secret influence and bargaining for the sake of personal gain.7 The most 
curious fantasy pertaining to power and influence on the world economy, one 
which Etkind and Yablokov mention in their article, was the one propagated by 
Vladimir Yakunin, a former director of the Russian Railways who now holds a 
chair at the Department of State Policy at MGU, the Moscow State University.8 
In a lecture he gave there in 2012, Yakunin retold the already retold story of an 
unnamed leading European politician9 who maintains that he had a meeting with 
eight people on the top floor of the Empire State Building during which he was 
asked for his evaluation of the economic perspectives of various European coun-
tries. They then had dinner and the anonymous politician claimed that after this 
dinner he witnessed how the people he had been speaking to contacted 150 fi-
                                                           
7  One should keep in mind that Karl Popper refutes a “conspiracy theory of society” (in 
his understanding this is a theory which explains historical phenomena mainly by re-
ferring to the intentions of persons involved) by describing simple market mecha-
nisms: If someone demands an item, he/she inevitably and unwillingly raises the price 
of the demanded good; if someone offers an item, then he/she lowers the market value 
of it (cf. Popper 2006: 14). Popper suggests that the intentions of individuals cannot 
significantly exercise influence on the prices—he discusses simple small markets (sel-
ling and buying real estate in one village), but his idea can be extended to complicated 
markets based on the circumstances that it would be even more difficult to realize 
one’s intentions on complex markets. Popper’s criticism of the idea that history is the 
result of the realization of purposeful intentions is also resumed in Butter 2018: 
40−42.  
8  Etkind/Yablokov 2017: 79−80. 
9  The sequence of narrators is as follows: the leader (“premier”) of a large European 
state spoke about his experience at the top of the Empire State Building to a diplomat 
and the diplomat told it to Yakunin who tells it to the audience at Moscow University 
and on the internet. 
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nancial institutions and ordered manipulative transactions amounting to 200 bil-
lion dollars. 
To substantiate the story he has just retold, Vladimir Yakunin added that he 
himself had also once been to this location at the top of the Empire State Build-
ing, “admittedly on another occasion.”10 This homodiegetic addition to a very 
curious story, of course, makes it more authentic than a mere repetition of a story 
about the meeting of the high-finance elite. 
While Yakunin’s tale about the central hub of international financial power 
being located at the top of the Empire State Building is remarkable, for indicat-
ing that conspiracy stories are told and spread by people very close to Russia’s 
political elite, another reference in Etkind and Yablokov’s paper is even closer to 
the subject of conspiracy discourse and narratology. This “amazing case,” as Et-
kind/Yablokov describe it,11 is related to mind reading. In 2006, one major of the 
Russian secret service, the FSB, stated in an interview that the unit he command-
ed at the FSB possessed a new technology which made it possible to read other 
people’s minds and ideas. The technology is said to have been applied to George 
Bush Sr., as well as to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Probing in-
to Mrs. Albright’s mind, the FSB claimed to have read that she thoroughly dis-
liked Russia’s ownership of territories so exorbitantly rich in natural resources.12 
 
 
Three Dimensions of Stories 
 
In pursuing a discussion of stories told within conspiracy discourses, one should 
refrain from judging conspiracy narratives as totally wrong or misleading, but 
instead simply treat them as narratives whose ontological status—true, false, or 
fictitious—is often unclear, at least initially when confronted with such a story. 
The two stories about Russia’s political elite not only indicate a certain bias 
amongst Russian politicians towards conspiracy theories, they also allow some 
insight into the close relationship between conspiracy narratives and literary dis-
course. 
This proximity can be illustrated from three different perspectives which will 
each be discussed in detail in the following sections: 
                                                           
10 «правда, по другому поводу» − “Novyi mirovoi klass i vyzovy chelovechestva,” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3OvqfkCyMMc (ca. 8:00–11:30). 
11  Cf. Etkind/Yablokov 2017: 63. 
12 https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/06/22/64636-patrushev-i-olbrayt-kak-
fraza-kremlevskih-trolley-stala-simvolom-very-kremlevskoy-elity 
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• textual-narratological/syntactical/formal; 
• referential/semantic; 





Conspiracy narratives usually do not have obvious textual-narratological mark-
ers that would allow for them to be identified as fiction;13 their authors avoid 
markers of fictionality, instead they prefer text types which are typical for factual 
(world-imaging) texts. The textual-narratological perspective is not particularly 






Usually, conspiracy narratives claim to be factual narratives and, as such, they 
are to be considered in terms of the distinction between truth and falsehood.14 
Whereas fiction or fictitious narratives can be described as explicitly and delib-
erately conveying untrue statements without any deceptive intention, factual nar-
ratives can be seen as world-imaging narratives, which is to say that they are as-
certained to be true or false with direct reference to the real world.15  
Factual discourse necessarily involves truth claims consisting, as it does, of 
statements about the world. However, due to their very nature, conspiracy narra-
tives which are not true cannot simply be dismissed as lies, especially when we 
take into consideration the extent to which the narrators seem to believe in them; 
                                                           
13  According to Nickel-Bacon/Groeben/Schreier, some textual markers indicating fic-
tionality include, e.g., reported inner speech or an obvious literary (“overstructured”) 
organization of the text; cf. Nickel-Bacon/Groeben/Schreier 2000: 396. 
14  The case of conspiracy narratives that are clearly paratextually marked as fiction is not 
of interest here. 
15  “World-imaging texts as representations of the actual world are subject to truth-valua-
tion; their statements can be judged true or false. Fictional texts are outside truth-valu-
ation; their sentences are neither true nor false.” − Doležel 1998: 24, cf. as well 
Gorman 2005: 163.  
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they ought, in fact, to be judged as erroneous statements.16 Usually, the mental 
state of the person supplying the text should not be decisive when judging upon 
the fictionality or factuality of a text (given that it cannot be accessed in an ob-
jective way). Similarly, after considering a narrative as a world-imaging text, 
one should better concentrate on the measure of accuracy and leave speculations 
about the mental states of the narrators aside. However, the promulgations of 
truthfulness and degree of sincerity which accompany the narration remain rele-
vant. 
With world-imaging stories, people assume that the narrator believes what he 
or she is saying and that he/she bears responsibility for the accuracy or truth of 
the story told. An argument may arise pertaining to the truth claims of the specif-
ic narrative in question, of course.  
What exactly are the semantic criteria according to which narratives can be 
classified as either fact or fiction? Promulgators of conspiracy narratives strive to 
prove the story in question with recourse to all kinds of material and references. 
On the semantic level, it is not easy to distinguish proper accounts of events 
from the false ones.17 Conspiracy narratives do not usually venture too far into 
                                                           
16  Due to their truth claims, conspiracy stories should best not be compared with fiction. 
Because of this wrong conception Horn/Rabinbach suggest that “conspiracy theory, 
like novels, is a form of fiction [sic! my emphasis], but unlike most serious fiction, it is 
devoid of any reflexive insight into its own fictionality.” − Horn/Rabinbach 2008: 6. If 
one treats conspiracy stories not as fictional, but as factual discourse, such specifica-
tions are not necessary at all. More accurate distinctions also outline the differences 
between fiction and factual discourse: “The conditions for satisfying the criteria of 
factual narrative are semantic: a factual narrative is either true or false. Even if it is 
willfully false (as is the case if it is a lie), what determines its truth or its untruth is not 
its hidden pragmatic intention, but that which is in fact the case. The conditions for 
satisfying the criteria of fictional narrative are pragmatic: the truth claims a text would 
make if it (the same text, from the syntactic point of view) were a factual text (be the 
claims true or false) must be bracketed out.” − Schaeffer 2014: 191. The distinction 
factual/fictional, thus, is decisive for the attitude towards a represented narrative, but 
the distinction itself is usually neither made from the perspective of formal/syntactical 
considerations, nor is it made from the semantic perspective, but it is guided by prag-
matic decisions which can take both the formal and the semantical perspectives into 
account.  
17  There are only very few, rather marginal, narratives in which it is more or less obvious 
that the story told must be fictional or wrong, such as David Icke’s assertion that pow-
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the world of fantasy, which makes it far harder to determine their truth. Yaku-
nin’s story about the top floor of the Empire State Building, as the hub of inter-
national financial power, is hard to disprove; on the basis of probability, it would 
be difficult to either verify or falsify the possible truth of his account. Yet the 
very notion of mind reading already pushes the story of the FSB major into the 
realms of the untruthful, to the extent that the Novaia Gazeta, which printed the 
interview, treats the story sarcastically.  
One should also take into account that people usually inform each other 
about factual events: an expectation of “true” messages is the “default” attitude 
towards communication; deviations are usually explicitly marked (as dreams, 
possibilities, fiction and the like).18 On the level of “semantics,” then, one usual-
ly needs a more thorough and detailed knowledge of what actually happened. 
One solution to this problem would be to gather further information through in-
tense research and deeper inquiry. This solution, however, often leads to further 
problems, such as a surplus of data and a mass of information being open to a 
wide range of interpretations and, as such, not able to help to clarify anything. 
Don DeLillo’s Kennedy-assassination novel, Libra, provides a good depiction of 
the notion of data surplus and the ensuing impossibility of solving the puzzle at 
hand. The fictitious character Nicolas Branch is overwhelmed by the amount of 
information that he has to deal with when examining the case of JFK’s murder.19 
Interesting conspiracy stories usually have some element of credible proba-
bility. The general public cannot indulge in minute verification processes on the 
amount of their truthfulness, so the “ordinary reader” of a story—which is to say, 
average persons not directly involved in the events, but informed by the media—
cannot do anything but compare the story to their own knowledge of the world; 
this often consists not only of direct or firsthand information, but also of works 
of fiction, such as crime novels, films and the like.20 The interpretation and clas-
sification of narratives—whether they are truthful or not, or whether they are on-
ly possible or actually real—rest partly on the recipient’s experience with literary 
texts or “realistic” fiction in general. With respect to this, modes of reception 
which have been acquired from fictional texts might also play a significant role, 
e.g., a predisposition for believing in fictional representations—one should think 
of the capability of imagining that one thing is, at the same time, something dif-
                                                           
erful reptiles from outer space live in the caverns inside the Earth and transform their 
shape from reptilian to human and back again. 
18  Zipfel 2014: 100−01. 
19  Cf. DeLillo 1988: 300−01 and 442−43. 
20  Cf. Boltanski 2013: 392−95. 
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ferent (a special form of a cloud is an animal or a face). The subsequent immer-
sion into fictional worlds enhances the belief in the stories told, no matter 
whether they are fictional or factual. When “make believe” can be regarded as an 
essential operation for the production and reception of fiction,21 then the famili-
arity with this operation makes it easier to believe stories towards which disbe-
lief should better not be suspended willingly. 
In the interesting cases of conspiracy narrative, then, there are not usually 
any obvious semantic traits which would enable the recipient to categorize the 
postulated narrative as false or fictitious. Analyses that could verify or falsify the 
narrative are usually complex; these analyses cannot normally be conducted by 
the general public. As a result of these obstacles, the general public can only, ul-





As we have seen in the case of conspiracy theories, textual-narratological and se-
mantic perspectives on conspiracy narratives tend not to provide sufficient evi-
dence for ascertaining the truthfulness or fictionality of a story. This is no great 
surprise insofar as the texts in question are not intended to be unequivocally 
qualifiable. Instead, they always contain a level of intentional ambiguity. There-
fore, the pragmatic level is of major importance when it comes to judging a text 
and when delineating factual and fictional texts. In combination with aspects of 
the textual-narratological and the semantic levels, it is the pragmatic level at 
which the relevant decisions about the text’s character are made.23 The partici-
pants engaging in a given communicative exchange have to take various aspects 
into account when trying to ascertain the truth or falsity of a given text, including 
both general aspects of the text and the message it conveys, as well as the situa-
tive context more generally. The recipient is confronted with paratextual infor-
mation and with questions pertaining to the narrator and his reliability. Luc 
                                                           
21  Cf. Bareis 2014: 51. 
22  This position shall not deny the heroic educational efforts of authors who have worked 
on methods of how to dismantle conspiracy theories, such as Hepfer 2015 and Raab/ 
Carbon/Muth 2017. Their mostly instructive suggestions serve as a remedy against 
many conspiracy stories; nevertheless, their main problem rests in the necessity of 
special training. Only then can the situation of “exposure” to stories, of various relia-
bility, be tackled. 
23  Cf. Nickel-Bacon/Groeben/Schreier 2000: 290. 
 Conspiracy Theories, Discourse Analysis and Narratology | 27 
Boltanski has analyzed letters to the editor of Le Monde with respect to particu-
lar markers of conspiracy postulations or markers of insanity. His analysis re-
vealed that there were indeed pragmatic markers that allowed a more or less con-
sensual identification of paranoid writers of conspiracy fantasies: e.g., when peo-
ple described themselves as victims of a powerful group of conspirators that 
even went so far as to have recruited their close relatives, or when they boasted 
of their status using dubious titles,24 there was usually hardly any doubt about 
the fantastic character of the stories told.25 
By far the most intriguing aspects of conspiracies lie in their cultural embed-
dedness and in their potential to shape interpretative groups, cultures or subcul-
tures. Conspiracy theories create a type of imagined communities comprised of 
all of the people who subscribe to a given narrative. This social process of creat-
ing groups that are united by their shared interpretation of a narrative helps to 
sharpen some important distinctions. Whereas conspiracies are clandestine ac-
tions directed against an enemy, conspiracy narratives are overt speech acts 
which create at least two groups: those who believe in the narrative and those 
skeptical non-believers who do not, whereby the very notion of a conspiracy 
theory implies that the plausibility of the narrative is inevitably hard to ascertain. 
As has been stated previously in relation to the interplay of fictional texts in the 
reception of world-imaging narratives, belief is of central importance when it 
comes to describing the reception of conspiracy stories because the interpretative 
process involves a significant amount of trust and belief: the addressees decide 
whether or not to believe a particular narrative. In most cases, it is hardly possi-
ble to verify the truth of the facts presented, so one simply has to rely on the nar-
rator or on the media sources disseminating the narratives; pragmatic aspects, 
thus, are highly relevant in this respect. 
This is where the problem of knowledge enters the field. Following Anton/ 
Schetsche/Walter, societies contain both official/orthodox and heterodox “know-
ledge.” Orthodox knowledge is widely accepted and confirmed by the authorities 
and among leading media companies, whereas heterodox knowledge dwells in 
subcultures and in their media.26 Conspiracy theories, in the ordinary sense, 
therefore belong to heterodox knowledge, which is rejected, discarded and dis-
qualified by the official position. The position that conspiracy narratives take up 
                                                           
24  When authors make pretentious use of academic titles, they try to obtain more accept-
ance; however, academic titles on book covers can often provoke suspicion and skep-
ticism in people who are engaged in the academic field. 
25  Cf. Boltanski 2013: 386−89. 
26  Cf. Anton/Schetsche/Walter 2014: 14. 
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along the sliding scale between orthodox and heterodox can vary; heterodox 
knowledge may even become orthodox knowledge and vice versa.27 
As has been stated previously, conspiracy narratives belong to factual dis-
course; to that end, they are closely intertwined with the various dimensions of 
discourse in general, especially with power relations on the one hand and with 
claims to truth on the other.28 Conspiracy narratives often explicitly refer to both 
real and imagined power relations in societies; at the same time, though, they are 
also informed by these power relations, even though this is often overlooked, ig-
nored or denied. Instead, the narrative claims to “tell the truth.” How can one 
best understand this denied relationship between discourse and power? First, it is 
worth noting that discourse always governs the scope of possible utterances: that 
which can be said in a given discourse does not always have to be true. The no-
torious Protocols of the Elders of Zion, for example, are still regarded by many 
people as proof of a Jewish conspiracy, even though their inauthenticity has been 
well known since 1921, when The Times published a series of articles proving 
that the Protocols were a forgery constructed on the basis of a fictitious French 
dialogue. This shows that the power of anti-Semitic-discourse is sometimes 
stronger than clearly proven sound argumentation, as was evident in Hitler’s de-
claration that even if the Protocols were a forgery, they were true insofar as they 
expressed the sinister aims of the Jews as he saw them.29  
So, when there are two opposing or antagonistic narratives, which both de-
scribe an important event or a particular state of affairs, it is not advisable to be 
too optimistic about one’s ability to make a rational choice between them on the 
basis of deliberate reasoning in the sense meant by Habermas. Instead, the dis-
cursive environment that people are embedded in often exerts quite a strong co-
ercive force, and people choose options that go against widely accepted and con-
firmed knowledge. 
 
                                                           
27  This does not happen very often, but see the chapter written by Alois Streicher on the 
possibilities of varying assessments of the plane crash of Lech Kaczyński and other 
representatives of the Polish authorities. 
28  Michel Foucault developed his idea of discourse in many writings on different sub-
jects in such a manner that is not at all easy to determine central passages in which the 
main ideas are expressed. Some commentaries, though, provide a concise and helpful 
overview of the Foucaultian notion of discourse and its interrelation with truth, power 
and knowledge. For our purposes, Mills 1997: 60−76, proves helpful. 
29  Cf. Benz 2011: 107−08, see also Marmura 2014: 2382. 
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Mediated Reality 
 
However, the possibility that truth might be overruled by the sheer power of dis-
cursive conditions need not lead to an impasse amounting to an equivalence of 
orthodox and heterodox interpretations of narratives. Instead of denying the pos-
sibility of distinguishing between true and false narratives, or of right and wrong 
ones, considerations about the role and function of the mass media in contempo-
rary societies might be helpful in a situation in which examining the truthfulness 
of stories is hardly possible. The media work in terms of distinguishing between 
information and non-information.30 It is clearly evident that any account of an 
extraordinary event fulfills the condition of providing information, but a hetero-
dox view participates as a parasite feeding on the orthodox account. The differ-
ences between the orthodox account and the heterodox one is, in itself, a new 
piece of information, its truth or falsehood notwithstanding. The media, accord-
ing to Niklas Luhmann, do not disseminate true accounts of what happens in the 
world: 
 
Although truth or at least the presupposition of truthfulness is indispensable for news and 
reports, the mass media do not follow the code true/not true, but even in their cognitive 
realm of programming they follow the code information/non-information. One can discern 
this on the circumstance, that untruthfulness is not used as a value worthy reflection. For 
news and reports it is not important (or at most during inquiries which are not conveyed to 
the public) that untruthfulness can be excluded. Differently than in science, information is 
not examined in a way that a truthful way allows for excluding untruthfulness before 
truthful statements can be proclaimed.31 
 
                                                           
30  This statement refers to Niklas Luhmann’s analysis of the functioning of mass media 
― cf. Luhmann 2017: 28. 
31  “Obwohl Wahrheit oder doch Wahrheitsvermutung für Nachrichten und Berichte un-
erläßlich sind, folgen die Massenmedien nicht dem Code wahr/unwahr, sondern selbst 
in ihrem kognitiven Programmbereich dem Code Information/Nichtinformation. Das 
erkennt man daran, daß Unwahrheit nicht als Reflexionswert benutzt wird. Für Nach-
richten und Berichte ist es nicht (oder allenfalls im Zuge von nicht mitgemeldeten Re-
cherchen) wichtig, daß die Unwahrheit ausgeschlossen werden kann. Anders als in der 
Wissenschaft wird die Information nicht derart durchreflektiert, daß auf wahre Weise 
festgestellt werden muß, daß Unwahrheit ausgeschlossen werden kann, bevor Wahr-
heit behauptet wird.” − ibid.: 52−53. 
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Mass media provide information about society, for society. Like any other sys-
tem in the modern world, the media reduces the complexity of the world accord-
ing to principles pertaining to their respective system. The media’s governing 
system (or “code,” as Luhmann puts it) is the distinction between information 
and non-information. This difference alone does not enable us to distinguish be-
tween true and false information, because anything “new,” regardless of whether 
or not it is correct, still counts as information. 
The point is that much of our knowledge of the world stems from the media 
system, and that this system has two sides: its thematic side, which is oriented 
towards the world and provides information about it, and its operative side, 
which usually remains concealed and is not generally visible in media-based 
communication. Any mediated information is selected and reworked by the me-
dia system. This gives rise to the general suspicion that the news is always some-
how manipulated and that “certain interests” underpin the functioning of media 
system.32 This suspicion itself is also interesting and informative and would 
make a good subject for media communication. The idea that our knowledge of 
the world is manipulated to our detriment is a side effect of the media system be-
cause it is easy to understand that information is always necessarily processed by 
people who cannot be totally neutral or objective.  
In contrast to the information selected and spread via the media, it is some-
times tempting to consider “what is left out,” or “what is not said,” that is: the al-
ternative side of the information selected. This is a current issue regarding con-
temporary politics and diplomacy in relation to Russia: any information that is 
spread is said to be motivated by self-interest. One need only think of “news” 
about current affairs: something is communicated by the media and, as a stand-
ard reaction, the audience and political commentators focus in on the source, 
thus questioning its bias and in so doing already unwillingly casting a shadow of 
doubt. This happens symmetrically: if the Russian media report something, then 
people who are critical of the Russian government tend to treat the information 
skeptically (something is left out, the report is not accurate…), but the same 
thing takes place when a Russian audience judges reports (preferably about Rus-
sia) issued by “Western” media. Both audiences assume some influence on the 
part of politics on the media system in their respective countries (“or spheres of 
                                                           
32  Boris Groys has generalized this idea of suspicion and extended it from the world of 
media to a philosophical description of the interrelation of subjects in the modern 
world, cf. Groys 2000: 19−54. This general suspicion of manipulation, though, is irre-
ducible—a media company can by no means prove that no manipulation is going on 
and this stimulates further communication; cf. Luhmann 2017: 56−57. 
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influence”) and question the “objectivity” of that media. This general suspicion 
towards mediated information is entertained not only towards state-controlled 
media (the general attitude towards Russian news), but also towards media 
which are not overtly under the tutelage of the state apparatus. “Manufactured 
consent” inevitably arouses suspicion and provokes conspiracy speculations.33 
Because of how the media system functions, any information communicated 
can be accounted for by the vested interests of the source, as well as the catena-
tion of orthodox and heterodox narratives that are pertinent to the media as our 
main source of cultural knowledge. If the media contribute to the dissemination 
of orthodox narratives, then any heterodox version already counts as “infor-
mation” (as something new and “interesting”) and can, therefore, be communi-
cated in the media system.  
Nevertheless, even though the media significantly construct our reality and 
contribute to our knowledge of the world,34 the fundamental rules and nature of 
the media system preclude false information in the long run. To put it bluntly: if 
heterodox narratives were more than merely interesting versions of the world, if 
their truth claims could be taken seriously, then these alternative narratives 
would be of too great a value to the media to remain neglected. Instead, the me-
dia would pounce on the narrative in question and appropriate it, because it 
would be a “breaking news” story in the true and literal sense of those words. 
This inherent self-correction of the media system precludes that overtly false 
narratives can, in the long term, spread via the media system. 
It is in this respect that “traditional” mass media differ from the “new” social 
media: via the latter, not only can anything be stated and communicated, there is 
often also no social responsibility for the communication in the sense that the 
sender represents a media enterprise (broadcasting company, media house, news 
agency and the like). This lack of responsibility corresponds to the annulment of 
self-reference on the part of the sender (which manifests itself in the use of ava-
tars, nicknames and pseudonyms). If there is no “palpable” self-reference, one 
cannot even speak of a system.35 In contrast, the traditional media count as rather 
complex systems36 operating in the real-world and are, therefore, intrinsically 
                                                           
33  Cf. the analysis of right- and left-wing conspiracy thinking in the U.S. in Marmura 
2014. 
34   Cf. Luhmann 2017: 83. 
35  Or only of an “odd” system in which the established link between sender and receiver 
significantly differs from face-to-face interactions, due to the circumstance that one 
does not know the identity of the disguised interlocutors. 
36  Their complexity even corresponds to the amount of self-reference in the system. 
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tied thereto. Therefore, media companies—no matter which interests lurk in the 
background—must be distinguished from internet “troll armies”: although these 
armies might have a great influence in reality, their lack of transparency and 





Why conspiracy theories “flourish” can easily be explained by way of how the 
media system functions. It prefers complex and mysterious cases because they 
easily attract publicity over an extended period of time, particularly if it seems 
that there is still something left unsolved.  
Unresolved events (“mysterious cases”) are not just interesting to the media. 
The history of conspiracy theories very clearly shows that the political system 
can also make good use of them. If something unusual or harmful simply hap-
pens by chance, then nobody can be blamed for it. Conspiracy narratives, on the 
other hand, imbue a given story with suspected responsibilities which are diffi-
cult to rebut, for example when European and American politicians are accused 
of influencing the price of oil and gas, as mentioned previously. In the field of 
politics, thus, conspiracy narratives serve to identify a scapegoat who can be 
blamed for undesirable effects or events.  
Conspiracy narratives, like factual narratives, must not be confused with ex-
plicit lies to the extent that, in many cases, the person professing believes in 
them and, moreover, he/she does not primarily aim to deceive the audience. The 
amount of truth in them is generally difficult to examine, so that it is very diffi-
cult to ascertain their ontological status on the vertical axis—the relationship of a 
given text to the world. The horizontal axis of the narrative situation links the 
narrative discourse with discourses pertinent to societies and cultures. The ex-
ample of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion shows that these horizontal relation-
ships between narratives and cultural discourses can sometimes even outweigh 
the vertical referential axis, so that a narrative is held to be true even though its 
falsehood has been proven comprehensively.  
When viewed from a systems theory perspective, conspiracy narratives fit 
the media system and provide a certain degree of mediated “knowledge” of the 
                                                           
37  The moment at which social media are used by media companies, they, of course be-
long to the social system of the companies, whereas state-sponsored troll armies do 
not belong to the system of mass media, but rather to the political system or to an or-
ganization. 
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world, their truth or falsehood notwithstanding. Conspiracy narratives should al-
so be regarded as an inevitable side effect of contemporary society in its depend-
ency on the media as a pervasive system—not because of the conspiracy itself, 
but because of the way the media work. Whenever information is provided, it is 
to be expected that someone will always question the “completeness” of the in-
formation and suspect that something is being withheld. In this way, conspiracy 
narratives fill in the gaps, occupying up the shady side of our contemporary, me-
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Conspiracy theories are often considered as being a danger to modern societies; 
they weaken trust in institutions by spreading dangerously false information. 
Apart from such a pessimistic view on the phenomena, this chapter tries to show 
that conspiracy theories are an irreducible side effect of the mass media. Due to 
their intrinsic entwinedness with the media system, one should not put great 
hope in the possibility of eliminating conspiracy theories but rather regard them 
as an interesting cultural phenomenon. This chapter votes to not qualify conspi-
racy theories automatically as fictional discourse, but as factual discourse whose 
truth claims are difficult to verify. Different perspectives of conspiracy narra-
tions—syntactic, semantic and pragmatic—are discussed. Pragmatic aspects and 
considerations from media theory can be deemed of primary importance for an 
analysis of conspiracy theories which does not lend itself to alarmism. 
 
The News and What Is Behind It: Social 
Disorder and Conspirational Reading in Mid-




conspiracy theory; conspirational mode of reading; Faddei Bulgarin; Diary of a 
Madman; The Demons; War and Peace 
 
 
“The human mind cannot grasp the causes of events in their completeness, but 
the desire to find those causes is implanted in the human soul.”1 Tolstoy’s Voina 
i mir (War and Peace), from which this quotation has been taken, can be read as 
an exploratory enquiry into the world’s complexity in post-revolutionary times; a 
time when the novel, due to its multilayeredness and pluriperspectivity, seemed 
to be the only medium fit to analyze and to counter monocausal, misleading, and 
biased explanations of historical events. Tolstoy famously challenged historical 
writing in general, and French historiography in particular, rejecting the common 
cult of the “great man” and replacing it with his own, rather mythicized, under-
standing of “national spirit.” Voina i mir is not a novel about conspiracy theories, 
of course, but it is a novel about the epistemological and communicational pat-
terns that can lead to their emergence. One should also bear in mind that, in the 
novel’s “Epilogue,” the main character Pierre Bezukhov is involved in the begin-
nings of what would eventually become a real conspiracy and culminate in the 
Decembrist revolt of 1825.  
                                                           
1  Tolstoy 2010: 1062. «Для человеческого ума недоступна совокупность причин 
явлений. Но потребность отыскивать причины вложена в душу человека». − Tol-
stoi 1940: 66.  
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Faddei Bulgarin and “Jewish Postal Service” 
 
On the most general level, Tolstoy’s novel was primarily concerned with under-
standing Russia—its society, its history and its historical fate—like most of 
Russia’s serious prose writing during the era of high realism. For Tolstoy and his 
peers, the novel was a mode of gaining knowledge and seeking the truth about 
Russia in a time when no other all-encompassing, “thick” descriptions of society 
were available due to heavy censorship restrictions on all forms of non-fictional 
sociological and political analysis. However, the novel was of course not the 
most apt instrument for comprehension where the social reality of everyday life 
was concerned, for the obvious reason of both its fictionality and its detachment 
from real-life time, space, and people. No Russian reader would expect informa-
tion about recent incidents in her town, on her street or in remote parts of the 
world from a novel. The novel would not be the first port of call for such re-
quests, since there was journalism for at least the 1820s onwards. Although a 
proper “mass-circulation press” did not emerge in the Russian Empire before the 
1860s, the newspaper as a source of information gained some relevance as early 
as in the late 1820s and 1830s with Severnaia pchela (The Northern Bee), then 
the only private newspaper authorized to publish political news.2 Faddei Bulga-
rin (1789−1859), the owner of Severnaia pchela, was also a prolific writer. His 
novel Ivan Vyzhigin, published in 1829, was a huge success and was translated 
into several foreign languages. The recipe for success was the adaptation of the 
model of the French picaro-novel Gil Blas to Russian imperial realities. Bulgarin 
kept the satirical tone and caustically mocked the weaknesses of Russian society 
of the time—from the Belorussian provinces to Moscow and further afield to the 
very outskirts of the European parts of the Empire. Bulgarin himself came from 
the Belorussian provinces and was a descendant of the landed gentry of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a young man in Wilno he started writing 
for Polish newspapers. After moving to St. Petersburg in 1819 he launched sev-
eral publishing projects, the most important of which was notably Severnaia 
pchela. Other than what is suggested by its romantic name, Severnaia pchela 
was notorious for publishing not only sublime pollen, carefully collected from 
the blossoms of contemporary arts and thought, but everything—from political 
news to talk of the town, gossip and rumors. 
Bulgarin was at the core of news in an age during which political stability 
was seen as being threatened by dark forces, organized in conspiracies. Russia 
during the reign of Nikolai I, was, of course, post-December Russia, but it was 
                                                           
2  Cf. McReynolds 1991: 20. 
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also post-1789, post-1801, and in a way still post Time of Troubles and post-
pugachevshchina-Russia. Nikolai’s reign was marked by a paranoid fear of con-
spiracies; the public sphere—if one can even speak of something like a public 
sphere at this time—was subjected to a whole system of measures the aim of 
which was to prevent the dissemination of seditious ideas. Conspiracy—and it 
was clear for Nikolai and his counselors that conspiracies lay behind the French 
Revolution, the murder of Pavel I in 1801, and the uprising of the Decembrists 
of 1825—was only possible if people had the means to conspire, i.e., to ex-
change ideas and information. The most efficient way to not let this happen was 
to control the press. 
Bulgarin was, by all accounts, a professional in the detection, transmission, 
and disclosure of information. Notoriously, he was also a prolific informer to the 
“Third Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancellery,” and the literary 
circles of St. Petersburg despised him deeply for this.3 In an epigram, Pushkin 
ridiculed him as “Vidocque Figliarin,” referring to the infamous French criminal 
and chief of Police Eugène François Vidocq, thus pointing to Bulgarin’s precari-
ous position at the point at which news was produced, transmitted, and often dis-
torted and instrumentalized.4 It is precisely Bulgarin’s practical expertise in 
these matters that makes his text so instructive for an analysis of the link be-
tween conspiracy theories and the media in early to mid-nineteenth-century Rus-
sia. There is a curious passage in Ivan Vyzhigin in which the narrator speaks 
about the role of information and of those responsible for its transmission: 
 
In the evening, Josel, the Jew, made his appearance, who rented all the mills and kartch-
mas on the property. This Josel was the general agent for the whole house, privy coun-
sellor both of master and servants, walking newspaper, and relater of all political news, 
and scandalous anecdotes within a circle of a hundred miles round, and teller of every-
thing good and bad.5 
 
Obviously, this episode takes place in the Pale of Settlement, in the Belorussian 
provinces that had until recently fallen under Polish-Lithuanian reign and where 
                                                           
3  Cf. Reitblat 2016: 12–14, 123–62. 
4  Pushkin 1948. 
5  Bulgarin 1831: 17. «Вечером являлся Иосель, Жид, арендатор мельниц и корчем 
во всем имении. Этот Иосель был всеобщим стряпчим целого дома, тайным по-
веренным господ и слуг, олицетворенною газетою, или источником всех поли-
тических сношений, соблазнительных анекдотов, в окружности двадцати миль, 
и пересказчиком всего доброго и худого». − Bulgarin 1829: 29. 
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the landowners belonged to the ethnically Polish landed nobility. Josel’s position 
as a “personalized newspaper” is, at least for the narrator of the novel (that is, 
Ivan Vyzhigin), highly problematic since Josel is a Jew and holds the monopoly 
over news transmission in this part of the Empire. The “Jew” in general, as the 
narrator explains, is so conscious of the high value of information that he uses 
Vodka to “pick … out of the peasants and servants all the secrets, all the wants, 
all the connections and relations of their masters, which makes the Jews the real 
rulers of the actual landholders, and subjects to Jewish control all affairs.”6 The 
landowners, for their part, are blissfully ignorant of what is going on:  
 
The landlords in these provinces have, in general, no idea of business, and receive their 
commercial information solely from the Jews. Throughout a whole government, there are 
only a few persons who take in newspapers, and they merely for notices of law-suits, and 
for the convenience of reference, if the conversation should turn upon politics.7 
 
The landowners depend exclusively on what the Jews tell them. What we have 
here is, of course, not yet a conspiracy theory, but it is the germ of or the allusion 
to one—the idea that Jews, perceived as mobile and crafty, stick together and 
tend to rule secretly over those among whom they live.8  
 
In general, the greater part of the small country-gentry regard the Jews as the best-in-
formed people in everything, even in politics; and, in place of subscribing to a newspaper, 
expend the money which would otherwise be applied for that purpose, on punch and wine, 
and the time which would be lost in reading, they prefer to spend in dialogues with the 
Jews on the state of affairs all over the world.9 
                                                           
6  Ibid.: 57. «Он посредством водки выведывает у крестьян и служителей все 
тайны, все нужды, все связи и отношения их господ, что делает жидов настоя-
щими владельцами помещиков и подчиняет жидовскому влиянию все дела и все 
обстоятельства». − Bulgarin 1829: 98–99. 
7  Bulgarin 1831: 62. «Помещики в тех странах вообще не имеют никакого понятия 
о торговых делах, и получают коммерческие известия только чрез Жидов. В це-
лой губернии едва несколько человек выписывают газеты, и то единственно для 
тяжебных объявлений и для запаса к нелепым толкам о политике». − Bulgarin 
1829: 108–09. 
8  For more about Bulgarin’s anti-Semitism and his novel Ivan Vyzhigin, see Katz 2007: 
413–20. 
9  Bulgarin 1831: 66. «Вообще бòльшая часть мелких помещиков почитают жидов 
сведущими во всех делах, даже в политике, и вместо того, чтобы подписываться 
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The novel depicts the problem of informational isolation in the backward pro-
vinces of the Empire in a satirical manner. For Bulgarin, the only remedy could 
be provided by newspapers—and the money that one is required to pay for them. 
According to him, it was highly dangerous to leave the sensitive field of infor-
mation to the Jews since, in his opinion, they used it recklessly to exploit pea-
sants and landowners. As is well known, Bulgarin’s novel is full of anti-Semitic 
stereotypes,10 but the emphasis he puts on the problem of communication has 
been widely neglected to date.11 In fact, the ‘Polish’ regions of the Empire are 
familiar with a phenomenon, called “poczta żydowska” (Jewish postal service), 
traces of which can be found in the works of eminent Polish writers, such as 
Józef Ignacy Kraszewski or Adam Mickiewicz.12 As Aleksander Hertz pointed 
out, the Jews became an “instrument of the distribution of news,” which was all 
the more important given the isolated existence of local communities in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century.13 This was a side effect of the Jews’ 
social and legal situation in the Belorussian and Ukrainian provinces; merchants 
were more mobile than peasants and landowners as a result of the requirements 
                                                           
на газеты, деньги, которые надлежало бы заплатить за них, они употребляют на 
пунш и вино, а время, которое должно б было терять на чтение, проводят в раз-
говорах с Жидами о всемирных происшествиях». − Bulgarin 1829: 116–17. 
10  Weisskopf ascribes them to the “tradition of Polish anti-Semitism” (2012: 48). How-
ever, Bulgarin could have borrowed this idea from one of the anti-Semitic pamphlets 
that were already circulating in the early nineteenth Century (e.g., de Bonald’s “Sur 
les Juifs,” 1806); he could have picked it up during his childhood years in the Belarus-
ian provinces, but he could as well have been inspired by Russian sources: None other 
than the great poet Gavrila Derzhavin wrote in a report on the living conditions of 
Jews in Belorussia (1800) that, “predestined to rule over others,” the Jews who now 
are “humiliated” and must live under “foreign yoke” nevertheless “dominate those 
among whom they live” («Древле предопределенный народ владычествовать, ны-
не унижен до крайности, и в то самое время, когда пресмыкается, под игом чуж-
дым, по большой части властвует над теми, между которыми обитает». − Der-
zhavin 1878: 276). Derzhavin is equally fascinated and frightened by the Jews’ pur-
ported ability to “instantly communicate everything among them” («тотчас все 
сообщают друг другу» − ibid.: 287). 
11  Contextualizing the depiction of Jews in Ivan Vyzhigin, Elena Katz points out that 
Jews in fact often served as “intermediaries between the Orthodox Belorussian pea-
sants and the Polish Catholic landowner.” − Katz 2012: 419. 
12  Hertz 2014: 288. 
13  Ibid.: 291. 
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of their professional activities. It is highly telling that Bulgarin links the Jews’ 
supposed proficiency in information transmission to their alleged tendency to 
conspire—by then already a common motif in anti-Semitic discourse. Those who 
control the flux of information are ultimately the secret rulers of society—which 
is why, following Bulgarin’s logic, newspapers are crucial and that is why his 
Severnaia pchela is crucial as a weapon of Enlightenment.14 Newspapers are the 
“good,” uncorrupted, and unbiased way of passing information, so to speak. 
There is a structural link between Enlightenment strategies of demystification 
and uncovering of hidden intentions on the one hand and the emerging aware-
ness of news transmission’s problematic effects on the other. 
 
 
Newspaper Reading and “Paranoiac Overdetermination”  
in Gogol’s “Diary of a Madman” 
 
In order to assess this argument’s validity it is useful to take a closer look at the 
case of one specific reader of Severnaia pchela: 
 
I’ve been reading the little Bee. A crazy lot, those French! What do they want? My God, 
I’d like to give them all a good flogging. There was a very good account of a ball written 
by a landowner from Kursk. They certainly know how to write, those landowners from 
Kursk.15 
 
Poprishchin, the hero and narrator of Gogol’s “Zapiski sumasshedshego” (“Dia-
ry of a Madman”), has a hard time in the department in which he works as a 
scribe. He is criticized by his superior for putting wrong characters, numbers, or 
dates in the documents that he is copying. He is shocked when he overhears a 
conversation between two dogs on a Saint Petersburg street; however, he is less 
shocked by the fact that dogs can speak and he mentions accounts from news-
papers16 reporting incidents like a fish uttering two words in a “strange lan-
                                                           
14  Analyzing Bulgarin’s anti-Semitic discourse, Mikhail Weisskopf speaks of a combi-
nation of “a loyalist pathos with the remains of eighteenth-century Enlightenment tra-
dition.” − Weisskopf 2012: 146.  
15  Gogol 2005: 177. «Читал Пчёлку. Эка глупый народ французы! Ну, чего хотят 
они? Взял бы, ей богу, их всех да и перепорол розгами! Там же читал очень при-
ятное изображение бала, описанное курским помещиком. Курские помещики 
хорошо пишут». − Gogol’ 1938: 196. 
16  «Читал … в газетах» − Gogol’ 1938: 195. 
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guage”17 or two cows coming into a shop to order a pound of tea.18 What really 
troubles him is the fact that the dogs talk about some letters that they were ex-
changing, that is, their ability to write:  
 
I’d stake my salary that that was what the dog said. Never in my life have I heard of a dog 
that would write. Only noblemen know how to write correctly. Of course, you’ll always 
find some readers or shopkeepers, even serfs, who can scribble away: but they write like 
machines – no commas or full stops, and simply no idea of style.19 
 
What unsettles Poprishchin so much is, it seems, his impending loss of status. As 
a nobleman, he insists on his right to maintain a privileged status in a society, at 
least symbolically, as this position is becoming more and more precarious. If 
birth is no longer the only criterion for social success, then some social climber 
might one day challenge him for his job in the department: “Does he [the head of 
the department] think I’m the son of a commoner, or tailor, or a non-commis-
sioned officer? I’m a gentleman!”20 he insists desperately. 
Poprishchin’s mind is hyper-focused, which makes him see connections 
between things that are remote from one another and which “normal” people 
would not realize. How do these things enter into his mind? I would argue that 
this occurs through his reading of Severnaia pchela. In the fall of 1833, at the 
time during which the story is set, Severnaia pchela was covering the so-called 
“Spanish affairs.”21 There was a regular section that chronicled recent develop-
ments in this conflict about the succession to the throne of Spain, the first of the 
so-called “Carlist Wars.” The sources were mostly French newspapers.22 The un-
                                                           
17  Gogol 2005: 176. «Говорят, в Англии выплыла рыба, которая сказала два слова 
на таком странном языке, что ученые уже три года стараются определить и еще 
до сих пор ничего не открыли». − Gogol’ 1938: 195. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Gogol 2005: 176. «Да чтоб я не получил жалованья! Я еще в жизни не слыхивал, 
чтобы собака могла писать. Правильно писать может только дворянин. Оно ко-
нечно, некоторые и купчики-конторщики и даже крепостной народ пописывает 
иногда; но их писание большею частью механическое: ни запятых, ни точек, ни 
слога». − Gogol’ 1938: 195. 
20  Gogol 2005: 179. «Я разве из каких-нибудь разночинцев, из портных, или из ун-
тер-офицерских детей? Я дворянин». − Gogol’ 1938: 198. 
21  Cf. Zolotusskii 1987: 145−46.  
22  Among others: Journal de Paris, Journal des Débats, Mémorial des Pyrenées, Moni-
teur—as quoted in Severnaia pchela from 2 December 1833 (p. 1099). 
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clear situation surrounding the succession to the throne—a fundamental threat to 
the stability of monarchies—makes Poprishchin start to meditate about his own 
identity:  
 
Perhaps I don’t really know who I am at all? History has lots of examples of that sort of 
thing: there was some fairly ordinary man, not what you’d call a nobleman, but simply a 
tradesman or even a serf, and suddenly he discovered he was a great lord or a sovereign. 
So if a peasant can turn into someone like that, what would a nobleman become? Say, for 
example, I suddenly appeared in a general’s uniform, with an epaulette on my left shoul-
der and a blue sash across my chest – what then? What tune would my beautiful young 
lady sing then? And what would Papa, our Director, say? Oh, he’s so ambitious! But I 
noticed at once he’s a mason, no doubt about that, although he pretends to be this, that and 
the other; he only puts out two fingers to shake hands with. But surely, can’t I be promot-
ed to Governor General or Commissary or something or other this very minute? And I 
should like to know why I’m a titular councillor [sic]? Why precisely a titular counsel-
lor?23 
 
His assumed enemy, the director of his department and the father of his would-
be beloved, must be a Freemason, of course, since Poprishchin is already com-
pletely absorbed by the conspirational mode of thought—‘nothing is as it seems 
to be, and sinister forces are plotting against him.’ In the above-quoted fragment, 
conspiracy and the fear of the loss of status converge. If his supervisor is a Free-
mason and if Grisha Otrep’ev, the False Dmitry, was the son of Ivan IV, then he, 
Poprishchin, might also be someone other than a miserable titularnyi sovetnik—
which was his grade in the imperial table of ranks (Gogol himself was quite un-
                                                           
23  Gogol 2005 187−88. «Может быть я сам не знаю, кто я таков. Ведь сколько 
примеров по истории: какой-нибудь простой, не то уже чтобы дворянин, а прос-
то какой-нибудь мещанин или даже крестьянин − и вдруг открывается, что он 
какой-нибудь вельможа, а иногда даже и государь. Когда из мужика да иногда 
выходит эдакое, что же из дворянина может выйти? Вдруг, например, я вхожу в 
генеральском мундире: у меня и на правом плече эполета и на левом плече эпо-
лета, через плечо голубая лента − что? как тогда запоет красавица моя? что ска-
жет и сам папа, директор наш? О, это большой честолюбец! Это масон, непре-
менно масон, хотя он и прикидывается таким и эдаким, но я тотчас заметил, что 
он масон: он если даст кому руку, то высовывает только два пальца. Да разве я 
не могу быть сию же минуту пожалован генерал-губернатором, или интендан-
том, или там другим каким-нибудь? Мне бы хотелось знать, отчего я титуляр-
ный советник? Почему именно титулярный советник?» − Gogol’ 1938: 206. 
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happy with being only a kolezhskii assessor,24 but this was still one grade higher 
than Poprishchin). The issue of samozvanstvo (imposture) was a popular topic at 
the time: it was none other than Bulgarin who published a novel about the tribu-
lations of the “False Dmitry” Grisha Otrepev in 1830.25 The reigning dynasty, 
the Romanovs, had come to power in the aftermath of the Time of Troubles. 
Tsar Nikolai I’s ascent to the throne had been overshadowed by a short period of 
confusion that triggered the December uprising of 1825—the conspirators 
thought that Nikolai’s elder brother Konstantin was the legitimate heir to the 
throne. They did not know that the latter had renounced his claim in an unpub-
lished note. The most prominent example of a usurper and a magical rise from a 
modest origin, albeit a noble one, up to the highest scale of political power was 
of course Napoleon.26 Read against this backdrop, the “Spanish affairs,” so meti-
culously reported by Severnaia pchela, can be seen as an allegory of the political 
order’s general instability in post-1789 Europe. 
Poprishchin loses his orientation; he can no longer be sure of his position in 
society. Even his superior position as a human being is called into question in a 
world in which dogs correspond with each other, cows order tea, and bees collect 
and disseminate news. His imaginary attempt to reestablish order by the tradi-
tional Russian measures, so dear to the landed gentry (“Those French! … I’d like 
to give them all a good flogging”),27 is of course nothing more than pathetic, 
given the scope of the crisis that struck ancien régime Europe. 
Poprishchin is not prepared for a world in which one is confronted with 
events from remote countries on a daily basis; he reads the global news through 
the prism of his own individual situation—and vice versa. At the same time, this 
is the world, where political order is put in jeopardy by conspiracies and in-
trigues. Fears over the loss of status and fears about political instability, induced 
by dark conspiracies, come together. In fact, reading the issues of Severnaia 
pchela from the fall of 1833, one is prompted to note that the way Bulgarin’s 
newspaper was covering the events did not inspire much confidence—the re-
spective articles are all based on accounts taken from other sources in the style 
of “According to French newspapers …,” “As the Messager related in its latest 
edition … .” The editors often explicitly point out that one cannot be entirely 
sure about the verisimilitude of the reported “facts.” These “facts”’ are an end-
                                                           
24  Cf.: Gogol’ 1940: 343. 
25  Faddei Bulgarin. Dmitrii Samozvanets. Istoricheskii roman, 4 vols, Sanktpeterburg 
1830. 
26  Zolotusskii 1987: 148. 
27  See above, footnote 15. 
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less series of intrigues, murders, executions, confiscations. The protagonists bear 
exotic names, often all too familiar to readers of romantic literature, such as Don 
Carlos, Queen Isabella, Don Miguel, Don Pedro Pastor, Donna Maria. All this 
fires Poprishchin’s semiotic imagination and nothing is there to stop the flames 
from spreading. This confusion calls for a great, all-encompassing disentangle-
ment and he eventually understands: 
 
There is a king of Spain. He has been found at last. That king is me. I only discovered this 
today. Frankly, it all came to me in a flash.28 
 
However, we, the readers, know that nothing is as it seems, of course: the Great 
Inquisitor approaching Poprishchin—“a mere tool of the English,”29 as the well-
trained newspaper-reader Poprishchin assumes—is obviously none other than a 
keeper in a madhouse. We know this, since we understand the semiotic structure 
of Poprishchin’s diary—the author, Gogol, conspires with his readers behind his 
protagonist’s back. But can we really be sure that we are immune to the “flash of 
lightning” that makes us think we understood what everything is all about (while 
it is evident to some invisible author/reader that this very flash of lightning is the 
most ridiculous aberration possible)? We are never safe from falling prey to the 
conspirational mode of reading the world, as long as there might be others out 
there with their own undisclosed intentions—e.g., dogs—who will not admit to 
their sinister dealings, even when Poprishchin confronts them (“Tell me every-
thing you know.”).30 All he can do is jot down: “Dogs are extraordinarily shrewd 
[literally: “extraordinary politicians”], and notice everything, every step you 
take.”31 
Poprishchin progressively adopts the “paranoiac overdetermination” that 
Svetlana Boym described as one of the basic features of “conspirational think-
ing.”32 This formula matches the psychosemiotic core of Poprishchin’s problem 
perfectly: from a certain point onwards, he correlates everything to the “Spanish 
affairs”—and then to himself. In this context, it is highly instructive to see how 
                                                           
28  Gogol 2005: 189. «В Испании есть король. Он отыскался. Этот король я. Именно 
только сегодня об этом узнал я. Признаюсь, меня вдруг как будто молнией осве-
тило». − Gogol’ 1938: 207. 
29  Gogol 2005: 195. «орудие англичанина» − Gogol’ 1938: 214. 
30  Gogol 2005: 181. «расскажи мне всё, что знаешь» − Gogol’ 1938: 200. 
31  Gogol 2005: 181. «Она [собака] чрезвычайный политик: все замечает, все шаги 
человека». − Gogol’ 1938: 200. 
32  Boym 1999: 97. 
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Gogol’s contemporary, Vladimir Odoevskii, came to a quite similar formula 
when analyzing the semiotics of insanity in his article, entitled “Kto suma-
sshedshie?” (“Who Are the Insane?”), published in the journal Biblioteka dlia 
chteniia (Library for Reading) in 1836.  
 
In insane people, all the notions, all the feelings, are gathered in one focus; in them the 
particular power of one specific idea draws in everything that belongs to that idea from all 
over the world; it acquires the ability, so to speak, to rip off the objects parts that are con-
nected to each other for a healthy person, and to concentrate them in a kind of symbol … 
We call a person insane when we see that he finds connections between objects that we 
think are impossible.33 
 
Gogol greatly appreciated the literary representation of madness in Odoevskii’s 
stories about artists.34 Gogol had initially planned to make the protagonist of 
“Zapiski sumasshedshego” a musician; then his story would have remained in 
the framework of the romantic paradigm of ‘inspirational insanity.’ The shift to a 
civil servant and copyist was also a shift to the more general (and more realistic) 
topics of semiotics, scripture, and mediality. 
Gogol was convinced that we are lost in a world of signs and that there are 
no guidelines whatsoever to help us out of this mess. In modern times (and Go-
gol’s story is of course about modern times) this problem is the problem of a 
reality constructed on the basis of information obtained by way of mass commu-
nication. Russian literary fiction had been dealing with this problem, to greater 
and lesser degrees, from the 1820s onwards. A particularly interesting case in 
this regard is Gogol’s novel Mertvye dushi (Dead Souls, 1842). The inhabitants 
of the town of N followed Bulgarin’s advice and subscribed to newspapers: 
 
At that time all our landowners, officials, merchants, shopmen, and all our literate folk, as 
well as the illiterate, had become—at least for all of eight years—inveterate politicians. 
                                                           
33  «В сумасшедших все понятия, все чувства, собираются в один фокус; у них 
частная сила одной какой-нибудь мысли втягивает в себя все, принадлежащее к 
этой мысли, изо всего мира; получает способность, так сказать, отрывать части 
от предметов, тесно соединенных между собою для здорового человека, и со-
средоточивать их в какой-то символ… Мы называем человека сумасшедшим, 
когда видим, что он находит такие соотношения между предметами, которые 
нам кажутся невозможными». − Odoevskii 1836: 61−62. 
34  Cf. Mann 2012: 358−59. Cf. Gogol’s letter to I. I. Dmitriev, 30 November 1832 in 
Gogol’ 1940: 247−48. 
46 | Herlth  
The Moscow News and the Son of the Fatherland were read through implacably and 
reached the last reader in shreds and tatters that were of no use whatsoever for any 
practical purposes. Instead of such questions as “What price did you get for a measure of 
oats, my friend?” or “Did you take advantage of the first snow we had yesterday?” people 
would ask, “And what do they say in the papers? Have they let Napoleon slip away from 
that island again, by any chance?” The merchants were very much afraid of this con-
tingency, inasmuch as they had utter faith in the prediction of a certain prophet who had 
been sitting in jail for three years by now. This prophet had come no one knew whence, in 
bast sandals and an undressed sheepskin that reeked to high heaven of spoilt fish, and had 
proclaimed that Napoleon was the Antichrist and was being kept on a chain of stone 
behind six walls and beyond seven seas but that later on he would rend his chain and gain 
possession of all the world.35 
 
In Bulgarin’s logic, newspapers were an instrument of counter-conspiracy, her-
alds of Enlightenment, so to speak. What Gogol shows in Mertvye dushi is quite 
the reverse: the reading of newspapers alienates the town of N’s inhabitants from 
their everyday life. Instead of dealing with issues that would really concern 
them, they have to digest disconnected bits of information that do not make any 
sense. It is left up to them to “concentrate” them into “some kind of symbol”—
which is why they come up with absurd theories about Napoleon being the Anti-
christ who is aspiring to world domination. 
The modern world, according to Gogol, is marked by “politics,” newspapers 
and the effect that is inevitably triggered by the merging of politics, print culture 
and a public sphere under rigid censorship control: conspiracy theories. In Go-
gol’s Dead Souls, newspapers are torn to pieces that are “of no use whatsoever.” 
Their material defectiveness reflects the insecure status of the world-view that is 
                                                           
35  Gogol 1996: 205. «В это время все наши помещики, чиновники, купцы, сидельцы 
и всякий грамотный и даже неграмотный народ сделались, по крайней мере на 
целые восемь лет, заклятыми политиками. ‘Московские Ведомости’ и ‘Сын Оте-
чества’ зачитывались немилосердно и доходили к последнему чтецу в кусочках, 
не годных ни на какое употребление. Вместо вопросов: ‘Почем, батюшка, про-
дали мерку овса? как воспользовались вчерашней порошей?’ говорили: ‘А что 
пишут в газетах, не выпустили ли опять Наполеона из острова?’ Купцы этого 
сильно опасались, ибо совершенно верили предсказанию одного пророка, уже 
три года сидевшего в остроге; пророк пришел неизвестно откуда, в лаптях и 
нагольном тулупе, страшно отзывавшемся тухлой рыбой, и возвестил, что Напо-
леон есть антихрист и держится на каменной цепи, за шестью стенами и семью 
морями, но после разорвет цепь и овладеет всем миром». − Gogol’ 1951: 206. 
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induced by, and becomes possible through, newspapers. The reader, as an eternal 
plot-maker (i.e., an “inveterate politician”), is trying to capture whatever sense 
may be around. If he relies solely on what newspapers tell him about the world, 
then he will inevitably slip into the conspirational mode of thought. This will 
make him prone to all sorts of manipulations.36 
 
 
Reading Between the Lines and the Conspirational Mindset  
in Dostoevsky’s The Demons 
 
When speaking about the nineteenth century, a time during which literary studies 
were only just developing and when there could be no question of any media 
studies of course, it is a good idea to turn to the expertise of writers and jour-
nalists if we wish to understand the effects of mass media on individual minds 
and on the public sphere. Fedor Dostoevsky was active in both fields and he had 
some experience in clandestine, perhaps even conspirational, activities dating 
back to the late 1840s when he attended the meetings of the Petrashevskii 
Circle.37 He was obsessively interested in the way revolutionaries made use of 
texts to propagate their ideas and to communicate among themselves. This is 
what his novel Besy (The Demons, 1871–72) is about. 
In Besy, the printed word is surrounded by an aura of significance that can 
mean both: highest value and the utmost suspicion. It can turn out to be abso-
lutely worthless as well. Stepan Verkhovenskii, the provincial town’s leading 
intellectual, suddenly understands this in a key scene of the novel when, during a 
charity event organized by the towns’ ladies and while holding a revolutionary 
leaflet in his hands, he exclaims: 
This is the shortest, the barest, the most simplehearted stupidity—c’est la bêtise dans son 
essence la plus pure, quelque chose comme un simple chimique. Were it just a drop more 
intelligently expressed, everyone would see at once all the poverty of this short stupidity. 
But now everyone stands perplexed: no one believes it can be so elementally stupid. ‘It 
                                                           
36  It is important to note in this context that Poprishchin was very much aware of the fact 
that the public sphere was under the control of censorship: After a visit to the theater, 
he jots down that he is surprised that the body of censors “let through” (“пропуска-
ла”) the play that he had seen. − Gogol’ 1938: 198. 
37  Frank 1979: 239–91. 
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can’t be that there’s nothing more to it,’ everyone says to himself, and looks for a secret, 
sees a mystery, tries to read between the lines—the effect is achieved!38 
 
This “between the lines” is precisely the point at which politics and the printed 
word meet in mid-nineteenth-century Russia and it was fertile ground for conspi-
racy theories. In 1848, the “Buturlin Committee,” an organ that supervised the 
censorship institutions during the last years of Nikolai’s reign, ordered that cen-
sors should no longer content themselves with a superficial control of the written 
texts, but that they should read “between the lines” as well.39 This new orienta-
tion was probably induced by a note on censorship that was addressed to the 
Tsar in 1848 by the poet and homme de lettres Petr A. Viazemskii. He suggested 
that the censors should not only search for “forbidden words” in what was actu-
ally written, rather they should also take the sense that is often “hidden under 
other words” into account. “In every word there is a hint. Our literature, and 
especially some of the Saint Petersburg journals are full of these hints and allu-
sions that are transparent for clever readers.”40 
The nameless provincial town in Besy is populated with these sorts of “clever 
readers” who know all too well that the seemingly harmless surface of the words 
might only be a cover-up for some hidden message. The novel is full of exam-
ples of this conspirational mode of reading. This mode of reading and interpre-
ting texts can easily be extended to a reading and interpreting of the world in 
which they live. However, the constant awareness that nothing is as it seems—
and this is the crucial point that the narrator makes in his account of the events—
makes it impossible for the inhabitants of the town to know what is really going 
                                                           
38  Dostoevsky 1995: 484. «Это самая обнаженная, самая простодушная, самая коро-
тенькая глупость, – c’est la bêtise dans son essence la plus pure, quelque chose 
comme un simple chimique. Будь это хоть каплю умнее высказано, и всяк увидал 
бы тотчас всю нищету этой коротенькой глупости. Но теперь все останавли-
ваются в недоумении: никто не верит, чтоб это было так первоначально глупо. 
‘Не может быть, чтоб тут ничего больше не было’, говорит себе всякий и ищет 
секрета, видит тайну, хочет прочесть между строчками, – эффект достигнут!» − 
Dostoevskii 1974: 371−72. 
39  «между строк» − Skabichevskii 1892: 344. 
40  Petr A. Viazemskii: [Zapiska o tsenzure]. «Смысл этих [запрещенных] слов … мо-
жет притаится под другими словами … На каждое слово есть обиняк», Viazem-
skii pointed out, «Литература наша и особенно некоторые из петербургских жур-
налов исполнены этих обиняков и намек<ов>, прозрачных для смышлeнных 
читателей». − in Gillel’son 1969: 324. 
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on. This is why it is so easy to deceive them. Stepan Verkhovenskii, who does 
not understand very much throughout the whole story, understands this at least: 
the generalization of suspicion is tantamount to its invalidation. The real conspi-
racy consists in this generalized suspicion that renders futile any attempt to make 
sense of the events that shook the provincial town. 
The narrator himself seems to be satisfied with Stepan Trofimovich’s finding 
that “nothing is behind all this.” We know that this was exactly Dostoevsky’s 
reaction when he witnessed the trial of Nechaev.41 This stance would be the most 
legitimate and the most appropriate, on condition that there indeed had been no 
conspiracy, if there were no sinister forces at work. However, the novel’s entire 
semiotic structure clearly indicates that there is in fact something behind all the 
events contained therein. 
Every value ascribed to the printed word can be and is in fact most often in-
validated: one example is the most ridiculous ageing writer Karmazinov who 
represents “literature,” another is Stepan Verkhovenskii who is taking a volume 
of de Tocqueville to read in the garden, all the while hiding a novel by the popu-
lar writer Paul de Kock in his pocket.42 Governor Lembke likes to assemble (to 
“glue”) models in his leisure time until his wife forbids it, allowing him to write 
a novel instead, “but on the quiet” (potikhon’ku).43 The climax of this meta-her-
meneutic grotesquery is the charity ball and the ominous “quadrille of literature” 
in the third and the “most difficult part of my chronicle,” as the narrator con-
fesses.44 One could hardly imagine, he writes, “a more pathetic, trite, giftless, 
and insipid allegory than this ‘quadrille of literature.’”45 It “consisted of six pairs 
                                                           
41  “I never would have imagined that this was all so simple, so straightforward. I do ad-
mit that until the very last moment I thought that there was something between the 
lines” (my translation – J. H.). «Никогда я не мог представить себе, чтобы это 
было так несложно, так однолинейно глупо. Нет, признаюсь, я до самого по-
следнего момента думал, что все-таки есть что-нибудь между строчками». − 
Dostoevskii 1975: 205. 
42  Dostoevskii 1974: 19. 
43  Dostoevsky 1995: 311; Dostoevskii 1974: 244. 
44  Dostoevsky 1995: 502. «Сам[ая] тяжел[ая] часть моей хроники» − Dostoevskii 
1974: 385. 
45  Dostoevsky 1995: 508. «Трудно было бы представить более жалкую, более 
пошлую, более бездарную и пресную аллегорию, как эта ‘кадриль литературы’». 
− Dostoevskii 1974: 389. 
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of pathetic maskers,” some of them representing letters (X and Z), one embo-
dying “honest Russian thought”:46 
 
“Honest Russian thought” was presented as a middle-aged gentleman in spectacles, tail-
coat, gloves, and—in fetters (real fetters). Under this thought’s arm was a briefcase contai-
ning some “dossier.” Out of his pocket peeked an unsealed letter from abroad, which 
included an attestation, for all who doubted it, of the honesty of “honest Russian thought.” 
All this was filled in orally by the ushers, since it was hardly possible to read a letter 
sticking out of someone’s pocket.47 
 
“What on earth is this?” one person asks. “Some sort of silliness,” a second per-
son answers. “Literature of some sort,” a third person supposes.48 But we already 
know what it is: It is a game of blowing up and popping balloons of significance. 
Тhe unfortunate “quadrille” ends abruptly when the news of an outbreak of fire 
in the Zarech’e district arrives. “There’s something behind this fire,”49 the crowd 
will suspect in the morning. They have no choice but to apply the conspirational 
mode of reading, imposed on them by the semiotic structure of the public sphere 
in the provinces of imperial Russia. Governor Lembke loses his mind and, of 
course, losing one’s mind means gaining insight into some secret meaning: “A 
dull smile appeared on his lips—as if he had suddenly understood and remem-
bered something,” the narrator remarks.50 Literature, madness, and conspiracy 
theory converge. 
Besy is of course a novel about a conspiracy (or a multitude of conspiracies), 
but this is well known and does need not to be analyzed further. Even more 
                                                           
46  «Состояла из шести пар жалких масок … честная русская мысль». − Dostoevskii 
1974: 389.  
47  Dostoevsky 1995: 508. «‘Честная русская мысль’ изображалась в виде господина 
средних лет, в очках, во фраке, в перчатках и – в кандалах (настоящих канда-
лах). Подмышкой этой мысли был портфель с каким-то ‘делом’. Из кармана вы-
глядывало распечатанное письмо из-за границы, заключавшее в себе удостове-
рение, для всех сомневающихся, в честности ‘честной русской мысли’. Все это 
досказывалось распорядителями уже изустно, потому что торчавшее из кармана 
письмо нельзя же было прочесть». − Dostoevskii 1974: 389. 
48  Dostoevsky 1995: 509. «Это что ж такое? … ‘Глупость какая-то’ … ‘Какая-то 
литература’» − Dostoevskii 1974: 390. 
49  Dostoevsky 1995: 518. «Горели неспроста» − Dostoevskii 1974: 397. 
50  Dostoevsky 1995: 511. «Тупая улыбка показалась на его губах, − как будто он 
что-то вдруг понял и вспомнил». − Dostoevskii 1974: 392. 
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importantly, it is a commentary on the semiotics of conspiracy theory. It lays 
bare the semiotic and social features that induce “the characters’ paranoia and 
conspiracy theorizing”;51 and its whole structure is, in itself, one big conspi-
racy—since the narrator is apparently unable to penetrate the mystery, let alone 
the truly apocalyptic scope that lies behind the events that shook the society of 
his town. The narrator’s incompetence is, of course, part of the game: all we—
the readers—can surmise is that there is possibly more going on behind the 
scenes than he is able to tell us.  
It might as well turn out that in the modern world, in which information 
about goings-on is transmitted by means of mass communication exclusively, the 
conspirational mode of deciphering reality is ineluctable. “But isn’t there a text 
that remains untouched by this game of convertible signifiers?,” a Dostoevsky-
reader might by prompted to ask. What about the Gospel, normally the last resort 
for the unsettled characters of Dostoevsky’s novels? Unfortunately, even the 
Gospel is not exempt from the dubious status of any printed matter in Besy: In 
the last chapter of the novel, Verkhovenskii is impressed by a woman who wan-
ders the land selling the Gospel, and he offers to help her, unfortunately not 
without suggesting to “correct the mistakes of this remarkable book” in his oral 
explanations.52 Even the Gospel is drawn into the whirl of doubt and suspicion. 
For contemporary readers this fact was probably less astonishing than it is for us 
today. The first officially sanctioned translation of the Gospel was published in 
1860, only ten years before the first installments of Besy. During the oppressive 
reign of Nikolai I, the very idea of a Russian translation of the bible carried an 
oppositional aura.53  
The sole remedy is, it seems, a certain straightforward and open-hearted 
naïveté which alone can put an end to the “unlimited semiosis”54 that is unset-
tling the townspeoples’ minds. The suspicious mind will always find another 
hint that allows him to build up a new theory about how everything is linked to 
everything else and how sinister forces pull the strings in the background. The 
anonymous narrator of Besy refuses to enter into this game. He simply relates 
what happened. His judgment is clear and univocal, often at the expense of a cer-
tain shortsightedness, but this is only for the better. If he is too easily impressed 
by Stepan Trofimovich’s theatrical gestures and his playing the maître à penser 
                                                           
51  Lounsbery 2007: 225. 
52  Dostoevsky 1995: 645. «В изложении устном … исправить ошибки этой замеча-
тельной книги». ‒ Dostoevskii 1974: 491. 
53  Men’ 2002: 419. 
54  Boym 1999: 110 (Boym is referring to Umberto Eco). 
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in the beginning of his narrative, then he successfully emancipates himself 
throughout the course of the events—and during the process of writing. As Svet-
lana Boym has pointed out, “Conspiracy theory is a conspiracy against con-
spiracy; it does not oppose the conspirational world view as such but doubly 
affirms it.”55 Dostoevsky’s narrator does not participate in this double affirma-
tion; his chronicle is a sober account of events; he relates actions and reveals 
intentions, but above all he points to the disproportion between the aura of sig-
nificance and the actual meaning behind it that is, according to his observations, 
the source of the catastrophes that happened in his town.  
What can we conclude from this? Bulgarin suspected a conspiracy of Jews in 
the Belorussian provinces through their monopolization and control over the 
transmission of “news.” His antidote was the newspaper (and we know what 
motivated this decision—he was the owner of one). In his “Zapiski sumasshed-
shego,” Gogol demonstrated what happens to a society that is struck by political 
crisis and, for the first time in history, has access to news from remote parts of 
the world on a daily basis. Dostoevsky in Besy showed that the constant suspi-
cion directed against any kind of printed information leads to a situation in 
which nothing is as it seems and every word is suspected of containing a secret 
meaning. There is no way around this. As early as 1836, a casual remark in 
Pushkin’s journal Sovremennik (The Contemporary) stated that our time is the 
“epoch of an uncovering of all mysteries.”56 This is a “dialectic of the Enlighten-
ment” of sorts: the urge to unmask mysteries wherever they are (or even where 
they are not) has become the cornerstone of journalism; it shapes the poetics of 
journalistic texts and, more importantly, it shapes the way in which readers will 
read newspaper articles and the world around them. 
 
 
“Entangled threads”: The Fallacy of the Conspiracist Worldview 
in Tolstoy’s War and Peace 
 
Of the stories and novels I have mentioned so far, only Tolstoy’s Voina i mir 
does not specifically deal with the problem of the construction of reality through 
journalism, which is of course something of a truism: The novel is set in the first 
two decades of the nineteenth century when the press did not yet have the impor-
tance it gained over time from the 1820s onwards. It is for this reason that Tols-
                                                           
55  Ibid.: 97. 
56  «эпох[a] разоблачения всех тайн» − Editor’s remark (“Ot redaktsii”) in Sovremen-
nik 1836/2: 312. 
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toy’s approach to the problem of the construction of reality and conspiracist 
epistemology is of particular interest here: Tolstoy refutes the very idea of inten-
tionality in history—an idea that is crucial for conspiracy theories. At the end of 
the novel, however, Pierre Bezukhov is presented as “one of the principle foun-
ders” of a certain “society,”57 which is quite an unambiguous allusion to his fu-
ture role as one of the conspirators of December 1825. This is not the germ of a 
conspiracy theory, but the beginning of a story about conspirators whose aim it 
was to reform Russian statehood and society. Tolstoy makes this quite explicit 
when he lets Pierre explain the current situation in Russia (by 1820) in the fol-
lowing way: “Arakcheev and Golitsyn … are now the whole government! And 
what a government! They see treason everywhere and are afraid of every-
thing.”58 According to Pierre, the problem was not conspiracy itself, but the fact 
that people like Arakcheev and Golitsyn, two highly influential counselors from 
the inner circle around Aleksandr I, suspected conspiracy everywhere. Pierre, the 
future Decembrist, was convinced that “he was chosen to give a new direction to 
the whole of Russian society and to the whole world.”59  
 
‘I only wished to say that ideas that have great results are always simple ones. The whole 
of my idea is that if vicious people are united and constitute a power, then honest folk 
must do the same. Now that’s simple enough.’60  
 
In the context of a discussion about conspiracy theories, Pierre’s “that’s simple 
enough” sounds quite alarming of course. There is a detail that subtly under-
mines his self-regarding ideas about the future of Russia. Only after having 
talked about his marvelous success at some meeting in Petersburg Pierre remem-
bers that his wife had been about to say something: 
                                                           
57  Tolstoy 2010: 1246. «Одного общества, которого Пьер был одним из главных 
основателей». − Tolstoi 1940: 270. 
58  Tolstoy 2010: 1255. «Аракчеев и Голицын – это теперь всё правительство. И 
какое! Во всем видят заговоры, всего боятся». − Tolstoi 1940: 280. 
59  Tolstoy 2010: 1267. «Ему казалось …, что он был призван дать новое направле-
ние всему русскому обществу и всему миру». − Tolstoi 1940: 293. 
60  Tolstoy 2010: 1267−68. «Я хотел сказать только, что все мысли, которые имеют 
огромные последствия, – всегда просты. Вся моя мысль в том, что ежели люди 
порочные связаны между собой и составляют силу, то людям честным надо сде-
лать то же самое. Ведь так просто». − Tolstoi 1940: 293−94. 
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‘I? Only nonsense.’ 
‘But all the same?’ 
‘Oh, nothing, only a trifle,’ said Natasha, smiling still more brightly. ‘I only wanted to tell 
you about Petya: today nanny was coming to take him from me, and he laughed, shut his 
eyes, and clung to me. I’m sure he thought he was hiding. Awfully sweet!’61 
 
This must be read as an implicit comment on Pierre’s blindness regarding his 
own future role in the history of Russia, a role about which he is so childishly 
proud. Pierre’s lofty ideas and his exaggerated self-esteem are juxtaposed with 
his baby son’s belief that he is invisible when he closes his eyes. Pierre reads the 
world from his own highly biased standpoint; he is convinced of his philosophi-
cal superiority (compared to his brother-in-law Nikolai, a slow reader of Rous-
seau, Montesquieu and Sismondi).62 He sees himself as an autonomous subject, 
the conscious master of his intentions and deeds, ready to act in a field that is 
historically open and which awaits his arrival upon the scene. However, the 
whole novel (and especially the theoretical second part of the “Epilogue”) was 
written in order to prove that this perspective is misleading, since the indivi-
dual’s will is not a decisive factor in history. These two standpoints—Pierre’s 
self-image as a sovereign master of his deeds and historical agent and the per-
spective of history—inevitably collide, with this collision showing us the in-
consistency of any reductionist understanding of history and the world. “It’s not 
that simple” is what Tolstoy wants to tell his readers. Or rather it is simple, but 
in another way. We, the readers, know that Pierre’s plans will fail (as all his 
other plans had, including his most ridiculous personal super-plot to kill Napo-
leon). We know that he will draw himself and his family into a catastrophe and 
Russia to the brink of a civil war, but at the same time we can admire his truly 
childlike enthusiasm. There is no viewpoint from which totality could be 
attained. We either have Pierre’s limited point of view or the zero focalization of 
the narrator’s (or rather the author’s) reflections on the theory of history. They 
are mutually incommensurable; to overcome this incommensurability, to ignore 
or to neglect it, would mean to enter the conspirational mode of reading the 
world.  
                                                           
61  Tolstoy 2010: 1268. «‘А ты что хотела сказать?’ − ‘Я так, глупости.’ − ‘Нет, все-
таки.’ − ‘Да ничего, пустяки’, − сказала Наташа … ‘Я только хотела сказать про 
Петю: нынче няня подходит взять его от меня, он засмеялся, зажмурился и при-
жался ко мне – верно, думал, что спрятался. Ужасно мил’». − Tolstoi 1940: 294. 
62  Tolstoi 1940: 292. 
 
‘And what were you going to say?’
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The case of Voina i mir is crucial here, given that the novel ends with the 
description of the nucleus of a future conspiracy and the ironic highlighting of 
the tendency for self-deceit that inevitably accompanies any action in the sphere 
of politics—according to Tolstoy at least. Pierre’s insistence that his secret 
“society” is a “society of true conservatives,” of “gentlemen in the full meaning 
of the word”63 is highly telling in this regard. He notably claims that the secret 
society is necessary to prevent a coup d’état, allegedly planned by Arakcheev. 
However, Pierre’s brother-in-law, Nikolai, tries to prove that “all the danger 
[Pierre] spoke of existed only in his imagination”64 and declares that he is deter-
mined to fight back against any secret society that will launch an assault on the 
political order of the Empire.65 Nikolai is not as well-read as Pierre, he clearly 
lacks convincing arguments in the discussion, but he feels that he is right66 and 
that Pierre is a “child” (rebenok) and a “dreamer” (mechtatel’).67 Nikolai’s rejec-
tion of any revolutionary endeavor (though obviously not his frequent recourse 
to violence) and his emotional way of reasoning makes him the author’s mouth-
piece here.68 
Again, Tolstoy uses a child’s or an adolescent’s point of view in order to 
show the fallacy of the conspiracist worldview: Andrei Bolkonskii’s 15-year-old 
son Nikolen’ka dreams of himself and Pierre being heroes, resembling the pro-
tagonists in an edition of Plutarch, “leading a huge army” on a battle field. The 
army consists of “white slanting lines that filled the air like the cobwebs that 
float about in autumn,” but these threads eventually became entangled “and it 
became difficult to move.”69 The philosophy of history that Tolstoy elaborates in 
                                                           
63  Tolstoy 2010: 1259. «Общество настоящих консерваторов …, джентльменов в 
полном значении этого слова». − Tolstoi 1940: 284. 
64  Tolstoy 2010: 1259. «Никакого переворота не предвидится … вся опасность … 
находится только в его [Пьера] воображении». − Tolstoi 1940: 285. 
65  Tolstoi 1940: 285. 
66  “He [Nikolai] was fully convinced, not by reasoning but by something within him 
stronger than reason, of the justice of his opinion.” − Tolstoy 2010: 1259. «Николай 
почувствовал себя поставленным в тупик. Это еще больше рассердило его, так 
как он в душе своей не по рассуждению, а по чему-то сильнейшему, чем рас-
суждение, знал несомненную справедливость своего мнения». − Tolstoi 1940: 
285.  
67  Tolstoi 1940: 287, 289. 
68  Cf. Trigos 2009: 33. 
69  Tolstoy 2010: 1268. «Войско это было составлено из белых, косых линий, напол-
нявших воздух подобно тем паутинам, которые летают осенью … Вдруг нити, 
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the theoretical digressions of his novel makes it clear that there can be no puppet 
master holding the threads that guide people in the real historical world; there are 





The texts that I have examined here involved themselves in a field that is latently 
structured by the conspirational mode of reading. Literature is capable of cap-
turing and mapping the complexity of the semiotic order in a public sphere that 
is dominated by this mode. But, apparently, it has no other means to step out of 
this mode than by simplification: Nikolai is clearly less intelligent and less well-
read than Pierre, but he is still more right than his brother-in-law. Mr. G-v, the 
narrator of Besy, is naïve and a bit shortsighted, yet his chronicle seems to be the 
only means to reinstall political order. Though not concerned with the conspira-
tional mode of reading induced by journalism and the press in the “epoch of an 
uncovering of all mysteries,” Tolstoy, in the concluding pages of Voina i mir, 
devaluates conspiracy as a political strategy; he ultimately ridicules Pierre’s de-
sire for fame. The paradigm of individual heroism, evoked here through the 
mentioning of Plutarch and impersonated in the figure of Napoleon, is possibly 
the most effective conspiracy theory of the nineteenth century. The idea that a 
chosen individual, by some secret force, some inner “genius,” could change the 
course of history left a deep imprint on the minds of the epoch—in historiogra-
phy, in novels as well as in daily life. The motif of threads, guided by an alien 
force, often recurs in conspiracy theories. It is of course no accident that in Niko-
len’ka’s dream they are denoted in French (“le fil de la Vierge”) by his tutor 
Desal’. Nikolen’ka’s self-indulgent vision of greatness, inspired by his godfa-
ther’s political speeches, is the dream of an adolescent who longs for recognition 
from his (dead) father.70 What follows is the second, theoretical part of the epi-
logue, in which Tolstoy explains his views on history; he notably confronts the 
“ancients’” view on history with the nineteenth century’s obsession with Na-
                                                           
которые двигали их, стали ослабевать, путаться; стало тяжело». − Tolstoi 1940: 
294. 
70  Cf. the last sentence of the first part of the Epilogue (Nikolen’ka’s thoughts): “‘And 
my father? Oh, father, father! Yes, I will do something with which even he would be 
satisfied…’” − Tolstoy 2010: 1269. «А отец? Отец! Отец! Да, я сделаю то, чем бы 
даже он был доволен...». − Tolstoi 1940: 294. 
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poleon and ends up with the crucial question: “What force moves the nations?”71 
Against the backdrop of the ever-growing knowledge about factors that have an 
impact on historical events and which predetermine the acts of individuals, he 
then discusses the problem of freedom and necessity.The crucial argument in his 
discussion is less about the factual side and more about the problem of con-
sciousness. It is “necessary to renounce a freedom that does not exist, and to 
recognize a dependence of which we are not conscious.”72 That means that we 
have to opt for an (impossible) double-point of view: in our story of the world, 
we have to be narrators and characters at the same time. In order to be able to 
act, we have to assume that we are the sovereign masters of our actions, but we 
should nevertheless bear in mind that there are objective factors that reduce our 
freedom—virtually to zero, as Tolstoy, a child of his positivist era, puts it. Only 
novelists can deal with this problem; they are able to switch between points of 
view, between dream and reality, between the individual and the general. The 
stories’ characters implicitly suspect that they are puppets in some puppet mas-
ter’s theater (which they ultimately are); this is why they are in constant danger 
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Literary fiction in Russia has been dealing with the problem of the transmission 
of news and information and its relevance for political communities since the 
1820s. Faddei Bulgarin, in his novel Ivan Vyzhigin, stressed the importance of 
newspapers as a crucial feature of a modern, enlightened public sphere. It was up 
to literature to discuss the dangers induced by the widening of the scope of the 
individual’s worldview—from the limited sphere of face-to-face conversations 
in villages and provincial towns to a situation in which people in a provincial 
backwater could apprehend news from all around the world. Some of them fall 
victim to “paranoiac overdetermination” (S. Boym); they try to make sense of 
the irredeemable complexity of the modern world by constructing conspiracy 
theories. Writers, such as Gogol, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy tried to counter this 
tendency by shedding light on the semiological and medial mechanisms underly-
ing these processes. 

 
Be on the Lookout! 





Soviet drama of the 1920s and 1930s; spy-mania; conspiracy drama 
 
 
When we consider spies as fictional figures, we can readily agree that the most 
suitable place for them is in detective narratives, in adventure literature, or per-
haps, in parodies. In fact, they initially also appeared in early Soviet art as char-
acters in action-focused, plot-driven novels and films, sometimes involving fan-
tastic or grotesque elements and slapstick comedy. One could mention Мariėtta 
Shaginian’s Mess-Mend, ili Ianki v Petrograde (Mess-Mend, or Yankees in Pet-
rograd, 1924–1925), together with its screen adaptation Miss Mend (1926) by 
Boris Barnet and Fedor Otsep, Aleksei Tolstoi’s Giperboloid inzhenera Garina 
(The Hyperboloid of Engineer Garin, 1925–1926), Viktor Shklovskii’s and Vse-
volod Ivanov’s Iprit (Mustard Gas, 1925) and Lev Rubus’ Zapakh limona (The 
Smell of Lemon, 1928). These novels are good examples of so-called “pinkerto-
novshchina,” a fiction written in the manner of Pinkerton’s detective stories 
which, however, did not persist for long in the USSR. 
By the end of the 1920s, adventure fiction and cinema had been ousted from 
the center of the public sphere on the grounds that they were bourgeois and, con-
sequently, harmful. They were replaced by “serious,” “realistic” narratives about 
                                                           
*  The research was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation, project 
№ 14-18-02952 (ONG–P). I am deeply grateful to Muireann Maguire (University of 
Exeter) for her invaluable help with the English version of this chapter, of which a 
Russian version has been published in Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 2018/5. 
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spies and saboteurs, which now moved into the limelight. The flexible and rela-
tively inexpensive theater system1 played a significant role in the development 
of this area of mass culture. Both dramatists, whose names were soon forgotten, 
and prominent writers who held their high positions in the Soviet literary pan-
theon until the collapse of the USSR were involved in such “spy hunting.” These 
sorts of plays were intended for professional theaters and amateur troupes alike. 
Their authors focused primarily on the current situation and often expressly indi-
cated the exact time of the play’s action, which was either immediately contem-
poraneous or else pre-dated the audience’s present by a few years, at most. 
Diverse theater productions of the 1920s and 1930s, all connected by their 
exaggerated interest in spies and saboteurs, can be considered as a separate genre 
named conspiracy drama.2 
Conspiracy drama occupied a specific place in the Soviet official culture, re-
sponding to the authorities’ political demands and influencing public opinion in 
its own rather unique way.3 Despite the fact that this genre had its functional 
equivalents in prose, cinema and posters (not to mention official public dis-
course),4 it managed to preserve its individual character.5 
                                                           
1  In his speech, entitled “Zadachi sovetskogo teatra” (“The Aims of the Soviet Thea-
ter”) at the first All-Union Conference of Theater Directors in 1939, Stalin’s Prosecu-
tor-General, Andrei Vyshinskii, corrected Lenin by expanding his famous phrase, 
“Concerning the struggle against all kinds of vestiges of private ownership, individu-
alistic psychology, ... the most powerful of the arts is—besides the cinema—the thea-
ter.” – Vyshinskii 1939: 4. And he was probably right. According to Soviet statistics, 
“by 1 January 1940, in the RSFSR there were 387 theaters, including 95 for collective 
farms and 36 for children.” In 1939, for the USSR as a whole, more than 86 million 
people visited 825 theaters; see Zograf 1960: 8–9.  
2  The attempt to define this sort of play as a genre does not, of course, exclude treating 
them, in more general terms, as a form of conspiracy theory discourse or as “a power-
ful cultural narrative;” see Arnold 2008: VIII. 
3  Critics certainly realized the integrity of drama focused on spies (none, of course, used 
the term “conspiracy drama”). For example, in 1939, Boris Emel’ianov, a theater ob-
server, made the following diagnosis: “We have sufficient evidence to state the fact of 
the existence of a remarkable trend in our drama which has accumulated all the pecu-
liarities of the detective genre, although, to all appearances, it has been burnished with 
the intention of increasing vigilance and nurture patriotism.” – Emel’ianov 1939: 119. 
4  In this chapter, in order not to drown in details and comparisons, I will exclude from 
considering representations of the theme of “enemy within” in all of the other arts, 
confining myself only to mentioning the fact that “conspiracy genres” could be found 
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The origin of conspiracy drama can be ascribed less to aesthetic reasons than 
to the paranoid character of state politics6 in the late 1920s and 1930s, although 
we should be aware that the inclination to search for “hidden enemies” charac-
terized Soviet art from its inception. Dramatists who dabbled in this genre were 
stimulated by major political events (the series of public show trials, for exam-
ples) which provoked an escalation or a certain shift in the genre’s evolution 
and, as a result, its re-evaluation by literary critics. 
However, the “conspiracy dramatists” were guided by the political impulses 
of the party and government, unofficially licensed to hunt imaginary foes, and 
were permanently vulnerable to critical attacks. They were blamed for a wide 
range of sins—from aesthetic defects in their writing to much more serious ideo-
logical mistakes. But when we remember that any artistic practitioner was by de-
finition at risk of persecution, under Stalin, the use of the stick instead of the car-
rot should not come as a surprise. Uneasy relations with the authorities could not 
prevent the genre from remaining in demand until the 1950s,7 although by 1938 
or 1939 the redundancy of spies on stage already provided a ready target for the 
genre’s opponents. What the experts did not like, according to the press reports, 
was popular success. 
                                                           
everywhere and were similar in many respects. By the same token, I will not discuss 
plays intended for children, although there are many significant examples among 
them: Leonid Makariev’s Timoshkin Rudnik (The Mine of a Boy Timoshka, 1926), 
Daniil Del’s U lukomor’ia (By the Curved Seashore, 1938), Aleksandr Kron’s Nashe 
oruzhie (Our Weapons, 1937), Georgii Gaidovskii’s Iasno vizhu (I See Clearly, 1937), 
etc. 
5  Of course, the Soviet “conspiracy drama” cannot unreservedly be treated as a unique 
phenomenon. Narratives prevalent in the Third Reich or in Hollywood’s anti-com-
munist films produced between 1947 and 1954, due to “recasting the familiar gangster 
genre to fit the Communist conspiracy” (Goldberg 2001: 32), represented similar re-
sponses to more or less similar political factors, determined by the general strategies 
of the central authorities. 
6  Gábor Rittersporn in his article “The Soviet World as a Conspiracy” discussed the 
“conspiracy” nature of the Soviet order under Stalin in detail; see Rittersporn 2001: 
103–24. Even earlier, Popper, describing the Nazi project, pointed out the possibility 
for conspiracy theorists to win political competition; see Popper 1962: 123. Pipes also 
wrote about the period between two World Wars when adherents of conspiracy theo-
ries came to power in Germany and the USSR; see Pipes 1997: 11. 
7  Aleksandr Shtein’s Zakon chesti (The Law of Honor, 1947), Konstantin Simonov’s 
Chuzhaia ten’ (Alien’s Shadow, 1949), etc. 
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These dramatists’ aspirations to produce plays about spies and saboteurs with 
“realistic” plots,8 apparently rooted in everyday life, show once again that “con-
spiracy drama” belongs among the many other discursive manifestations of gen-
eral conspiracy theory which, in the case of the USSR, was advocated and prop-
agandized by the authorities.9 Although they were fictional statements about hid-
den enemies, these plays genuinely assumed the role of factual discourse. The 
rhetoric upon which they were based aimed to persuade the audience that the im-
aginary, on-stage spies had real-life analogues, who were both numerous and 
tangibly close. Like the show trials of the so-called “enemies of the people” 
mounted by the government, these plays were an attempt to render fiction as re-
ality via aesthetic conceptualization. 
What were the topics that the conspiracy drama tackled? What were the 
boundaries of this near-forgotten genre? What were its ethical and ideological 
agendas? What was conspiracy drama teaching, persuading, and imposing upon 
audiences? In which forms, in conspiracy drama, did the project of mass art exist 
that later succeeded it?10 These are the questions addressed in this chapter. 
                                                           
8  Peter Knight, who includes literature, cinema and other variations of entertainment 
culture in his analysis of the circulation of conspiracy theories in the U.S. points to the 
difference between “culture of conspiracy” and “culture about conspiracy;” – see 
Knight 2000: 3. In practice, it is not often easy to draw the boundary between the first 
category and the second, but I believe that Soviet “conspiracy dramatists,” like Soviet 
politicians, wanted their fictional constructions to be accepted as reality (the politi-
cians) or as more or less “realistic” (the dramatists). In any case, this was a “commod-
ified” form of knowledge; see Birchall 2006: 39. 
9  The idea that the government apparatus is the main center of the conspiracy theory in-
fluence does not contradict a more general premise about the naivety of the belief that 
morbid attention to the “enemy within” arises from propaganda and manipulation of 
public opinion (see, for example, Gudkov 2004: 558). I would like to stress that, in the 
USSR, the media which expressed these social anxieties and hopes enjoyed unprece-
dented support from the state. This support was much more substantial than what the 
experts dealing with conspiracy theories in the U.S. and Europe describe. 
10  Of course, some of the plays I will mention have been analysed by other scholars, 
more than once. A considerable amount of literature on several of them has already 
been published in the USSR—mainly on Maksim Gorky’s and Leonid Leonov’s 
plays, although not from the perspective of conspiracy specifically. After the collapse 
of the USSR, narratives of this type immediately attracted attention as a subject for 
revision. In 1993, Evgeny Dobrenko considered them in the context of “defensive-
patriotic” art; see Dobrenko 1993: 189–96. Violetta Gudkova in her monograph Rozh-
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Boundaries 
 
At the end of the 1920s, Pavel Ial’tsev (1904–1941), one of many authors who 
joined the hunt for fictional spies, published a play with the not terribly original 
title of Na granitse (On the Border,1928), which used a typical plot formula 
about a failed attempt by masked enemies to enter Soviet territory. An attractive 
Polish girl, Marina Zbrozhek, persuades a Soviet border guard, Vasilii, who has 
fallen in love with her, to allow her relatives, including a former White army of-
ficer, to cross the Soviet border under cover of night. She claims that her rela-
tives, after much suffering abroad, long to return to Russia in order to start an 
honest life under a new identity. The naturally kind Vasilii reluctantly agrees to 
assist them, but a random accident disrupts their plans. Vasilii’s brother, a 
staunch Communist, replaces him on patrol and is killed as a result. Regretting 
his deviance from the rules, Vasilii helps to expose the nest of spies: without 
compunction, he shoots his fiancée as she attempts to escape.11 
It is clear that the interest in spies taken by border guards or counter-intelli-
gence officers at the state border, however genuine, does not necessarily imply 
any efflorescence of conspiracy theory or even transient spy-mania in the public 
sphere. “Conspiracy culture” derived from the strong suspicions intensively cul-
tivated in society when the “rhetoric of distrust” extends beyond the limited 
“frontier” zones into other territories and spheres of everyday life. Soviet art suc-
cessfully displayed this expansion. 
In the new Soviet “conspiracy” landscape, spies were attracted to remote col-
lective farms in the borderlands, and dramatists took full advantage of this cir-
cumstance. For example, the plot of Ėduard Samuilenok’s (1907–1939) popular 
play Gibel’ Volka (The Death of Wolf, 1939) revolved around the life of one 
such spy. The play was written in Belarussian, first performed at Belarussian 
Drama Theater and immediately translated into Russian. Apart from the lan-
guage of composition, the author’s nationality did not impinge upon the narra-
tive’s reception. However, Samuilenok’s case is intriguing precisely because it 
does not differ from the prevailing Soviet formula of the time. 
                                                           
denie sovetskikh siuzhetov (The Origin of Soviet Storylines), an indispensable com-
mentary on Soviet pre-war drama, devoted quite a few pages to saboteurs and to other 
enemies as well; see Gudkova 2008. But “spy drama” was not yet debated as a com-
plete and comprehensive whole, nor was it examined in sufficient detail. 
11  Ten years later, another “conspiracy dramatist” Vladimir Bill’-Belotserkovskii was 
inspired by the same idea and wrote his own piece with an almost identical plot. His 
play had the title Pogranichniki (Border Guards, 1938). 
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Samuilenok’s characters, Soviet peasants, are faced with gradually increas-
ing problems: a haystack starts to burn, grazing lands flood, barley fails to grow, 
etc. These misfortunes make them suspect that an enemy has infiltrated their 
community with his accomplices. One character reflects, “The man seems like 
an ordinary fellow: a bright face, a cheery grin, a voice like a nightingale, but the 
soul of a wolf.”12 Soon their suspicions are justified. A “spy-saboteur,” the ex-
landowner Shabinskii, who yearns “to re-install himself as the lawful master on 
the backs… of his former slaves”13 has illegally crossed the border. Helped by a 
forester disguised as a loyal citizen and by a few other criminals, he plans to poi-
son horses intended for the Red Army and then to totally incinerate the collective 
farm. However, border guards and local Komsomol members keep the whole ar-
ea under such strict control that he is reduced to hiding in a damp dugout at the 
edge of the forest. Even a high-ranking official (also a secret saboteur) who ar-
rives from the local district capital is unable to help him. Both (as well as all oth-
er baddies) are ultimately arrested. 
Apart from this official from the local authorities, another “big man” from 
Moscow, to whom the spy Shabinskii has tried to forward coded messages from 
abroad, is mentioned in Gibel’ Volka. From this point, independently of the au-
thor’s volition and irrespective of the “big man’s” ultimate unmasking, the narra-
tive begins to subvert the ideology that it serves. The point is that the play risks 
persuading its audience that, despite solid barriers, the USSR remains vulnerable 
to hidden enemies not only on the frontiers, but even in the heart of the state. 
Meanwhile the author ignores the paradox that borders remain permeable despite 
the officially impenetrable level of border protection; in fact, Soviet drama in the 
1930s typically ignored this paradox.14  
 
 
                                                           
12  «Кажется – человек, как человек: обличье светлое, усмешка веселая, голос – 
точно у соловья, а душа волчья…». – Samuilenok 1939: 9. 
13  «На спинах… бывших рабов восстановить свое право законного господина». –
Samuilenok 1939: 26. 
14  Though sometimes this paradox of permeable borders did inspire conscious doubt. 
Thus, when in 1937, Evgenii Shvarts wrote his play Nashe gostepriimstvo (Our Hos-
pitality) about representatives of the Soviet young generation who suddenly met 
saboteurs who landed by plane in the Russian steppes, the critic L. Maliugin from the 
journal Teatr accused Shvarts’s work of appearing unnatural; see Maliugin 1938: 96. 
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Expansion 
 
Areas vulnerable to espionage were not limited to frontiers or to special military 
enterprises and army structures, or even to the capital which could easily be im-
agined as an appealing place for enemy agents. In the Soviet “fictional reality,” 
the interests of foreign aliens could affect the remotest, obscurest towns and vil-
lages; it could even affect people in the most peaceful professions. 
In Semen Semenov-Polonskii’s15 play Na otshibe (A Remote House, 1939),16 
a stranger comes to a lonely woman who lives in a house at a distance from a 
collective farm village. At first she takes him on as a poultry-farming instructor, 
but quickly identifies him as a masked foe; she locks him in the cellar. 
Similarly, Ial’tsev’s Afrodita (Aphrodite, 1938)17 describes the everyday life 
of an upcountry estate museum that is managed by an elderly intellectual. In this 
conspiracy play, a young art expert from Moscow—a female character, appear-
ing unexpectedly but opportunely—immediately uncovers a plot between a for-
eigner named Frost, who is visiting the museum to study a canvas called Aphro-
dite, and the young director’s wife. Frost and the director’s wife have replaced 
that valuable picture with a copy in order to sell the original abroad illegally. 
The history of Soviet drama owes much to Nikolai Virta (1906–1976), 
whose Zagovor (Conspiracy, 1939), is an outstanding example of “conspiracy 
theory expansion” in the field of theater. The plot of Virta’s play covers 1936 
and 1937, set at one of numerous land offices in central Russia, headed by a cer-
tain Ol’ga Petrovna Popova who courageously battles bureaucracy and so-called 
“wreckers” (vrediteli). Everything is turned upside down when an important of-
ficial from Moscow, Balandin, arrives in order to assist Popova in her struggle. 
As their conversation reveals, both Popova and Balandin are members of a clan-
destine group planning a coup d’état in the USSR. With this aim in mind, the 
conspirators poison cattle, impose backbreaking grain taxes on peasants, com-
pelling the latter to hide their harvest from the authorities, and imprison hun-
dreds of loyal individuals while sending secret orders to shoot honest citizens. 
The plotters are revealed to include the supporters and associates of real-life in-
dividuals such as Nikolai Bukharin, Leon Trotsky, Mikhail Tukhachevskii (who 
                                                           
15  According to Viacheslav Ogryzko, two authors, who were under close surveillance by 
Soviet secret police since 1938, wrote under the pseudonyms “Semen Zakharovich” 
and “Semenov-Polonskii.” They were Klavdiia Aleksandrovna Novikova (1913–
1984) and Leonid Vladimirovich Sobolevskii (1912–1942); cf. Ogryzko 2005: 20. 
16  Semenov-Polonskii 1940. 
17  Ial’tsev 1938b. 
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has undertaken to seize the Kremlin shortly), as well as ordinary, lower-profile 
spies. 
Unsurprisingly, at the last moment and with Stalin’s moral support, these in-
ternal enemies’ plans are frustrated. Once again the spectator encounters an un-
resolved paradox: he or she sees on stage only a few thoroughly respectable par-
ty members and representatives of the state. By constructing his universe of infi-
nite conspiracy, Virta managed to populate his fictional USSR almost exclu-
sively with conspirators, leaving few roles for loyal citizens. 
But espionage discourse spread beyond these purely territorial and pure the-
matic aspects. Ultimately, its expansion led to the corrosion and deformation of 
the genre structure, even in traditionally “peaceful” forms of narration, such as 
melodrama, family drama, domestic drama, and comedy. 
 
 
The Corrosion of the Genre 
 
The 1917 Revolution and the Civil War almost immediately gave birth to a new 
(for Russian culture at least) narrative variation, focusing on the relations be-
tween spouses or pairs of lovers belonging to opposing political camps. Konstan-
tin Trenev’s play Liubov’ Iarovaia (1926) and Boris Lavrenev’s story Sorok per-
vyi (The Forty First, 1926) are the best examples of such literature. Meanwhile, 
the political and military context also influenced traditional genres in which love 
affairs and various aspects of family life traditionally constituted and, with some 
exceptions, exhausted the content of narration. A new espionage/saboteur dis-
course began filtering through them as well. 
Mikhail Zoshchenko’s play Opasnye sviazi (Dangerous Liaisons, 1939)18 
exemplifies this new formula. 
A married, high-ranking official, Bessonov, has a young mistress for whom 
he is looking for a room to rent. Once the place of refuge has been found, the 
protagonist acquires yet another love interest. She is the daughter of the owners 
of the rented room, and her parents enthusiastically encourage Bessonov to win 
her favor. They want him to leave his wife and to marry their daughter. The plot 
thickens, but instead of ending with a denunciation of immorality and bourgeois 
ideological legacy (as would have been typical for Zoshchenko’s writings of the 
1920s), the play closes with the unexpected and unconvincingly motivated es-
cape and arrest of the protagonist, who turns out to be a former agent provoca-
teur of the tsarist secret police, now acting on behalf of members of the opposi-
                                                           
18  Zoshchenko 1940. 
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tion. The metamorphosis of a morally wicked person into a political enemy, 
thereby shifting a romantic plot into the “conspiracy genre,” is so surprising that 
one might well wonder if it was added to the plot exclusively in order to please 
the authorities and critics. 
Something similar happens in Leonid Leonov’s Volk (The Wolf, 1938).19 On 
one level, the play tells the story of an individual trying to hide from the NKVD; 
on another level, Leonov pays excessive attention to romantic and familial rela-
tions between his characters. Spectators spend most of their time following the 
development of tension within a family. The author touches on all of the other 
subjects only in passing until the end of the second act (the play has three acts), 
when a certain Luka Sandukov appears. Luka Sandukov is, additionally, a rela-
tive who pretends to be a brave polar explorer who has just returned from an ex-
pedition. But in fact he is a “wolf” in the guise of a “hero” (“wolf as enemy” was 
a popular metaphor), and this “beast” is now in a hopeless situation: he is trying 
to flee both the police and his fellow conspirators. 
Justifiably, another Leonov play Polovchanskie sady (The Gardens of Polov-
chansk, 1938)20 can also be considered an example of generic ambivalence. The 
same bias distinguishes one of the most prominent Soviet writers, Maksim Gor-
ky, in his conspiracy play Somov i drugie (Somov and Others, 1931),21 which 
was (with perhaps a few exceptions) the only literary work in which the founder 
of Soviet literature depicted life in the USSR. Curiously enough, Gorky did not 
risk publishing it himself. 
 
 
Semantic Transgression  
 
The genre hybridization, which was intrinsic to “conspiracy drama,” correspond-
ed to the rhetoric and even perhaps to the pure linguistic fusion, which was pecu-
liar to Soviet public space under Stalin. Without introducing new elements, it 
embodied the “logic of rhetoric” that was obvious in official discourse of the 
1930s and which, on the one hand, related merely to terminology but, on the oth-
er, fruitfully participated in constructing the social phenomena that the terminol-
                                                           
19  Leonov 1940. 
20  Leonov 1938. 
21  Gorky 1941. 
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ogy addressed. Thanks to this logic any individual in the USSR, except for the 
dictator, could be declared a spy.22 
As observed previously, there were two major trends in Soviet art, motivated 
by the aim of exposing spies and “conspiracy.” For example, the show trials held 
in the 1920s and 1930s, accompanied by wide media campaigns, provided scru-
pulously detailed information about the networks of spies and saboteurs which 
they revealed. It is not surprising that fiction, cinema, and theater often followed 
the same formula, exhaustively presenting proofs of their characters’ criminal 
activity: they described when, where, and who committed an offense or treason 
in detail. 
At the same time, the explicit “conspiracy” narration competed with a drasti-
cally different, obscurer way of presenting the topic. Maksim Gorky’s aforemen-
tioned Somov i drugie belongs to dramatic literature of this second kind. In his 
play, Gorky preferred to focus rather on the indirect manner of undermining a 
character than on an extended description of his illegal activity. So, the central 
character Somov, an engineer and fascist agent, indirectly unmasked himself be-
fore the theater audience through his sexual habits: he seduces his wife in a 
lighted room, and thus after arousing brute animal instincts in the unfortunate 
woman, he inflicts severe psychological and moral suffering upon her. The sex 
itself was, of course, not shown. In other words, thanks to an ad hominem argu-
ment, a character needed do nothing, at least before the spectators’ eyes, in order 
to be exposed as a spy. Ethical deviations, together with hints about his double 
life more than compensated for the absence of explicit demonstration and discus-
sion of character demolition. Zoshchenko’s Opasnye sviazi and Leonov’s Volk 
resemble Gorky’s play in this respect, although Leonov’s case is not so obvious. 
The invention of “passive espionage” fitted well with the image of Soviet “witch 
hunting.” 
But in advancing the idea of conspiracy, Soviet dramatists, of course, did not 
always choose such sophisticated ways of writing. More often, the national con-
text helped them to produce a similar effect. The terms “wrecker,” “saboteur,” 
“spy,” etc., immediately became interchangeable after they were adopted by the 
Soviet public discourse. Moreover, the set of lexical items denoting a “hidden 
enemy” permanently expanded. The theater subordinated this more general pro-
cess and at the same time took part in “stoking” it. 
                                                           
22  The nationality of a character did not play a significant role in Soviet conspiracy dra-
ma. As Violetta Gudkova wrote, “The Jewish question, openly discussed in the earlier 
Soviet drama, was later put out of sight and did not manifest itself in censored dra-
matic writings.” – Gudkova 2008: 300. 
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The identity between the political opposition and hostile intelligence services 
was presented as self-evident. Thus, in Leonid Karasev’s play Ogni maiaka 
(Lighthouse Signals, 1937),23 which inspired its audience by showing how Sovi-
et individuals heroically fought Japanese secret agents on an island in the Pacific 
Ocean, an unmasked saboteur confesses to being recruited straight away for this 
work by a Trotskyist called Petrov. 
Two more demonstrative texts utilize considerably different devices to pro-
duce essentially the same result. In Vladimir Bill’-Belotserkovskii’s (1885–
1970) play Golos nedr (The Voice of the Core, 1929), which depicts the recon-
struction of a derelict mine, only those enthusiasts ready to work selflessly and 
unpaid for up to two years are recognized as loyal citizens. All the other workers 
are portrayed either as unwitting saboteurs or as obvious spies’ accomplices. 
However, in spite of the potentially unlimited set of synonyms referring to 
the notion of “inner enemies,” one strong distinction between them and other law 
breakers was established. Leonov stressed this particularity in his “quasi-conspi-
racy” play Metel’ (Snowstorm, 1939). I refer to Metel’ as a “quasi-conspiracy” 
because it only superficially corresponds with the pattern of the “spy/saboteur” 
plot. In fact, the author evidently plays with the audience’s expectations, provok-
ing spectators or readers to view it from the conspiracy perspective in order to 
frustrate them at the end. Finally, it becomes clear that the key villain in Leo-
nov’s play, a factory director suspected of espionage and sabotage, is only guilty 
of “accepting bribes from foreign companies when he offered them contracts.”24 
A remark by his wife Catherine, an honest Soviet woman who (like the audi-
ence) expected much more severe misdeeds from her husband, is notable: “I 
thought he was an enemy, but he turned out to be a mere thief.”25 
Following this logic, we can conclude that, with minor exaggeration, only a 
person who committed a common crime could avoid the accusation of espio-
nage. 
Although it does not perfectly fulfil the requirements of the “conspiracy” 
genre, Metel’ certainly belongs within it. Even after standing the conspiracy plot 
                                                           
23  Karasev’s play was permanently under critics’ attacks for its relatively, by the Soviet 
standards, adventure bias, for the reason that “Karasev builds the intrigue of his play 
specifically on the base of the audience’s unhealthy curiosity” («Карасев интригу 
своей пьесы строит именно на разжигании нездорового любопытства зрителя».); 
cf. Mlodik 1938: 151. 
24  «…брал комиссионные от фирм, когда распределял советские заказы». – Leonov 
1940: 72. 
25  Катерина: «Я думала, он враг, а он просто вор…». − Leonov 1940: 72. 
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on its head, it retains the pathos of the genre, its concern with revealing hidden 
evil. In his play, Leonov has simply replaced spies and saboteurs with conspira-
tors and slanderers. 
I doubt whether Aleksei Faiko’s (1893–1978) play Chelovek s portfelem (A 
Man with a Briefcase, 1928) can be numbered as conspiracy drama without res-
ervation. Instead, it marks the limitations of the genre when relocated beyond its 
traditional territory. Faiko tells the story of a prominent academic at the so-called 
State Institute for Culture and Revolution in Moscow who is trying to conceal 
his participation in an anti-Soviet group named “Russia and Freedom”26 which 
was uncovered by the NKVD several years previously. This protagonist is incon-
trovertibly alien to Soviet society; moreover, he is a genuine murderer. But now 
his motives have gone beyond espionage and sabotage. His main aim is to sur-
vive his dangerous situation and to build a career as a respectable Soviet acade-
mic. He is teaching his son survival skills, following this agenda, “You will live 
among wild animals and you must become the best of them.”27 In this play, the 
audience encounters neither scenes of sabotage nor signs of espionage. In addi-
tion, the protagonist’s extreme individualism in Faiko’s work resists the con-
struction of a story about conspiracy. 
Vsevolod Rokk’s28 play Inzhener Sergeev (Engineer Sergeev, 1942),29 about 
spies who infiltrate a new Soviet electric power plant, represents a borderline ex-
ample of the opposite type. Its storyline fits the genre’s standards propagandiz-
ing vigilance against masked enemies, and the enemies it visualizes are typical 
of this milieu. The only moment that violates the general scheme of conspiracy 
drama is the time of action, set in the second part of 1941 when Germany had al-
ready begun attacking the USSR. Thus the reality of wartime has displaced im-
aginary espionage activity in the storyline. 
But despite certain exceptions, it should be apparent that all these “transi-
tional” or “quasi-conspiracy” plays owe their existence to the pivotal corpus of 
definitely “conspiracy” drama texts. They were written either with the intention 
to fit perfectly within this canon or to depart from the most obvious specimens of 
the genre. 
 
                                                           
26  «Русь и Воля»  
27  «Ты будешь жить среди зверей и ты должен стремиться стать лучшим зверем». 
– Faiko 1929: 61.  
28  Vsevolod Rokk was a pen name of Vsevolod Merkulov (1895–1953), a high-ranking 
GPU officer, and a close associate of Lavrenty Beria. 
29  Rokk 1942. 
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Irrationality and Logic 
 
A well-known approach to conspiracy theories, which involves treating them as 
“a specific kind of irrationality associated with a stubborn, highly rational, and 
highly operational logic,”30 is easily applicable to the case of “spy theater” in the 
USSR. Despite a diversity of dramatic realizations, Soviet plays about hidden 
enemies generally suggested a rather coherent vision of reality. 
If we consider the key ideas and notions that underpin this fictional construc-
tion, but which lack any direct connection with the topos of espionage, then So-
viet “conspiracy dramatists” did not present anything new to their audience that 
might have contrasted with the authorities’ official, factual discourse. Many 
plays fixated on the conflicted questions of factory or collective farm labor; 
therefore, the heroic enthusiasm of the masses naturally became one of their 
most prominent themes for many of them. This effusion of enthusiasm was char-
acteristically expressed by chief engineer Nikolaev, a character from Iakov Ru-
binshtein’s (1891–1930)31 play Na raznykh putiakh (Upon Different Ways, 
1930), who warns his colleagues: “If we don’t finish by the first of February, I’ll 
shoot myself.”32 
The idea of the militarization of labor was vital for conspiracy drama. Im-
plicitly, the conspiracy dramatists inculcated the slogan “labor is war” as zeal-
ously as any other Soviet writers and artists; but in Rubinshtein’s play another 
character, the chief engineer’s wife, explicitly expresses the same message. She 
states: “We could not feel more enthusiasm if the war were about to start.”33 
The slogan “Vigilance!” (bditel’nost’) also appears both natural and proper 
in this atmosphere of “almost-war.” In the words of an aged and very experi-
enced member of the Communist Party, a female character from Aleksandr Afi-
nogenov’s (1904–1941) play Strakh (Fear, 1930): “If class enemies still dare to 
make bureaucratic delays, burn collective farms, poison canned food and speak 
                                                           
30  Groh 1987: 4. 
31  Iakov L’vovich Rubinshtein was an influential manager in the fisheries industry as 
well as a dramatist. He was shot in 1930, according to the information received from 
Тat’iana Кukushkina (The Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of 
Science/Pushkin House).  
32  «Если мы не закончим к первому февраля, я застрелюсь». – Rubinshtein 1930: 13. 
33  «Энтузиазм прямо как перед войной». – Rubinshtein 1930: 15. 
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from this lectern, it means that they are not scared enough. It means that we must 
redouble our vigilance.”34 
In turn, this politics of vigilance, which purported the destruction of a hidden 
enemy, linked to a revised notion of “humanism,” in a manner of speaking, to 
the “merciless humanism” finds expression in, for example, Boris Voitekhov’s 
(1911–1975) and Leonid Lench’s (1905–1991) play Pavel Grekov (The Com-
munist Pavel Grekov, 1939). Immediately before the curtain falls, one character 
claims, “Don’t allow the enemy to strike you, strike him yourselves. … Be mer-
ciless towards enemies. This is true humanism!”35 
The citations provided above are exceptionally bald and straightforward, but 
“conspiracy drama” impressed the identical message on their audiences by every 
available, sometimes very sophisticated and theatrical means. 
The word “vigilance” (bditel’nost’) normally carries positive connotations; at 
the same time it relates semantically to a wide set of lexemes referring to the 
field of sensory experience which, in contrast to “vigilance,” imply negative be-
haviors by the actor: “suspiciousness” (podozritel’nost’), “distrustfulness” (mni-
tel’nost’), etc. But the “conspiracy” dramatists, like Soviet writers in general, 
rarely fell into this trap of synonymy. They preferred to use an alternative term 
popular in the 1920s and 1930s: “scent” (chut’e). 
Dramatists, like other Soviet public figures, regularly refer to chut’e in order 
to stress that rational reasoning was insufficient to reveal an enemy. Here is only 
one example to show how this mechanism worked in conspiracy drama. 
In Ial’tsev’s play Katastrofa (A Railway Catastrophe, 1937), one of the posi-
tive characters, Engineer Novikov, doubts whether or not a railroad accident 
which took place was really accidental; perhaps conspirators were responsible. 
Novikov discusses his suspicions with a colleague, and the following exchange 
of cues ensues: 
 
                                                           
34  «Когда классовый враг ещё осмеливается разводить волокиту, поджигать кол-
хозы, отравлять консервы и говорить с этой кафедры, – значит он недостаточно 
боится. Значить надо удесятерить бдительность». – Afinogenov 1931: 69.  
35  «Не допускайте, чтобы враг бил Вас. Бейте его сами. … Будьте беспощадны к 
врагам, в этом подлинный гуманизм!» – Voitekhov/Lench 1939: 123. 
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Barsov: But evidence! Where is the evidence?  
Novikov: I don’t have direct evidence yet. But I scent something. Something stinks here, 
Nikolai Vasil’evich.36 
 
It would seem that, while Soviet epistemology never dismissed the significance 
of intuition, the fictional narratives vastly inflated its utility. 
Normally a protagonist has an unerring ability to “scent” trouble and trusts 
this feeling completely. If the character fails to trust his intuition, retribution is 
inevitable. Thus, in Mikhail Shimkevich’s (1885–1942) drama V’iuga (Snow-
storm, 1931) depicting the construction of an hydroelectric power plant on a riv-
er, a selfless, almost ideal communist named Voronov generously orders the re-
lease of a suspicious monk who had been detained near the dam of the power 
plant at night, as there is no direct evidence against him. “Of course, he isn’t one 
of us,” Voronov explains, “but what more can we do? We cannot catch an empty 
cassock.”37 Voronov resists the emotional arguments of his more perspicacious 
comrade-in-arms, a female character, who immediately identifies the monk as a 
typical anti-Soviet White Guard sympathizer. As a result, a year later, the “pseu-
do-monk” kills Voronov’s comrade. On the one hand, her death is regarded as 
the severest moral punishment of the protagonist; on the other, she becomes, in-
evitably, a sacrifice to the cult of vigilance. The last act of the play closes with a 
symbolic scene in which workers standing on different banks of the river call out 
to each other, “Be on the lookout! Be on the lookout! Be on the lookout!”38 
Rational reasoning retained its importance for the investigation of conspi-
racies: not, however, as a tool for revealing the truth (which was already known 
through intuition) but rather as an element of rhetorical arguments without which 
no criminal could be denounced and punished. 
From the perspective of the “sociology of the total conspiracy,” which was 
suggested to Soviet audiences, ideas about kinship and family relationships lost 
their traditional meaning. Or, to be more precise, conspiracy drama (and other 
genres, too) implied that the natural human affection and trust for one’s relatives 
had to be disregarded in a socialist society. 
                                                           
36  Барсов: «Но доказательства! Где доказательства!» – Новиков: «Прямых доказа-
тельств у меня пока нет. Но я чую. Здесь дурно пахнет, Николай Васильевич» – 
Ial’tsev: 1938a: 16. 
37  «Конечно, он не наш … Ну, а дальше что? Схватить и взять пустую рясу?» – 
Shimkevich 1931: 77. 
38  «Будь на-чеку! Будь на-чеку! Будь на-чеку!» – Shimkevich 1931: 124. 
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This substitution of older concepts of kinship and family relationships with 
the idea of a single social organism perhaps came to a head in Georgii Mdivani’s 
(1905–1981) play Chest’ (Honor, 1937) about the aged hunter Iagor. During an 
action sequence, one of his sons, a border guard, is killed by spies. Another son, 
revealed as an enemy agent, was killed by Iagor himself. As soon becomes clear, 
a bosom friend of Iagor guides saboteurs across the border; Iagor exposes him in 
public. Prior to this revelation other people, including Iagor’s border guard son, 
had suspected Iagor himself. Finally, Iagor’s former friend’s daughter, who is 
the widow of Iagor’s honest son, repudiates her father. 
The demolition of kinship and family relationships is topped off with a dia-
log between Iagor’s son, the border guard, and this son’s platoon leader, which 
contains the following statement: 
 
Platoon leader: Aren’t you ashamed to hide your thoughts from me, Nadir? You have nev-
er done anything like that before. (He is drawing nearer to Nadir, embracing him.) The 
two of us were like a single man, like a single heart...39 
 
After an attempt by Nadir to separate from the “collective body,” his death is 
predetermined.40 
The politics of vigilance, based on the identification of a peaceful life with 
military action, also directly influenced more intimate (sexual) relations between 
characters. Consequently, such relations were also considered criminal: let us re-
member here Pavel Ial’tsev’s Na granice (On the Border, 1929) or Gorky’s So-
mov i drugie. 
If we focus on feelings and emotions in general, Afinogenov’s play Strakh 
can serve as the best illustration of how an ideal positive character succeeds in 
controlling his basic instincts and emotions. Afinogenov’s play persuades the 
audience that “eternal unconditioned stimuli, such as love, hunger, rage, and 
                                                           
39  «Как тебе не стыдно, Надир, скрывать от меня свои мысли? Разве это когда-ни-
будь раньше бывало? (Подходит к Надиру, обнимает его за плечи.) Оба мы 
были как один человек, как одно сердце…». – Mdivani 1938: 28.  
40  At the same time we should note that, in the beginning, family relationships occasion-
ally contained the opposite meaning. For example, in Anatolii Lunacharskii’s (1875–
1933) play Iad (Poison, 1925) it is affection for his close relative which awakes a 
sense of responsibility in the 18-year-old son of a prominent member of the Soviet 
government and which prevents this son from poisoning his father on the instructions 
of a prostitute in the pay of foreign agents; cf. Lunacharskii 1926. 
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fear”41 have been replaced in the Soviet individual with “collectivism, enthu-
siasm and the joy of life.”42 In other words, Afinogenov clearly puts social life 
and politics in opposition to basic human instincts, keeping the leading role for 
the former. 
Adapting the almost paramilitary enthusiasm attributed to the New Soviet 
Man, Soviet writers (“engineers of souls”) transform the meaning of the instinct 
of self-preservation in a particular way. This is not to say that their characters 
consciously control this instinct. Simply put, their instinct of self-preservation 
turns off in certain situations which always coincides with a climactic narrative 
event. If Soviet art normally cultivated the virtue of self-sacrifice, then conspi-
racy drama produced its own extreme form of this virtue. 
In the simplest cases, which pre-date the plays of “conspiracy dramatists,” a 
captured Soviet soldier prefers suicide to captivity. Conversely, spies choose life. 
Let me mention in this connection Bill’-Belotserkovskii’s play Pogranichniki 
(Border Guards, 1938). A negative character in Ial’tsev’s play Na granitse 
states: “Any man clings to life, Mr. Stenshinskii... .”43 
Another, less widespread, more sophisticated and therefore more interesting 
from a rhetorical perspective, representation of the idea of heroic self-sacrifice is 
based on legal terminology and expresses itself in terms of the logic of “pre-
emptive justice.” Under these terms, a character who has failed to be vigilant 
blames himself in advance and demands the death penalty. 
In Ial’tsev’s play Na granitse, a guilty border guard first executes his fiancée 
(a secret agent) and, still agonized by his mistake, insists on justice for himself 
too: 
 
Okunev: Comrade Strepetov! This is an illegal trial... 
Vasilii: Yes, it is. This is an illegal trial. Take me away. I let this gang through... I allowed 
them to cross the border... I did not stand firm. I let everyone down… There is no 
place here for men like me!44 
 
In the same manner, a character in Ial’tsev’s Afrodita, a museum director, sen-
                                                           
41  «Вечные безусловные стимулы: любовь, голод, гнев и страх». – Afinogenov 
1931: 7.  
42  «Коллективность, энтузиазм, радость жизни» – Afinogenov 1931: 21. 
43  «Всякий человек цепляется за жизнь, пан Стеншинский...». – Ial’tsev 1929: 49. 
44  Окунев: «Товарищ Стрепетов! Это самосуд!» – Василий: «Да, самосуд… Берите 
и меня. Я открыл этой шайке дорогу… Я пропустил их сюда… Не крепко 
стоял… Проскользнулся… Такому здесь не место!» – Ial’tsev 1929: 52. 
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tences himself to be shot after he allowed criminals to replace an original pain-
ting with a copy. “No! Put me up against the wall, me!,” the museum director in-
sists, “I was trusted to keep this painting safe. A brilliant creation, our pride… 
Dear God!!”45 We find similar scenes in plays mentioned previously, such as 
Bill’-Belotserkovskii’s Golos nedr; or, for example, in Afinogenov’s Malinovoe 
varen’e (Raspberry Jam, 1926),46 Boris Romashov’s (1895–1958) Konets Krivo-
ryl’ska (The End of The Town of Krivoryl’sk, 1925–26).47 The list goes on. 
Thus, the meaning of the notion of bditel’nost’ influenced the “deepest psy-
chology” of the Soviet “homo conspiratus” both metaphorically and actually, 
acting on his basic needs and motives, sometimes simply refuting them. In so do-
ing, conspiracy drama mostly followed the mainstream of Soviet art. But, as I 
have shown, it was also distinguished as a genre by specific variations, peculiar 





In spite of their widely ranging fantasy, Soviet dramatists had to show the au-
dience a reality which at least partly resembled everyday life in the USSR. One 
of the tasks which conspiracy drama sought to tackle was to draw the audience’s 
attention away from various routine problems and dangerous themes or to give 
the latter a more attractive appearance. Nevertheless, undesirable “thematic con-
traband” all too often entered these plays. Trips abroad, foreign life, and foreig-
ners as subjects of desire were the most popular “illegal” topics that the con-
spiracy drama dealt with. For example, in Iakov Rubinshtein’s play Na raznykh 
putiakh, Soviet girls are fascinated by an American engineer, knowing that his 
mother wishes to see him get married in Russia. Thanks to this trick, the spy 
gains the confidence of one of his vulnerable victims. The same motif appears in 
Zoshchenko’s play Opasnye sviazi, Ial’tsev’s play Nenavist’ (Hate, 1928),48 etc. 
Another sort of implicit undesired content characteristic of this genre might 
be called “a negative discourse of everyday Soviet reality.” Often, authors do not 
direct particular attention to this content. It is incidental in the sense that authors 
                                                           
45  Директор: «Нет, это меня надо к стенке, меня! Ведь мне же доверили эту кар-
тину. Величайшее произведение, наша гордость… Боже мой!». – Ial’tsev 1938: 
240. 
46  Afinogenov 1935. 
47  Romashov 1935. 
48  Ial’tsev 1929. 
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are helpless before its power, in spite of their aspirations to paint a cheerful, 
rose-colored life. Let us look at one example among many. Miners from Bill’-
Belotserkovskii’s Golos nedr complain to the chief engineer about the barracks 
built for them: “We moved in only three months ago. And already the plaster has 
come off, the walls have cracked, the window frames have sagged. ... In the bar-
racks bedbugs and fleas bite.”49 
Helplessness before the everyday reality with which one is faced is typical 
not only of the “conspiracy” genre, although the paranoid thinking which distin-
guishes it makes depictions of daily life even more absurd. The representations 
of total state terror in conspiracy dramas are more specific. Afinogenov in his 
Strach provides a lot of frightening images but the most disturbing of these plays 
is perhaps Virta’s comedy Kleveta (Slander, 1939). 
Virta’s play tells the story of a respectable Moscow official, Anton Ivanovich 
Proskurovskii, about whom a rumor circulates that he is under suspicion and will 
be soon arrested. After Proskurovskii’s wife Mar’ia Petrovna tries to reach her 
son by telephone, who lives elsewhere, she is informed that her son never re-
sided at the address she knows to have been his, she does not doubt what has 
happened to him. “Now it’s clear: my son Petia’s been arrested!,” she con-
cludes.50 
When her husband reasonably remarks, “Mashen’ka, you are going crazy 
from fear,”51 Mar’ia Petrovna replies: “It is too easy to go crazy from what is go-
ing on around!… Say a word, and you will be jailed straight away!”52 Moreover, 
her paranoia is justified on every count. Before long, many of the neighbors stop 
talking to Proskurovskii while others begin surreptitiously to sympathize with 
his predicament. Suddenly, a young man who rents a room in their apartment 
and is courting their daughter moves to another flat. Then, Proskurovskii’s 
housekeeper asks him for money to buy some bread in order to put it in the oven 
and make dried rusks for him to take to prison. After that, Proskurovskii (who 
was about to make a business trip abroad as a trusted official) is fired without 
notice, and his wife becomes disappointed in the fact that she is married to him. 
Finally, a new person appears in the apartment intending to replace Proskurov-
                                                           
49  «Только три месяца как пожили, а уж штукатурка отвалилась; стены потреска-
лись, рамы скосились. … В казармах клопы едят, блохи грызут». – Bill’-Belotser-
kovskii 1930: 61. 
50  «Так, ясно: Петку посадили!» – Virta 1939b: 97. 
51  «Машенька, ты просто сошла с ума от страха». – ibid. 
52  «Сойдёшь с ума, ежели кругом такое… Ты что-нибудь скажешь, а тебя как цап-
нут!» – ibid. 
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skii, who has apparently been “arrested”; and as a result the rearrangement of the 
apartments begins. In other words, intentionally or unintentionally Virta presents 
a detailed picture of the typical situation of an individual denounced as a sabo-
teur. The comic effect of the plot, according to Virta, is based on the fact that the 
peripeteia the character undergoes arises not from “real” conspiracy, but from a 
slander which is soon exposed.  
If Virta’s play Conspiracy, the action of which took place in 1936 or 1937, 
was over-saturated with spies and saboteurs, soon after, when Nikolai Ezhov was 
denounced (which implied the end, or at least the suspension, of the Great Purg-
es), spies and saboteurs were replaced by slanderers and “paranoiacs.” In terms 
of the “rhetoric of genre,” Virta suggested a very simple way of solving the 
problem of the sudden shift in Stalin’s politics. He suggested transforming the 





Although the discourse of total terror infiltrated the conspiracy drama in one way 
or another, one subject related to this theme was placed under strict taboo. This 
unspoken prohibition probably played a noticeable role in shaping the new form 
of the fictional narratives about “enemies within” which appeared before World 
War II but developed into a “genre factory” from isolated cases only after Sta-
lin’s death. The genre that I have in mind embraces various detective narratives 
in their Soviet adaptations—within fiction, cinema, and drama. By taboo sub-
jects I mean representations of the common practice of intimidation and torture 
of defendants and suspects. 
The link between the prohibition on discussing tortures and the interest in de-
duction is easily explained. In this respect, art resembles real life: if violence is 
not allowed, one should rely upon intellect instead. But some nuances that arise 
here should be examined. 
Such “humanity,” that is passing over in silence the matter of violence during 
investigations, did not tacitly mean the victory of logic which, in conspiracy 
drama as we have already observed, was opposed by “intuition.” It is not to say 
that “torture” was substituted by the capacity of “scent” (chut’e), but this “scent” 
definitely ousted the professional detective as a character from the center of the 
dramatic narrative. It is not surprising, therefore, that in most cases the investiga-
tion itself did not attract a lot of authors’ attention in conspiracy drama. 
Conspiracy drama contains some elements of poetics of the detective genre 
but only isolated elements. More often than not, party officials, collective farm 
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chairpersons, and ordinary vigilant citizens (but not GPU or police/militia) are 
involved in the sort of spy hunting depicted by conspiracy dramatists. As a rule, 
professionals appear only at the end and often only in order to escort a suspect to 
jail. They sporadically act in Voitekhov’s and Lench’s Kommunist Pavel Gre-
kov, in Afinogenov’s Volch’ia tropa (The Wolf’s Path, 1927) and Strach. Their 
activity is more noticeable than in others in Romashov’s play Konets Krivoryl’s-
ka. One of the main characters of Virta’s play Zagovor serves as a district prose-
cutor, but his investigation is rather slack: it seems that the conspirators are 
ready to fall into his lap. 
However, conspiracy drama directly relates to the development of the Soviet 
spy detective genre, a genre which was consolidated only after Stalin’s death. It 
was the environment into which one of the first and most important examples of 
the latter type emerged. I am referring here to the Brothers Tur’s53 and Lev Shei-
nin’s (1906–1967)54 play Ochnaia stavka (Confrontation, 1936), which was not 
fully typical of this class of play. 
This is not an attempt to explain the fact that the Brothers Tur and Sheinin 
made the central character of their play an investigator only for aesthetic reasons. 
But it is evident that they hoped to profit from the defamiliarization of genre 
standards. Before the beginning of the main action, they make the following re-
mark: 
 
Lartsev as an investigator is extremely different from the traditional figure of the inves-
tigator from other plays, in which characters of this kind played a minor role.55 
 
In this play, the Brothers Tur and Sheinin successfully combined the propaganda 
of labor enthusiasm and hysteria about the “internal enemy,” on the one hand, 
with a full-fledged detective plot on the other. The investigator Lartsev is a des-
perate workaholic, and at the same time, according to the authors he “is far from 
being a person with gloomy searching eyes, looking mistrustfully from under the 
                                                           
53  The pen name of Leonid Davidovich Tubel’skii (1905–1961) and Petr L’vovich 
Ryzhei (1908–1978). 
54  As is well-known, Lev Sheinin worked as an investigator in the 1920s and 1930s. He 
was then imprisoned but was released soon thereafter; in 1945 Sheinin participated in 
the Nuremberg trials, then he was repressed again. 
55  «Следователь Ларцев разительно не похож на традиционный тип следователя из 
пьес, где, правда, ему отводилось обычно второстепенное место». – Tur/Sheinin 
1938: 15. 
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brows and speaking with a metallic voice.”56 To a certain degree, one can treat 
Lartsev as a sort of “incarnation” of Lenin, as the latter was presented in the So-
viet iconography. As the Brothers Tur and Sheinin describe him: “He is an ordi-
nary cheerful individual with vivid, smiling eyes.”57 The victory of detective 
genre conventions over the formulaic agenda of conspiracy plays is expressed 
clearly in the following advice by Lartsev: 
 
Don’t believe human eyes too much, Lavrenko... Although, of course, try to see every de-
tail... Again and again knock together facts and facts, evidence and hypotheses, intuition 
and reality. Set them, like dogs, on each other. Knock their foreheads together! (emphasis 
added).58 
 
In this respect, the Brothers Tur’s and Sheinin’s protagonist behaves not like a 
character from a typical “conspiracy” play, but like a character from a detective 
story: he teaches his assistant to be skeptical with regard to first impressions and 
to bring together intuition and real facts. There is nothing similar here to other 
plays from the 1930s, even those explicitly about spies and saboteurs.59 
By any consideration, Ochnaia stavka is still a conspiracy play. In some re-
spects it is a striking example of the genre. For instance, Lartsev explains the 
failure of the spy mission he has exposed by the fact that “170,000,000 ‘non-
secret’ agents” (that is the whole population of the USSR) serve the GPU. More-
over, the “conspiracy theater” continued to work successfully after the triumph 
of both the play itself and its screen adaptation Oshibka inzhenera Kochina (En-
gineer Kochin’s Mistake, 1939), directed by Aleksandr Macheret. On the whole, 
however, what these experiments in the detective genre did was to mark out one 
of the blurred boundaries of totalitarian art. 
 
 
                                                           
56  «Это отнюдь не кислый хмурый человек с мрачными испытывающими глазами, 
подозрительным взглядом исподлобья и металлическим голосом». – ibid. 
57  «Это обыкновенный жизнерадостный человек с живыми, смеющимися глаза-
ми». – ibid.  
58  «А глазам человеческим всё-таки не очень верь, Лавренко… Хотя, конечно, ста-
райся замечать всё… И снова и снова сталкивай факты и факты, улики и гипо-
тезы, интуицию и реальность. Стравливай их, стравливай, Лавренко. Сшибай 
их лбами!» – Tur/Sheinin: 23–24. 
59  Critics did not like plays by the Brothers Tur or Sheinin, but they were greatly popular 
with audiences. 
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Conclusion 
 
The development of conspiracy drama is directly related to the birth of Soviet 
detective fiction and cinema, including their sub-genres that focused on espio-
nage. Although, of course, prose fiction (such as Lev Ovalov’s and Lev Shei-
nin’s novels and stories) played an important role in pushing forward the process 
as well. Later, the outdated conspiracy drama detective genre conquered the ter-
ritory for itself in the sphere of entertaining literature and cinema for a mass au-
dience. The value of this transition from “serious” “conspiracy art” to detective 
writing can scarcely be overestimated, if one considers detective genres jointly 
alongside adventure narratives and stories from the erotic and horror genres as 
significant forms of public discourse which respond to some basic, and not al-
ways legitimate, individual needs. I believe that “genre tolerance” and “genre 
xenophobia” are symptoms that clearly indicate a society’s character: finally, the 
beginning of the era of Soviet detective fiction and cinema coincided with a time 
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This chapter describes how ‘spy mania,’ which affected both public and private 
life in the Soviet Union (particularly in the 1930s), intersected with Soviet litera-
ture and theater. Diverse theater productions during the 1920s and 1930s, linked 
by their exaggerated concern with spies and saboteurs, can be considered to be a 
separate genre, conspiracy drama. Conspiracy drama occupied a distinct place in 
Soviet official culture, responding to shifts in ideology, in Stalin’s policy, and in-
fluencing public opinion in its own, rather unique way. What were the bounda-
ries of this near-forgotten genre? What was conspiracy drama teaching, persuad-
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Conspirology is the interpretation of historical and political events and facts that 
can be characterized as an endeavor to reveal ‘the one truth’ that has been hidden 
from most of society’s members. It is based on the theory of conspiracy, i.e., “on 
the entirety of hypotheses trying to represent an event or a process as the result 
of a secret group’s conscious actions with the intention to influence a historical 
process.”1 Conspiracy theories have gained particular prominence in the twenty-
first century, and that is for a good reason. The new media, especially the so-
called social media, are associated with a perpetual and total stream of informa-
tion, a stream with which not everyone is able to cope. The contemporary 
rhythm of life and its continuous acceleration provoke chaos in an individual’s 
processes of thinking. Furthermore, the new media forces recipients to com-
prehend whole chunks of diverse, often contradictory information at a time, to 
discern truth from falsehood and to abandon obsolete information.2 Examples of 
this kind of information include the presentation of new or alternative reasons 
for a catastrophe, alternative developments in history, documentaries or pseudo-
documentaries about ‘secret societies,’ propaganda for the polarization of the 
world, for its division in terms of good and evil, etc. As a result of such an over-
whelming amount of information, the individual is increasingly less able to ana-
                                                           
1  Pavlova 2013: 144. 
2  Cf. Rudnev 2011: 8. 
88 | Safargaleeva 
lyze the events in the world and the human mind becomes susceptible to manipu-
lation.3 
In order to separate real conspiracies in history from hypothetical ones, scho-
lars from various disciplines—historians, social scientists, and philosophers—
have tried to understand how and why conspiracy theories spread, and just what 
makes them so popular. Correspondingly, specialists in language and literature 
speak of the beginning of an era of fiction evolving around conspiracies and con-
spiracy theories. One example of such fiction is the conspirological novel. Schol-
ars have recently tried to identify the dominant features of novels belonging to 
this genre, certain narrative formulas that influence the basic forms of the poetics 
of fiction, such as plot, subject, composition, the system of characters, the mo-
tifs, and the images. The following features may be considered as characteristic 
of conspirological narration: 
 
• extreme polarization of the protagonists (their division into “good and evil” 
characters) and of space 
• exciting and captivating subjects such as emergencies and the protagonists’ 
desires to solve a mystery 
• a concept of two worlds in the text 
• a new way of playing with worlds (the creation of ideal, concealed worlds, and 
the search for an ultimate, final objective reality)4 
 
The question of society’s organization, and of interpretations of reality as such in 
the light of new media, is not merely one of the most important questions for 
scholars, but also one of the prominent subjects in the work of Russian writers 
and playwrights alike. One expressive and authentic playwright who refers to 
conspiracy theories throughout his work is Maksim Kurochkin (*1970). On the 
basis of an analysis of his play Istrebitel’ klassa Medeia (Medea Type Fighter,5 
1995), it will be shown which particularities of conspirological narration are pre-
sent in the text and which goals the author strives to achieve by using them. 
Maksim Kurochkin—a historian by profession—is one of the most noted and 
significant representatives of young contemporary drama. Having started his 
creative path at the Lubimovka Festival, he has since actively worked with junior 
                                                           
3  Cf. Pavlova 2013: 144. 
4  Cf. ibid.: 145–49. 
5  The text has only been published on the Internet (http://www.theatre-library.ru/ 
files/k/kurochkin/kurochkin_1.html), therefore the further quotations are made with-
out reference. 
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playwrights. He has also been a member of the organizational committee and an 
invited expert at the beginner playwrights’ festival Prem’era (Moscow). Further-
more, he has worked with young participants of the project Dokumental’nyi 
teatr. Layers of time and the space of the past and the future are always shown 
from an unusual point of view through the usage of certain artistic skills, no mat-
ter what Kurochkin writes about in his plays. “It is always one monolithic, entire 
continent which is made up of fantasy and reality, and in which objects, things 
and people are transferred from one age to another.”6 
The distinguishing feature of Kurochkin’s works is how he playfully em-
ploys cultural discourse. The playwright not only stylizes a certain cultural atmo-
sphere, but also creates a dialogue between cultural mythology and contempo-
rary language and experience. This may occur at the level of the external subject. 
The inner subject, however, becomes increasingly more important than the level 
of the external subject. The protagonists surpass the boundaries of their historical 
role and start discussing the situation of the play’s subject from a contemporary 
point of view. The protagonists project their everyday life experience onto the 
mythological past. The famous researcher of the phenomenon of “New Drama,” 
Mark Lipovetsky, defines Kurochkin’s historical plays as anti-utopias that have 
more or less come true. Accordingly, Kurochkin represents the cultural myth in 
which the phantasmagoria found in the original, is confirmed by the contempo-
rary experience of reality.7 In other words, through his texts the author expresses 
that nothing has really changed since ancient times. Despite all of humanity’s 
progress and achievements, peoples’ minds are still archaic, dark, and primeval. 
Kurochkin vividly displays how savagery and offended feelings are ever lurking 
behind a facade of culture. These motifs can be found in his plays Kukhnia 
(Kitchen, 2000) and Vodka, eblia, televizor (Vodka, Fucking, Television, 2005). 
A quotation from the latter goes as follows: “As in ancient times, as in the Stone 
Age, simple gods reign over us.”8 These gods are in fact exposed as human in-
stincts. Kurochkin combines historical events with a real experience in the pre-
sent, and reality confirms the phantasmagoria of a mythological or legendary sit-
uation. The myth and the languages of European high culture act as an interme-
diary of the dialogues between the events of the past and the reality of today. A 
                                                           
6  «И всегда это монолитный, единый художественный материк, сплавленный из 
фантастики и жизненной достоверности, где предметы, вещи, люди из одной 
эпохи спокойно переносятся в другую». − Gromova 2009: 176. 
7  Cf. Lipovetsky 2012: 222–23. 
8  «Как в древности, как в каменном веке нами правят простые боги». − Kurochkin 
2005: 28. 
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psychological footprint of violence—a trauma—characterizes these languages. 
The playwright takes a certain turning point in the life of the protagonists or a 
mythological situation, and illustrates that this very situation only emerges due 
to a “traumatic paradox.”9 
The myth of Medea and the Argonauts is one such myth in the play Istre-
bitel’ klassa Medeia. The play shows the last war in humanity’s history. It 
evolves around an alternative future in which all conflicts in this world—racial, 
religious, international, social, and political—have been surmounted; only one 
war rages: a war between men and women. In his stage direction, the author 
warns us that “not a single one of those sitting here in this hall shall live to see 
the events this play is about.”10 A truly apocalyptic image of destruction emerges 
in the play brought about in the aftermath of an assault by the destroyer squad 
carrying the name of the mythological heroine—the avenger Medea. 
The myth of Medea and the Argonauts, which has become famous through 
the classical interpretations of Euripides, Seneca, and Corneille, remains signi-
ficant even in the twenty-first century, given that it deals with ethical and moral 
questions which concern human beings when faced with the choice between of-
fended feelings and the morally forbidden. The myth represents the protagonist’s 
inner fight trying to achieve her goal, which is to take revenge for the inflicted 
injustice.11 In our analysis, we will, first and foremost, deal with the part of the 
myth that details how Medea cruelly takes revenge on Jason by murdering their 
shared children—an episode with tremendous meaning for the understanding of 
the author’s intention and the basic idea of the text. 
As we know, during the quest for the Golden Fleece, the Argonauts were 
helped by the sorceress Medea who fell in love with their leader Jason. Jason re-
ciprocated her feelings. Thanks to Medea’s skills, he acquired the fleece and, 
making her his wife, went home with her. According to the myth, Medea and Ja-
son soon had children upon their arrival in Corinth. But Jason, captivated by the 
beauty of another woman, decided to leave Medea. However, only with Medea’s 
assistance, could he accomplish such a great feat as the retrieval of the Golden 
Fleece and could avoid death several times.  
Medea, having learned of her husband’s betrayal, fell into despair, which 
grew into fierce anger and a thirst for revenge. However, Medea’s rage affected 
                                                           
9  Lipovetsky 2012: 223. 
10  «Ни один из сидящих с этом зале, не доживет до событий, о которых пойдет 
речь». − Kurochkin 1995. 
11  Cf. Savinykh 2017: 126–27. 
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not only the guilty party, Jason, but also their children. In other words, Medea 
turned her anger against herself.  
In the play, the playwright realizes this motif in an unexpected way: he 
draws a picture of a last great war, a war that affects the whole world, which is 
further illustrated by the presence of three characters from different countries 
and the fact that they are united by the shared desire to survive, i.e., there is an 
emergency situation—an indispensable condition for a conspirological narrative. 
Somewhere on a small piece of land on Coney Island, three soldiers—Uncle Ko-
lia, a Ukrainian sergeant; Sergei, a Russian; and Peter, an American—are all 
struggling to resist the brutal ‘man-haters.’ There is a categorical division into 
‘bad’ and ‘good’ characters, which is another important hallmark of a conspiro-
logical narrative.  
The men would rather die than surrender to the savage female warriors. For 
men, captivity turns out to be a fate worse than death, since the exterminators 
make “housewives” out of their captives: they force them to “do the dishes and 
wash their socks.” By the end of the play, however, it turns out that the conflict, 
which has been built is a false one, because there are no more real, “ancient” 
men. They were slaughtered long ago, and women now play the role of men. 
This becomes evident when the soldier Sergei takes off his shirt, revealing his 
female breasts in a bra. It becomes clear that the women are waging war against 
themselves: 
 
Sergei: If you are asking about the ancient men, well, they were all slaughtered at the be-
ginning of the war. I didn’t cross any of them. 
Woman: So whom have we been fighting with all this time? With ourselves. 
Sergei: You have been fighting with men. With those who feel and act as men. The an-
cient ones didn't make it. They were weak. Now we are men.12 
 
The mystery is revealed: initially, it appears to the reader that the play presents a 
gender conflict—a conflict with the social other, but in the end it turns out that 
women are exterminating themselves. The pseudo gender conflict turns out to be 
an existential conflict, as the only female character speaks about her inner anxi-
eties and contradictions. 
                                                           
12  Сергей: «Если ты говоришь про древних мужчин, то их перебили ещё в самом 
начале войны. Я их уже не застал» – Женщина: «Так с кем мы всё это время вое-
вали? Сами с собой» – Сергей: «Вы воевали с мужчинами. С теми, кто чувствует 
себя мужчиной и поступает как мужчина. Древние не справились. Они были 
слабыми. Теперь мы мужчины». 
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The play begins with the men crawling out from under the rubble. The action 
takes place “among the chaos, destroyed guns, shell boxes, rubble, helmets, 
backpacks, dead bodies and other military debris,”13 the stage set is created using 
minimal artistic means. The initial description of the scenery creates an apoca-
lyptic atmosphere and the feeling of an extremely exposed world on the verge of 
extinction. The debris is a warning to civilizations what the consequences of the 
outbreak of war could be, because war always fatefully turns on its instigator. It 
is symbolic that the play begins and ends with scenes of destruction. At first, the 
viewer does not understand who the characters are fighting against, the enemy is 
not referred to by name. The play’s structure is strongly linked to the creation 
and preservation of intrigue from beginning to end. Each of the three male char-
acters has a name, an indication of rank, and a nationality, while the only female 
character, simply called Woman, is a kind of universal category, a collective im-
age of all women. Initially, there is only the knowledge of the war between two 
camps, but the very essence of this war is revealed only on the last pages of the 
play. The “mystery” of what is happening gradually dawns on the viewer in ac-
cordance with the laws of the conspirological strategy of narration. One could 
argue that there is a bipolar system of characters: three male characters as “posi-
tive heroes,” allegedly seeking to defeat evil, on the one hand, and a woman as a 
villain or antihero and the embodiment of this evil on the other, which is another 
integral feature of conspirological narrative.  
Interestingly the play does not emphasize and elaborate on how the charac-
ters look and what their motivations are, but instead strives to create a terrifying 
picture of the world and a specific war (Sergeant: “At this terrible moment, when 
our own way of thinking and the very existence of our species is threatened”14). 
A war that is absurd and paradoxically meaningless in its essence and in which 
there can be no winners as a matter of principle, because if one gender is de-
stroyed, then the other will simply disappear. Thus, the forces actually waging 
war are revealed closer to the finale and gradually, we come to understand that 
the war is being fought not between different genders, but within the same sex—
women. 
In the play, the characters are portrayed in a state of confrontation with ex-
tremely tense feelings. Realizing that they actually have nothing to lose, the 
characters return to the fundamentals, begin to look for the meaning of life, and 
                                                           
13  «Среди хаоса, развороченных орудий, снарядных ящиков, щебня, касок, ранцев, 
мертвых тел и прочего военного мусора». 
14  «В этот страшный момент, когда свойственный нам образ мыслей и само су-
ществование нашего вида находится под угрозой». 
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make attempts to find themselves. This becomes obvious in the second act, when 
the Woman asks Sergei to teach her how to pray. In addition, some time before 
the murder of Sergei, the heroine hesitates in doing it leading the spectator to 
suppose that she longs for a “real” man. However, her doubts do not last long. 
They are replaced almost immediately by confidence in the righteousness of the 
act she is supposed to commit—Sergei must die. The next sign of conspirolo-
gical narration appears here: the hint of a new secret. The reader inevitably asks 
the question: “What will follow next?” Before the play’s finale in which the 
reader is offered a new riddle we briefly gain access to the Woman’s inner 
world, to her mental anguish: 
 
Woman: “Then why all this? War, these corpses? We are told: fight to win. If we win, we 
will destroy the worst men. Only those who do not want to wash the dishes and 
wash socks. And then we will live, better than before … Aaa, I don’t want to live! 
I do not want to – kill me … Why live? Who shall I kill? Who shall I love?”15 
 
Although it turns out that the women are not fighting their enemies, they contin-
ue their destructive actions, they continue to kill each other out of habit. The 
parallels with the myth of Medea are thus realized on several levels in the play. 
The title itself sets the stage and doubles the motif given—the image of Medea is 
transformed into an instrument of the extermination of men, which is again em-
phasized by the choice of military weapons (fighter aircraft). Seen from the out-
side, the traditional plot motivation of revenge comes down to the confrontation 
of the sexes; the reason for the killings is the desire to affirm matriarchy. It 
seems that the use of the myth is limited to these superficial functions at first 
glance. As is known, Medea, having decided to take revenge on the unfaithful 
Jason, raised her hand not only to him, but also to herself, killing their shared 
children. This is exactly what the women in Kurochkin’s play do; they ex-
terminate themselves even after they have found out what is really going on: 
there are no more real men. That any war is pointless and absurd is one of the 
play’s main ideas, but the author develops this idea further, giving it a metaphy-
sical meaning: no matter what kind of war, against or for whom and whatever its 
ideals—war is always self-destruction. It is a defeat for both sides. Therefore, the 
                                                           
15  Женщина: «Зачем тогда всё это? Война, эти трупы? Нам говорят – воюйте, 
чтобы победить. Когда мы победим, то уничтожим самых плохих мужчин. Толь-
ко тех, которые не хотят мыть посуду и стирать носки. И тогда мы заживём – 
лучше, чем раньше… А-а-а, не хочу жить! Не хочу – убей меня… Зачем жить? 
Кого убивать? Кого любить?». 
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original situation in the play is brought to the point of absurdity: women were 
fighting men when it turned out that there were no men anymore. However, 
women continue to fight because war itself has become their reason to live. The 
idea of the absurdity of war is reinforced by the incompatibility of two concepts 
that the author combines: on the one hand, the fact that it is women who are cre-
ated by nature to give life. On the other hand, war means cruelty, violence, and 
death. In the play, these features are united in one entity, that is, in the women as 
fighters and as destroyers. Women are the embodiment of violence in the world. 
The world as depicted has been divided in two: the “ancient” real men have 
become extinct, one half of humanity remains truly female, while the other half 
has decided that they know how real men should behave. This latter half even 
feels like men and, therefore, starts to play their role. Men, in their understand-
ing, should be despots and some kind of uncouth boors (it should be noted that 
this is a kind of playful playing with stereotypes): 
 
Sergei: “Men are not gone. They stayed. Close your eyes. I smell like men’s sweat and to-
bacco. I know how to swear, you bet. I will never wash the dishes after dinner, I 
will sink into the sofa and look only at the newspaper. If I get drunk, then I can 
fulfill my marital duties. … It is easier for me to remove the socks from a slain 
enemy than to wash them myself. I pick my teeth at dinner. I will chase after eve-
ry skirt. I will hide my salary from you. I will never notice your new dress, your 
new hairstyle. Never.”16 
 
The author creates an unexpected cultural conflict: the entire world’s culture, up 
to recent centuries, was created not by women, but by men. Within this culture 
there are many examples of art and literature in which a certain image of an ideal 
woman has been formed, as well as the unspoken rules for her behavior. Men 
formed an image of femaleness that was both flawless in their eyes and conve-
nient for them, and women were brought up accordingly, modeled after men’s 
ideas. In the play, the opposite situation can be observed: although women have 
                                                           
16  Сергей: «Мужчины не умерли. Мужчины остались. Закрой глаза. Я пахну 
мужским потом и табаком. Я умею материться. Я знаешь, как умею материться. 
Я ни за что не стану мыть за собой посуду после обеда, я завалюсь на диван и 
уткнусь в газету. Если меня хорошо напоить, то я могу исполнить свой супру-
жеский долг. … Мне легче снять носки с убитого врага, чем постирать их. Я 
ковыряюсь в зубах за обедом. Я буду волочиться за каждой юбкой. Я буду 
прятать от тебя зарплату. Я никогда не замечу твоего нового платья, твоей но-
вой прически. Никогда». 
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exterminated men, they continue to create the image of them that they want to 
see. The conflict cannot be solved: gender roles have been reversed, but the situ-
ation remains unaltered. 
The system of images and motifs in the play is linked to mass media meta-
phors and stereotypes that are broadcast in popular culture. The exposure of such 
stereotypes is often another sign of conspirological narration. It should be noted 
that the choice of place (America) is determined not only by the author’s desire 
to illustrate the global nature of the conflict, but is also a play on various fiction-
al hypotheses related to the political relations between Russia and America, as 
well as to common gender clichés. The characters of Uncle Kolia, Sergei, and 
Peter are indispensable to introducing the reader to the course of events and to 
forming ideas about the male world (“I like to lie down and watch baseball,”17 as 
one of them remarks), although there is no unity even among these represen-
tatives of the male world. Internal ethnic conflicts flare up throughout the course 
of events. Furthermore, the motif of American culture’s dominance (“Sergeant: 
Some [pointing to Sergei] have been cleaning rotten potatoes in camps since 
their childhood, while others have been eating fricassee sitting in banks. Don’t 
worry, it’s quite alright.”18) and the notion of the Americans as “a stupid people” 
can be clearly identified. We learn that the whole world has been destroyed more 
or less; the play mentions Moscow, Kiev, and New York as the last bastions that 
still continue to exist. In addition, the motif of the Inquisition, the return to the 
Middle Ages, which in turns is connected with all sorts of gender stereotypes, 
can also be found in the play. Women, as Sergeant Uncle Kolia understands, are 
a terrible dark force that must be extinguished at all costs (“Sergeant: Let your 
steadfastness and your very death … Your very death … stop this eternal dark 
power humanity has nurtured on its bosom.”19). The male characters use super-
natural mechanisms to try and influence the course of the war. Thus, men’s se-
cret weapon is hatred, which traps enemy fighters with the help of a special de-
vice. This device, the so-called indicator, which generates a certain emotional 
field, is the author’s attempt to play with a stereotype: Women are considered to 
be more frequently guided by an emotional impulse than by rational reasoning. 
                                                           
17  «Я люблю лежать и смотреть бейсбол…». 
18  Сержант: «Одни (показывая на Сергея) с детства в лагерях гнилую картошку 
чистят, а другие в банках в это время фрикасе едят. Всэ нормально, ничого тут 
такого». 
19  Сержант: «Пусть ваша стойкость и сама ваша смерть… Сама ваша смэрть… 
остановят эту извэчную тэмную силу, которую пригрело на своей груди чеело-
вэчэство». 
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In the play, this idea manifests itself in its literal, grotesque meaning. Women are 
some sort of mythical creatures for the three male characters, they are shrouded 
in a veil of mystery. It is not by chance that Uncle Kolia asks Peter if it is true 
that the Statue of Liberty is a woman, as if he could not believe that a woman 
could embody freedom. 
The artistic space of the play can be called two-worldliness: the initial false 
conviction that the play shows a war of the sexes (the war of women against 
men), and the subsequent dispelling of this belief reveals a second layer of reali-
ty, which is the natural and logical ending of what is happening. As a result, the 
reader discovers the actual reality; namely, that the species of men has been ex-
terminated, women are killing each other, their time is running out, and hu-
manity is on the verge of extinction. It is particularly important to realize that the 
play’s two-worldliness has nothing to do with the two-worldliness of romanti-
cism, when two different places intersect only in the protagonist’s imagination. 
Istrebitel’ klassa Medeia is localized on a single plane, the line between the 
worlds is embedded in the initial misconception of reality, in the erroneous in-
terpretation of the events. Therefore, concepts such as “ideal” or “enemy” be-
come vague, indefinite, easily blurring the line between each other. The world 
that is revealed in the play is a fanatical and inhuman one. 
The creation of alternative constructions of reality eventually arises from the 
space of two-worldliness. Women live in self-deception and it is easier for them 
to close their eyes than to admit the truth and end the war. It is vital for them to 
recognize an enemy in someone and to destroy them. In addition to an existential 
and cultural type of conflict, there is a conflict over the spectator’s perception of 
the play. The question put to the audience is the following: “Is wounded pride 
really worth such sacrifice; is it worth starting a war for this?” The author shows 
what is going to happen if people continue to fight each other—all of humanity 
will be doomed. The recipient of this message may come to the conclusion that 
conflicts need to be resolved otherwise, that is, by agreeing and uniting. These 
are the thoughts and the conclusion that the audience is supposed to come to 
while reading the play. The author does not force any decisions upon the reader, 
he simply shows the consequences. The play’s central idea can be summed up as 
follows: if people fight each other, then they are doomed. 
It is in fact thanks to the construction of an alternative world that the fol-
lowing fact becomes obvious: the confrontation of men and women has existed 
since the beginning of time; the conflict of the sexes has always been and will 
always be. Yet, the author develops this confrontation to the point of absurdity: 
he shows that there can be no winners in the conflict between the sexes, because 
in any case the victory of one side inevitably means its simultaneous defeat. 
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Sergei knows that he is a “she,” but the role of “the new man” has been 
forced upon him. He lives as a misconception of his own identity—an identity 
made that way by somebody else. The scene in the play in which the bra he is 
wearing under his clothes is first mentioned, comes as a surprise to the reader. 
This represents an equally big surprise for the female protagonist. Consequently, 
we deal with a greater conspiracy in the text. Someone had previously made the 
decision that a group of women shall identify themselves as men and act ac-
cordingly. The question of who remains open throughout the play. Since the sex-
es have been waging war against each other for centuries, and the original men 
were extinguished long ago, then the following may be presumed: it was either 
the last original men (drevnie muzhchiny) or the first women who claimed to be 
the “new men.” In the first case, it would be a legacy: those women who were 
willing to see themselves as men were supposed to preserve men’s place on 
earth. In the second case, it would be a usurpation because the women who saw 
themselves as “new men” forced another group of women to pretend to be men 
so that the sexes could continue fighting each other and so that the concept of the 
enemy could be perpetuated. Thus, they occupied a position that they are not in 
fact entitled to. The conflict is based on an intrigue that conceals the fact that 
there is no actual reason for the conflict. 
Thus, in this play, we see the creation of alternative constructions of reality. 
This is achieved by transforming the plot of a famous myth, which provides the 
playwright with additional opportunities to express his individual position as 
well as the play’s central message, which in turn encourages the reader to think 
independently about ambiguous processes that occur in society. Furthermore, the 
creation of such an alternative reality contributes to the reader’s ability to come 
to their own conclusions, being aware of the existence of stereotypes and clichés 





Gromova, Margarita (2009): Russkaia dramaturgiia konca XX–nachala XXI 
veka. Uchebnoe posobie. Moscow. 
Kurochkin, Maksim (1995): “Istrebitelʼ klassa Medeia,” in Teatralʼnaia biblio-
teka Sergeia Efimova. http://www.theatre-library.ru/files/k/kurochkin/ku-
rochkin_1.html 
Kurochkin, Maksim (2005): Imago i drugie pʼesy, a takzhe lunopat. Moscow. 
Lipovetsky, Mark/Beumers, Birgit (2012): Performansy nasiliia: Literaturnye i 
teatralʼnye experimenty “novoi dramy.” Moscow. 
98 | Safargaleeva 
Pavlova, Dar’ia (2013): “Konspirologicheskaia formula povestvovaniia,” in 
Vestnik Samarskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 103/2, 144−50. 
Rudnev, Pavel (2011): “Temy sovremennoi pʾesy: mesto soprikosnoveniia ne-
metskoi i russkoi dramy,” in Sovremennaia rossiiskaia i nemetskaia drama i 
teatr. Kazanʼ, 4−14. 
Savinykh, Olʼga (2017): “Transformatsiia siuzheta o Medee v evropeiskoi i ros-
siiskoi dramaturgii XX–XXI vv. (Zh. Anui, M. Kurochkin, V. Klimenko),” 




The new media, especially the so-called social media, are associated with a per-
petual and all-embracing stream of information, a stream with which not every-
one is able to cope. The question of society’s organization and of imaginations 
about reality as such, in the light of new media is one of the most prominent sub-
jects in the work of Russian writers and playwrights alike. The twenty-first cen-
tury is characterized by freedom and the diversity of artistic expression as well 
as the author’s desire to develop their individual strategy. This is most clearly 
visible in drama, which becomes active during periods of crisis in society due to 
its generic characteristics. The goal of “new drama” is to reveal the secret and 
hidden, to expose hidden actions and processes, to reflect upon and organize 
them and to point out situations of conflict. The famous contemporary play-
wright Maksim Kurochkin deals with exactly these questions throughout his 
work. This article is devoted to the problem of artistic representations of reality 
in his dramaturgy. Using the example of Kurochkin’s play Istrebitel’ klassa Me-
deia (Medea Type Fighter) it is possible to analyze and to interpret such alterna-
tive constructions. One may conclude that the depiction of collective elements of 
imagination is an integral component of the process of constructing reality and 
affects the properties of the artistic space in his plays. The result is the author’s 
individual position regarding the opposition of “truth – fiction,” offering origi-
nal, non-standard mechanisms as a solution. 
 
“Thinking Spiritually” about the Last Tsar’s 
Murder: Religious Discourse and Conspiracy 




conspiracy theory; political eschatology; Russian Orthodoxy; Metropolitan Ioann 
(Snychev); Konstantin Dushenov; religious nationalism 
 
 
The concept of a conspiracy theory serving as a research object, especially given 
its close connection with the beliefs and practices of political eschatology, could 
be hardly listed as a popular theme among the social disciplines. Nevertheless, in 
this field there are some classic texts1 and widespread conventional presupposi-
tions. 
One of the field’s central themes is set out as follows: religious conspiracy 
theories, like any other ones, along with related fields of knowledge about the 
world—eschatology, alternative history, and applied political science—are al-
ways a “work in progress,” and the most conservative religious groups often 
prove to be the most creative in this respect. For example, in the Russian Ortho-
dox Church, until quite recently, many eschatological believers considered the 
Internet to be the main weapon of the “world government” and the easiest way 
for people who use it to embrace the Antichrist. Now, former opponents of the 
Internet find each other on the global network and discuss the spiritual harm 
caused by the most recent information technologies. For many years, fears over 
individual taxpayer numbers and social security numbers, as well as passports 
                                                           
*  Supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation, project No № 14-18-
02952 (ONG–P). 
1  Barkun 2003. 
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and electronic cards, was the central point of vernacular Orthodox discourses in 
Russia. Nowadays, this concern has been displaced by upcoming discussions 
about climate weapons developed by enemy powers. In response, Orthodox be-
lievers from a Vladikavkaz congregation (North Ossetia), whom I know through 
my field work, applied to Patriarch Kirill with a request to fly around the entire 
border of the Russian Federation by airplane carrying icons to protect the coun-
try from “meteorological attacks” in the summer of 2017 (the Patriarch has not 
yet responded to this request). After several months, President Putin’s statement 
about American structures that are allegedly gathering “biological material” 
from Russian people for secret purposes (October 2017) engendered an ava-
lanche of interpretations amongst the same believers, which led to the develop-
ment of new narratives about a conspiracy of foreign special services. At pre-
sent, the authors of the letter, as far as I am aware, are no longer interested in this 
“climate weapon” (or in the story about “biological materials”) but are instead 
interested in other conspiracy issues. This demonstrates that these attitudes are 
very transient. 
At the same time, if we evaluate the entire repertoire of conspiracy narratives 
that have circulated amongst Orthodox believers in Russia for the last three dec-
ades, we can conclude that a number of ideas have remained popular for more 
than 25 years; moreover, they constitute part of the everyday knowledge of an 
average Orthodox Christian. They are related to certain stories about the history, 
current state and future of both Russia and the world and they are built primarily 
on the idea of a secret warfare enacted against the Russian people and the Ortho-
dox Church.2 This conspiracy theory’s basic ideas and images can be found in 
the works of the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, Ioann (Snychev). 
These ideas were published between 1992–95, reprinted in different formats and 
remain very popular among politically active Orthodox advocates.3 
 
 
Perestroika and the Search for Russia’s True History 
 
The second half of the 1980s, the era of Perestroika, threw the USSR into a polit-
ical and economic crisis. However, the party leadership assured themselves and 
the Soviet people that everything was not so bad, and that the country was able 
to change, driven by the political elite’s ability to reflect and analyze, to discover 
                                                           
2  See Rossman 2002: 195–255; Mitrokhin 2007; Ahkmetova 2010: 176–214; Shnirel’-
man 2017. 
3  Ioann 1992, 1992a, 1993, 1993a, 1994, 1944a. 
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and to use new resources. Given that institutions of religion—traditional Russian 
ones or some other—were almost totally prohibited under Communist rule, these 
resources were to be found somewhere outside of the USSR—in Western coun-
tries, in the Russian émigré community. The most socially significant aspect of 
this propaganda campaign was probably the persistent repentance for the Soviet 
regime’s crimes. Several years were enough to assure the Soviet audience that 
any narrative about the national past lay on the principle of a sad truth, previous-
ly hidden and then revealed, and that no Soviet historians could be trusted. All 
this was planted within the context of late-Soviet panic about the imminent loss 
of historical (cultural) memory. In that context, historical memory meant re-
membrance about the pre-Soviet national past. A distinguishing feature of this 
time was the concept of the mankurt, which became extremely popular in public 
discourse. Invented or at least introduced into public discussion by the well-
known writer Chingiz Aitmatov, the word ‘mankurt’ referred to a story told in a 
novel from 1980, entitled Burannyi polustanok (The Buranny Railway Stop), an-
other name for which is I bol’she veka dlitsia den’ (The Day Lasts More Than a 
Hundred Years). It was about one cruel tribe’s custom (most probably non-exis-
tent) in which they deprived their prisoners of their memory through an agoniz-
ing and complicated procedure, thereby turning them into hardy and disciplined 
slaves devoted only to their owners, without the slightest intention to flee. The 
story, told in the form of a legend, finds its dramatic peak when the main charac-
ter—a young mankurt—not only fails to recognize his mother who sought him 
out to take him home, but kills her masterfully at his owner’s command who 
does not want the mankurt to return to his family.4 This term’s popularity, and 
the image behind it, clearly reflects the common social imagination of the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Aitmatov’s thought captured many people’s attention through-
out these years: a person can be true to himself only if he keeps ethnic traditions 
and treasures the national history. 
Perhaps the most important consequence of the deepening reflection on the 
past and public representation of Soviet history was the fast and furious de-
struction of the Soviet regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of politically and econom-
ically active people. The memory of the GULAG, the huge losses of the Second 
World War and the eroding heroic etiological narrative of the October Revolu-
tion and Russian Civil War turned life under the rule of the CPSU into a kind of 
political pathology, catastrophic for the population of the country ruled by peo-
ple who did not spare their population, or, rather, who systemically destroyed it. 
More and more popular dystopian narratives (the novels 1984 by George Orwell, 
                                                           
4  Aitmatov 1981. 
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My [We] by Evgenii Zamiatin, the film Pokaianie [Repentance] by Tengiz Abu-
ladze) were reasonably seen by people as allegorical descriptions of life in the 
USSR. Many people wanted to live in a completely different country. Some 
people (and there were more than a few) simply left the country. For instance, 
one hundred thousand evangelical Christians fled to the western parts of the 
USA and Canada. Some stayed in former national republics, which were rapidly 
gaining political independence. Some began to change their own country. 
Almost all of the later initiatives for creating a new Russia (or for recreating 
some version of the previous one) involved a historiographic component, which, 
in its turn, was required to solve three tasks: 1. to determine some model period 
in Russia’s history (either Pre-Petrine or pre-revolutionary time for example); 2. 
to correlate it with the Soviet era (which is not the right period for the country); 
3. to tell us where we could find the “source” of the real Russia, in order to use it 
to replace the fake (but actual) one. 
The third question was usually answered in the following way: the place in 
which the true Russia was preserved lay in emigration, or in the anti-Soviet un-
derground, or—Russia was still there—it simply could not be seen from under 
the communist-international ideological veil, which masked authentic Russian 
life.  
As for the first two questions, for many (especially Orthodox believers 
whose faith, or at least churchliness, was born a couple of years or, sometimes, 
months previously) the real Russia had existed before the Bolsheviks came to 
power. Accordingly, the Bolsheviks were considered the destroyers of Russia 
and the period of their rule was a pathology (in a variety of meanings of that 
term) of national development. 
Driven by this obsession with history, the past, and distrust in the Soviet his-
toriographical heritage, many people started to actively search for new sources 
of facts, and—what is more important for this chapter’s purposes—they started 
to develop new ways to work with them, that is, they produced new methods of 
interpretation. One of the most influential discursive moves to remake Russian 
history can be found in Metropolitan Ioann’s writings.5 
                                                           
5  Speaking about the literary activity of Metropolitan Ioann at that time, it should be 
pointed out that the academic and an ‘ecclesiastical publicity community’ are still dis-
cussing the question of the real authorship of these texts. The fact is that in those 
years, the press secretary of the metropolitan was Konstantin Dushenov, who later be-
came a well-known political publicist. He is often considered to be the author of the 
most vivid texts that are officially thought to be written by his patron (Verkhovskii 
2003: 21). It is now difficult to assess the degree of Dushenov’s participation, but it is 
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A general analysis of Metropolitan Ioann’s conspiracy texts6 leads us to be-
lieve that they are built upon a different category of arguments. On the one hand, 
it is a philosophy of history in a general sense. According to the texts, the whole 
historical process is not just determined by, but really is the permanent struggle 
of Satan against his Creator, a plight which is doomed to eventual failure. Ac-
cordingly, the fate of all people is, in some way, connected to this struggle. 
Considered from a different, but also rather general, perspective, the world 
historical process is almost entirely conditioned by what happened in the past 
with the Jewish race. These people, having misunderstood the idea of God about 
Jews as the chosen people (they thought God had chosen them to dominate the 
world), did not accept Christ as the Messiah. The Lord punished the people of Is-
rael with dispersion. Then, according to this narrative about the global Jewish 
conspiracy, the Jews, scattered around the world, decided to fight for power over 
all of humanity. This plan was hampered by Christianity spreading around the 
world which liberated people from the power of their base passions. The plot or-
ganizers planned to stoke these passions in order to execute their plan. 
Nevertheless, the worldwide conspiracy to establish the power of the de-
scendants of the “scribes and Pharisees” is turning into reality, which can be 
clearly seen in the fact that the Western world is moving away from Christianity. 
However, this “mystery of lawlessness,” according to apostle Paul’s prediction, 
will not work, “until He [who now restrains] is taken out of the way” (2 Thess. 
2:7). Specifically, this is something or someone that can and/or should prevent 
this plan from happening. This role is assigned to Russia, the Russian people, 
headed by an Orthodox monarch. They are the “natural” enemies of world Jew-
ry. Russia’s entire history is considered from this perspective, but also the histo-
ry of Russia in the twentieth century—the Revolution of 1917, and the collapse 
of the USSR particularly. These events are interpreted as attempts by the con-
spirators to remove Russia and its Tsar (or his functional deputy) from their path 
to world domination. In this context, the fate of the last Russian emperor is ex-
tremely important for understanding the entire history of the nation and mankind 
more generally. 
The narrative about holy Russia, the wicked who seek to destroy it, and the 
heroes who sacrifice themselves for the good of others was well-known and ap-
pears throughout late nineteenth-century Russian literature and journalism and is 
                                                           
obvious that Metropolitan Ioann knew something about these texts and understood 
them. He undoubtedly shared (or pretended to share) ideas published under his name. 
6  One can find a brief and clear description of Metropolitan Ioann’s general ideas in an 
article by Konstantin Kostiuk (2002). 
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similar to some other conspiracy theories that were prevalent in different parts of 
the world (to give several examples, I might mention the anti-papistical narra-
tives in seventeenth-century England, the Roman Catholic Church’s anti-mason-
ic theories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the German Nazis’ anti-
Semitic meta-myth and the American right’s anti-Communist myth in the twen-
tieth century). These narratives are similar both in terms of the function of the 
historical drama heroes, and in terms of the nature of the relationship between 
them. So what is it that actually makes Metropolitan Ioann’s theory interesting? 
In trying to answer this question, I have to clear up a particular issue: how 
did Metropolitan Ioann (alone or together with Dushenov), being a child of the 
Soviet era, so skillfully create a specifically religious narrative about the desti-
nies of the world and Russia on the basis of conspiracy ideas? How did he learn 
to present history in this very certain, analytical, and discursive way? It is pretty 
obvious that in order to represent history in such a manner, one must pretend to 
see the so-called spiritual sense of events in political, economic, and cultural life. 
It is supposed that a real sense of world history is beyond the understanding of 
people who do not have “spiritual vision”; alternatively, as opponents of this 
view would say, this includes people who are not inclined to interpretative ac-
tivities of a certain type (paranoia for example). Of course, Metropolitan Ioann’s 
history of the centuries-old secret war of the Jews against Christ, the Church, and 
Russia has its roots in the conspiracy thinking of Soviet times. But they did not 
delve any deeper than some general presuppositions. One such presupposition is 
the idea about Russia’s (or the USSR’s) responsibility for the destiny of the 
whole world, its leadership in the movement towards religious or secular salva-
tion of all of humanity. That is why it is hated by those who do not want this sal-
vation, but instead pursue their narrow self-serving interests. Ideas of this type 
are widespread at least from the time of Reformation. The second presupposition 
is related to mechanisms of historical interpretation and is referred to as teleolo-
gy. According to this way of thinking about the world and national history, every 
historical event and phenomenon is a step or а stage toward the main aim of his-
tory in its entirety. This is the basic principle of most historical grand narratives, 
including Soviet ones. Usually such narratives are not intended to disclose the 
secret meaning of what is happening to man and the world. Of course, we can 
say that the Soviet philosophy of history, especially in its practical application, 
was based on quasi-religious ideas about the messianic potential of the proletari-
at or the Soviet people, but this view of historical events usually did not involve 
a disclosure of any secrets. Meanwhile, Metropolitan Ioann did not just examine 
secrets, but also the meaning of events that are inaccessible to participants them-
selves, because the real reason for what is happening cannot be found in the ma-
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terial world. Marxists, as we know, tend to explain any immaterial phenomena 
by way of material theories. So, both Metropolitan Ioann and his secretary (a for-
mer member of the Communist Party and a former Soviet Navy officer) were 
more familiar with the discourse and argumentation of historical materialism 
than Orthodox historiosophy (or metahistory). However, unlike Metropolitan Io-
ann and Dushenov, these skills could be found in many representatives of the 
Russian Orthodox Church abroad (ROCA), where connection with the pre-revo-
lutionary Russian tradition of spiritual interpretation of history went uninterrupt-
ed. By this tradition, I do not mean a high-flying religious philosophy, but rather 
a popular Orthodox literature, with its most vivid representative being Sergei Ni-
lus—publisher of the classic conspiracy theory text The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion. It is ironic that this mysterious book published and interpreted by the 
mystic is not about mysteries, but instead concerns itself with very rational plans 
allegedly created by extremely practical people for material reasons. The very 
interpreter reveals the spiritual foundation of those rationalistic decisions. How-
ever, Nilus’s heirs benefited from his skill, as they saw the mystical in the ra-
tional and the seemingly understandable. In this search for meaning, both revela-
tions and analytical methods, including search techniques, were used as sources 
of information. It is the ability to leap from the level of political analytics into 
the space of visionary discoveries that determined the discursive style of the 
post-Soviet Orthodox conspiracy, which is largely believed to have been found-
ed by Metropolitan Ioann. 
One problem arises from the fact that he and his secretary were almost en-
tirely disconnected from the world of traditions set by Nilus and similar writers: 
specifically, they were quite remote from the representatives of the Russian 
Church abroad, which Metropolitan Ioann describes as absolute strangers in his 
early works. Of course, the Soviet Church stayed in contact with the so-called 
foreigners, but a whole range of different people were engaged in this communi-
cation. At the time of the Soviet system’s collapse only late-Soviet public and 
domestic anti-Semitism could be used from all of Metropolitan Ioann’s ideologi-
cal and discursive baggage. However, this conception did not involve “mysteries 
of lawlessness” or any mysteries at all, except for state secrets and imaginary 
undercover operations by secret services, such as the CIA and the Mossad. 
 
 
Learning to Speak about History Spiritually 
 
So, what might explain the origin of Metropolitan Ioann’s skills as employed for 
the analysis of historical events and processes from the point of view of spiritual 
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content, which usually boiled down to the struggle of Light and Darkness? This 
skill can be partly explained by his probable familiarity with the pre-revolutio-
nary publications of Nilus’s works. In any case, the Metropolitan believed that 
the Protocols were not a forgery and that the world was living according to the 
plans of their authors. But this was clearly not enough to create the so-called 
Russian Symphony—a doctrine that focused on the meaning of Russian history. 
And here we must return to Dushenov’s role in the creation of Metropolitan 
Ioann’s theories. While Dushenov might not have written the articles, he did, in 
my opinion, introduce his patron to the basic skills of interpreting events of po-
litical and social life in the spirit of Orthodox conspiracy theories, and also told 
him several “important facts from Russian history” that were unknown to Soviet 
people, but which were actively discussed among emigrants. He seemed to take 
all this from the members of the Christian Revival Union, an Orthodox-mo-
narchical organization (Dushenov communicated with them at meetings of na-
tionalists).7 
The original name of the aforementioned union was the “Christian Patriotic 
Union” (CPU), established at its First Congress in Moscow on December 17, 
1988. It was, in turn, set up on the basis of an initiative by a group known as 
“For the Spiritual and Biological Salvation of the People” (July 23, 1988), 
chaired by an old Orthodox dissident and prisoner of conscience Vladimir Osi-
pov. Osipov was elected chairman of the CPU. However, he was removed from 
leadership as a result of a number of intrigues. In the beginning of the 1990s, 
Osipov and the CPU members faithful to him created a new structure, which was 
developed, independently of Osipov, by publicist Viacheslav Demin and poet 
Aleksei Shiropaev to a large extent. They had close ties with the most anti-
Soviet part of the Orthodox Russian emigrant groups and they had been actively 
mastering the lexicon and the ideology of radical conspiracy historiosophy and 
historiography since 1988. As of May 1990, they began publishing a semi-under-
ground newspaper Zemshchina (‘Realm, Land’), which was very popular among 
Orthodox nationalists and was published until 1993 (it had 97 issues in total). 
Close to Zemshchina in ideology and its team of authors, was Tsar’-Kolokol 
(Tsar Bell), an almanac published from 1990–1991. Zemshchina and Tsar’-
Kolokol republished conspiracy materials from émigré and pre-revolutionary 
publications. For example, Tsar Bell published a book by the emigrant Mikhail 
Skariatin in 1990 entitled Zhertva (The Sacrifice), which contains very important 
materials to prove the ritual character of the royal family’s murder. This infor-
mation (or rather, translation and decipherment of mysterious signs from the 
                                                           
7  LD 2003: 105. 
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house of Ipatiev, in which the Bolsheviks executed the family of the last emper-
or) was then actively used in other Orthodox nationalists’ conspiracy arguments. 
In his memoirs, Viacheslav Demin describes the sources of information that 
formed the ideology of future members of the “Christian Revival.” Recalling the 
events of 1988, he writes: 
 
I found the books by Nilus and other counter-revolutionary authors, Orthodox-convinced 
monarchists, banned in the Soviet Union, at the house of my friend Vadim Kuznetsov, 
whom I once met in Arbat. … His house was always crowded, filled with: lamp oil, in-
cense, candles, rare historical and modern photographs, icons, and, most importantly with 
ecclesiastical and monarchical literature, which he copied in large quantities. … It was at 
his house that I first saw copies of icons of the Royal Martyrs, glorified by the foreign 
Church in 1981, and learned a lot of new and mysterious information about the Ekaterin-
burg crime, which, as it seems, was of a ritual nature.8 
 
This narrative about the ritual murder of the royal family, developed by Russian 
emigrants, deserves a separate study. Here I will only point out that the narrative 
took shape as early as the beginning of the 1920s. It was based on the testimo-
nies of those who were part of the crime investigation team, or somehow came to 
know about it (investigator Sokolov, General Dieterichs, and a British journalist 
referred to as Wilton), after the troops of Admiral Kolchak in 1918–1919 tempo-
rarily freed Ekaterinburg from the Bolsheviks. 
This evidence laid the ground for the formation of a narrative about the kill-
ing of the Tsar and his family, which was said to be not just a political execution 
without charge of trial, but a religious or quasi-religious ritual.9 
Dieterichs and Wilson generally formulated a picture of the murder of the 
royal family as follows: the execution of Nicholas II and his relatives was carried 
                                                           
8  «Книги Нилуса и других запрещённых в советской стране контрреволюционных 
авторов православных убеждённых монархистов я нашёл у своего приятеля Ва-
дима Кузнецова, которого однажды случайно встретил на Арбате. … В его доме, 
доверху забитом лампадным маслом, ладаном, свечами, редкими, историчес-
кими и современными фотографиями, иконами, и главное церковной и монархи-
ческой литературой, которую он размножал на ксероксе большими тиражами, 
всегда было многолюдно. … Именно у него я впервые увидел копии икон 
Царственных Мучеников, прославленных зарубежной Церковью в 1981-ом и 
узнал много нового и таинственного о екатеринбургском злодеянии, которое, 
оказывается, носило ритуальный характер». – Demin 2008. 
9  Slater 2007: 60–80. 
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out by “Jewish Bolsheviks” under the direction of Germany, which sought to de-
stroy Russia, the evidence for which was that it was a black magic ritual. The 
main evidence for the involvement of religious Jews in the incident were four 
strange signs inscribed on the walls of the execution room. They were discov-
ered during the investigation and later interpreted as secret Kabbalistic writings, 
deciphered by Enel (M.V. Skariatin) in 1925, as mentioned previously, to read as 
follows: “Here, by the order of mysterious forces, the Tsar was sacrificed for the 
destruction of the State—all people are to be notified about this.”10  
The version of ritual murder was deeply rooted in some Orthodox émigré 
communities. It was repeated in sermons by certain prominent hierarchs of 
ROCA several times (for example, Archbishop Averkii of Syracuse [Taushev] 
and Bishop Nectarii of Seattle [Kontsevich]). It is important that the version re-
ceived a new “spiritual” interpretation in this context and that its meaning was 
scaled up to an eschatological level. 
 
This murder was thought out and organized and had to be carried out, by any means, by 
servants of the coming Antichrist—those who sold their soul to Satan and those who in-
tensely prepared for the speedy triumph of the enemy of Christ––the Antichrist. They per-
fectly understood that their main obstacle was Orthodox Tsarist Russia. Therefore, it was 
necessary to destroy Orthodox Russia and arrange in its place an evil state opposed to God 
that would gradually spread its power over the entire world. And for the earliest and cer-
tain destruction of Russia, it was necessary to destroy the one who was the living symbol 
of the country—the Orthodox Tsar.11 
 
This interpretation of the events of 1918 became the basis and source of inspi-
ration for the Russian Orthodox historiosophy of the early 1990s. 
                                                           
10  On this publication see: Panin 2017: 116–18. 
11  «Это убийство было продумано и организовано никем другим, как слугами гря-
дущего Антихриста – теми продавшими свою душу сатане людьми, которые 
ведут самую напряженную подготовку к скорейшему воцарению в мире врага 
Христова – Антихриста. Они отлично понимали, что главное препятствие, 
стоявшее им на пути, это – Православная Царская Россия. А поэтому надо уни-
чтожить Россию Православную, устроив на месте ее безбожное богоборческое 
государство, которое бы постепенно распространило свою власть над всем ми-
ром. А для скорейшего и вернейшего уничтожения России надо было уничто-
жить того, кто был живым символом ее – Царя Православного». – Averkii 1975: 
299. 
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Indeed, the texts by Demin and his companions demonstrate their knowledge 
of émigré nationalist literature, which was not available to the majority of be-
lievers in the Soviet Union. It was Demin and his followers who, taking the idea 
of Nicholas II’s holiness from emigrant books, began to collect signatures for his 
canonization in the ROC MP. This practice of collecting signatures was critiqued 
by the church leadership repeatedly, but persisted among believers wishing to 
canonize certain revered people. 
Among the main methods of analysis of historical events and phenomena in 
this context was the discovery of “spiritual meanings” that lay behind certain ac-
tions, actions which, incidentally, were usually reduced to the fact that the au-
thoritarian (ideally monarchic) form of governing Russia was the instrument of 
God’s care for the salvation of “the chosen” under the conditions of the Anti-
christ’s triumph. Here is what Viktor Shnirel’man wrote about this in his recent 
book: 
 
The return of Orthodoxy to public discourse of nationalists was accompanied by a grow-
ing interest in eschatology, which helped them to comprehend the crisis phenomena un-
folding before their eyes … Moreover, it [the discourse] was recognized at two levels—
phenomenological and metaphysical. The first dealt with current events and their dis-
cussion in political, social, and economic terms. But the second employed the traditionalist 
concept of involution, drawing a picture of inevitable swirl from the Golden Age down to 
decay, explained by the Christian eschatology as “satanic forces” clearing the way for An-
tichrist. These forces could only be confronted by “the Restrainer,” and therefore, from 
this point of view, the main world conflict arose between him and the “forces of evil,” 
whoever they were.12 
                                                           
12  «Возвращение православия в общественный дискурс и обращение к нему нацио-
нал-патриотов сопровождались ростом интереса к эсхатологии, помогавшей им 
осознать развивающиеся на их глазах кризисные явления… При этом он [дис-
курс] осознавался на двух уровнях – феноменологическом и метафизическом. 
На первом речь шла о текущих событиях и их обсуждении в политических, со-
циальных и экономических терминах. Зато на втором в дело вступала традицио-
налистская концепция инволюции, рисующая неизбежное движение от Золотого 
века к упадку и разложению, что христианская эсхатология объясняла дейст-
вием “сатанинских сил”, расчищавших путь антихристу. Этим силам мог проти-
востоять только “удерживающий”, и поэтому, с этой точки зрения, основной 
конфликт в мире возникал между ним и “силами зла”, кем бы они ни были». – 
Shnirel’man 2017: 264. 
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The members of the “Christian Revival” learned to “speak spiritually.“ This 
means that they could use the conspiratorial language of Orthodox mysticism in 
the discursive context of modern Russian political eschatology.13 
 
 
The Tsar’s Murder as a Ritual and Cosmic Drama 
 
In order to understand the working principle of that discursive and analytic 
method, let us analyze two of the first articles to appear in the newspaper Zem-
shchina. The first one is Aleksei Shiropaev’s article “Pobeda imperatora Niko-
laia II” (“The Victory of Emperor Nicholas the Second”). 
Shiropaev builds his picturesque narrative around the criticism of popular 
ideas about the personality of Emperor Nicholas II and the meaning of his mur-
der.14 He does not trust legal and, most importantly, ethical interpretations of the 
events of 1917–18. He tries to overcome common-sense logic, overturning the 
social reality interpreting method that Paul Ricœur meant when he wrote about 
the so-called “school of suspicion.”15 
From this point of view, any attempts to remain in the practical domain when 
discussing those historical events are not just a mistake, but a malicious hoax: 
“Dark forces are trying … to suggest that the Ekaterinburg crime was conducted 
under a moral and legal imperative in order to hide ritualistic and mystical mean-
ing of what ‘happened’ on 17 July 1918.”16 
Shiropaev puts forward a simple and seemingly non-ideological word “hap-
pened” in quotation marks. In so doing, he tries to point out that the events of 
Nicholas’s life cannot be interpreted using terminology which implies random-
ness. These events could neither have been caused by a confluence of circum-
stances, nor by hastily taken political decisions. These events were by no means 
a crime committed by some people against others. And here Shiropaev points out 
two secret (and hidden) meanings behind the execution of the royal family. The 
first relates to the disclosure of the murderers’ real motives. They did not just 
seek to kill the Tsar, who incidentally was no longer in power and who had no 
                                                           
13  For some sources and details of this discursive tradition, see Hagemeister 2018: 428–
33. 
14  For a brief overview of different conspiracy versions of this event, see Rossman 1999. 
15  Ricœur 1970. 
16  «черные силы пытаются … перевести Екатеринбургское злодеяние в плоскость 
нравственных и юридических оценок, дабы скрыть ритуально-мистический 
смысл того, что “произошло” 17 июля 1918 года». – Shiropaev 1990. 
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influence over the events of the Civil War. Instead, the organizers of that male-
ficent execution sought to destroy the metaphysical image of the Russian state 
and nation: “In the murder of the Anointed, there was a certain ritual, dark mean-
ing: the destruction of the State and the desire to enslave the soul of people.”17 
But the author does not stop at this level of interpretation (ritual-mystical 
crime). He believes that this simple meaning “lies on the surface.” Therefore, he 
goes beyond conspiracy theories. He not only understands the crime that the vil-
lains secretly committed, but he looks to go further when he brings in “non-
random” mystical coincidences. For example, the murder occurred on the day 
commemorating St. Right-Believing Grand Prince Andrei Bogoliubskii who was 
killed by court conspirators in 1174. Prince Andrei is considered to be the crea-
tor of the Moscow state by some radical monarchists, so the parallel between the 
fate of the first and last rulers of Russia unites the entire history of the monarchy 
in an integrated narrative. Yet this is not enough, and Shiropaev aspires to go to 
the second level of interpretation—“to see in the Ural events” not just another 
political assassination, but “the Divine Providence, overshadowing all devilry.”18 
From this point of view, the death of the last Russian Tsar is not a tragedy, but a 
triumph of the forces of Light over the forces of Darkness. Here the author has 
likened the execution of Nicholas to the death of Christ on Calvary to promise 
the future resurrection of Russia. As the resurrection of the deceased Christ is a 
reliable guarantee of immortality to a Christian, so the death of Nicholas is a 
firm promise of the Russian nation’s immortality: “On 17 July 1918, the Russian 
Tsar and His Family gave their lives for their Motherland—a great, all-victorious 
sacrifice.”19 
To convince the reader of such an optimistic view of the emperor, and of his 
family’s death, Shiropaev declares non-religious interpretations of Nicholas’s 
personality to be mythology. To eradicate this “false consciousness,” we must 
learn to see everything from the point of view of the “church’s mystical posi-
tions.” It turns out that multiple descriptions of the emperor’s weak will, given 
by his contemporaries, are nothing less than evidence of the Tsar’s great Chris-
tian humility, which can only be maintained by a very strong will. The Tsar’s 
shortsightedness, his inability to understand the current political processes also 
                                                           
17  «В убийстве Помазанника был вполне определенный ритуальный, черный 
смысл: разрушение Государства и стремление поработить душу народа». – ibid. 
18  «Увидеть в Уральских событиях … смысл Божий, затмевающий всякую 
бесовщину». – ibid. 
19  «17 июля 1918 года Русским Царем и Его Семьей совершена великая всепобеж-
дающая жертва за Родину». – ibid. 
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evolves into his amazing gift to see the real meaning of the global historical pro-
cess in political routine. 
From this point of view, all of Nicholas’s reign becomes not a failed ruler’s 
career, but the path of Christ, who initially knew how and why he would have to 
go. Shiropaev easily finds biblical parallels in the life of Nicholas. He finds sev-
eral individuals who betrayed their teacher and benefactor to play the part of Ju-
das; he interprets the emperor’s behavior during abdication as the Lord’s prayer 
in the garden of Gethsemane and so on. In the latter case, the gesture of weak-
ness and helplessness is an act of the greatest willpower—he could have changed 
everything, but he decided not to do so. 
Thus, such behavior, which is understood by many secular historians as a 
forced one, is consecutively interpreted by Shiropaev as conscious and volun-
tary. For him, then, it was not a political murder, but a divine sacrifice. 
 
In the Ipatievskii cellar there was a clash of Kabbalistic ritual with the indestructible force 
of the Christian sacrifice, which Emperor Nicholas II made to atone for the sins of the Fa-
therland, a sacrifice for which his whole life served as preparation. And the outcome of 
such a clash has always been, is and will be one and the same—the disgrace of dark forc-
es.20 
 
Three levels of historical process can easily be distinguished in this version of a 
“spiritual interpretation” of Russian history. The first presents the execution of 
the royal family as a political murder. At the second “secret” (or conspiratorial) 
level, this event is understood as a ritual sacrifice. Incidentally, the assumption 
that this was a ritual makes the event religious. This is no longer just a murder, 
but a sort of rite-of-passage that was carried out with the purpose of changing the 
course of world history. Finally, at the third “sacred” level, the event appears to 
be a sacred act of redeeming Russia and its people from the eternal curse expe-
dited by the servants of the Antichrist. 
Another example of historiosophical reflection about Russia’s destiny as well 
as its place in global history, can be found in the article “The Orthodox kingdom 
and the false monarchy” by V. Kovalevskii, an author from the small town of 
Kostroma. Kovalevskii begins his argument by saying that God made Russia as 
an ideal model for a state and, thereby, endowed it with the role of savior of the 
                                                           
20  «В Ипатьевском подвале произошло столкновение каббалистического ритуала с 
несокрушимой силой христианской жертвы, которую принес за грехи Отечества 
Император Николай II по которой Он шел всю жизнь. А исход такого столкно-
вения всегда был, есть и будет один – посрамление сатанинских сил». – ibid. 
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world from satanic conspiracy. These intrigues are aimed at replacing the Rus-
sian monarchical state with an illusion, which looks like an Orthodox kingdom, 
but in fact is the realm of Antichrist. 
The martyr’s feat of the last Sovereign and his victory over the forces that 
seek to capture the world is of cosmic significance. But the meaning of these 
events cannot be appreciated by the spiritually blind people of modern Russia. 
This meaning is revealed in its entirety only in the eschatological perspective of 
the triumph of the Antichrist’s kingdom. 
 
The Emperor knew that the main goal of all efforts of Antichrist’s servants was not the de-
struction of the Russian monarchy and establishment of a different state system other than 
that bestowed by God, but the substitution of the source of power.21 
 
The dark hierarchy, which had already come to power in Russia in 1917, pushed 
Nicholas II to unleash the terror of power against the people. Allegedly he was 
offered the possibility to install “fifteen thousand gallows on the Nevsky [pros-
pect], and then for twenty years nothing would be heard about a revolution in 
Russia.”22 But such an outcome would deprive the institution of monarchy of its 
sacral status and, accordingly, of the name of a role-model state system. “In a 
critical moment for the entire world … the sovereign, after praying before the 
image of the Savior all night, decided to abdicate the Throne, with his whole 
family voluntarily treading the path of humility and sorrow destined to him from 
birth.”23 
Loyal to his faith and ready to accept death voluntarily, like Christ, the em-
peror sacrificed his life for his people and all mankind, and “the world was re-
leased from the impending disaster.”24 
                                                           
21  «Государь знал, что главной целью всех усилий слуг Антихриста было не уни-
чтожение Российской монархии и установление иного, отличного от дарован-
ного Богом России государственного строя, а подмена источника власти». – Ko-
valevskii 1991. 
22  «Пятнадцать тысяч виселиц на Невском, и тогда двадцать лет о революции в 
России не будет и слуху». – ibid. 
23 «В критическую для всего мира минуту… государь после молитвы перед обра-
зом Спасителя, длившейся всю ночь, принял решение об отречении от Престола, 
со всей своей семьей добровольно ступив на предначертанный ему от рождения 
путь смирения и скорби». – ibid. 
24  «Вселенная была избавлена от надвигающейся катастрофы». – ibid. 
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Kovalevskii also reflects on the historical process, differentiating three le-
vels. At the first level (the level of political history), some forces provoke Nicho-
las II to make tough political decisions, and he wisely rejects this scenario. At 
the conspiracy level, there was an attempt by conspirators to discredit the prin-
ciple of monarchical rule (Nicholas II preferred to abdicate, rather than to tarnish 
the throne with the blood of his subjects). At the “spiritual” level of interpreta-
tion, the dark forces sought to replace the sacred Russian monarchy with the 
kingdom of Antichrist in order to condemn the whole world to eternal perdition. 
But the emperor repeated Christ’s feat, destroyed Satan’s plan and saved the 
world. Thus, the “external” aspects of the historical process come to light, and 
behind them we see the meanings that live beyond the material world, accessible 
only for “spiritually shrewd” people. 
As we can see, Shiropaev’s and Kovalevskii’s mystical historical theories, 
like many of their followers, including Metropolitan Ioann, are not just a col-
lection of ideas, but also a discursive skill of arranging arguments. Explanations 
of different natures—be they eschatological, soteriological or political—should 
clash within one text, should come into conflict, and then lead to the discovery 
of hidden meanings of well-known events. This kind of “spiritual speaking” pre-
supposes the art of conspiracy thinking as a prerequisite to any statement about 
history. 
The ability to see the invisible meaning of events makes it possible to create 
narratives about the past and the present state of affairs, which are alternative to 
an “official” interpretation of history. Those narratives are used by people who 
strive to see themselves as a counter-elite, a group that can compete with acade-
mic institutions in producing knowledge about the past. In order to do this, au-
thors turn to traditional religion, which has its own way of presenting infor-
mation about core values. One of those values resides in the “real meaning” of 
national and world history. Therefore, this alternative version of the past is pre-
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Evaluating the repertoire of conspiracy narratives that have circulated amongst 
Orthodox believers in contemporary Russia, one might conclude that a number 
of ideas have remained popular for more than 25 years. These ideas are related to 
certain stories about the history, current state and future of both Russia and the 
world, and they are built primarily on the suggestion of secret warfare enacted 
against the Russian people and the Orthodox Church. This conspiracy theory’s 
basic ideas and images can be found in the works of the Metropolitan of St. Pe-
tersburg and Ladoga, Ioann (Snychev). This chapter’s purpose is not just to in-
vestigate the source of these ideas but also to analyze the unique discursive pre-
sentation of events from the past (particularly the execution of the last Russian 
emperor and his family) which reveals “the real mystical meaning” of national 
and world history and supplies Orthodox intellectuals with a conceptual base to 
enable them to compete with secular academic institutions as they attempt to 
deepen our knowledge of the past. 
 
Alternative Healing Practices, Conspiracy 
Theory, and Social Trust in Post-Soviet Russia 
Konstantin Bogdanov * 
 
Keywords 
post-Soviet Russia; alternative healing practices; conspiracy theory; mass psy-
chosis; social trust; semantic satiation; Anatolii Kashpirovskii; Allan Chumak 
 
 
By the end of the 1980s, Russia was rocked by the appearance of two ‘healers’ 
on national television, who quickly became extremely popular figures in the 
Russian mass media. Their names were Anatolii Kashpirovskii and Allan Chu-
mak. Their performance on national television attracted an audience of several 
millions and caused a remarkable phenomenon that could be referred to as, with-
out exaggeration, as a “mass psychosis.” In modern psychology, “mass psycho-
sis” refers to the manifestation of direct, indirect and induced effects on groups 
of people whose behavior is characterized by extraordinary suggestibility and 
imitation. In this definition, not every element of this psychosis is unproblemat-
ic, since any human behavior is more or less characterized by the effects and ef-
fectiveness of suggestion and imitation.  
But in this case, it is sufficient to rely on the fact that the target audience’s 
behavior when confronted by Kashpirovskii and Chumak—despite all the dif-
ference in the methods that they used—was remarkable in its massiveness and 
apparent irrationalism. The television appearances of Kashpirovskii (born 1939), 
a professional psychotherapist who had worked at the psychiatric hospital in 
Vinnitsa for 25 years, began after his speech in March 1988 on the program 
Vzgliad (The View) which covered the live surgical operation on TV in Kiev of a 
                                                           
*  This work was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation, project № 
14-18-02952 (ONG–P). 
118 | Bogdanov 
patient (Liubov’ Grabovskaia) who suffered from breast cancer. The surgery for 
breast resection was performed without anesthesia (the patient had contraindica-
tions to this) under Kashpirovskii’s remote hypnotic influence; Kashpirovskii 
himself was at the Ostankino television studio in Moscow. The operation was 
successfully completed. A few months later, Kashpirovskii repeated the same 
procedure at a distance from Moscow to Tbilisi with complicated operations to 
remove cavitary ventral hernias from two girls (O.B. Ignatova and L.N. Iursho-
va), one of whom demanded champagne excitedly during the operation, and the 
second moaned softly; and after coming out of her trance, one girl stated that she 
had experienced several orgasms at once. Participants in both the first and sec-
ond operations were, by the way, respectable and highly regarded doctors of the 
country, and their rave reviews contributed greatly to Kashpirovskii’s triumph in 
public opinion. In 1989, he became the host of the program Seansy zdorov’ia 
vracha-psikhoterapevta Anatoliia Kashpirovskogo (Sessions on health by the 
doctor-psychotherapist Anatolii Kashpirovskii) which was broadcasted by Cen-
tral Television. Kashpirovskii would look at the audience with a heavy, unblink-
ing gaze and a monotonous voice, calling on them to trust him. Kashpirovskii 
treated young and old alike and he saved children from all over the country from 
enuresis, dealt with internal “alarm clocks,” resorbed postoperative sutures, and 
generally inspired hope in the restoration of health to all those who thought of 
themselves as sick. In 1989, these programs ran during prime time—immedia-
tely after the program Vremia (Time), which covered the main events of the day 
in the rapidly changing world of the perestroika USSR.1 Kashpirovskii’s star ca-
reer on television was supplemented with tours around the country and mass 
medical sessions, during which dozens of patients fell down on the floor in hyp-
notic trance, waved their hands over their heads, lamented and laughed, and 
some stood up from their wheelchairs.2 
According to Leonid Kravchenko, the first deputy chairman of the USSR 
State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, Chumak’s public ap-
pearance on television in 1989 was caused by circumstances similar to those of 
                                                           
1  I would also like to note that the fifteen-minute program, which was just after the pro-
gram Vremia, resembled an “adult” version of Spokoinoi nochi, malyshy (Good Night, 
Kids) with its famous lullaby soundtrack “Spiat ustalye igrushki” (“Sleeping tired 
toys”). 
2  The literature dedicated to Kashpirovskii is extremely extensive. For a revealing, if 
general, idea of how commendably Kashpirovskii was perceived by the masses in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s see Maksimov 1990; Morgovskii 1990; Psikhoterapevti-
cheskii i dukhovnyi fenomen A.M. Kashpirovskogo 1992; Shenkman 1992. 
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Kashpirovskii’s invitation: perestroika television was looking for new heroes and 
found them among those who were able to perform in a new format of commu-
nication with the audience.3 Chumak (born 1935), a journalist by training, was 
an alternative to Kashpirovskii. He was not a psychotherapist capable of demon-
strating the wonders of tele hypnosis, but he was close to the television commu-
nity and had been working on Moscow television for many years (as a sports 
commentator). However, Chumak was not completely ignorant of the basics of 
psychological influence. Since 1983, he worked at the Educational Psychology 
Research Institute of General and Pedagogic Psychology of the USSR Academy 
of Pedagogic Sciences. 
Chumak looked much more ordinary, quite unlike the athletic and dressed-
all-in-black Kashpirovskii who seemed to be charged with the “demonic” aura of 
a magician. His program was called “Health Sessions” and was broadcast early 
in the morning, so that viewers had time to see it before work. A modest, every-
day-dressed intellectual with thick glasses appeared in front of the audience. He 
was mostly silent to begin with, plunged into a mysteriously sleepwalk-like state 
and then began to make strange cross-shaped movements with his hands. These 
passes, or gestures, were able to “charge” various substances and things—oint-
ments, creams, water in glass jars, tapes, etc., which the viewer was invited to 
place near the screen. Over the next three years, hundreds of thousands watched 
Chumak’s programs, receiving tons of miraculous water as a reward, the con-
sumption of which guaranteed the elimination of various diseases (the programs 
also became more specialized over time: some episodes were intended for pa-
tients with cardiovascular diseases, others for gastrointestinal distress and so 
on).4 Like Kashpirovskii, Chumak also began to tour the whole country, relying 
on an audience that can be defined as “believing in a miracle” (this would be the 
English translation of Chumak’s book Tem, kto verit v chudo, 2007), even 
though he did not call himself a psychotherapist.5 In this case, public sessions of 
“charging” water may serve as a vivid example of the psychological setup that 
programs a response with the placebo effect: for example, Chumak simply sug-
gested that the public compare “uncharged” cream to “charged” cream to see 
whether there was a therapeutic difference.  
                                                           
3  Cf. Tsvetkova 2014. 
4  In 1992, the Moskvoretskii experimental beer factory established a line of Chumak’s 
“charged” water. It was initially assumed that 100,000 bottles a year would be pro-
duced. Chumak himself estimated that amount as a “drop in the bucket” for Moscow, 
cf. Vandenko 1992. The production was subsequently curtailed. 
5  Chumak 2007. 
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Crowds near newsstands in Moscow on 1 September 1989 can be regarded 
as the apotheosis of collective trust in Chumak. The object of the people’s desire 
was to acquire a copy or a number of copies of the newspaper Vechernaia Mos-
kva (Evening Moscow), which was, as previously reported in the media, 
“charged” with the healer’s beneficial energy (it was well-known that second-
hand dealers of this issue sold it at exorbitant prices, and suffering individuals 
ate pieces of the newspaper). 
By order of the Ministry of Health (“Ob uregulirovanii netraditsionnykh me-
todov lecheniia” – “On the settlement of non-traditional methods of treatment”), 
some television programs were banned in 1993 and the mass psychosis, caused 
by the activities of Kashpirovskii and Chumak in 1989–92, began to decline; 
however, the two kept on sporadically appearing in their own “tour” activities.  
One should also mention the activities of their increasingly multiplying com-
petitors. In the 1990s, Dzhuna (Eugenia Davitashvili, 1949–2015), specialized in 
the practice of “contactless massage” and claimed to be an Assyrian queen, as-
trologer, “honorary academician of 129 world academies,” as well as a personal 
therapist for Brezhnev and other party and artistic celebrities. Nikolai Levashov 
(1961–2012) treated incurable diseases at a distance and claimed that he had re-
peatedly saved Russia from various disasters, such as hurricanes, fires, ozone 
holes and radioactive contamination (once Levashov saved humanity as a whole 
from the collision of the Earth with the neutron star of Nemesis). Iurii Longo 
(Golovko, 1950–2006) once excited audiences with television sessions of mag-
ic—specifically telepathy, telekinesis, levitation, etc. Especially remarkable were 
his famous performances of “resurrections of the dead” (as it turned out later, 
during these sessions he was assisted by a friend who effectively played the re-
vived dead). 
Adepts and preachers of these movements usually appealed not to science, 
but to alternative and traditional medicine—from urine therapy and “healthy” 
starvation to magic and ritual procedures. Social trust in these cases is attained 
and maintained by persuading the public that the alternative methods of treat-
ment can be used as a deliberate opposition to institutional medicine—an ap-
proach based on the logic of “we know your enemies.” It is believed that the 
mistrust of institutional medicine and the rejection of professional medical care 
in Russia was motivated by such social factors as the destabilization of the na-
tional health system, a significant deterioration in clinical care, the collapse of 
the insurance institutions, the emigration of physicians, etc.6 But apart from 
                                                           
6  Cf. Field 1987, Schecter 1997, Cockerham 1999, Maximova 2002, Rose 2000, Re-
shetnikov 2003. 
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these social reasons, the social trust in alternative medical treatments was also 
maintained through a number of cultural and psychological traditions in Russia.  
The Soviet Union’s collapse, a result of the reforms of perestroika, led to a 
profound defamation of scientific knowledge as a whole and to a major loss of 
credibility among the country’s scientists and medical professionals.7 At the 
same time, the public was increasingly attracted to alternative methods of treat-
ing conditions that regular science could neither explain nor cure. This interest 
was due to, on the one hand, the general mood of protest during the perestroika 
period and to the rise of “non-rational” and “irrational” hopes for change that of-
ten arise in situations of social instability, revolution, and ideological and eco-
nomic crisis on the other. In my previous work on the cultural history of Russian 
medicine—in particular, in the study of the history of the cholera epidemics in 
Russia in the nineteenth century—I pointed out how a situation of danger and 
risk “constructs” social protest and helps to create an emotional consensus in dis-
tinguishing between “us” and “them.”8 Cholera epidemics, for example, often 
contributed to the emergence of the “enemies of the people,” who were seen by 
the public as guilty of contagion. Another important phenomenon that emerged 
in these cases was linked to what is known in ethnographic studies as “cargo 
cults.” In an article on the history of the Russian intelligentsia, Sander Brouwer 
made a witty comparison to the first representatives of the natives of Melanesia 
in the period in which “cargo cults” were also active. The natives believed that if 
they followed certain behavioral ceremonies, their unknown benefactors would 
one day bring them the gifts of social and economic prosperity. According to 
Brouwer, Russian intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth century were similarly ex-
pecting that the West would bring them the gift of acculturation and moderniza-
tion.9 I find that this metaphor applies to different historical contexts as well: the 
few years that are associated with Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms can, in my opin-
ion, also be compared with a popular cargo cult, a kind of quickly spread social 
imagination in which the norms of rational criticism were suspended and the 
non-rational hopes and faith were emphasized.  
Demand creates its own supply: at the end of the 1980s, bookshelves were 
filled with literature on occultism, magic, extrasensory phenomena, astrology; 
religious and mystical literature was republished frequently. These years also 
marked the beginning of an industry in which the emergence of new miracle-
working healers was accompanied by the expansion of the market of paramedi-
                                                           
7  Lonkila 1998. 
8  Bogdanov 2005. 
9  Brouwer 1999. 
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cal services, which were officially distributed among the population.10 It quickly 
became big business from this point on, behind which lay not only individual 
scams but also officials charged with the production of innovative medicines and 
devices; such advertised and well-sold novelties included zirconium bracelets, 
neutrino generators for the treatment of cancer, bioactivators and biocorrectors. 
One type of these biocorrectors was patented by Dzhuna—holographic stickers 
allegedly protecting from exposure to harmful emissions from mobile phones 
and televisions etc. It is characteristic that the Commission on Pseudoscience 
and Research Fraud of Russian Academy of Sciences, created in 1998 at the ini-
tiative of Academician Vitalii Ginzburg (1916–2009),11 immediately aroused 
and continued to provoke fierce attacks in the press and on the Internet by adepts 
of various kinds of alternative “sciences.” It is necessary to remark that many of 
these adepts are institutionally connected with the Russian Academy of Natural 
Sciences, willingly encouraging fantasies about torsion fields, “wave genomes,” 
ophthalmogeometry, ufology, etc. 
Mass psychosis, associated with the hope created by miracle healers and var-
ious extrasensory practitioners, was sometimes ideologically, but more often 
emotionally connected with the spread of new religious movements throughout 
Russia, whose preachers largely appealed not to the traditional, but to the folk or 
alternative medicinal traditions—from urine therapy and starvation to magical 
manipulations. In the course of the last fifteen years, these methods have been 
actively promoted, for example, on the pages of the newspaper Vestnik ZOZH 
(Health Promotion Review), published twice a month with more than 3 million 
sold copies (considered alongside the most popular newspapers in the country, 
Komsomol’skaia Pravda and Moskovskii Komsomolets, which sell only 2 million 
and 400 thousand copies respectively). By reading this newspaper one can learn, 
for example, that urine relieves obesity, alopecia, thyroid problems, acne, sweaty 
feet and liver diseases. It also improves eyesight, if the eyes are wiped with it. A 
headache is well treated by bumping one’s head into cold glass rhythmically, 
given that this beat neutralizes the electrostatic charge. One can also easily cope 
with alcoholism at home: by taking three apples, sticking six nails into each of 
them, then taking out the nails, and eating apples and continuing to do this for a 
month and a half. As for women who are worried about their facial hair growth, 
it is recommended that they stop using condoms, because they influence such 
growth.12 
                                                           
10  Pachenkov 2001, Brown/Rusinova 2002. 
11  Problemy bor’by s lzhenaukoi 1999. 
12  Cf. Timonina 2015.  
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Taking into account the oddity of these texts, both the texts and their context 
are significant for understanding discursive and emotional mechanics that struc-
ture social trust, which in turn is “responsible” for this newspaper’s huge audi-
ence. In general, there are three mechanisms: the urgency of treatment, the rec-
ognition of an illness and the conviction that scientific medicine is unable to 
cope with it. Talcott Parsons writes that patients become sick not when they feel 
pain, but when they are ready to become patients, undergo medicalization, and 
assume the “sick role.”13 It is sociologically correct to think that any medicine 
“constructs” diseases and appropriates or, in the words of Ivan Illich, expro-
priates health.14 A patient should know what and who is opposing them. In this 
sense, Kashpirovskii’s patients, Chumak’s charged water supporters, and the 
readers of the Health Promotion Review likewise know their enemies—i.e., dis-
eases and physicians. 
As mentioned previously, it seems reasonable to assume that people’s dis-
trust of institutional medicine and refusal of professional medical assistance dur-
ing the perestroika years were, by and large, determined (and continue to be de-
termined) by the influence of such objective social factors as the destabilization 
of the national health care system, the deterioration of clinical care, the collapse 
of insurance systems, and the emigration of physicians.15 Nevertheless, psycho-
logical and even cultural factors also came into play. In one of my previous 
works, I have already had the opportunity to point out that in a situation of dan-
ger and risk, the “construction” of social protest, helps to achieve an emotional 
consensus in maintaining the distinction between “own” and “alien.”16 Social 
trust in these cases is constructed and maintained by building (self)confidence in 
the reliability of (alternative) treatment methods based on an identifiable, delib-
erate and adversary-controlled opposition with adherents consolidating themsel-
ves based on the rule “we know our enemies.” 
Starting with Erik Erikson, who saw the basic social unit of the human perso-
nality in social trust, psychologists and sociologists have written about the ra-
tional and “positive” nature of trust as an innate confidence in the good will of 
other people and a generalized social expectation that other people are likely to 
fulfill their promises. The pragmatic and theoretical implications of social trust 
were considered to be both psychologically and economically appropriate—be it 
                                                           
13  Cf. Lupton 1994: 89–90, 105–06. 
14  Illich 1976. 
15  Cf. Field 1987, Schecter 1997, Cockerham 1999, Rose 2000, Maksimova 2002, Re-
shetnikov 2003. 
16  Bogdanov 2005: 351–54. 
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the anticipation of actions through a clarification of the common motives, the 
consolidation of social networks, the minimization of risks when making deci-
sions under conditions of information deficit, the stabilization of expectations, 
the reduction of transaction costs in practices of economic exchange, and so 
on.17 However, it is important to emphasize that building and maintaining the 
spheres and networks of social trust can be psychologically dramatic and episte-
mologically absurd, since they often rely on various “conspiracy theories.” This 
theory should be shared by all those who are included in the network of social 
trust (which is known as the phenomenon of “group secrets” in child psycho-
logy). Medical conspiracy theories include the persistent ideas, opinions and ru-
mors about the secret and coordinated activity of physicians, pharmacists and 
other members of the medical profession who are accused of deliberately dama-
ging the health and lives of their patients. Medicine, as a practice and field of 
scientific knowledge, is directly connected with the health and life of people and 
has repeatedly been the subject of the social suspicion that its representatives use 
their knowledge and skills for malicious purposes. The question remains: what 
are these theories and how are they supported? Emile Durkheim, in his study of 
the dynamics of change in religious rituals, wrote that social trust acts as a form 
of moral solidarity and conformity to common symbols and signs of collective 
identity that are perceived as self-evident and beyond critical discussion. These 
symbols and signs can be both material (e.g., visual) and linguistic. Therefore, 
alternative healing practices (if we do not reduce them to just quasi-medical cu-
riosities) deserve to be studied as a practice of linguistic and extralinguistic 
(nonverbal) social construction.  
If we call these symbols attributes or, for example, “fixed objects” and re-
duce them to their defining semantics, then it will highlight their connection with 
threats and danger. In the social conditions of informational asymmetry, as Peter 
Kollock has shown, risk forms the basis of confidence: the more extreme the 
threat is seen to be, the more extreme the expectations associated with the ex-
ploitation of trust will be (as, in particular, it happens in the practice of multi-
level marketing built on the principle of financial pyramids: for example, Ameri-
can Herbalife).18 This fact was confirmed by studies by Craig Parks and Lorne 
Hulbert, who came to the conclusion that the degree of trust in others depends on 
the degree of reaction to the danger.19 
                                                           
17  Cf. Kollock 1994, Sztompka 1999. 
18  Kollock 1994. 
19  Parks, Hulbert 1995. 
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Put otherwise, strengthening social trust requires the construction of danger. 
There is nothing new here, of course. History is full of examples in which the 
achievement of such trust—and, accordingly, the confidence in those who em-
body it—is provided by the image of enemies who threaten or allegedly threaten 
a society. But from the linguistic and, more extensively, semiotic point of view, 
it is interesting how the discursive attributes of such trust are maintained at the 
communicative level—within the group of those who share this trust. I believe 
that one of the most effective factors in maintaining such trust is the predicta-
bility and repeatability of those markers that are correlated with the communica-
tion within this group. So, for example, if for an orthodox person an icon serves 
as such a marker, then for supporters of these two healers such markers would be 
a hypnotizing view of Kashpirovskii and silent manipulations with water jars of 
Chumak. In a certain sense, these are examples of predictable communication 
which, following linguist Lev Iakubinskii, can be referred to as a “stereotyped 
interaction”: a situation of emotional rather than verbal commonplace.20 Com-
municators do not need to understand each other if they agree to perform protest 
communication against a particular danger. It would be sufficient if this commu-
nication is marked in a specific way and is reproduced regularly. This is, in par-
ticular, the function of slogans, various memes and precedent texts, which are 
aimed not at defying and explaining something, but at pointing out those who as-
sociate themselves with them. 
The reproduction of common symbolic attributes is interesting in this case 
due to its semantic vacancy. It has been observed that a word, phrase or utter-
ance loses its meaning when repeated again and again. In linguistics, this phe-
nomenon is called verbal or semantic satiation and it is actively investigated with 
relation to speech activity in most diverse aspects.21 In recent years, interest in 
this phenomenon has been shown by experts in the field of cognitive science and 
by neurophysiologists in particular. One of their explanations for the nature of 
this phenomenon is that the repetition of the same word activates the correspond-
ing neurostructure (i.e., a group of neurons) in the cerebral cortex. The activation 
of the same neurons, in turn, strengthens their reaction inhibition. The intensity 
of neuroreaction to this very word decreases with each subsequent repetition.22 
In such a situation, words and the “objects” associated with them—understood 
                                                           
20  Yakubinsky 1986. 
21  Cf. Fillenbaum 1967, Jakobovits/Hogenraad 1967, Negnevitskaya 1970 and 1976, 
Black 2003. 
22  Smith 1984, Smith/Klein 1990, Frenck-Mestre/Besson/Pynte 1997, Pilotti/Antro-
bus/Duff 1997. 
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as a complex of systemic and semantic links—serve as attributes of trust, that are 
always connected with them, regardless of what they mean or can mean. Kash-
pirovskii, Chumak, and other healers from the 1990s preached their methods of 
healing as protection from the world of dangers, illnesses and misfortune, as well 
as the dangers of official scientific medicine. These cases can serve as examples 
of how social confidence becomes non-reflexive. Trust in this faith is something 
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This article provides a study of post-Soviet methods of alternative healing: be-
ginning in the late 1980s, these methods include hypnosis, “folk” and innovative 
forms of therapy, astrological predictions, spells and rituals, and new kinds of 
narcotics and medicines. Some of these methods were widely propagandized in 
the media during the perestroika period; their distribution was also accompanied 
by both radical ideological changes and the communicative transformation of the 
Alternative Healing Practices in Post-Soviet Russia | 129 
languages of social trust in the public sphere. In my view, the intensification of 
social trust requires the construction of danger, particularly in terms of images of 
enemies who are portrayed as threatening to society. From a semiotic point of 
view, some of the most relevant factors in support of this trust are the predicta-
bility and repetition of markers associated with communication within a given 
group. Such instances can be examined as examples of “stereotyped interaction” 
(in Lev Iakubinskii’s terms) and this is a situation of emotional, rather than ver-
bal, prejudices and assumptions. All these factors, from the weakness for other-
wise implausible alternative treatments to the mechanics and semantics of social 
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A conspiracy theory is a powerful explanatory model or way of thinking that in-
fluences many cultural forms and social processes throughout the contemporary 
world. Conspiracy theories can include a number of principal ideas and concepts 
that make them adaptable for a broad variety of discourses and forms of collec-
tive imagination; they are generally defined as “the conviction that a secret, om-
nipotent individual or group covertly controls the political and social order or 
some part thereof.”1 Conspiracy theories produce ethical models that oppose 
“us” to “them,” “victims” to “enemies,” “heroes” to “anti-heroes,” explaining 
and identifying evil as a social and moral category. At the same time, conspiracy 
theories are extremely teleological; they do not leave any room for coincidences 
or accidents and explain all facts and events as related to intentional and pur-
poseful activities undertaken by “evil actors.” Quite often, conspiracy theories 
are grounded in a holistic worldview that leads, in turn, to a particular hermeneu-
tic style. Reality is always considered to be deceptive; it provides “simple,” “su-
perficial,” and “obvious” explanations, which must give pride of place to more 
complicated intellectual procedures aiming to disclose a “concealed truth.” From 
this perspective, the concept of mystery appears to be the most powerful element 
                                                           
*  This research project was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation, 
project № 14-18-02952 (ONG–P). 
1  Fenster 2008: 1. 
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of conspiratorial narratives that operate in both pre- and post-industrial societies. 
Recent academic research into conspiracy theories provides a set of interpreta-
tions, ranging from medicalization (“social/political paranoids”) to the concept 
of “popular knowledge,” as a specifically postmodern phenomenon. It is obvi-
ous, however, that the social, political, and cultural power of conspiratorial nar-
ratives should not be underestimated. Conspiracy theories often motivate politi-
cal action and social praxis, accompany transformation of institutional and in-
formational networks, and provoke moral panics and changes of identities in 
both modern and postmodern societies. Still, the roles played by conspiracy the-
ories in various societies, discourses, and social contexts can be quite different, 
even in the age of globalization. 
This chapter deals with present day conspiratorial discourse in Russia, which 
could perhaps be discussed as the universal symbolic language of post-Soviet 
collective imagination. That does not necessarily mean that most Russians today 
take conspiracy theories seriously and base their everyday behavior on social 
paranoia. Instead, this “language of suspicion” appears to be the most adaptable 
set of memes and meanings that link people to each other, thereby providing 
them with collective identities. Yet, it is necessary to explain how and why the 
language of suspicion has obtained this privileged position in Russian society 
and what mimetic advantages it possesses.  
In his recent publications, Serguei Oushakine has suggested that post-Soviet 
conspiratorial thinking is a specific form of the “patriotism of despair, with its 
combination of the traumatic and the conspiratorial,” that “has become especial-
ly emblematic of the postmillennial Russia.”2 As Oushakine argues, our 
 
… inability to convincingly explain individual or collective losses has resulted in an inten-
sive production of popular conspiracy narratives aimed to bring to light hidden forces and 
concealed plans of “evil outsiders.” … In these narratives, references to pain and suffering 
are often linked with fundamental economic changes in the country. Emerging market re-
lations both polarized people and simultaneously activated what Jean and John Comaroff 
have fittingly called the “will to connect.” … The post-Soviet uneasiness about the in-
creasing social role of capital is translated into stories about universal lies and deceptions. 
The perceived exposure to foreign values and capital is often counterbalanced with ideas 
of an enclosed national community and unmediated values. Increasingly, Russo-Soviet 
culture is construed as “inalienable wealth,” as a particular form of socially meaningful 
                                                           
2  Oushakine 2009: 74. On conspiracy theories in post-Soviet collective imagination see 
also Bennett 2011: 132–52; Yablokov 2018; Borenstein 2019. 
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property that could be shared among people, but that could not enter commercial circula-
tion or exchange.3  
 
Although Oushakine is certainly right in pointing to conspiratorial narration as a 
specific social device, one employed to make sense of “unsettling and disloca-
ting experiences of the post-Soviet transformation,”4 it is obvious that many of 
those narratives have appeared and become popular during the late Soviet de-
cades; therefore, their popularity cannot be interpreted only in the context of eco-
nomic and social transition. 
The case that I will deal with in this chapter, and a number of other examples 
demonstrate that many post-Soviet conspiracy theories emerged in the late Sovi-
et decades, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. This means, in turn, that in order 
to look for at least some roots of post-Soviet conspiratorial discourses, we will 
first need to pay greater attention to ideologies, social settings, and the everyday 
practices of the late Soviet period. This will also mean that we will have to deal 
with cultural continuity, rather than breaks and changes. What, then, was so pe-
culiar about the decades under examination? 
In his book about the “last Soviet generation,” Alexei Yurchak argued that  
 
… the spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union was completely unexpected by most Sovi-
et people and yet, as soon as people realized that something unexpected was taking place, 
most of them also immediately realized that they had actually been prepared for that un-
expected change. Millions became quickly engrossed, making the collapse simultaneously 
unexpected, unsurprising, and amazingly fast. This complex succession of the unexpected 
and the unsurprising revealed a peculiar paradox at the core of the Soviet system.5  
 
Yurchak explains the paradox by introducing the concept of “performative 
shift,” i.e., the “process in which the performative dimension of ritualized and 
speech acts rises in importance (it is important to participate in the reproduction 
of these acts at the level of form), while the constative dimension of these acts 
become open-ended, indeterminate, or simply irrelevant.”6 In the context of late 
Soviet authoritative discourse 
 
… it became less important to interpret its texts and rituals literally, as constative descrip-
                                                           
3  Oushakine 2009: 74−75. 
4  Ibid.: 75. 
5  Yurchak 2005: 282. 
6  Ibid.: 26. 
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tions of reality, and more important to reproduce them with great precision. … The repro-
duction of the forms of authoritative discourse became powerfully constitutive of Soviet 
reality but no longer necessarily described that reality; it created the possibilities and con-
straints for being a Soviet person but no longer described what a Soviet person was. As a 
result, through its ritualized reproduction and circulation, authoritative discourse enabled 
many new ways of life, meanings, interests, relations, pursuits, and communities to spring 
up everywhere within late socialism, without being able to fully describe or determine 
them.7  
 
Following this logic, it is possible to consider the shift as having challenged the 
very nature of social reality, making it dubious, deceptive, and susceptible. Per-
haps this was at least one of the social factors that supplied fertile ground for 
conspiratorial imagination. There could be some others, though, and I will turn 
to them later. 
We can ask what “performative shifts” from late Soviet discourse were adop-
ted and transformed by “communities of loss” in the 1990s and 2000s: Why did 
the conservative nationalism of the 1970s become so significant for Russian pop-
ular culture forty years thereafter? What messages are encoded by the symbolic 
language of moral panics and conspiracy theories related to the “imaginary 
West” in late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian society? These questions can be 
partly answered by an analysis of the so-called “Dulles Plan for Russia,” a 
conspiratorial forgery that has been widely publicized in Russia since 1992. In 
the following analysis I will focus on the document’s history, ideological con-
texts, and popular reception in present day Russia. 
Ironically enough, on 7 April 2015, a local court in the Sverdlovsk region 
added the text of the Dulles Plan to the “federal list of extremist materials” (i.e., 
texts, images, videos, and websites that are banned for distribution in the coun-
try). The court resolution mentions that “in the city of Asbest, certain unrecog-
nized individuals distributed flyers with the text of the ‘Dulles Plan to Destroy 
the USSR (Russia)’ on one side and the text of the ‘Last Wishes for Ivans’ on 
the other.”8 An expert from the local criminal laboratory of the Federal Security 
Service concluded that the flyer promoted “information aimed at stimulation of 
                                                           
7  Ibid.: 286. 
8  «B г. Асбесте УФСБ России по Свердловской области выявлен факт распростра-
нения неустановленными лицами среди жителей г. Асбеста текстового материа-
ла “План Даллеса уничтожения СССР (России)” и “Последние пожелания Ива-
нам’” экстремистского характера». – “Reshenie Asbestovskogo gorodskogo suda 
Sverdlovskoi oblasti po delu № 2-414/2015”  
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hatred of public agents in contemporary Russia.”9 Unfortunately, the full text of 
the expert’s report is not available, but its final statement seems to be quite 
doubtful, if not an outright Freudian slip, since the only passage in some versions 
of the “Dulles Plan” that could be interpreted in that way is a vague mention of 
certain “officials” with their “bureaucratic despotism” and “flourishing of brib-
ery and lack of principle.”10 In any event, the official ban of the “Dulles Plan” 
seems to be quite symptomatic, in terms of scope at least, of its receptive con-
texts in contemporary Russia. I will return to this topic later. 
Generally speaking, the text of the “Dulles Plan” does not include any ideas 
that could be regarded as exclusively novel or as original in the history of mod-
ern conspiratorial thinking. It narrates a plan for the moral and social corruption 
of the Soviet Union, allegedly formulated in the mid-1940s by the American dip-
lomat, lawyer, and the first civilian director of the CIA, Allen Dulles (1893− 
1969). According to the text, the secret postwar politics of the U.S. towards the 
Soviet Union was to concentrate on disseminating “false values,” the “vulgariza-
tion of national morality,” “weeding out all social significance from art and liter-
ature,” making public administration chaotic and confused, the promotion of 
“the basest feelings,” of drunkenness and drug addiction, nationalism, and ethnic 
hatred. 
In fact, however, the text had no relation to American Cold War politics to-
wards the USSR. The “Dulles Plan” was publicized for the first time in 1993, in 
two slightly different versions and was compiled from the novel Vechnyi Zov 
(Eternal Call, 1971–76) by Soviet writer Anatolii Ivanov (1928–1999), a promi-
nent member of the Brezhnev period’s literary establishment. Ivanov was the ed-
itor-in-chief (as of 1972) of the nationalistically oriented literary journal Mo-
lodaia gvardiia (the Young Guard), a member of the board of the Union of Sovi-
et Writers, and even a member the USSR’s Supreme Soviet between 1984−89. 
In 1984, Ivanov, whose books sold more than 30 million copies and appeared in 
screen-adapted versions produced by various Soviet studios, was awarded the 
honorary title of a “hero of socialist labor,” one of the most prestigious awards in 
the USSR. In short, Ivanov’s literary career, for a man who had been born to an 
ordinary peasant family in eastern Kazakhstan, must be considered a model so-
cial paragon of the late Soviet period. Meanwhile, in the 1970s and 1980s he was 
                                                           
9  Cf. “Reshenie Asbestovskogo gorodskogo suda Sverdlovskoy oblasti po delu № 2-
414/2015” 
10  Hereafter I quote the translation of the Russian original of the “Dulles Plan” by Eliot 
Borenstein (cf. 2019: 90−91). However, Borenstein proceeded from an incomplete 
version of the text, so in some cases I quote my own translation of its parts. 
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one of the informal leaders of the ‘Russophile’ or ‘national-conservative’ wing 
of Soviet writers. 
Leaving to one side the details of Ivanov’s literary biography and political 
views, I will focus on those episodes from his novel that were later used by the 
compiler(s) of the “Dulles Plan.” The ideas, which were then ascribed to the di-
rector of the CIA, are here expressed by the most evil character of the book, Ar-
nol’d Lakhnovskii. The reader learns about him for the first time in the prologue, 
in which he appears as an investigator from the Tomsk gendarmerie department 
(the events take place in 1908, and Lakhnovskii is about 35 years old) pursuing 
revolutionaries and forcing one of them, Petr Polipov, to become a traitor. Lakh-
novskii then disappears from the scene for a long time, and we get to know about 
his life at the time of and following the October Revolution only in the second 
volume of the novel. Here, the setting is quite different with the year 1943 pass-
ing and Lakhnovskii, now an SS officer, in command of the collaborationist 
“People’s Liberation Army” that fights against the Soviet forces. Ivanov, how-
ever, is now eager to tell his readers more about the biography of the vicious 
character. It appears that “before the end of the civil war in Siberia” Lakhnovskii 
“moved to Moscow where he took part immediately in the activities of Trotsky-
ite groups.”11 The Trotskyites in the novel are portrayed according to the Stalin-
ist political tradition and propaganda; however, as we will see, that is not the on-
ly meaning of imaginary Trotskyism for the writer. At any rate, as a Trotskyite, 
Lakhnovskii is mostly engaged in what was known as “wrecking” or “sabotage” 
(vreditel’stvo). In 1922, he establishes “sabotage groups” in Donbass; after that, 
he returns to Moscow and works at Trotsky’s office. At the same time, however, 
he soon becomes an agent of the German intelligence and continues to spy after 
the fall of Trotsky. In 1941, Lakhnovskii joins the Nazis and later becomes the 
founder and chief commander of the “People’s Liberation Army.” It is in some 
village in the territory occupied by the Germans that he relates a Trotskyite plan 
for the post-war moral corruption of the Soviet Union and “the demise of the last 
unbroken nation on Earth” to an old acquaintance of his, Petr Polipov. 
I have already mentioned that Ivanov, on the whole, follows the official Sta-
linist historical tradition and interprets the events of the 1930s in terms of a 
“Trotskyite conspiracy,” the latter being responsible not only for the USSR’s 
problems of social and economic development, but even for the “extremes” of 
Stalinist repression: 
 
Due to Lakhnovskii and people like him, the Trotskyite underground penetrated most of 
                                                           
11  Ivanov 1981: 423. 
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the big cities of the country and many parts of the gigantic state machinery including the 
army. The Trotskyites were still active, they wrecked and perverted various good deeds 
and undertakings.12  
 
At first glance, the aims of the underground seem to correspond with the prin-
cipal ideas promoted by Stalinist propaganda. However, the very episode of the 
novel that was used for the fabrication of the “Dulles Plan” refers to more ambi-
tious plans by Lakhnovskii and his brothers-in-arms. Their purpose, as it ap-
pears, is not only to restore capitalism in Russia, but also to subordinate the So-
viet people to some mysterious forces.  
Before discussing this passage’s subtexts and possible meanings, I would 
first like to briefly examine the history of the “Dulles Plan” conspiracy theory 
and the public figures involved in its dissemination. Although the history of the 
forgery has been repeatedly discussed by Russian journalists, the only academic 
publication that deals with it, that I am aware of, is an article by Serghei Golu-
nov and Vera Smirnova.13 They argue that the passage from the novel by Ivanov 
was initially ascribed to Allen Dulles in the pamphlet Kniaz’ T’my: Dva Goda v 
Kremle (The Prince of Darkness: Two Years in Kremlin) (1992) by the Ukraini-
an poet and member of the CPSU Central Committee between 1990−91 Boris 
Oleinik (Oliinyk). However, this statement is not correct. The text by Oleinik 
was published in two different editions between 1992−94,14 and the full version 
of the “Dulles Plan” was included only in the second one. Furthermore, the first 
publications of the passage from Vechnyi Zov attributed to Dulles appeared in 
the spring of 1992 in a number of pro-communist Russian newspapers. Here the 
“Dulles Plan” was included in a set of partly falsified and partly distorted “state-
ments by the enemies of Russia” (apart from Dulles, the list included Napoleon, 
Goebbels, John F. Kennedy, and James Baker). The first set of these “fake quo-
tations” known to me was published in 1992 in St. Petersburg in the pro-com-
munist newspaper Narodnaia pravda (the People’s Truth) under the title “Otkro-
                                                           
12  Ibid.: 435. «Благодаря деятельности таких, как Лахновский, троцкистское под-
полье было организовано в большинстве крупнейших городов страны, во мно-
гих ячейках гигантского государственного организма, включая и армию. Оно 
помаленьку действовало, вредило, занималось тем, что доводило до абсурда, до 
своей противоположности различные добрые дела и начинания». 
13  Golunov/Smirnova 2015. 
14  The first edition was published three times (Oleinik 1992, 1993a and 1994). The sec-
ond was published in 1993 in two journals (Roman-gazeta, No 3, and Molodaia gvar-
diia, No 7; see Oleinik 1993b) and separately as Oleinik 1993c. 
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veniia zakhvatchikov” (“Revelations by Invaders”).15 Later that same year, the 
text was republished by a number of other newspapers. 
However, the pamphlet by Oleinik addressed Mikhail Gorbachev directly 
and does indeed seem to boost the “Dulles Plan” as a separate conspiratorial nar-
rative. After reciting the passage from Vechnyi Zov, Oleinik writes: 
 
You should recall this, Mikhail Sergeevich! The words are by Dulles himself, and he pro-
nounced them even in 1945 when he was dealing with the postwar American doctrine 
against the USSR. Now, let’s look around—haven’t we made a reality of the dream by the 
American strategist, haven’t we realized his program? And you are still living in your irra-
tional world (or pretending to live), you still argue that the Perestroika is your invention. 
But even [James] Baker has clearly announced that “we have spent trillions and trillions of 
dollars over the last 40 years in winning the Cold War against the USSR,” that is, follow-
ing the Dulles’ program!16  
 
Another publication that contributed to the popularity of the Dulles Plan was the 
article Bitva za Rossiyu (The Battle for Russia)17 by Ioann Snychev (1927− 
1995), the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg, and one of the leaders of the Russian 
nationalist movement in the early 1990s. It was published on February 20, 1993, 
in the newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia (the Soviet Russia) and included a historical 
discussion of Russia’s struggle against its imaginary enemies since the eleventh 
century and up until the present day. After paying a great deal of attention to the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (with the remark that “the Protocols may or may 
not be authentic, but the eighty years that have passed since their appearance 
give us ample material for reflection” and “the world history … has followed the 
                                                           
15  Inozemtsev 1992. 
16  Oleinik 1993b: 38. «Неужели не вспомнили, Михаил Сергеевич?! Да это же Дал-
лес, да-да, тот самый, который сказал это еще в 1945 году, разрабатывая план 
реализации американской послевоенной доктрины против СССР. А теперь огля-
нитесь окрест: не правда ли – почти один к одному мы с Вами наконец исполни-
ли заветную мечту американского стратега, то есть реализовали его программу? 
А Вы еще и до сих пор, пребывая (или, скорее, прикидываясь, что пребываете) в 
иррациональном мире, доказываете, что “перестройка” – Ваше изобретение! 
Когда даже Бейкер черным по белому заявил: “Мы истратили триллионы долла-
ров за последние сорок лет, чтобы одержать победу в “холодной войне” против 
СССР”, то есть реализовать программу того же Даллеса!»). The quotation from 
James Baker also comes from the Revelations by Invaders. 
17  Snychev 1993. 
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plan laid forth in the Protocols to a surprising degree”18), Ioann finally presented 
the text of the “Dulles Plan.” 
The same ideas that link the “Dulles Plan” to imaginary “Zionist forces” 
were expressed by Oleinik in his publication in Molodaia gvardiia. Ironically, 
Ivanov still worked as the editor in chief of the journal, so he was obviously 
aware of this unusual use of this literary piece by Oleinik and other supporters of 
the “Dulles Plan” conspiracy theory. While referring to the Perestroika as a part 
of the “Dulles Plan,” Oleinik did mention its original source however. In a foot-
note he wrote: 
 
As we got to know, these ominous words were included in the second volume of the novel 
Vechnyi zov by Anatolii Ivanov … . For more than a decade, however, they were not au-
thorized by the censorship under Kremlin-Zionist control. For the first time, the author 
managed to publish the passage in the fourth volume of his collected works in 1981. How-
ever, neither the high and mighty nor our celebrated ideologists, neither literary critics nor 
intellectuals [intelligentsia], in short, nobody except ordinary readers paid attention to this 
warning about the plans by Zionist forces for our country and our people—plans that have 
already become real practice. Today, the results are obvious.19  
 
I am not able to claim how accurate Oleinik was when he spoke about the cen-
sorship that had not allowed the publication of the full text of Lakhnovskii’s con-
fessions. However, a close analysis of this passage certainly reveals its three dif-
                                                           
18  «Подлинны “Протоколы” или нет, но восемьдесят лет, прошедших после их 
опубликования, дают обильный материал для размышления, ибо мировая исто-
рия, словно повинуясь приказу невидимого диктатора, покорно прокладывала 
свое прихотливое русло в удивительном, детальном соответствии с планом, из-
ложенным на их страницах». 
19  Oleinik 1993b: 38. «Эти зловещие слова писатель Анатолий Иванов, как нам 
стало известно, включил в текст 2-й книги романа “Вечный зов”, опубликован-
ной в 1970 году. Но в течение более 10 лет эти слова выбрасывались цензурой, 
находящейся под кремлевско-сионистским контролем, из всех изданий. Впер-
вые автору удалось их опубликовать в 4-м томе собрания сочинений, вышед-
шего в 1981 году. Однако ни власть имущие в СССР, ни прославленные наши 
идеологи, ни литературные критики, ни интеллигенция – словом, никто, кроме 
рядовых читателей, не обратил внимания на это предупреждение писателя о на-
мерениях сионистских сил в отношении нашей страны, нашего народа, намере-
ниях, давно уже превратившихся в активную практику. Результаты этой прак-
тики ныне налицо». 
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ferent versions, presented subsequently in the first journal publication of the 
novel (1976), in its separate edition (1977), and in its final version included in 
Ivanov’s collected works (published in five volumes in 1981). The second and 
the third redactions included more radical additions that could be interpreted as a 
nationalistic criticism of culture and society of the late Soviet decades. For that 
reason, it might have been subject to certain censorship corrections. More impor-
tant, though, is what Ivanov himself wanted to tell his readers when he was writ-
ing his “ominous warning.” 
The most visible example, even though it still requires some competence in 
corresponding “cultural encoding,” is the passage’s anti-Semitic subtext. For 
members and supporters of the so-called “Russophile” (or “national-conserva-
tive”) party in the late Soviet literary establishment, the label of Trotskyism (as 
well as Zionism) was a common euphemism for Jewishness and Judaism and, in 
this context, a part of conventional “language of struggle,” to use the formulation 
of Nikolai Mitrokhin,20 against imaginary Jewish (or Judeo-Masonic) conspira-
cy. It is possible that Russian nationalists of the late 1970s and 1980s see the 
passage from the novel as a kind of manifest of “legal anti-Semitism,” so to 
speak, a short adaptation of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion for a general but 
still “competent” reader. It was no accident, of course, that Ioann Snychev dis-
cussed the Protocols and their predictions “coming true” before introducing the 
“Dulles Plan” to his readers. 
One more subtext of the confessions by Lakhnovskii is related to polemics 
between, roughly speaking, the Russophiles and the Westernized among Soviet 
intellectuals, writers, and artists of the 1960s−1980s. The mentioning of arts and 
literature lacking social significance and proclaiming “the basest of human feel-
ings” as well as of the “cult of sex, violence, sadism and betrayal, in a word, im-
morality” promoted by the “so called creators” clearly refers to those debates 
that were recently analyzed by a number of scholars dealing with nationalistic 
trends in late Soviet literature and culture (e.g., Yitzhak M. Brudny, Nikolai Mit-
rokhin).21  
This subtext or context, however, can be extended to political issues more 
broadly. Both the communist elite and the Soviet propaganda of the 1970s and 
1980s paid a lot of attention to the imaginary moral degradation of the younger 
generations, which was allegedly induced by Western influences generally and 
by American popular culture in particular. This propagandistic trend perhaps ac-
counts for ascribing the authorship of the imaginary conspiracy to the American 
                                                           
20  Mitrokhin 2003: 535. 
21  Brudny 1998; Mitrokhin 2003. 
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intelligence agency. From this perspective, Allen Dulles was a perfect candidate 
for the position of chief conspirator, being generally considered to be a some-
what mysterious and suspect figure of the Cold War global political scene, the 
“king of spies,” both in Russia and the U.S.22 He was also well known enough 
for the Russian audience, due to the enormous popularity of the Soviet television 
series Seventeen Moments of Spring (produced in 1973 by the Maxim Gorky 
studio, based on Iulian Semenov’s novel) in which a Russian spy operating in 
Germany in 1945 is ordered to collect information about secret negotiations 
(known as the Operation Sunrise) between representatives of the German Mili-
tary Command and the Western Allies coordinated by Dulles. As James von 
Geldern remarks, “Semenov … was retelling old Cold War myths of American 
treachery in Seventeen Moments. Yet he also managed to portray Nazi leaders 
with a sympathy unknown to Soviet viewers, and to use Nazi Germany to offer a 
sly critique of Soviet society.”23  
The late Soviet propagandist obsession with moral purity and dangers is ob-
viously related to general politicization of moral reasoning in the USSR since the 
early years of the Khrushchev period. It is not easy to decide on the extent to 
which both Soviet society and its leaders believed in the twenty-year program of 
building communism, which had been proclaimed at the Twenty-Second CPSU 
Congress, but the idea that the “moral standards” of the average Soviet person 
standing on the threshold of communist society should be transformed met with 
a certain amount of support from the liberal intelligentsia. In this context, the no-
torious “Moral Code of the Builder of Communism” included in the Third CPSU 
program was taken quite seriously by many, more seriously perhaps since it was 
the only part of the broader program oriented towards the formation of a new 
communist morality. In 1959, “the first scientific conference on aspects of Marx-
ist-Leninist ethics” was held in Leningrad, and departments of ethics and aes-
thetics were set up in Moscow and Leningrad state universities a year later. In 
1961, the first university textbook and the first reader on Marxist ethics were 
published. There is a strong analogy between this new moral culture and journal-
istic campaigns of the late 1920s against meshchanstvo and the “petty bourgeoi-
sie.” 
                                                           
22  Symptomatically enough, the American journalist David Talbot has recently pub-
lished a book in which he accuses Dulles of manipulating and subverting American 
presidents and of being involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy – 
cf. Talbot 2015. 
23  Geldern (n. d.). 
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It is possible to explain the new politics of morality taking into consideration 
a number of reasons including social and demographic changes (the rapid growth 
of the urban population in particular) as well as ideological expectations of the 
communist utopia. One might ask, however, what moral or ethical norms and 
standards were claimed to be “positive” and “negative,” appropriate or inappro-
priate for the “builders of communism.” Although the topic, of course, deserves 
a longer discussion, I would suggest that the debates did not result in any con-
sistent model of ethics or moral reasoning. It is equally important that actual re-
lations between moral habitus or moral practices and official moral ideologies, 
as well as moral identities, in late Soviet culture were quite complex and not nec-
essarily consistent at all. Here I would return to the book by Alexei Yurchak in 
which he introduces the principle of performative shift as informing the logic of 
late Soviet ideological production. Still, moral meanings were produced and re-
produced there, albeit in a more complicated way. If we look back at the “Dulles 
Plan,” we might assume that “immorality” and “false values” here generally re-
fer to individualistic and consumerist trends of everyday social life. Perhaps this 
is the key to understanding the continued popularity of this conspiratorial narra-
tive. Ivanov obviously intended to criticize the current state of affairs in the 
USSR in the 1970s, and explained what he thought to be the moral degradation 
of contemporary Soviet society in terms of a Trotskyite or Zionist or Jewish con-
spiracy. His narrative also appeared to be effective and adaptable in a much wid-
er context as a tool for what can be called social self-description or even self-
criticism related to the social changes of both the late Soviet and post-Soviet pe-
riods. In arguing this, I mean that the reasons behind the fabrication of the “Dul-
les Plan” might be explained not only in terms of “Cold War mythology” or 
“emotional adaptability” of the text by Ivanov, but also as related to continuity 
between Soviet and post-Soviet society. The Dulles Plan, then, seems to be a 
kind of self-representation of a society that witnesses suspended and authorita-
rian modernization, as well as the relatively rapid growth of consumerist culture. 
Let me return, in conclusion, to the post-Soviet history of the “Dulles Plan” 
conspiracy theory. We have already seen that it was initially disseminated by the 
“anti-liberal” opposition of the early 1990s, which comprised both secular com-
munists and religious nationalists. Quite soon thereafter, however, the narrative 
became perhaps the most popular “indigenous” post-Soviet conspiracy theory 
and penetrated many different political, religious, and ideological communities 
in Russia. Like many other conspiratorial narratives, the “Dulles Plan” has not 
lost its popularity in the aftermath of the disclosure of its actual sources that have 
been made known by journalists since the late 1990s. At present, its supporters 
discuss either Ivanov’s prophetic gift that allowed him, somehow mystically, to 
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learn about the intentions of Dulles or his contacts with certain KGB officers that 
shared their knowledge of the CIA’s secret plans with him. The variety of post-
Soviet social, cultural, and economic phenomena discussed in terms of the “Dul-
les Plan” is really broad, from Scientology and juvenile justice to urban graffiti. 
Both the “Dulles Plan’s” huge popularity in present day Russia and ambivalent 
reception given to it by Putinist officials (bearing the legal ban of 2015 in mind) 
seem to prove its effectiveness as a tool of social self-description or, in terms of 
psychoanalytic anthropology, projective inversion. A popular meme that could 
be found on the Russian Internet presents a black frame that reads as follows: 
“The ‘Dulles Plan’—does not exist, but is still effective.”24 Anybody who cares 
to can upload a picture of his or her own to the frame, informing potential view-
ers of particular aspects of everyday life that should be interpreted in relation to 
the imaginary American conspiracy. To my mind, this meme presents the clear-
est idea of how this and other conspiracy theories work in contemporary post-
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This chapter deals with present day conspiratorial discourse in Russia, which 
could perhaps be discussed in terms of the universal symbolic language of the 
post-Soviet collective imagination. That does not necessarily mean that most 
Russians today take conspiracy theories seriously or that they base their every-
day behavior on social paranoia. Rather, this “language of suspicion” appears to 
be the most adaptable set of memes and meanings that link people to each other 
and provide them with collective identities. Still, it is necessary to understand the 
messages that are being encoded by the symbolic language of moral panics and 
conspiracy theories related to the “imaginary West” in late Soviet and post-
Soviet Russian society. These questions can be at least partly answered by an 
analysis of the so-called “Dulles Plan for Russia,” a conspiratorial forgery that 
has been widely publicized in Russia since 1992. This chapter focuses on its his-
tory, ideological contexts, and popular reception in present day Russia. 
 
 
Conspiracy Theory and Neoconservative  
PR Strategies in the 2000−2010s:  








Aleksandr Prokhanov (born 1938) has written a number of novels since the first 
half of the 1990s that offer a conspiracist interpretation of political life in post-
Soviet Russia. In Poslednii soldat imperii (The Empire’s Last Soldier, 1993), re-
published in 2007 as Gibel’ krasnykh bogov (The Death of the Red Gods), the 
1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR, 
were presented as the result of a major operation conducted by Western intel-
ligence services and a Soviet intelligentsia who shared Western values. In Gos-
podin Geksogen (Mr. Hexogen, 2001), a series of apartment bombings in Mos-
cow in 1999 and the subsequent Chosen One’s rise to power were regarded as 
the result of KGB-planned actions. In Politolog (The Political Scientist, 2005), 
the death of children during the Beslan school siege and parliamentary election 
results also appeared to be steps taken by a security force’s secret operation 
aimed at establishing “biological fascism” in Russia. In Virtuoz (The Virtuoso, 
2009), a power struggle between the national spiritual leader Dolgoletov (Vla-
dimir Putin) and President Lampadnikov (Dmitrii Medvedev) was introduced as 
a network of sophisticated conspiracy intrigues. Vremia zolotoe (The Golden 
Times, 2013) showed how mass protests at Bolotnaia Square and the threat of the 
                                                           
*  Supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation, project № 14-18-02952 
(ONG–P). 
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“Orange Revolution” were neutralized with the help of a carefully designed se-
cret operation. And, finally, in Krym (Crimea, 2014), the protagonist’s unin-
tentional participation in conspiracy was interpreted as a grievous sin that must 
be atoned for. 
Prokhanov is not only an author of conspiracy fiction. As the editor-in-chief 
of the newspaper Zavtra (Tomorrow), he has also written a number of articles 
primarily discussing conspiracy theories. In many of these works, he criticizes 
political decisions taken by Russian authorities, although his accusatory rhetoric 
has become more moderate in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
Interestingly, his critical approach did not prevent him from becoming a sought-
after media personality. Prokhanov is a frequent guest on various talk shows. In 
2012, a documentary about him, Soldat imperii (A Soldier of the Empire, 4 epi-
sodes) was made by the state-owned Russian television channel Russia-1. That 
same year he headed an influential conservative think-tank by the name of “Iz-
borskii klub” (Izborsk Club). Prokhanov is a very informed person due to his 
long-standing connections to Russia’s political elites, security services, and mili-
tary forces. In the past few years, he has positioned himself not only as an advo-
cate of ultra-conservative views, but also as a figure whose beliefs and writings 
have a real impact on some of the representatives of the Russian ruling elite. In 
an interview with Aleksandr Dugin, the writer mentioned his private conversa-
tion with the President of Russia. Prokhanov underlined—and his remark is of a 
primary interest to my chapter—his intention to influence the Russian leader’s 
worldview. 
 
It seems to me that Putin feels his mission. I had a private conversation with him a few 
weeks ago. I told him about himself, the way I see him and understand him, by means of 
mysterious Russian codes that are awakening in him. He listened to me with interest, at-
tention, and understanding.1  
  
Sometimes Prokhanov’s inclination to conspiracy theories is interpreted fairly 
broadly: for instance, Lev Danilkin examines the writer’s conspiracy thinking in 
relation to the “sacral topography” of his novels and publications.2 However, I 
                                                           
1  «Мне кажется, что Путин чувствует свою миссию. У меня несколько недель на-
зад была с ним личная встреча, и я рассказывал ему о нeм самом, так, как я его 
вижу и понимаю через таинственные русские коды, которые в нем просы-
паются. Он слушал это всe с интересом, вниманием и пониманием». − “Chetver-
taia politicheskaia teoriia” 2017.  
2  Cf. Danilkin 2007: 85−86. 
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will examine Prokhanov as a conspiracist in the strict sense, implying the use of 
conspiracy explanatory models in public discussions or in political analysis. Pro-
khanov has earned a reputation as a conspiracy theory supporter thanks to his 
novels Poslednii soldat imperii and Gospodin Geksogen, which have been gen-
erally perceived by scholars as a manifestation of post-Soviet conspiracy think-
ing. It is worth taking into account that conspiracy theory in these novels came 
from the protest moods of the 1990s. At that time, conspiracy models were used 
mainly by politically marginalized groups that did not have any access to outlets 
of real power. Their interpretation of the decade’s major developments (from 
privatization to the shelling of the Russian “White House” in October 1993, from 
the confrontation of media corporations to military operations in Chechnya) 
sharply challenged an official opinion and delegitimized Russian liberal elites 
who had come to power, supposedly, as a result of long-term subversive acti-
vities and conspiracies. In response to this criticism, the authorities and liberal 
politicians declared conspiracy theorists to be social and political losers unable 
to put forward any satisfactory (that is rational) arguments.  
Prokhanov’s novels are rightly regarded as an attempt to articulate “the post-
Soviet unconscious” and to express an experience of “mass-reproducible trau-
ma.”3 Poslednii soldat imperii and Gospodin Geksogen are examples of the crea-
tion of “a new master narrative of social suffering”4 and they can therefore, be 
considered from the perspective of the construction of collective trauma through 
the implanting of “traumatic” meanings into interpretations of destructive social 
processes and events. Economic, political, social, and cultural causes that led to 
the collapse of the USSR were thus reduced by the writer to a single cause: the 
use of conspiracy technologies (from brainwashing to magical practices) by geo-
political enemies. Mastery over these weapons was still attributed solely to an 
enemy, while the novel’s protagonist was presented as totally defenseless and 
vulnerable to them. Issues fundamental to collective identity, such as control, 
governance, guilt, and responsibility, were discussed in these novels within a 
conspiracy discourse in which the line between the victim and the culprit was 
sometimes extremely vague. This resulted in the fetishization of painful experi-
ence and in the persistent recurrence of the latter in different types of discourse. 
This is what Prokhanov has been engaged in for many years, including in his late 
novels, journalism, and public appearances5—he has been creating an atmo-
                                                           
3  Ryklin 2003: 288.  
4  Alexander 2003: 97. 
5  Motifs of penetration into the brain and the body, fear of loss of (self-)control—the in-
fernal images of these two novels were a cultural representation of morbid experienc-
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sphere of anxiety and calling for the utmost vigilance against faceless, cunning, 
and ubiquitous enemies.  
Despite Prokhanov’s more recent novels seem to be repeating previous con-
spiratorial ideas and metaphors (for instance, fear of enemy invasion, the poten-
tial loss of control, self-sacrifice, and a determination to sacrifice other people), 
they are certainly being written within changed cultural and political circum-
stances. The novels concern the conservative turn in Russia in the 2000s−2010s 
that directly affected neoconservative circles. It is well known that the patriotic 
milieu, represented by Prokhanov, was skeptical of Vladimir Putin at first. When 
Putin required a new image and new PR strategies in the first years of his presi-
dency they could not offer him anything because the patriotic opposition, as 
Aleksandr Dugin put it, “was exhausted by the years of marginalization and by 
the government pressure.”6 However, by the middle of the 2000s, the patriots’ 
state of mind and their attitude towards Putin had changed, so Prokhanov might 
have felt the possibility to influence the Russian authorities’ rhetoric in order to 
enlighten them, and to offer them new self-identification models. Such an ap-
proach is characteristic of the post-Soviet neoconservative community that has 
existed and developed, in Maria Engström’s words, as a “metapolitical intel-
lectual movement … at the junction of art, literary, philosophy, and politics.”7 
Engström supposes that these metapolitical communities consider culture to be a 
political instrument and that they try “to influence public opinion in order to es-
tablish the dominance of pro-conservative political power and/or to introduce 
‘the new order.’”8 By creating “a new mythology of the empire,” they have been 
primarily solving social mobilization tasks, which is why their texts “do not rep-
resent some political program, but rather resemble futurist manifestos and pam-
phlets.”9 Prokhanov’s books, written after 2005, exemplify these intentions and 
strategies vividly. His novels Virtuoz, Vremia zolotoe, and Krym increasingly re-
semble literary and ideological schemes with the articulated enlightenment-
                                                           
es of abrupt and unexpected social changes, but at the same time the ideology and im-
agery of Prokhanov’s writings paved the way for a contradictory social mythology of 
“the restoration of order” in the 2000s with Putin. In this respect, his novels might be 
considered as a rich source of metaphors that are typical of different kinds of con-
servative political demonology.  
6  «Патриотическая оппозиция … за годы маргинализации и прессинга со стороны 
власти выдохлась». – Dugin 2012: 13. 
7  Engström 2014: 358. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Engström 2016: 329. 
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prognostic message addressed both to a wide audience and a particularly im-
portant reader—the Russian authorities.10 These novels’ conspiratorial ideas 
were formulated by Prokhanov from the perspective of groups sympathizing 
with a current political course of the Russian authorities and sought to keep their 
influence. I believe Prokhanov’s novels of the 2000s−2010s are the quintessence 
of neoconservative “strategies of influence” based, among other matters, on con-
spiracy theories and appropriate rhetoric devices. In this essay, I will focus on 
the question of how the writer exploits conspiracy theories as a tool for maintain-
ing traditionalist ideological trends. But first it is worth giving at least a general 
outline of the contexts and ideas, which have predetermined the writer’s propen-
sity to conspiracy thinking. 
 
 
“In the Beginning There Was a Conspiracy…” 
 
The factor that influenced Prokhanov’s conspiracy views was his enthusiasm to-
wards esoteric knowledge. As is known, in the late 1960s he contacted the Iu-
zhinskii circle in which esoteric concepts were being passionately discussed and 
occultism was being intensively practiced. Despite the writer’s social back-
ground and ideological preferences being different from those of the circle’s 
members,11 he appeared to be impressed by a macabre atmosphere of the “occult 
underground.”12 Later, he carefully read Dugin’s Konspirologiia: nauka o zago-
vorakh, tainykh obshchestvakh i okkul’tnoi voine (Conspirology: The Science of 
Conspiracies, Secret Communities, and Occult War, 1993, 2005) which bore ob-
                                                           
10  It would be incorrect to say that Prokhanov’s contribution to the expansion of conspir-
acy rhetoric directly influenced the official ideological discourse; it is doubtful that 
Russian politicians read his novels and became infected with a virus of “political para-
noia.” A mutually beneficial alliance, however, began to form precisely at that time. 
On the one hand, the contemporary Russian Neo-Conservatism and the political re-
gime that was formed in Putin’s Russia appeared to be quite susceptible to conspiracy 
rhetoric and adopted some of its devices. On the other hand, conspiracy theories sup-
porters who were not very similar to the agitated “seekers of truth” used the favorable 
ideological conjuncture for their self-promotion. 
11  Cf. Prokhanov 2015. 
12  In his Aleksandr Prokhanov and Post-Soviet Esotericism Edmund Griffiths (2016) ex-
amines thoroughly the writer’s ideology imbued with Gnostic beliefs and with ideas 
borrowed from Nikolai Fedorov’s Filosofiia obshchego dela (The Philosophy of the 
Common Cause). 
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vious marks of the author’s contacts with the Evgenii Golovin’s “mystical un-
derground.” Prokhanov’s new conspiracy ideas and style have been largely in-
spired by Dugin’s provocative book. According to Prokhanov, various conspi-
racies are historically specific versions of an eternal struggle between God and 
the Devil, or of a superconspiracy interpreted in the vein of millennialism.13 The 
writer, basically, recognizes the occult nature of conspiracy and views the latter 
as the manifestation of a “dark side” of being, or, in René Guénon’s terms, a 
form of counter-initiation, that is “a special type of tradition in which … all the 
accents are rearranged oppositely.”14 That is why to deny conspiracies and con-
spiracy theory, in his view, is absurd. It is like denying the existence of evil as 
such. “[World] history,” as Prokhanov put it, “is a history of conspiracies.”15 
Nevertheless, he believes the “classic” conspiracy theories (the international 
Jewish conspiracy, Masonic conspiracy theories, etc.) need to be updated.16 Try-
ing to avoid associations with caricature paranoid conspiracists, he describes 
himself as an artist who tends towards conspiracy thinking and at the same time 
as a researcher of the mass interest in conspiracy who is exploiting conspiracy 
theory because it is “very convenient for a text … Such a flow of events … All 
this can be organized only through rather simplified conspiracy metaphors …”17 
He specified:  
 
Starting with the September 11 attacks and ending with the horrors of Beslan ..., all of 
these [conspiracy theories] programmed public consciousness in a special way. People 
tend to think that all the most interesting things are produced by certain secret structures. 
… I can be accused of encouraging these conspiracy attitudes that play into the hands of 
enemies of Russia. I do not claim that the notorious bombings of houses or the submarine 
disasters were directly executed by security services. … The bottom line is, the authorities 
                                                           
13  According to Michael Barkun’s classification, “this term refers to conspiratorial con-
structs in which multiple conspiracies are believed to be linked together hierarchical-
ly. … At the summit of the conspiratorial hierarchy is a distant but all-powerful evil 
force manipulating lesser conspiratorial actors” – Barkun 2003: 5−6. 
14  «Особый тип традиции, в котором … все акценты переставлены на противопо-
ложные». – Dugin 2005: 28. 
15  «Всемирная история – это история заговоров». – “Aleksandr Prokhanov v pro-
gramme Shkola zlosloviia” 2002. 
16  Latysheva 2007. 
17  «Очень удобна для текста ... Такой поток событий ... Все это может быть органи-
зовано только через довольно упрощенные метафоры заговора». – Aleksandr 
Prokhanov v programme Shkola zlosloviia” 2002. 
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feel the effect of their helplessness before series of catastrophes better than the others and 
use it in their own interests. … [E]verything I described is just a reaction to this effect of 
helplessness.18  
 
Being ironical towards the traditional conspiracy rhetoric, however, Prokhanov 
is well aware of its powerful mobilizing effect. If history, as Dugin alleges, “is 
ruled by the combination of archetypal schemes, expressed in various ideological 
forms,”19 then conspiracy theory, combining political and “basic religious facts,” 
using the language of symbols and metaphors, gives an opportunity to form 
some ideological strategies and to appeal primarily to the emotional sphere. Such 
a view of conspiracy theory refers to both “the paranoid style,” described by 
Richard J. Hofstadter, and to the link between this phenomenon and political 
populism (the difference being that Prokhanov simulates the paranoid belief in 
conspiracies). In his analysis of Hofstadter’s work, Mark Fenster adds that “con-
spiracy theory is a particularly unstable element in populism,” and “its success-
ful and thorough-going incorporation within a large populist movement would 
most likely occur in authoritarian or fascist regimes.”20 To be sure, Prokhanov 
was familiar with the use of conspiracy theories by totalitarian regimes and tried 
to exploit this experience in the present-day political situation. He has usually 
taken inspiration from the conspiracy culture of the Stalin era, borrowing meta-
phors and rhetoric to excite and to mobilize his audience. He has provided vari-
ous images of the enemy and has used populist clichés since the early 1990s, 
when a confrontation between new “corrupt” political elites and the “deprived” 
Russian people became commonplace in his fiction and journalism. Depending 
on the political situation of the time, his novels’ political demonology has in-
                                                           
18  «Начиная от 11 сентября 2001 года и заканчивая ужасами Беслана … – все это 
[теория заговора] по-особому кодирует общественное сознание. Люди начинают 
постепенно думать, что все самое интересное производится действиями неких 
закрытых структур. … Меня могут обвинить в том, что я поощряю эти конспи-
рологические настроения, которые могут сработать на руку врагам российского 
государства. Я не утверждаю, что пресловутые взрывы домов или гибель под-
лодок были инспирированы напрямую спецслужбами. … Главное другое – 
власть чувствует лучше других эффект своей беспомощности перед серией 
катастроф и использует его в своих интересах. … все, описанное мной, – лишь 
реакция на этот эффект беспомощности». − Prokhanov 2005. 
19  «… управляется комбинацией архетипических схем, выраженных в различных 
идеологических формах». – Dugin 2005: 54. 
20  Fenster 2008: 89. 
152 | Razuvalova 
cluded satirical images of manipulated Russian politicians, sinister images of the 
oligarchs like Berezovskii or Gusinskii, as well as of corrupt KGB officers, po-
litical technologists, lying journalists, spoilt representatives of “the creative 
class,” etc. Obviously, such a demonology has clearly identified Russia’s ene-
mies and appealed to mass resentment. In more recent articles and novels, it has 
allowed for the simulation of a kind of ridiculous conspiracy panic towards Rus-
sia’s ruling elites21 thereby provoking a mobilizing mood. 
As mentioned previously, Prokhanov has been inclined to a very broad un-
derstanding of conspiracy. Everything that seems to him to be an activity by 
“servants of the devil” is treated as a conspiracy to prevent Russia from the im-
plementation of its messianic mission.22 It is also worth taking into consideration 
that the USSR’s collapse became a paradigmatic situation of a successful con-
spiracy for Prokhanov and his like-minded public. This catastrophic develop-
ment, the writer asserts, occurred as a result of the prolonged use of a so-called 
“organizational weapon” (organizacionnoe oruzhie)23 against the USSR. In Pro-
                                                           
21  Prokhanov has been ready to discover signs of diverse psi-attacks against the current 
Russian President everywhere. He has often defined any anti-Putin statements and ac-
tions as attempts to compromise the President, thereby weakening the Russian state. 
For instance, the writer interpreted Aleksandr Litvinenko’s death as a “shahid” suicide 
and a vivid “episode of the psychotronic operation that is being conducted against 
Putin personally. It aims at exhausting his psyche, deforming his will, inducing him to 
abandon the third presidential term and to open thereby the way to a ‘liberal revenge’” 
(«…часть психотронной операции, которая проводится против Путина лично. 
Она имеет целью измотать его психику, деформировать волю, побудить отка-
заться от Третьего президентского срока, что открывает дорогу “либеральному 
реваншу”». – Prokhanov 2011: 220). The murder of Anna Politkovskaia was another 
example of the same psychotronic “explosion.” This crime, from the writer’s point of 
view, was supposed to have an occult implication, so it was committed on Putin’s 
birthday, when his psyche was most “exposed to external influences” («открыта для 
внешних воздействий» – ibid.).  
22  Cf. “Metafizika russkoi istorii” 2013: 28−29.  
23  In the early 1990s, Prokhanov most likely began to use the term “organizational 
weapon” as a result of the influence of two Soviet scholars, Spartak Nikanorov and 
Sergei Solntsev, experts in the field of conceptual design of control systems. – cf. 
Danilkin 2007: 393−95. Nikanorov supposed that it was Solntsev who used the term 
“organizational weapon” for the first time “to refer to a wide variety of techniques to 
block a productive activity of organizations. … The term became popular quickly. 
The tragedy of the collapse of the Soviet Union was explained as a consequence of the 
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khanov’s interpretation, the notion of the “organizational weapon” implied a 
wide range of means and methods that influences collective and individual iden-
tity—from attacks on the population’s psyche to the use of psi-generators, from 
discrediting the opponent’s moral values to sophisticated intelligence service op-
erations. In other words, the “organizational weapon” in his writings has always 
been an emphatic metaphor for a clandestine subversive activity, which is more 
dangerous the harder it is to detect. Therefore, Prokhanov insists on developing 
various skills to defend oneself against the “organizational weapon” and on cre-
ating special institutions that would deal with it. Russia, he believes, should mas-
ter new technologies to influence consciousness and to exploit them in its con-
spiratorial counter-play and/or within “soft power” strategies as efficiently as its 
opponents have been doing. Prokhanov’s novels of the second half of the 
2000s−2010s were written when the post-Soviet “culture of influence”24 was be-
ginning to take shape rapidly; moreover, they actively contributed to its for-
mation, providing it with flashy metaphors and appropriate rhetorical schemes. 
 
 
A Political Scientist as a Hero of Our Time 
 
The novel Politolog,25 which retrospectively might be called a bridge between 
the protest conspiracy theory of Poslednii soldat imperii and the later novels’ 
conservative conspiracy theory, has been usually read as evidence of Pro-
khanov’s complete disappointment in most political actors in the mid-2000s. A 
                                                           
organizational weapon application” («Для обозначения широкого разнообразия 
приемов, блокирующих продуктивную деятельность организаций. … Термин 
очень быстро стал популярным. Трагедия краха СССР объяснялась как следст-
вие применения против него организационного оружия». – Nikanorov 2011). 
Some of Nikanorov’s ideas, and those of his colleagues, shone through in Prokha-
nov’s novel 600 let posle bitvy (Six Hundred Years After the Battle, 1989). In addition 
to the language of Soviet analysts-conceptualists, belief in the organizational weapon 
and psi-effects in Prokhanov’s articles and novels refer to popular topics of the post-
Soviet culture of the 1990s. 
24  «культура воздействия» – Prokhanov 2011: 229. 
25  It is symptomatic of this phenomenon that Prokhanov deliberately merged the profes-
sion’s two designations—“political scientist” and “political technologist.” This is pro-
bably because their functionality and professional domains were not differentiated 
clearly in the Russia’s political culture in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
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new character—the political technologist, Mikhail Strizhailo, who personified all 
of the Russian elite’s most repulsive features, replaced the two previous conspir-
acy novels’ protagonist, an intelligence officer and a mystic, Belosel’tsev. The 
writer attributed to him some features of well-known political technologists, 
primarily Stanislav Belkovskii and, to a lesser extent, Gleb Pavlovskii. Prokha-
nov’s interest in political technologists, however, could also be predetermined by 
deeply personal motives. As Stanislav Belkovskii wittily remarked, Prokhanov 
has always been not so much a writer as a PR man:  
 
The best job for him would have been Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev’s media spokesman in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s because the young, still very handsome Prokhanov would have 
looked great at Kremlin briefings, talking about Leonid Il’ich’s good firm handshake, and 
he could have changed the Secretary General’s image, both within the country and abroad. 
But then again there was no such position as media spokesman at the time, so Prokhanov 
became a writer.26  
 
Indeed, Prokhanov’s preoccupation with political activity and his ambition to be 
at the center of public events, maintaining contacts with the ruling elite expres-
sed his aspiration, inherited from the late Soviet period, firstly to be integrated 
into a stable management system and secondly to affect public attitudes and to 
construct a new worldview. It is noteworthy that Prokhanov often describes his 
activities as a writer, a public figure, and an editor by comparing himself with a 
gardener, a collector, or a design engineer.27 Put differently, his ambitions have 
never been limited to creating a new literary (fictional) world, but also extended 
to the creation of a social reality. 
The appearance of a new protagonist also highlighted Prokhanov’s sus-
ceptibility to political tendencies that emerged in the 1990s and the first half of 
the 2000s. In fact, the role played by political technologies in Russia’s public life 
at that time was enormous. An empirical study of this phenomenon was provided 
by Andrew Wilson who believed that the intensive use of political technologies 
                                                           
26  «Идеальное для него поприще было бы пресс-секретарь Брежнева Леонида 
Ильича в конце 70-х–начале 80-х годов прошлого века, потому что тогда Проха-
нов, молодой, еще очень красивый, прекрасно смотрелся бы на кремлeвских 
брифингах, рассказывая о крепком рукопожатии Леонида Ильича и мог бы не-
сколько изменить имидж генсека и внутри страны, и за ее пределами. Но тогда 
такой должности не было, пресс-секретарь, поэтому Проханов ушел в литера-
туру». − Bez durakov 2014. 
27  Cf. Prokhanov 1997. 
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in post-Soviet Russia, based on media manipulations, an “administrative re-
source,” dirty tricks, and “active measures” developed by both tsarist Okhrana 
and by Soviet secret services, had given rise to virtual politics. This created a 
quasi-democratic facade (“faking democracy”) by eliminating genuine democra-
tic procedures: “Politics is ‘virtual’ or ‘theatrical’ in the sense that so many as-
pects of public performance are purely epiphenomenal or instrumental, existing 
only for effect or to disguise the real substance of ‘inner politics.’28  
Prokhanov, like other Russian writers of the 2000s (Viktor Pelevin being 
chief among them), shared the widespread opinion that Russia’s politics had a 
virtual nature. However, “democracy” in Wilson’s formula of “faking demo-
cracy,” seemed to cause a lot more irritation in the writer. From his perspective, 
it was precisely electoral democracy that could provoke the rapid development 
of a market for political technologies. Shifting the focus to a public space, demo-
cracy requires additional evidence of the authorities’ legitimacy (for example, 
during honest elections) and thereby stimulates virtual political techniques that 
imitate notorious “democratic procedures.” Being an ardent supporter of a strong 
state power, and an equally zealous opponent of “democratic procedures … and 
the disgusting nonsense of constitutional order,”29 the writer insists on the exact 
opposite: authority is legitimate when it is able to hear a mystic “call of history” 
and to direct the nation to the fulfillment of its mission. Political technologists, 
who professionally create simulacra, are only able to offer a virtual political and 
ideological project. In Prokhanov’s eyes, political technologists personify all the 
main defects of Russia’s ruling elites, who feel comfortable within fictional poli-
tical realities and postpone the launching of a new modernization project. The 
latter would require the willingness to use violence on the part of the authorities 
and a high level of engagement and sacrificial efforts by the Russian people. 
As a matter of fact, Prokhanov identifies political technologies by the various 
methods of influence on consciousness and mind control, specifically those relat-
ed to the sphere of conspiracy. In a sense, he follows the popular opinion by at-
tributing many of the capabilities of an all-powerful manipulator, and a creator 
of conspiracy intrigues, to a political technologist. It would seem that there is 
every reason to closely associate the methods of constructing conspiracies and 
the use of political technologies: they are both created behind the scenes and are 
based on manipulation and they both claim to control public attitudes and behav-
ior (following the same arguments, Samuil Markov called political technologists 
                                                           
28  Wilson 2005: 47. 
29  «… демократических процедур, … и бреда отвратительного конституционного» 
− “Desiat’ vekov russkoi demokratii” 2006. 
156 | Razuvalova 
the “heroes of political behind-the-scenes”).30 However, in response to the de-
monization of political technologists, Pavlovskii has argued that the keen interest 
in the manipulators themselves merely demonstrates a drive to be manipulated 
and to be involved in conspiracy.31 Prokhanov has expressed this neurotic ten-
dency in his novel once again. The identification of political technologies with 
methods of influence on consciousness was also rooted in his longtime interest 
in social management issues combined with the broad interpretation of mind 
control practices in the vein of New Age culture. 
Shifting the focus from the unlucky conspirator to the creator of sophisti-
cated behind-the-scenes intrigues, Prokhanov nevertheless retained the plot 
scheme of Poslednii soldat imperii and of Gospodin Geksogen: the protagonist, 
who considered himself as a kind of Demiurge and claimed to solve the most 
complex intellectual and creative tasks, suddenly realizes that he has ended up as 
a puppet, obediently playing a role in another, much more sinister conspiracy. 
Having observed the death of the children in Beslan, Strizhailo eventually real-
ized that this bloody sacrifice had been designed to shock Russian society and, in 
so doing, to prepare it for the establishment of a regime of biological fascism. He 
tried to expose the conspiracy, but he failed. His death, on the one hand, was 
equated by the author with a ransom sacrifice, and on the other, he argued that 
any conspiracy always “devours its children.” Politolog, like Prokhanov’s previ-
ous conspiracy writings, can again be called a symptom that shows a desperate 
attempt to regain control over the course of events, as well as the failure of these 




Virtuoz and Vremia zolotoe: Conspiracy and Political 
Technologies vs. the “Call of History” 
 
Prokhanov continued to discuss the use of political technologies and conspira-
torial intrigues in his subsequent two novels, in which the eccentric and narcis-
sistic postmodernist Strizhailo, brought up in the atmosphere of the late 1990s, 
gives way to the tragic characters of Balaev (Virtuoz) and Beketov (Vremia zolo-
toe). Both protagonists were portrayed, in typical fashion, as the real power be-
hind the throne. These characters, as the writer argued later, were inspired by 
                                                           
30  «геро[и] политического закулисья» – Markov 2005: 9. 
31  Quoted in Izmailov and Gamalov 2001. 
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contacts with the Deputy Chief of the Russian presidential administration Vladi-
slav Surkov,32 whom Prokhanov held in high regard: 
 
He is such a clairvoyant … he understands the structure of society and he constructs it ac-
cording to his own patterns. To be sure, this is a feature of a major political strategist. Al-
though the society he had been constructing is deeply hostile and alien to me, but that does 
not prevent me … from praising him as a master and as a virtuoso.33  
 
The renewed ideology of conspiracy theory in both novels took shape during 
discussions about Putin’s third presidential term. Prokhanov gave unreserved 
support to Putin’s re-election for a third term using all of his eloquence and his 
criticism to convince Russia’s society and the leadership of this option’s appro-
priateness. During the discussion surrounding the issue of the third term, the 
writer persistently paid attention to Putin’s patriotic and statist views and re-
minded him about a leader’s mission, namely about starting a new moderni-
zation project in Russia. In fact, at that time, Prokhanov had transformed his 
conflicting evaluations of Putin’s activities into a completed narrative based on 
the conspiratorial idea about the controllability of Russia’s leaders. Since the 
early 1990s, he has been obsessed by the issues of loss of control and control-
lability, and the post-Soviet society’s vulnerability to external hostile influence. 
In both Poslednii soldat imperii and Gospodin Geksogen, he argued that while 
Russia seemed to be a sovereign state in the 1990s, Gorbachev and Yeltsin were 
in fact under the control of secret para-Masonic organizations (hence Prokha-
nov’s fears and prophecies about secret societies’ plans to turn Russia into the 
Second Khazaria and to set up a regime of biological fascism). Given the cir-
cumstances of Putin’s emergence onto the political scene, the writer believed 
him to be a product manufactured by Berezovskii, the notorious Yeltsin Family, 
                                                           
32  Marlene Laruelle argues that “Surkov played a key role in structuring a public land-
scape during Putin’s second term and Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency, and in orches-
trating many patriotic projects” – Laruelle 2016: 628. “Surkov’s worldview,” she con-
tinues, “largely opposes that of the Izborsky club,” and the latter was able to emerge 
as a unified platform for nationalists “only after Surkov fell from grace” – ibid.: 
628−29. 
33  «У него такое ясновидение, он понимает устройство общества и выстраивает его 
под свои лекала. Это, конечно, способность такого крупного политического 
стратега. Хотя общество, которое он выстраивал, оно мне глубоко враждебно и 
чуждо, что не мешает мне … высоко его превозносить как такого мастера, как 
виртуоза». − Prokhanov 2013. 
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and by political technologists. That is why Prokhanov depicted Putin as a puppet 
or as a kind of clone: for example, “Putin had never existed before. He was 
cloned like Dolly the sheep.”34 Later in Gospodin Geksogen, the Chosen One 
was described as an obscure figure: the conspirators found him to be an obedient 
and easily manipulated puppet, but the writer stressed this character’s mutability 
and uncertainty. In 2002, unsatisfied with an inconsistency in the President’s po-
litical decisions, Prokhanov called Putin “the genius of emptiness,”35 who was 
acting in his patrons’ interests by taking cover behind, in the words of Dugin, 
“verbal patriotism.”36 Subsequently, Prokhanov’s depiction of Putin’s political 
career took on a new twist: after a while the writer asserts that Putin gained 
strength and began acting against a “world corporation,”37 i.e., against the secret 
structures that had brought him to power. For example, from Prokhanov’s point 
of view, the conspiratorial message to Putin was encrypted in the James Bond 
movie Casino Royale (2006). The writer found a striking similarity between 
Putin and Daniel Craig, who played the main part, and this circumstance pro-
vided a stimulus for the conspiratorial interpretation of Casino Royale. Accor-
ding to Prokhanov, Casino Royale presented a scenario that the “world corpo-
ration” would like to impose on Putin (it was about rejecting the third presiden-
tial term in exchange for a high office in a reputable international organization 
like the United Nations). In order to get rid of their influence and to turn Russia 
into a strong and independent player in the world political arena Putin, however, 
came into conflict with “secret para-political centers.”38 For this reason, as Pro-
khanov claims, Putin must run for a third term regardless of the constitutional re-
strictions. 
When the government ignored Prokhanov’s calls, the writer, trying to defend 
his position, depicted the possible tragic consequences of this decision in Vir-
tuoz. Russia’s political life during the presidency of Lampadnikov (Dmitrii 
Medvedev) was presented as a power struggle, threatening the stability of the 
State. Balaev, the ideologist of a new Russia’s statehood and a “behind-the-
scenes Kremlin maestro,”39 nicknamed “Virtuoso,” is placed at the heart of these 
intrigues and conspiracies and seems to manage them well. All credit for image-
                                                           
34  «Путина раньше не было. Его клонировали, как овцу Долли». – Prokhanov 
2011: 28. 
35  «гений пустоты» – Prokhanov 2011: 141. 
36  Dugin 2012: 11. 
37  «мировая корпорация» – Prokhanov 2011: 220. 
38  «секретные параполитические центры» – ibid.: 238. 
39  «закулисный кремлевский маэстро» – Prokhanov 2009: 6. 
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making of the former President Dolgoletov (from the reinterpretation of the 
Kursk submarine disaster to the Munich speech writing) and for constructing a 
political system, preserving the stability of Russia after Dolgoletov’s rejection of 
the third presidential term, is given to Balaev by the author. But all of the Vir-
tuoso’s efforts are destroyed as the pro-Western liberal Lampadnikov, who was 
brought to presidency just to observe legal formalities, begins plotting against 
the national spiritual leader Dolgoletov. Lampadnikov’s proponents organize a 
kind of a coup d’état, resulting in liberal elites coming to power. As a political 
technologist, however, Virtuoso is fully integrated into an existing system of 
power relations. So, even after having been morally crushed by the triumph of 
the liberals, he seems ready to serve his new masters. 
The fact that political technologies and conspiratorial methods are ineffective 
when they encounter the mysticism of Russia’s history is illustrated in Dolgo-
letov’s life story: over the years, he had distanced himself from the control of the 
behind-the-scenes circles and had prepared a “development” project, but having 
been scared of unfavorable predictions, he handed over power to his old friend 
Lampadnikov. The absurd death of Dolgoletov, the narrator claims, becomes a 
retribution for trying to refuse his historical mission. Thus, the main novel’s 
storylines are unfolded against the backdrop of multiple conspiracies. In a sense, 
political technologies and conspiracies are normalized and legitimized as a tool 
to protect the Russian State from internal and external enemies. This legitimi-
zation, however, remains limited. Russian history’s mysticism and its inherent 
sacrificial impulse, in Prokhanov’s opinion, can destroy the most intricate con-
spiracies, given that these are at work only on the political level, and not the spir-
itual one: “Politics, however, differs from history in that the latter is being creat-
ed not by technology but by Providence.”40 
In Vremia zolotoe, Prokhanov pursued his efforts to rehabilitate political 
technologies and conspiracies, in a word, the “culture of influence,” applied for 
neutralizing ideological enemies. It is noteworthy that the novel’s character 
Prime Minister Chegodanov (Putin at the end of Medvedev’s presidential term), 
who yearns to regain the presidency, pins all his hopes on an “éminence grise,” a 
political analyst and technologist Beketov, capable, in his opinion, of suppres-
sing the liberal protest on Bolotnaia Square. Being a stalwart supporter of rigid 
political power, Beketov, like Balaev in Virtuoz, is ready to use any method to 
defend the State. At the same time, like Belosel’tsev in Poslednii soldat imperii 
                                                           
40  «Однако политика отличается от истории тем, что последняя творится не техно-
логиями, а промыслом». – Prokhanov 2009: 15. 
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and Gospodin Geksogen, he is a bearer of “mysterious knowledge.”41 Creating a 
secret scenario to counteract liberal unrest, he follows his visions and Orthodox 
prophecies (the Russian Orthodox Church is presented here as a loyal ally of 
Russia’s government in protecting the State against a rebellious spirit and dissi-
dent elements). For example, his toughest actions towards the opposition leader 
Gradoboev (Aleksei Naval’nyi) are preceded by a conversation with a monk, Fa-
ther Filip. The latter likens protestors to demons and refers to the prophecy about 
the appearance of a young tsar after which Russia will become “invincible.”42 In 
this novel, a series of conspiracies developed by Beketov is again interpreted as 
a countermeasure to neutralize another secret operation aimed at shaking the 
Russian State’s foundations, but which is disguised as a protest against electoral 
fraud. This activity is led by all of the same secret para-political centers and the 
world Jewry that want to discredit Chegodanov, who had freed himself from 
their influence, and to replace him with Gradoboev. They continue to practice 
psi-attacks against Russia’s leadership, but now they also use new technologies: 
the Internet and social networks are presented in the novel as the main tool for 
mobilizing the liberal community and for discrediting the authorities.43 Vremia 
zolotoe can be regarded as an eloquent illustration of, in Il’ia Kalinin’s words, 
“antirevolutionary exorcism,”44 of the tendency of Russia’s current political elite 
to stigmatize any spontaneous mass movement as a manipulated one, a potential-
ly destructive one, something that causes chaos and catastrophic revolutionary 
changes. Prokhanov, however, not only explicates the ruling elite’s deep fears 
but also shows how these fears, integrated into appropriate discourses by profes-
sional political technologists, can be used to form public moods. Beketov claims: 
 
It is necessary to do everything so that the square would be crowded with people. So that 
the number of new protestors would increase more and more … We should show to the 
people the horrible face of rebellion … It is necessary to compare the Bolotnaia Square to 
Perestroika, Yeltsin, the Belavezha Accords. Russia is destined to be disintegrated and to 
be occupied like the USSR. It is necessary to convince people—no matter how abhorrent 
                                                           
41  «таинственное знание» – Prokhanov 2012: 37. 
42  Ibid.: 45. 
43  Some ideas of Vremia zolotoe, in particular about the Internet’s fundamental impor-
tance for starting mass anti-government protests during so-called “revolutions 2.0,” 
have gained wide currency within the radical conservatives’ environment. – Cf. Che-
remnych and Voskanian 2013: 60−93. 
44  Kalinin 2013: 130. 
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you may appear—that you are the last protector of the State. Your destruction is a destruc-
tion of the State.45  
 
In other words, the fear of social chaos and of revolution is not just a culturally 
significant mass emotion for Prokhanov and for his novel’s protagonist, but also 
a tool of political technologies used by Beketov against the opposition. 
Interestingly, Prokhanov portrays Beketov once more as a mystic who can 
decode hidden meanings in Russian history (for a long time Prokhanov consid-
ered the detection of mysterious signs and codes to be his main creative task).46 
Beketov has managed to destroy its opponents’ conspiracy by using Russia’s en-
emies’ methods, so that liberal “demons” fail to reverse the course of events. At 
the end of the novel, Beketov, who has been subjected to disgrace, goes to a 
small Russian town to wait for the appearance of the Chosen One from the old 
royal race.  
Thus, the novels in question offer various ideas that are fundamental for Pro-
khanov’s “theory of power” firstly, this involves the confrontation of conspiracy 
and history; secondly, it concerns the political and religious mission to be im-
plemented, or the chosenness of a leader and the Russian State, and finally it 
concerns the sacred and mysterious nature of power and the authorities. This 
“theory of power” is, in fact, a set of authoritarian ideas that discredit the rational 
(legal) aspects of the management of State affairs and emphasize the allegedly 
irrational and unfathomable nature of Russian statehood. 
Inspired by the annexation of Crimea and guided by his “theory of power,” 
Prokhanov has rushed to showcase a positive scenario of Russia’s development 
in the novel Krym. He once again describes mysterious forces that try to obstruct 
                                                           
45  «Надо делать все, чтобы площадь ломилась от народа. Чтобы на ней появлялись 
все новые и новые бунтари. … Надо показывать народу чудовищное лицо бунта. 
… Надо сравнивать Болотную площадь с перестройкой, Ельциным, Беловежьем. 
Россия уготована судьба СССР, распад, оккупация. Надо убеждать людей, что 
ты, каким бы нелюбимым и ненавистным ни выглядел, являешься последним 
защитником государства. Твое уничтожение является уничтожением государст-
ва». − Prokhanov 2013: 59. 
46  Prokhanov never stops portraying his own personality: he endows both novels’ char-
acters, who are his alter ego, and their opponents with some facts of his own bio-
graphy and with his own psychological characteristics. For example, Verkhoustin, a 
key figure in the conspiracy against the Russian authorities (Krym), collected folk 
songs and participated in writing an open letter “A Word to the People” («Слово к 
народу») on the eve of the August coup (1991) just like Prokhanov. 
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Russian history’s messianic course, but this time without getting into details 
about conspiracies. A central figure of the novel, Lemekhov, the Deputy Prime 
Minister for defense issues and a possible successor to the President, turns out to 
be involved in the conspiracy against the Russian State and President Labazov 
personally. Following his political ambitions, Lemekhov does not suspect that he 
has been manipulated. He believes that he is implementing his own political pro-
ject to create a new Victory Party. But there is a weird philosopher among Leme-
khov’s proponents, Verkhoustin, who represents a deeply secret intelligence or-
ganization Acorn (these are allusions to the conflict of two secret “orders,” one 
of which includes pro-Western-oriented KGB officers—they apparently are 
Acorn—and another one which brings together patriotic GRU officers).47 Verk-
houstin is a collective image of a conspirator, many-faced and elusive, like a 
werewolf. He possesses all means of mind control, including singing folk songs 
and reading Pushkin’s poems aloud. Lemekhov has become the main target of 
conspirators because he really has been chosen by Russian history to become 
Russia’s next president. So, Verkhoustin and political technologists familiar to 
him have managed to compromise the protagonist in the eyes of President Laba-
zov, but Lemekhov atones for the sin of political ambitions and for his back-
room political tactics. As a result, he is forgiven by the President and, probably, 
would return to power to participate in the “Great Project” finally initiated by 
Labazov. The annexation of Crimea is interpreted by Prokhanov as the begin-
ning of this Great Project, which has been launched largely thanks to Leme-
khov’s spiritual efforts and through Labazov’s political will. In contrast to the 
psychotic experience expressed in Poslednii soldat imperii and Gospodin Gekso-
gen, Prokhanov asserts that serving the State and, as he puts it, a “Russian mira-
cle” could weaken the potential impact of any underhanded enemy’s activities. 
In this novel, as in Virtuoz and Vremia zolotoe, there is a heuristic aspect (that is 
unmasking conspiracy and conspirators) which seems to be subordinated to a 
performative aspect of conspiracy rhetoric: in Krym, it serves primarily to create 
and to reproduce an image of the mysterious and dangerous enemy, or of the om-
nipotent Other who constantly threatens Russia. Moreover, taking part in protest 
is considered by Prokhanov to be evidence of participation in a liberal anti-
Russian conspiracy that is headed by world para-political centers, although its 
participants appear not to realize that they are being manipulated. In this sense, 
the conservative conspiracy discourse functions in a proven way—it is adapted 
                                                           
47  In Dugin’s Konspirologiia, it has been suggested that the “Eurasian” and patriotic 
GRU are waging war with another secret service, the “Atlantic” and cosmopolitan 
KGB. Later, Prokhanov developed this idea further in Gospodin Geksogen. 
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to construct the enemy through the projection of our own fears and desires onto 
them48 (the fact that the image of liberal opponents is based on psychological 
projection has been usually emphasized by a symmetrical logic of conspiracy 
thinking: any conspiracy requires a counter-conspiracy, this involves fighting a 
strong enemy using the same methods, weapons and strategies as the enemy). 
Another function of conspiracy rhetoric in Prokhanov’s late novels, especial-
ly in Krym, is to maintain and reinforce mass anxiety that, according to the writ-
er, can be the best basis for social mobilization. Such a paranoid persecution of 
the enemy and their demonization dates back to the conspiracy culture from the 
time of Stalin and similar cases of conspiracy panics for political purposes (for 
example, the witch hunt in the USA during the McCarthy era), but given that the 
conspiracy discourse is considered by the writer to be a weapon in the infor-
mation wars, the functioning of the latter is defined by the rules of modern me-
dia. It turns out that a referent is not necessary for a widely interpreted con-
spiracy, into which—according to Prokhanov—his political opponents are in-
volved. He claims:  
 
When there are battles, wars—to hell with the truth! … And what is the truth anyway? I 
understand what an “information war” is, but I do not understand what “truth” is. “We, 
journalists, stand solely for truth” … What nonsense is this? There is no truth in the in-
formation space—there is only war.49  
 
Thus, conspiracy, still functioning as an effective political tool, turns into a phe-
nomenon of a virtual reality within which it is more important not to prove the 
existence of real conspiracies, but to manage the various emotional effects on an 
audience. In this case, however, Prokhanov’s previous criticism of political tech-
nologists, who have moved political life into a “symbolic space,” no longer ap-
pear to be justifiable, given that the writer exploits the very tricks practiced by 
political technologists.  
 
 
                                                           
48  Cf. Ryklin 2003: 288, 291. 
49  «Когда идут сражения, войны― какая на хер правда! … Да и что такое правда? 
Я понимаю, что такое “информационная война”, но не понимаю, что такое 
“правда”. “Мы, журналисты, только правду…” Ну что за хрень! В информа-
ционном пространстве нет правды – есть война». − Prokhanov 2016. 
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Conclusions 
 
Prokhanov, as we see, remains committed to conspiracy explanatory models and 
to appropriate metaphors thereof, but he alternates the manner in which he repre-
sents them in his works. For example, the grotesque monstrous images from 
Poslednii soldat imperii and Gospodin Geksogen are replaced by the pseudo-
realistic style of Krym, which is supposed to remind the reader about both Rus-
sian classical literature of the nineteenth century and novels of socialist realism. 
The liberal/mondialist conspiracy (the rather obvious anti-Semitic subtext of 
Prokhanov’s novels suggests that he is talking about an international Jewish con-
spiracy too) was, and remains, the main object of the writer’s unmasking efforts; 
thus, he seems to welcome any ways to use conspiracy theories in order to ex-
pose the enemy. 
In his novels and political journalism of the 2000s−2010s, Prokhanov has 
pursued his long-standing ambition—to create a new imperial ideology. Since 
the collapse of the USSR had been the main impetus in the creation of this re-
sentment ideology, the latter turned out firstly to be permeated with conspiracy 
motifs and secondly to be aimed at legitimizing institutions that are capable of 
developing and implementing counter-conspiracies to protect the Russian State. 
According to Prokhanov, nowadays conspiracies are usually realized in political 
and cultural spheres, although they always originate from mystical spiritual rea-
lity: political conspiracies go back to the eternal conflict between Good and Evil, 
God and the Devil, but the important target of the enemy’s secret subversive ac-
tivities are the Russian authorities and the State. This is because they serve, in 
Prokhanov’s words, as tools to perform the “Russian miracle.”50 Proceeding 
from such an understanding of conspiracy, the writer endows any action, or any 
step taken in politics or culture, with a hidden meaning in order to interpret them 
from the perspective of strengthening/weakening the Russian State.  
At the same time, Prokhanov makes good use of conspiracy explanatory 
models to achieve specific tactical objectives, particularly to strengthen the posi-
tion of Russia’s neoconservative circles, to exclude any opportunity for liberal-
minded politicians to come to power, and finally to encourage Putin to start the 
conservative modernization project, by inspiring him with the idea of having 
been chosen. In a sense, the intensive exploitation of conspiracy rhetoric is dic-
tated by precisely this tactical consideration. 
Exacerbating anxiety-provoking situations, trying to reveal to Russia’s leader 
the true mystical meanings of some political developments, Prokhanov, in my 
                                                           
50  «Русское чудо» – сf. Prokhanov 2014: 207. 
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opinion, tends to invent a special stance in the political field. He persistently de-
fines himself not only as a political analyst, but as a visionary, knowing “spiritu-
al codes” that are accessible to only a few “metaphysicians” with “mystical ex-
perience.”51 He spares no effort in enhancing the relevance of such a cultural 
figure that would be valuable for the authorities, on the one hand—as a political 
expert and a wise adviser connected with exalted spiritual spheres—and for the 
Russian people on the other hand as the creator of an inspiring myth. In this new 
stance, Prokhanov mobilizes all of the institutional and symbolic resources avail-
able to the political analyst and the writer to promote the traditionalist mytholo-
gy of power, according to which normally functioning institutions, legal proce-
dures, and political mechanisms can never replace a charismatic leader who has 
comprehended a sacred meaning of power and the “theory of the Russian state 
which … will create Heaven on Earth.”52 Thus, the use of conspiracy models can 
be considered a feature of the Neoconservatives’ self-promotion strategy and a 
time-honored way of flirting either with Putin as a personified quintessence of 
power or with the representatives of the security services (siloviki). Turning the 
world of politics into a world of conspiracy, Prokhanov and his proponents per-
form like ‘panic entrepreneurs’ who influence public moods and the authorities’ 
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Aleksandr Prokhanov, writer, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Zavtra (Tomor-
row), and leader of the post-Soviet neoconservatives, is an individual who ac-
tively contributed to the expansion of conspiratorial thinking and rhetoric into 
the field of political analysis. Since the USSR’s collapse, he has attempted to 
provide insight into both the occult nature of secret subversive activities and into 
the use of conspiracy technologies in politics. Although conspiratorial ideas have 
always been a crucial element of his prose, in his recent novels these ideas are 
formulated from the perspective of groups that sympathize with the conservative 
turn of the 2000s and the Russian authorities’ current policies. This article focus-
es on Prokhanov’s attempts to create the Russian version of a so-called “culture 
of influence,” to promote a traditionalist mythology of power, and to legitimize 
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After spending enough time on the Russian Internet, flipping channels on state 
television, leafing through extremist newspapers, or simply reading the latest ac-
tion-packed potboilers, it’s easy to come to the conclusion that Russia is under 
siege, from within as well as from without. The country’s apparent enemies in-
clude jihadists, Communists, oligarchs, the CIA, the FSB, Georgians, Ukraini-
ans, a rainbow coalition of “color revolutionaries,” homosexuals, Harvard Uni-
versity, and let’s not forget the Jews (because trust me, no one else has). The 
building blocks of conspiracy may change (or, more likely, simply increase in 
number), but their possible combinations and permutations are limited only on 
the level of small details.  
If it seems that I’m picking on Russia, I hasten to point out that anyone with 
a Facebook friend who watches Fox News can testify that my own home coun-
try, the United States, is hardly immune to syncretic conspiratorial thinking. Af-
ter all, that country has, on two separate occasions, elected a gay Kenyan Mus-
lim black separatist socialist secular antichrist (proving yet again that for a black 
man to succeed in America, he has to overachieve). The fact that he was suc-
ceeded in office by a man who praises Alex Jones’s Infowars and The National 
                                                           
∗  Parts of this chapter have been published already in Eliot Borenstein: Plots against 
Russia. Conspiracy and Fantasy after Socialism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2019. Copyright © 2019 by Cornell University. 
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Enquirer while hyping the non-existent threats of voter fraud and murderous il-
legal immigrants speaks for itself. 
 So Russia is not alone when it comes to conspiracy. Indeed, we could see 
the growth of conspiracy theory in both Russia and the United States as yet an-
other manifestation of a decades-old rivalry: which country can outperform the 
other in conspiracy theory production? The rise of conspiratorial thought in the 
United States is a well-studied, and sadly relevant, phenomenon, and I talk about 
it a bit in my book.1 Russia’s multiple brands of conspiracy are far less familiar 
on a global level, but the country has not been idle: for at least fifty years, Russia 
(along with the Russophone diaspora) has been a reliable provider of conspira-
torial narratives, overfulfilling virtually any conceivable paranoid plan with Sta-
khanovite zeal. 
I use the hackneyed Stakhanovite metaphor advisedly, since it has been dec-
ades since Russia could be accused of the hyperproduction of anything besides 
oil. Or at least, of anything tangible. Here I recall Mikhail Epstein’s marvelous 
essay, “Labor of Lust,”2 in which he demonstrates that any failure to produce 
factories, heavy machinery, and weapons on the scale demanded by the various 
five-year plans was easily remedied by a proliferation of images and texts (i.e., 
discourse) about factories, heavy machinery, and weapons. In the symbolic 
realm, Russia and its precursor, the Soviet Union, was a powerhouse of produc-





Conspiracy, however, is not mere simulation. It takes all the various mythemes 
available to it and turns them into a persuasive narrative; that is, conspiracy is a 
kind of discursive bricolage. Even this formulation is not entirely satisfactory, 
since it looks at conspiracy on too large a scale. The basis of all the mythemes 
and tropes that form a conspiracy theory is a much more fundamental substance: 
information. Conspiracy is a disease of information, and a communicable disease 
at that. A better word, though, would be disorder, if it weren’t for the fact that 
conspiracy’s relation to information is to take what is dis-ordered and express it 
as a surplus of order. It is a disorder of signal to noise, in which all noise is con-
strued as signal.3  
                                                           
1  See Borenstein 2019: 76–84 and 237–41. 
2  Epstein 1995.  
3  I am referring to Umberto Eco’s instructive explanations in Eco 1976: 18–47. 
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Conspiracy does what centuries of crackpots’ failed attempts at perpetual 
motion machines could not: conspiracy fights entropy without increasing en-
tropy. Operating according to an inversion of the Second Law of Thermodyna-
mics, conspiracy concentrates all information into an increasingly orderly sys-
tem. Trying to define “conspiracy theory” is a thankless and ironic task. Thank-
less, in that there is a vast body of literature on the subject that must be addres-
sed. Ironic, in that the term “conspiracy theory” is so familiar as to be part 
of common knowledge, while the philosophy of the conspiracy theory is based 
on the idea of hidden knowledge. We know a conspiracy theory when we see it, 
but what we know is that it is an argument that there is something we don’t 
know because we can’t see it. It is the unknown that we know everything about. 
Conspiracy takes on its form and character in direct relation to a given so-
ciety’s information ecosystem, that is, to the media/cultural habitat that can facil-
itate and/or restrict the circulation of information. In Russia over the last fifty 
years or so, we find three particular information ecosystems that give rise to 
three distinct phases of conspiracy theory: the first is late socialism, the second is 
roughly coextensive with perestroika and the Yeltsin years, and the third is to-
day’s era of Putinist conservatism and the rise of social media. Unlike so many 
patterns that Slavists are used to seeking and finding in modern Russia, these 
phases are not characterized by rupture; indeed, the very syncretism that is so 
fundamental to conspiratorial thought admits no rupture, to the extent that it ad-
mits no contradiction. Though conspiracy’s approach to information is anti-en-
tropic, its development is usually expansionist and hegemonic: everything fits, 
and every seeming contradiction can be turned into another confirmation. In the 
American context, Michael Barkun shows us the confluence of initially separate 
conspiracy theories into one master conspiratorial narrative whose complexity 
would put Foucault’s Pendulum to shame: any good conspirologist knows that 
the Elders of Zion and the Freemasons are actually working with both the lizard 
people who dwell within our hollow earth and the gray-skinned aliens who are 
somehow never satisfied, no matter how many anal probes they perform on un-
willing abductees.4 (Apparently, anal probes are like potato chips: you can’t stop 
at just one.) 
 
 
                                                           
4  Cf. Barkun 2013. 
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Rumor as Currency 
 
Late socialism functioned as a petrie dish for conspiracy theories, providing the 
ideal conditions for their development. First, we must acknowledge that there 
was no need to invent conspiracy whole cloth. It is Tsarist Russia that bequea-
thed the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (n.d.) to the world at large, though, in 
one of Russian culture’s perpetual ironies, even this native product turned out to 
have been initially taken from France, like Neo-Classicism or salat oliv’e, and 
Russified to near-unrecognizability. Added to this semi-native heritage is the les-
son that the Protocols’ pedigree teaches us: conspiracy theories cross national 
boundaries with the greatest of ease, which means that the entire European heri-
tage of conspiracy theory was at late socialism’s disposal.  
Yet it was more than just this heritage that made late socialism such an ame-
nable home for conspiracy theory. The Brezhnev era was marked by any number 
of shortages of this or that consumer good, but what was truly in short supply 
was information. The state media and government famously restricted access to 
news and cultural production. Though the USSR’s official ideology was, of 
course, communist, its approach to information was decidedly mercantilist: in-
formation was a scarce resource to be conserved, if not hoarded, and the State 
jealously guarded its stash of information like a dragon sitting on its treasure 
trove of gold.  
But the absence of gold encourages the development of alternative curren-
cies. The paucity of reliable information, and the nakedly partisan nature in 
which information was presented, not only facilitated skepticism about official 
pronouncements, but also left a knowledge vacuum easily filled by speculation 
and rumor (far from hard currency, but it was all that people had). If we follow 
through on my currency metaphor one last time, facts were Deutschmarks, while 
conspiracy is Bitcoin. 
Again, the effects of information deprivation went far beyond the national 
boundaries; in the West, Kremlinology thrived on a paranoid, conspiratorial 
epistemology that combed over every word in Pravda and every movement 
in state funerals for something on which to construct an often shaky hypothesis.  
It is this skepticism that shows the weakness of the cold war propaganda 
model of mass culture: in response to the clear limits of official information, So-
viet subjects of late socialism did not simply accept everything they heard uncrit-
ically, just as most of them did not become anti-Soviet dissidents. Rather, the as-
sumption that people are being lied to produced an entire genre of what might be 
considered urban folklore, or at least urban folk knowledge: alternative theories 
about what’s really going on, and who is really in charge. Engaging in this sort 
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of speculation did not necessarily entail adopting an anti-Soviet subject position. 
Quite to the contrary: casual, everyday conspiricism could even be viewed 
as defining the late Soviet subject position. The assumption that all leaders and 
bureaucrats are self-interested liars is certainly cynical, but by no means revolu-
tionary, in that its challenge is not to the utopian ideology of the regime (a better 
future through communism) but to the utopian anthropology that justifies it. Late 
socialist casual conspiracy turns its skeptical eye on human nature far more than 
it does on this or that political system.5 
The situation evolves with the dynamics of glasnost and chernukha (that is, 
pessimism, naturalism, and muckraking): while the policies of glasnost purpor-
ted to fill in the “blank pages” of history, these pages had never been truly 
blank.6 The facts had been known or suspected, or speculation had filled in the 
gaps. Glasnost functioned on the boundaries of revelation and confirmation, 
since what was brought to light was never entirely unknown. Rather, it is the 
fundamentally melodramatic ritual of exposure (razoblachenie) that endowed the 
disclosure with meaning and power. It is not that the truth could “set you free”; 
the truth itself was set free, released from the confines of conspiratorial epis-
temology. 
Yet glasnost, rather than sounding conspiracy’s death knell, gave it a new 
lease on life. The exposure of the hidden truth may have meant the end of specif-
ic secrets, but it ultimately confirmed the prevalence of secrecy and the validity 
of conspiratorial epistemology. What could be a more valid response to all this 
than to ask, “Who knows what else they’re keeping from us?” which is the ante-
cedent to the biggest conspiratorial meme of Putinism, “Who is beyond this?”7 
This is particularly understandable given the pendulum swings of Soviet-era re-
forms, dating back to Khrushchev: partial truths were doled out during the Thaw, 
only to be elaborated under Gorbachev, but the slow, multi-step process of reve-
lation was not conducive to the belief that the “whole truth” had been disclosed. 
 
 
Mass Culture as Information Warfare 
 
So late Socialism encouraged a kind of casual conspiricism, and glasnost’s con-
firmation of decades of government lies and omissions only intensified the dis-
trust that lay behind conspiratorial thinking. But there were already more com-
                                                           
5  For an overview of the role of conspiracy theories under Stalin, see Rittersporn 2014. 
6  Cf. Borenstein 2007. 
7  “Кто за этим стоит?” 
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mitted versions of conspiricism ready for more widespread adoption with the 
changes in the media in the perestroika and post-perestroika eras. More commit-
ted conspiricism directly challenged the regime of power/knowledge that consti-
tuted late Soviet ideology. Here we have right-wing dissident counter-narratives, 
complete with their own myths of origin. For the sake of brevity, let me simply 
mention two of the more important conspiratorial narratives floating about at this 
time.  
Each of them is a variation on the theory that the United States has been con-
ducting covert operations to destroy the Soviet Union/Russia by subverting pub-
lic morals and destroying Russian culture. As so often happens with conspiracy 
theory, there is an undeniable grain of truth here: after all, was not the very ex-
istence of Radio Liberty an open attack on official discourse? (Which renders 
RT, the former Russia Today, a long-delayed attempt at striking back.) 
The most elaborate version of this narrative was developed in emigration, but 
made its way back to Russia in samizdat: the writings of Grigorii Klimov. In 
both his non-fiction and his novels (which were intended to be read as fictional 
glosses on hidden truth), Klimov warned his readers about the sinister “Harvard 
Project” (garvardskii proekt). The Harvard Project gives the anti-Semitism of the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion a pseudoscientific veneer, updating them with the 
preoccupations of the Cold War (mind control, the American threat) and con-
temporary sexual panic (predatory homosexuals and militant lesbians), and rein-
forcing the religious dimension by approaching Biblical texts and confessional 
differences in terms of genetics and evolution. The beauty of Klimov’s formula-
tion is that it is both Soviet and anti-Soviet: the Cold War enemy is truly a threat, 
but both America and the Soviet Union have been controlled by Jews from the 
very beginning. Klimov developed an all-purpose demonology that gives the ap-
pearance of rigor while actually being extremely flexible. The result has all the 
hallmarks of the most baroque conspiracy theories to attract attention in the 
West, such as Lyndon LaRouche’s assertion that the Queen of England is an in-
ternational drug kingpin working with the Rothschilds. Klimov finds his enemies 
slightly closer to home: for decades, Russia has been under siege by a cabal of 
genetically defective Jews and homosexuals (virtually synonymous in Klimov’s 
lexicon), plotting the country’s downfall from behind the ivy-covered walls of 
Harvard University.8  
Somewhat surprisingly, a close cousin to Klimov’s theory actually found its 
way into an officially published work of Soviet fiction: the anti-Soviet brain-
washing campaign that would eventually take the name “The Dulles Plan.” Rem-
                                                           
8  Cf. Klimov 1998a, Klimov 1998b, Klimov 1998c, Klimov 1998d. 
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iniscent of both Klimov’s novel Imia moe—Legion (My Name Is Legion, 1998) 
and Verkhovenskii’s speech in Dostoyevsky’s Besy (Demons, 1872), the broad 
contours of the plan first appear in Iurii Dol’d-Mikhailik’s 1965 novel I odin v 
pole voin (I Am the Only Soldier in the Field), but reach a much broader au-
dience when attributed to an SS Officer in Anatolii Ivanov’s miniseries Vechnyi 
zov (Eternal Call) 
 
When the war ends, everything will work itself out. And we will throw everything we’ve 
got, everything we own: all the gold, all the material strength on turning people into idi-
ots! The human brain, people’s consciousness are all capable of change. After we seed 
chaos in them, we will imperceptibly switch out their values for false ones and make them 
believe in these false values! How, you ask? How?! … 
We’ll find like-minded people: our allies and our helpers in Russia itself!9  
 
Though this particular line of thought would only be christened “The Dulles 
Plan” in 1993, it already provided a broad framework for understanding the Cold 
War in terms of conspiratorial melodrama, while still casting the relations be-
tween opposing sides in terms of symbolic exchange. 
One of the most striking things about the text of the Dulles Plan is its obses-
sion with popular culture. The Dulles Plan is as much media theory as conspir-
acy theory, a perhaps unintentional example of an outdated model that assumes 
propaganda works as intended, and that audiences are helpless to resist.10 Con-
sistent with Soviet policies that carefully restricted access to media, culture, and 
information, the Dulles Plan can only make sense if culture is understood in nar-
row, quasi-biological terms. The Dulles Plan is based on an implicit definition of 
media and consumer, emphasizing media’s nutritional content. While some 
forms of cultural production are, quite simply, good for you (the classics, for in-
stance), there are others that are not merely innately harmful, but whose entire 
purpose is moral or ideological harm. The audience, meanwhile, is totally pas-
                                                           
9  «Окончится война ― всё как-то утрясётся, устроится. И мы бросим всё, что 
имеем, чем располагаем: всё золото, всю материальную мощь на оболванивание 
и одурачивание людей! Человеческий мозг, сознание людей способно к измене-
нию. Посеяв там хаос, мы незаметно подменим их ценности на фальшивые и за-
ставим их в эти фальшивые ценности поверить! Как, спрашиваешь? Как?! …  
 Мы найдём своих единомышленников: своих союзников и помощников в самой 
России!»  
10  The Media Effects School or Hypodermic Model, most recently resurrected in by 
Pomerantsev 2014.  
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sive. The media consumer is, essentially, an open orifice receiving all input in-
discriminately. 
Compare this with the conspiratorial mania that characterized the Stalin 
years: certainly, censorship was strict and propaganda was unrelenting, but the 
crimes of which alleged conspirators were accused were not restricted merely to 
anti-Soviet agitation. “Wreckers” were sabotaging industrial projects, and spies 
and internal enemies were engaged in assassinations and attempted murder.11 
The Dulles Plan turns out to be perfect for both the Cold War and its aftermath; 
violence and subversion are now entirely discursive. 
Equally important is the Dulles Plan’s focus on youth. By positing nearly all 
forms of popular youth culture as dangerous (something the Plan shares with 
moral panics throughout the modern world), the Dulles Plan weaponizes the 
generation gap. Young people are not merely strange and perhaps impertinent 
(the perennial complaint about “kids today”), they are the victims and perpetua-
tors of warfare against everything the country stands for. 
It is the combined focus on media and youth that ensures the Dulles Plan’s 
longevity. The structure of cross-generational misunderstanding can endure even 
as the content of youth culture changes (as Americans with long enough memo-
ries will recall, the evolution of popular music is also the story of successive 
moral panics, from jazz to rock to hip hop). The generation vilified by the Dulles 
Plan in its early days is now the generation that could find itself appalled by its 
own children’s culture. 
If we borrow the language of Putin’s third term, the Dulles Plan is all about 
values. Thanks to the Plan, conspiracy is a culture war. Or, to once again borrow 





The Dulles Plan’s formalization in 1993 points to the second phase of 
the informational ecosystem I have mentioned: perestroika and the 1990s. This 
ecosystem gives us the opposite extreme from that of late socialism: we move 
from information deprivation to information overload. Here we are dealing with 
a more recognizably postmodern condition (recognizable, because it is the ver-
sion of the condition that has long obtained in the West). This new embarrass-
ment of informational riches could have served to debunk conspiratorial thinking 
entirely, but in fact the opposite occurred: revelation after revelation about the 
                                                           
11  See Rittersporn 2014. 
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hidden crimes and corruption of the Soviet Union served as confirmation of a 
paranoid mindset. This is when conspiratorial thinking moves from the under-
ground to the mainstream.  
I do not wish to dwell on this period as much, because it is also the version 
of conspiracy with which we are probably most familiar. In Overkill. Sex and 
Violence in Contemporary Russian Popular Culture, I argued that in the 1990s, 
everyone learned the language of crime.12 Today I would add that they also lear-
ned the language of conspiracy (which, like that of crime, was a subcultural lan-
guage that was now given unprecedented popular exposure). As in the West, 
conspiracy provides the basic framework for thrillers and action stories (the he-
roes are inevitably fighting those who plot against Russia), often using a conspir-
atorial framework that seems to be stripped of its conventional ideological con-
tent (the heroes fight organizations that look like right-wing visions of Jews and 
Masons, but are not called Jews or Masons). In the 1990s as conspiratorial narra-
tives are now free to combine and recombine like viruses swapping genes, they 
tended to revolve around one of the dominant paradigms of the post-Soviet era: 
catastrophe. With catastrophe, conspiracy manages to be both a myth of origin 
and a prophecy of the future: here is how our secret enemies brought us to our 
knees, and here is how they are planning to utterly destroy us in the coming 
days. Just as Engels brackets all of human history between a primitive communi-
tarian lost Eden and an eventual communist Golden Age, so, too, does Yeltsin-
era conspiracy enclose modern Russian history with identically catastrophic ori-
gins and endings.  
We see this with the evolution and eventually replacement of the Harvard 
Project. The Harvard Project reaches its apotheosis in a trilogy of novels by Ser-
gei Norka that combine Klimov’s ideas with the structure of a thriller, the estab-
lishment of an actual Inquisition in Russia, and the country’s salvation by a 
“Dark Horse” who looks very much like Vladimir Putin.13 From this point on, 
though, the Harvard Project, once its own independent force for xenophobic par-
anoia, is superseded by the Houston Project. Or, to be more precise, it is sub-
sumed: annexed, like a disputed discursive peninsula, by a larger, neighboring 
narrative with quasi-imperial ambitions. This produces a peculiar imaginary ge-
ography, where Harvard and Houston (two names rarely uttered in the same 
breath) coexist on opposite sides of a shared border. For the early Putin era, 
though, this game of imaginary topography is actually prophetic: ideas (Harvard) 
are trumped by oil (Houston). Not to mention the fact that Putin’s first terms in 
                                                           
12  See Borenstein 2007. 
13  Norka 2000, Norka 2004a, Norka 2004b. 
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office coincide with the presidency of a former Texas governor. An imaginary, 
evil Texas is the perfect straw man to petrify a petrostate.  
The Houston Project, while as much a flight of fancy as the Protocols or the 
Dulles Plan, appears to share one of the few saving graces of the Harvard pro-
ject: it is not the result of plagiarism. In fact, it seems to be entirely unsourced. 
Appropriately enough for a digital phenomenon, it may not even have a clearly 
defined original. Searching for the “Houston Project” reminds us of the beauty 
and complexity of conspiracy as a viral Internet phenomenon: no one really 
owns it. As a result, its manifestations and elaborations vary wildly.  
Compared to the Houston Project, both Harvard and Dulles look like under-
achievers. It is with the Houston Project (as elaborated by General Petrov and his 
many imitators) that conspiracists really start thinking big. Harvard and Dulles 
conceive of the apocalypse as local event: the end of Russia may as well be the 
end of the world (if you live in Russia), but otherwise, who knows? The Houston 
Plan loops around to global annihilation while never losing sight of the centrality 
of Russia. 
The Houston Plan goes back to the conspiratorial well (no, not anti-Semi-
tism; that particular poisoned well was already tapped out by the Harvard Pro-
ject): the cabal of multinational schemers who really run the world. The renewed 
emphasis on the cabal is the result of a Western import. By the beginning of the 
twenty-first- century, many of the more popular English-language conspiratorial 
tracts are translated and published in Russia. John Coleman’s Conspirator’s Hi-
erarchy: The Committee of 300 (1992) is repeatedly referenced in Houston and 
Houston-adjacent conspiratorial writings; as the title suggests, it describes the 
machinations of our true overlords. Many of Coleman’s tropes were then picked 
up by RT, the Russian English-language television channel that has provided a 
home for the lunatic fringe. 
Thus Russian conspirators and Western conspirators end up speaking the 
same language, constantly referring to the Trilateral Commission, the Council on 
Foreign Relations, and the Bilderberg Group. The Bilderberg Group is an elite 
club whose secrecy has sparked a predictable set of claims as to their true acti-
vity, and whose leaders (the “Olympians”) are conspiring to corrupt the world’s 
youth along the lines laid out in both the Protocols and the Dulles Plan.  
The Houston Project is predicated on one of the obsessions of post-Soviet 
political culture: the fate of Russia’s natural riches. The Project’s plan to destroy 
Russia as a state by dismembering it into dozens of tiny statelets is, at first glan-
ce, nothing more than a resource grab, supported by numerous fictitious quotes 
by Western leaders. Since 2006, the Russian media and blogosphere have been 
claiming that former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright lamented the injus-
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tice of Russia’s share of the world’s oil and mineral wealth (Siberia should there-
fore be under international control). Albright herself has denied saying any such 
thing, while Putin has managed to have it both ways (“I’m not familiar with this 
quote by Madame Albright, but I know that such thoughts wander through the 
minds of certain politicians”).14 This fake with Albright’s “quote” is part of a 
perfect feedback loop, reinforcing both the rapaciousness of Americans (and par-
ticularly the Clinton administration, responsible for the bombings in Serbia) and 
the greatness of Russia itself. And its way was paved by the Houston Project. 
For the Houston Project, the expropriation of Russian resources is only the 
beginning. The real goal of Western conspirators is far more evil, and also a 
much more primal threat to blood-and-soil notions of Russian identity. The Hou-
ston Project makes literal one of the primary metaphors of national betrayal: that 
Russia is being bought and sold. Now the truth comes out: the West is plotting to 
take the Russian land itself. Why? 
It seems the West wants to move to Russia. It turns out that Moscow isn’t 
just the Fourth Rome; soon, all of Russia will become the next Mt. Ararat (even 
though the first one is practically a neighbor). When the rest of the world suc-
cumbs to ecological catastrophe, only Russia will remain habitable. This scenar-
io is the result of yet another mutation in Russian conspiracy theory. Just as the 
Houston Project is packaged as the next, more detailed iteration of the Harvard 
Project, its detail is drawn from yet another set of sources. Much of the content 
of Houston Project is filled by the growing lore accruing to a powerful local, 
Russian conspiracy called “Zolotoi milliard” (The Golden Billion). 
 
 
Russia as Post-Apocalyptic Real Estate 
 
First put forth by A. Kuz’mich (the pen name of Anatolii Kuz’mich Tsikunov) in 
a book called Zagovor mirovogo pravitel’stva: Rossiia i ‘zolotoi milliard’ (The 
World Government Conspiracy: Russia and the Golden Billion, 1994), “Zolotoj 
milliard” was quickly popularized by the prolific Sergei Kara-Murza and has be-
come a staple of contemporary Russian conspiratorial thought.15 “Zolotoi milli-
ard” represents a real change in the Dulles/Harvard rhetoric of conspiracy, in that 
it is based less on (bad) social science than it is on (bad) natural science. 
In a refreshing change from what is familiar to followers of American con-
spiracy and right-wing discourse, “Zolotoj milliard” takes the prospect of eco-
                                                           
14  See Smolchenko 2007. 
15  Cf. Kara-Murza 2004. 
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logical change seriously. So seriously, in fact, that most of the plans of the 
“world government” are predicated on looming global disaster. The coming cat-
aclysm is not just a matter of climate change or even the depletion of fossil fuels; 
“Zolotoi milliard” is a nightmare vision of overpopulation. It weaponizes Mal-
thusianism. The “milliard” (‘billion’) in its name refers to an imagined, ideal 
population for a sustainable planet; the “zolotoe” (‘golden’) part describes the 
class dynamics on which the conspiracy is built. The developed world is maneu-
vering to a point where one billion people (the wealthier people from the wealth-
iest part of the globe) populate the planet. It is not the meek, but the rich who 
shall inherit the earth (which makes some sense, since they have the most expe-
rience with inheritance).  
“Zolotoi milliard” also has the attraction of an uncompromising Russocen-
trism. If the only inhabitable territory left on the globe were in, say, Africa or 
Australia, the theory would be far less compelling. Russia would be destroyed, 
but only as part of a larger story of calamity. “Zolotoi milliard” tells the opposite 
story: it is the God-given right of Russia to survive the apocalypse, but the West 
is conspiring to steal Russia’s very destiny. Here the power and desirability of 
the Russian land are reinforced precisely by the covetousness of the enemy, and 
the struggle against this plot can be yet another heroic tale of the defense of Rus-
sia from invasion. 
“Zolotoi milliard” gathers together many of the most important tropes of be-
nighted, post-Soviet Russia (the need to defend the country’s natural resources 
from a rapacious West, the West’s demoralization of Russia’s youth, destruction 
of Russia’s economy, and destruction of public health) into one compelling nar-
rative, a story combining historical touchstones (the Great Patriotic War) with 
science and pseudoscience. It also builds on and sustains the hostility towards 
population control encountered throughout the Russian media in the Putin era, in 
which the distribution of condoms is a clever Western plot to bring down Rus-
sian birth rates. This idea is often reinforced by an unsourced, but frequently re-
peated quote from Margaret Thatcher, that “Russians should be reduced to 15 
million.” All of this can be summed up in a phrase that is common to Russian 
extremist discourse, and made more mainstream by the conflict in Ukraine: “The 
genocide of the Russian people”16 In a Russocentric world, there could be no 
ending more catastrophic than that. 
 
 
                                                           
16  «геноцид русского народа» 
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Russophobia Begins at Home 
 
Which brings us to the supremacy of Vladimir Putin. If under Yeltsin conspiracy 
became a common language, under Putin (particularly since his return to office 
after Medvedev), conspiracy is a meta-language. One of the many brilliant 
moves of Putin and his supporters is to coopt the language of conspiracy and fal-
sification so thoroughly that all symbolic exchange of truth value collapses into 
false equivalencies. As the 2012 protest movement captured video after video of 
suspicious election activity, police brutality, and corruption (i.e., uncovering a 
state conspiracy to claim power through unlawful means), state television re-
sponded with charges that the falsification itself has been falsified. Here I should 
note the contrast between the way conspiratorial accusations used to be handled 
in the U.S., and the way they are handled in Putin’s Russia. In the States, the gui-
ding principle before Trump was not to engage, because engaging simply feeds 
the beast (hence the long months before Obama’s final, anti-climactic release of 
his long-form birth certificate). The Kremlin’s response is to engage at all costs, 
because feeding the beast is in the regime’s best interest.  
Two television documentaries in the wake of the protest movement highlight 
this new dynamic. First is the three-part mockumentary Rossiia: polnoe zatmenie 
(Russia: Total Eclipse)17 which, though broadcast on NTV, looked exactly like a 
typical muckraking NTV documentary. Here the director gives a seamless facade 
of utter seriousness as he takes the familiar tropes of the last few decades of con-
spiracy theory and claims to expose their actual truth. One part tells us about the 
secret cabal of homosexuals who control the media; another exposes the genetic 
basis of fascism; and all of them repeatedly invoke the Dulles Plan as established 
fact. This deliberate confusion of fact and fancy is itself the perfect commentary 
on today’s media environment, in which truth claims can be so easily faked that 
fiction may as well be fact, and fact fiction.  
Most notorious is Anatomiia protesta (Anatomy of a Protest).18 Here we dis-
cover that every move made by the protest movement has been funded by the 
U.S. State Department and Georgian plutocrats, while every instance of police 
brutality is simply a “provocation” designed to produce the appearance of police 
brutality as a weapon against the regime. Even the footage of ballot stuffing 
turns out to be footage of a pre-election ballot-casting exercise, reconfigured by 
the treacherous protesters as evidence of vote tampering.  
                                                           
17  Сf. Loshak 2012. 
18  Kisliakov et al. 2012. 
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At this point, conspiracy reaches total semiotic overdrive, as well as becom-
ing the perfect state of total simulation: everything becomes conspiracy, includ-
ing the attempt to expose conspiracy. The whole MH-17 airline disaster is a clear 
example of what happens when conspiracy moves from the margins to the cen-
ter, to be embraced by the state and the media. The large-scale conspiracy theo-
ries can be invoked or alluded to, but their main purpose is to serve as an availa-
ble backdrop or heuristic device when constantly accusing one’s opponents of 
being the tools of evil Western governments hell-bent on Russia’s destruction. 
The mindset of conspiracy becomes reflexive, a continuous loop both based on 
and reinforcing a sense of anti-Russian hostility.  
Are there plots against Russia? Absolutely. But they should be a source of 
Russian pride rather than anger, since they are such a reliable and useful domes-
tic product. In 1979, before the advent of cell phones, there was an American 
horror movie about a babysitter being threatened on the phone, only to be told by 
the police (over the phone) that the calls are not coming from far away; the killer 
is right there, because (to quote the movie’s tag line) the “calls are coming from 
inside the house.” So it is with anti-Russian conspiracies. The plots against Rus-
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Conspiracy theories have been a perennial feature of Russian culture for more 
than a century. This prevalence is related to the vexed status of information in 
the Soviet and post-Soviet world, starting with the nakedly partisan presentation 
of the news in Late Socialism. Since World War II, Russia and the Soviet Union 
have undergone three different periods of conspiracy theorizing, corresponding 
to three distinct informational ecosystems: the first, under Brezhnev, was predi-
cated on information as a scarce resource, supplemented by rumor and specula-
tion. The second, starting in Perestroika and continuing through the 1990s, re-
sponds to the sudden surplus of information, when competing narratives chal-
lenge and one claim to truth and validity. Finally, in the Putin era, conspiracy 
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On 2 May 2014, the city of Odessa1 was shaken by violent clashes between two 
warring political groups. Among the total number of 48 fatalities, six people died 
during the street clashes, while 42 people fell victim to the fire in the Trade Un-
ion building that spread a few hours later. Roughly speaking, the two opposing 
groups consisted of protesters of a pro-Russian (or anti-Maidan or pro-fed-
eralism) orientation on the one hand, and of pro-Ukraine (or pro-Maidan or pro-
unity) activists on the other. However tragic the incident was in itself, it also 
marked a crucial point in the heated sentiments of spring 2014. The event was 
instantly converted into a psychological weapon in the political and military con-
flict between Russia and Ukraine, backed up by an unprecedented propaganda 
campaign launched by public Russian TV. Accordingly, the coverage of the trag-
edy on Russian TV screens was enormous and intense, while the question of 
what had ‘really’ happened required months of investigation2 and could not be 
answered when public interest in the case was at its peak.  
                                                           
1  Except for ‘Odessa,’ the English translation of the Ukrainian city ‘Odesa,’ all other 
toponymies in this article are referred to by their Ukrainian names.  
2  In April of 2014, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe established an Inter-
national Advisory Panel (IAP), which was to supervise the Ukraine authorities’ inves-
tigations into the violent incidents that occurred during the protests on the Maidan in 
Kiev from 30 November 2013 onwards (Report of the IAP 2015: 5). Accordingly, the 
IAP reviewed the investigations that were conducted in Odessa and presented a relia-
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The Odessa events of 2014 and their representation on Russian TV can be 
regarded as highly revealing against the backdrop of questions concerning to-
day’s mass media communication and constructions of reality. In the analysis 
that we have undertaken, we will go a step further by scrutinizing the ‘fabrica-
tion’ of facts—a process that is frequently encompassed by conspiracies and con-
spiracy theories and which will be referred to in our study as ‘alternative’ news. 
In so doing, the Odessa case will serve as an example, and as a model, in order 
to better understand how alternative news is created and how it is spread effec-




1. Persuasive Mass Communication in a Hybrid Media System 
 
Despite the rapid growth of internet users in the last two decades, public TV by 
far still remains the most efficient nationwide means of mass communication in 
Russia. According to opinion polls, the vast majority of Russia’s population re-
lies on TV as a source of political information. The two main state-run channels, 
Pervyi kanal (Channel One) and Rossiia-1, have a nationwide reach of 99% and 
                                                           
ble report on what had actually happened on 2 May 2014. On this day, local pro-
Ukraine activists and city residents (about 2,000 people) wanted to “hold a rally in 
support of a united Ukraine” before the start of a football match in Odessa (Report of 
the IAP 2015: 11). While marching towards the football stadium, the rally was as-
saulted by approximately 300 pro-Russian protesters near Hrets’ka Square. In these 
violent clashes, the pro-Ukraine protesters finally gained the upper hand and pursued 
the retreating opponents towards the pro-Russian protesters’ camp at Kulykove Pole 
Square. Facing the approaching pro-Ukraine protesters, pro-Russian activists fled into 
the nearby Trade Union building. The pro-Ukraine activists “destroyed and set fire to 
the tents of the AntiMaidan camp,” while the pro-Russian protesters who were inside 
the Trade Union building exchanged shots and Molotov cocktails with their opponents 
outside (Report of the IAP 2015: 13). At around 7:45 p.m., a fire broke out, spreading 
rapidly, the fire brigade arriving only at 8:09 p.m. In the report, the number of victims 
and their cause of death was summarized as follows: “48 persons died (seven women 
and 41 men). Six persons died as a result of firearm injuries they had received during 
the clashes on and around Hrets’ka Square and 42 died as a result of the fire in the 
Trade Union building. Of those 42, 34 died as a direct result of the fire and eight died 
as a result of jumping or falling from a height; no other violent cause of death was es-
tablished.” – Report of the IAP 2015: 15.  
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95% respectively. TV’s leading role has led to perceptible, far-reaching conse-
quences when Russian TV screens had to deal with the conflict in Ukraine from 
the end of 2013 onwards. The Russian sociologist Denis Volkov describes the 
effects of political influence on mass media as follows: “With the beginning of 
the Ukraine conflict, the propaganda tone in broadcast rose dramatically, and for 
nearly two years, TV channels worked in emergency mode.”3 However, it would 
be too simple to equate the proclaimed ‘information war’ with the state control 
over mass media in Soviet times. The same can be said with regard to propa-
ganda strategies and techniques which in 2014 were definitely not new in their 
general features, but which had changed significantly with respect to their poten-
tial impact and to new possibilities of dissemination. 
It is commonly agreed that contemporary media systems are characterized by 
complexity and hybridity. This implies, according to Andrew Chadwick, “inces-
sant processes of boundary-drawing, boundary-blurring, and boundary-crossing, 
as the logics of older and newer media interact, compete and coevolve.”4 A di-
rect consequence of this “boundary-blurring” and “boundary-crossing” on Rus-
sian TV screens appears to be the blending of professional and non-professional 
media and media producers, the specific placement of which can be utilized to 
enhance the audiovisual media’s manipulative effects. Amateur videos have be-
come an integral part of the visual material used in news broadcasts and they are 
exploited for the immediacy and authenticity that they seemingly convey. Fur-
ther crucial elements of the interaction between older and newer media on Rus-
sian TV include the numerous references to the ‘new’ social networks that are 
made in the supposedly ‘old’ media of television. This, again, allows for additio-
nal manipulative effects, through the launching of impious verbal abuse as a 
form of ‘factual’ commentary by a political opponent on current events for ex-
ample.5  
                                                           
3  «С началом украинского конфликта резко вырос пропагандистский накал веща-
ния, и почти два года телеканалы работали в чрезвычайном режиме». – Volkov 
2016. 
4  Chadwick 2013: 184. 
5  In the Odessa case, a demonstrative example of this strategy of referring to social 
networks on TV in order to vilify political opponents is the news broadcast of 3 May 
entitled “The Odessa events did not leave anybody cold, but everyone reacts dif-
ferently to what happened.” One of the messages supposedly posted on Twitter and 
quoted in the news item reads as follows: “Evromaidan @Dbnmjr: ‘Odessa, I’m proud 
of you! Ten thousands of townsmen cleanse their land of pro-Russian activists. Kiev 
and the whole Ukraine are with you #Odessa’” («Євромайдан @Dbnmjr: “Одесса, 
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One of the most effective propaganda strategies is repetition, which to some 
extent was reliably utilized by the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. 
In his famous Language of the Third Reich: LTI—Lingua Tertii Imperii, the 
German diarist Victor Klemperer scrutinizes the propagandistic use of language 
in Nazi Germany, highlighting the power of repetition: 
 
No, the most powerful influence was exerted neither by individual speeches nor by articles 
or flyers, posters or flags; it was not achieved by things which one had to absorb by con-
scious thought or conscious emotions. Instead Nazism permeated the flesh and blood of 
the people through single words, idioms and sentence structures which were imposed on 
them in a million repetitions and taken on board mechanically and unconsciously. … And 
what happens if the cultivated language is made up of poisonous elements or has been 
made the bearer of poisons? Words can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed 
unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic reaction sets in af-
ter all.6 
 
Indeed, today’s television broadcasting with its 24-hour news cycle, round-the-
clock transmission and its numerous channels provide the ideal conditions for 
maximum propagandistic impact. In addition, Russian state-run TV has deve-
loped highly appropriate programming in order to reach its viewers “mechanical-
ly and unconsciously” by repetition. The two main channels, Pervyi kanal and 
Rossiia-1, both offer their primetime news Vremia (Time) and Vesti (News) at 9 
and 8 p.m. respectively. Both news programs are preceded by talk shows: Pria-
moi ėfir (On Air Live) with a starting time of between 6:15 and 6:30 p.m. on 
Rossiia-1, and Pust’ govoriat (Let Them Talk) starting around 7:45 p.m. on Per-
vyi kanal.  
Apart from repetition, propaganda strategies in audiovisual media rely on 
both argumentation and rhetoric on the one hand, and emotional effects achieved 
and enhanced by specific means on the other. Thus, when questioning audiovi-
sual media’s potential impact, it appears to be crucial to analyze both the rhe-
torical-argumentative and the rhetorical-affective structures of TV broadcasts. 
Regarding the rhetorical-affective side, visual material in general and images in 
particular are commonly regarded as equally powerful as, or even more powerful 
                                                           
горжусь тобой! Десятки тысяч горожан очищают свою землю от колорадов. 
Киев и вся Украины [sic!] с тобой #Одесса”». – “Sobytiia v Odesse nikogo ne 
ostavili ravnodushnym, no reagiruiut na sluchivsheesia po-raznomu”, Vremia, 3 May 
2014.  
6  Klemperer 2002: 15.  
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than, argumentative verbal discourse. Images are supposed to draw the viewer’s 
attention more effectively and are thought to be remembered more accurately 
and for a longer period of time.7 
One of the first film theorists and practitioners who explored the emotional 
impact of particular images, as well as film as a whole, was Sergey Eisenstein. 
There is no doubt that Eisenstein anticipated the affective logic of contemporary 
mass media with his “montage of attractions” which he formulated in 1923 while 
still engaged in theatrical work. For Eisenstein, “attractions” are impact factors 
produced by cinema—images that have the potential of attracting intensified at-
tention and of “subject[ing] the spectator to a sensual or psychological impact.”8 
By being deliberately exposed to “aggressive” moments in theater, the spectator 
was supposed to experience “emotional shocks.” As a consequence, she or he 
would “perceive the ideological side of what is being demonstrated—the ulti-
mate ideological conclusion.”9 Eisenstein’s first films, Stachka (Strike, 1925) 
and Bronenosets Potemkin (Battleship Potemkin, 1925), can actually be regarded 
as experimental laboratories for two different types of “attractions,” namely for 
shocking pictures (in particular images of violence against children) on the one 
hand and scenes of atrocity and violence that are unfolded by narration on the 
other.  
With regard to propaganda strategies developed for TV specifically, we can 
assume that placing a talk show before the primetime news opens up the pos-
sibility of emotionally ‘attuning’ the TV viewers to the ‘factual’ information that 
follows. The melodramatic stories conveyed in talk shows, dealing with love, 
family or friendship, aim to affect the viewers, stirring their feeling of happiness, 
shock, disgust, astonishment or fear. Returning to Eisenstein’s understanding of 
sensual and psychological impacts, then, we can say that the talk shows emotio-
nally prepare the TV audience to perceive what will be transmitted on an ideo-
logical level in primetime news. 
This particular affective function of talk shows on Russian TV has been de-
scribed by Anna Kachkaeva, a media scholar at the Moscow-based Higher 
School of Economics. She argues that “[w]hile policymakers and straight news 
shows define the agenda, the political talk shows provide ‘emotional support’. … 
They just support the atmosphere that exists and heat it up.”10 This is definitely 
                                                           
7  See Dauber/Robinson 2015.  
8  Eisenstein 1974: 78. 
9  Ibid. 
10  “Russia’s TV talk shows smooth Putin’s way from crisis to crisis.” – The Washington 
Post (Newspaper article, 2015).  
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one reason why talk shows on Russian TV are not only numerous, but also oc-
cupy a significant part of the daily airtime—up to 11 hours on Pervyi kanal, to be 
precise. Moreover, a number of new politically oriented talk shows were 
launched during the Ukraine crisis, such as Tolstoy. Voskresen’e (Tolstoy. Sun-
day),11 Vremia pokazhet (Time Will Tell), Struktura momenta (Structure of the 
Moment), Pravo znat’! (The Right to Know!) and Spisok Norkina (Norkin’s List). 
The sudden increase in 2014 of broadcasts that had a focus on political and so-
cial issues is confirmed by Iuliia Dolgova, a researcher at the Department of 
Journalism at Moscow State University:  
 
In February of 2014, the situation escalates dramatically in Ukraine, where the political 
crisis changes into a phase of active hostilities between the opposing forces. In this period, 
the numbers of broadcasts on political and social issues begin to increase. Many of these 
broadcasts primarily deal with the ongoing events in Ukraine.12 
 
In comparison to the media landscape of the 1920s, the time at which Eisenstein 
developed his theories on film, media, and art, the extent to which today’s every-
day life is permeated by the media appears to be incomparably higher. The jour-
nalist and social scientist Sergei Medvedev goes even further by suggesting a to-
tality of impact by comparing Russian TV to the air that we breathe:  
 
TV is like air or water. And suddenly all the water running out of the tap is flavored with 
vanilla. Or with blood. Exactly the same happens with TV. The air of the media and the 
information that we breathe is usurped with propaganda.13 
                                                           
11 The title of this show was based on the name of its presenter, Petr Tolstoy (a great-
great-grandson of the writer Leo Tolstoy) and is also a play on words. The show was 
broadcasted on Sundays, and the Russian word for this day of the week is identical to 
the Russian title of Leo Tolstoy’s novel Resurrection (1899). 
12  «В феврале 2014 г. резко обостряется ситуация на Украине, где политический 
кризис переходит в фазу активных действий противоборствующих сторон. В 
этот период на российском телевидении начинает расти количество передач об-
щественно-политической тематики, выпуски которых посвящены преимущест-
венно событиям на Украине». – Dolgova 2015: 163. 
13  «[Т]елевидение … – это как воздух или вода. И вдруг вся вода из крана начинает 
течь с привкусом ванили. Или с привкусом крови. И то же самое происходит с 
телевидением. Это тот медийный, информационный воздух, которым мы ды-
шим, и он узурпирован пропагандой». – “Ėffekt zomboiashchika” Radio Svobodа, 
8 November 2017.  
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2. Odessa 2014 in Primetime News and Talk Shows 
 
This section will analyze the coverage of the events that unfolded in Odessa in 
May 2014 by Pervyi kanal’s primetime news Vremia and in TV talk shows. 
From a quantitative angle, the coverage of the Odessa events in Vremia was ex-
tensive: Starting with a newsflash on the fire on the evening of 2 May, there was 
a total number of 23 news items dedicated to Odessa between the date of the fire 
and 11 May, the total running time amounting to ca. 109 minutes. Several broad-
casts stretch over 7 minutes and more—the most extensive one running 12:54 
minutes on 11 May. Additionally, this increase in attention on the Odessa events 
was sustained right until the end of May by dedicating newsflashes and two fea-
tures, on 15 and 23 May, to the fire in Odessa. 
As far as talk shows are concerned, four programs on the two main state-run 
TV channels addressed the Odessa events in May of 2014: On Rossiia-1, the 
news appeared on the talk show Priamoi ėfir (On Air Live) on 5 and 12 May, as 
well as on Spetsial’nyi korrespondent (Special Correspondent) on 20 May. On 
Pervyi kanal, they featured on the show Politika (Politics) on 14 May. Priamoi 
ėfir,14 placed right before the primetime news on Rossiia-1, can be classified as a 
‘confessional’ or ‘daytime’ talk show,15 its focus being on the life stories of or-
dinary citizens as well as social problems, such as crime, drug abuse or prostitu-
tion. In comparison to Priamoi ėfir, Spetsial’nyi korrespondent and Politika are 
political talk shows with guests who primarily work in the area of politics or the 
economy (e.g., members of parliament, political experts, etc.). 
From the viewers’ perspective, TV news programs are expected to focus on 
hard news and to present information in a more or less impersonal and objective 
way. By contrast, talk shows are television shows, which are per se characterized 
by the phenomena of “boundary-blurring” and “boundary-crossing” between in-
formation and entertainment, facts and fiction. By assembling different guests, 
and by giving a voice to people ranging from eyewitnesses to experts, there is 
practically nothing that cannot be stated in TV talk shows. In their study on 
threat narratives on Russian TV, the members of the non-governmental organi-
                                                           
14  Priamoi ėfir started broadcasting in April 2011 on Rossiia-1. From 2013 to 2017, the 
host of the talk show was Boris Korchevnikov, who then became the general director 
of the orthodox TV channel Spas (The Savior). Priamoi ėfir is the equivalent of the 
popular Pust’ govoriat on Rossiia-1, which has been on air on Pervyi kanal for more 
than a decade. Both are broadcasted right before the primetime news and, according to 
opinion polls, enjoy great popularity; see Levada 2015. 
15  See Haarman 2001: 34; Shattuc 2015: 194–98.  
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zation ‘Ukraine Crisis Media Center,’ Makukhin, Tsybulska, and Kavatsiuk 
stress the role played by talk shows in the spreading of disinformation:  
 
Television talk-shows became a real godsend for the Russian disinformation machine. The 
political talk show format allows [the] Kremlin to launch necessary messages in the in-
formational field and avoid accusations of misinformation and propaganda. Continually 
repeated, these messages become part of public discourse. The talk-show format also al-
lows to give voice to the most [sic] radical messages without taking responsibility.16 
 
On a more general scale, TV talk shows can be characterized in terms of tab-
loidization, the three decisive techniques of which are dramatization, personali-
zation, and emotionalization. According to Timberg et al., among TV talk 
shows’ guiding principles, whether they are live or taped, is their “present-tense 
immediacy.”17 The title of the Russian talk show Priamoi ėfir clearly addresses 
this principle. In contrast to the impersonal tone that dominates TV news, talk 
shows create a more private and intimate atmosphere as the host addresses the 
public directly, speaking “to millions as if to each alone.”18 
By focusing on the two different TV formats, news and talk shows, we will 
demonstrate how the affective potential of the ‘real’ Odessa events was en-
hanced, intensified, and maximized on Russian TV, as well as how TV viewers 
were manipulated by alternative news and by images and narratives indulging in 
atrocity. While we will focus on the rhetorical-argumentative structures of the 
messages for the analysis of alternative news, the discussion of atrocity narra-
tives will shed light on the rhetorical-affective side of the Odessa coverage. With 
regard to the talk shows that addressed the Odessa events, the main focus lies on 
the Priamoi ėfir issue of 5 May 2014 for two reasons: First, this issue can be 
qualified as a striking example of TV sensationalism; second, it was the first talk 
show on either of the two main TV channels dedicated to the Odessa events. 
 
 
3. Alternative News  
 
As Russian-born British journalist Peter Pomerantsev and his colleague Michael 
Weiss have pointed out, after the decline of the “grand narratives” of socialism, 
ideology in post-Soviet Russia has come to resemble “an interchangeable and 
                                                           
16  Makukhin/Tsybulska/Kavatsiuk 2018: 31. 
17  Timberg et al. 2002: 4. 
18  Ibid. 
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contradictory set of accessories,”19 in contrast to Soviet ideology, which “pre-
sented a coherent, self-sufficient, and seamless world-view.”20 This has serious 
consequences for the credibility and reliability of facts or about what is presen-
ted as fact in Russian mass media, as Gleb Pavlovskii, a former consultant to 
Vladimir Putin, states: “Even if they [the Soviet propagandists] were lying, they 
took care to prove what they were doing was ‘the truth.’ Now no one even tries 
proving the ‘truth.’ You can just say anything. Create realities.”21 Viewed from 
the perspective of current international discussions on filter bubbles, social me-
dia and troll factories, Russian mass media communication during the Ukraine 
crisis marks a turning point in what is publicly claimed and regarded as true or 
false, fact or fiction. This challenge, which emanates from contemporary media 
realities, has found its expression in the term ‘alternative facts’ or ‘alternative 
news,’ which can be understood as pieces of information that appear to be uncer-
tain—either because they are highly biased or because they have been deliberate-
ly fabricated and disseminated. Conspiracy theories, unlike alternative news, 
lean towards totality and face the world’s ‘big’ questions and relations. In mass 
media communication, both phenomena coexist and complement each other. 
The first report on primetime news of 2 May was little more than a descrip-
tion of what had happened on that day in Odessa and what was still ongoing. 
However impersonal and matter-of-factly it might have appeared, the report al-
ready included hints about how the event would be interpreted in the days that 
followed, and how it would be linked to the Russian media’s discourse on the 
Ukraine crisis more generally: 
 
The activists of the “Right Sector” and “Self-Defense” from Kharkiv and Kiev, who earli-
er this day provoked mass riots in the center of the city, set fire to the tent camp of the an-
ti-Maidan. In the camp at the square of the Trade Union building people collected signa-
tures for a referendum and for the status of Russian as official language. The fire spread to 
the building. Neither the police, nor the fire brigade can be seen.22 
                                                           
19  Pomerantsev/Weiss 2014: 5. 
20  Arkhangelskiy 2016. 
21  Pomerantsev/Weiss 2014: 9. 
22  «Активисты “Правого сектора” и “Самообороны” из Харькова и Киева, которые 
ранее сегодня спровоцировали массовые беспорядки в центре города, подожгли 
палаточный городок Антимайдана. Это на площади перед облсоветом профсою-
зов, там собирали подписи за референдум и государственный статус для русс-
кого языка. Огонь перекинулся на здание. Ни милиции, ни пожарных не видно». 
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The first report already exhibits a rhetorical-argumentative structure by presen-
ting what happened in binary categories: On the one side, there are the “acti-
vists” (note the rather neutral word used here) who came from outside (from 
Ukraine’s largest cities Kharkiv and Kiev), and the “anti-Maidan protesters” on 
the other. In the news broadcasts that followed, the events of Odessa were repre-
sented in the—by then already established—friend-foe pattern of Ukraine “natio-
nalists” (natsionalisty), “fascists” (fashisty), “radicals” (radikaly), “Ukraine ul-
tras” (ukrainskie ul’tras), “neo-Nazis” (neonatsisty), or “Euromaidan” (evromai-
dan) on the one hand, and of “supporters of federalization” (storonniki federali-
zatsii) and “activists of an anti-fascist meeting” (aktivisty antifashistskogo mitin-
ga) on the other.  
From the first report in the primetime news of 2 May onwards, the set of 
statements and narratives that was developed from the news coverage of Vremia 
can be summed up as follows: The peaceful, local (i.e., Odessan) supporters of a 
federal Ukraine were attacked by nationalist and fascist radicals from outside 
and were literally slaughtered.23 The police and other Ukrainian governmental 
institutions did not act and react adequately. They did not turn up when the 
Trade Union building caught fire (as was clearly stated in the first report) and in 
the days that followed, they did not conduct the necessary investigations. There 
are two central ‘alternative narratives’ developed in Vremia: One refers to the 
fights that took place in the streets of Odessa, the other one depicts what hap-
pened during the fire in and around the building.  
In his report of 4 May,24 Pavel Pchelkin presents the first narrative that 
would be repeated in the numerous broadcasts that followed until 23 May, when 
                                                           
– “V Odesse gorit zdanie oblsoveta profsoiuzov” (“The Trade Union building in 
Odessa is burning”), Vremia, 2 May 2014.  
23  In the news broadcasts, the term “carnage” (boinia) is repeatedly used for what hap-
pened in Odessa. This is particularly the case in the first broadcast of 3 May, in which 
the word is used six times: first for establishing the image (it was a “real” [nastoiash-
chaia] and a “bloody” [krovavaia] carnage), then already rather matter-of-factly in 
phrases such as “during the carnage” or “from the place of the carnage.” – “V Odesse 
boeviki Pravogo sektora zazhivo sozhgli protestuiushchikh v Dome profsoiuzov” (“In 
Odessa combatants of the Right Sector burnt the protesters in the Trade Union build-
ing alive”), Vremia, 3 May 2014.  
24  See “Odesskaia tragedia ostavliaet mnogo voprosov” (“The Odessan tragedy leaves 
many questions”), Vremia, 4 May 2014.  
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the last lengthy news item25 on the Odessa events was broadcasted. According to 
Pchelkin’s reasoning, which is backed up by audiovisual material and presented 
with the support of animation (see Figure 1), the two conflicting groups were in-
filtrated by Maidan agitators and professional combatants of the Right Sector. 
The combatants who mingled with the pro-Russian activists were wearing cam-
ouflage Saint George’s ribbons. Their aim was to provoke the opposing crowd of 
football fans and to lead them in the direction of Kulykove Pole where they at-
tacked the tent camp. The second narrative was developed with regard to the fire 
in the Trade Union building and runs as follows: The Right Sector’s combatants 
invaded the building, set it on fire, and committed a number of atrocious murders 
ranging from the use of gas to carving up bodies.26 Both narratives provide al-
leged evidence for a conspiracy behind the Odessa events—as a plan plotted by 
the Ukrainian Security Service and its secretary Andriy Parubiy, as claimed in 
the news broadcast of 6 May.27 Consequently, it became the self-proclaimed task 
of Russian (TV) journalism to “disclose secret links” (raskryt’ tainye sviazi), as 
                                                           
25  See “Oni napisali ubiistva—stsenaristy odesskoi tragedii” (“They wrote the murder—
the screenwriters of the Odessan tragedy”), Vremia, 23 May 2014.  
26  Different stories behind this “mass murder” (Iuliia Ol’khovskaia in her report of 7 
May) are primarily conveyed—mostly by eyewitnesses—in the lengthy reports of 6 
and 7 May; see “V Odesse kolichestvo pogibshikh v Dome profsoiuzov mozhet byt’ 
bol’she, chem utverzhdaiut ofitsial’nye vlasti” (“The number of dead people in the 
Trade Union building might be higher than the official authorities claim”), Vremia, 6 
May 2014; “Mezhdunarodnye ėksperty obnarodovali novye dannye o tragedii v Odes-
se” (“International experts revealed new facts about the Odessan tragedy”), Vremia, 7 
May 2014). Additionally, the report of 6 May opens up another productive field of 
uncertainty and speculation by contesting the official Ukrainian death statistics. Num-
bers varying from 60 to 200 fatalities, once again purported by eyewitnesses and in-
terviewees from Odessa in several news broadcasts in the days that followed, were 
utilized to spread distrust in the Ukrainian political institutions. The same subject is 
taken up by talk shows, as in the Politika issue of 14 May, where the alleged eyewit-
ness Dmitrii Odinov, the leader of the Odessan self-defense militia, claims that more 
than 218 people died during the Odessa events. 
27  See “Poiavilos’ video, na kotorom sekretar’ SNBO i predvoditel’ sotni Maidana ob-
suzhdaiut sotrudnichestvo” (“A new video appeared, on which the secretary of the Na-
tional Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the Maidan Hundreds commander 
discuss collaboration”), Vremia, 6 May 2014.  
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news presenter Ekaterina Andreeva stated on 23 May when introducing the re-
port with the telling title “Oni napisali ubiistva—stsenaristy odesskoi tragedii.”28 
 
Figure 1: Animation 
 
Vremia (News broadcast, 6 May 2014) 
  
The friend-foe pattern is equally conveyed in talk shows, but it is expressed in a 
more vulgar, highly metaphoric language. Thus, when addressing the Kievan 
government, the Ukrainian army or the Ukrainian Security Service, talk show 
participants label their representatives “ugly creatures” (urody), “jerks” (pridur-
ki), “gangsters” (bandity), “monsters” (izvergi), “beasts” (zveri) or “non-hu-
mans” (neliudi). In contrast to this, the pro-Russian victims of the Odessa events 
are termed “peaceful people” (mirnye liudi), “simple people” (prostye liudi), “or-
thodox people” (pravoslavnye liudi), “heroes” (geroi), or even “angels” (angely). 
The fire in the Trade Union building is referred to as a “lethal fire trap” (smer-
tel’naia ognennaia lovushka) and a “planned carnage” (boinia splanirovannaia) 
which resulted from an “extermination order” (prikaz na unichtozhenie). Addi-
tionally, religious metaphors are used as the Odessa events are referred to as 
“hell” (ad), “ritual murder” (ritual’noe ubiistvo), or a “special satanic action” 
(spetsial’naia satanicheskaia aktsiia).  
With regard to the two central narratives conveyed in the news broadcasts, 
the talk shows focused solely on the second narrative of the “carnage” in and 
                                                           
28  “They wrote the murder—the screenwriters of the Odessan tragedy”; see footnote 24.  
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around the Trade Union building, where “organized killers” (organizirovannye 
ubiitsy) and “fascist Ukrainian nationalists” (fashistskie ukrainskie natsionalisty) 
gassed, tortured, burnt and massacred peaceful people. The talk shows utilized 
the affective potential of the inadvertent disaster and maximized its emotional ef-
fects by extending upon already circulating narratives and by enhancing their 
thrilling and horrifying moments. Accordingly, the number of puppet masters 
behind the alleged plan is expanded to include perpetrators from outside Ukrai-
ne. In Priamoi ėfir of 5 May, Evgenii Fedorov, the deputy of the Russian State 
Duma, even spoke of a “foreign intervention” (inostrannaia interventsiia): “This 
is a foreign intervention, achieved by a coup d’état and punitive actions with the 
help of local punitive forces. … This is an intervention from outside, both 
against Ukraine and Russia.”29 It is noteworthy that the speaker repeats the 
catchword “punitive action” (karatel’naia operatsiia)—a term used previously 
by Vladimir Putin in his famous Crimean speech on 18 March, in which the key-
words for the official rhetoric on the Ukraine crisis were coined; these included 
“fifth column” (piataia kolonna), “neo-Nazis” (neonatsisty) and “national-trai-
tors” (national-predateli).30  
The ‘alternative narratives’ presented in the news broadcasts were not only 
enhanced and expanded in the talk shows that focused on the Odessa events, but 
were also linked to anti-Western conspiracy theories. In Priamoi ėfir of 5 May, 
invited experts repeatedly claimed involvement by the United States. Among 
these accusers was Aleksandr Iakovlev, a journalist working for the tabloid 
newspaper Komsomol’skaia pravda, who stated: “Let’s be honest. The punitive 
action has been ordered, the customer being situated across the ocean.”31 Fur-
thermore, alleged outside intervention was implied when Ukraine was referred to 
as a “hostage” (zalozhnitsa) in the Politika issue of 14 May, or when it was 
claimed that Ukraine had been supported by foreign specialists in Priamoi ėfir of 
5 May. To complete the picture, the circle of conspirators extended to inde-
                                                           
29  «Это иностранная интервенция, путём государственного переворота и каратель-
ных операции с помощью местных карательных частей. … Это интервенция 
иностранная, и против Украины и России». – “Maiskaia Odessa: Khatyn’ XXI ve-
ka” (“Odessa in May—Khatyn’ of the 21st century”), Priamoi ėfir 5 May 2014.  
30  See “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (“Address by President of the 
Russian Federation”), 18 March 2014. 
31  «У карательной операции есть заказчик. … Заказчик карательной операции 
находится за Океаном, давайте скажем это честно». – “Maiskaia Odessa: Khatyn’ 
XXI veka” (“Odessa in May—Khatyn’ of the 21st century”), Priamoi ėfir 5 May 
2014.  
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pendent Russian media, in particular to the radio station Ėkho Moskvy and the 
TV channel Dozhd’, when, in the Priamoi ėfir issue of 27 May, the military col-
umnist at Komsomol’skaia Pravda, Viktor Baranets, called these media the 
“mouthpiece of the Kievan junta or the European Union.”32  
In news broadcasts and talk shows alike, the central technique of dissemi-
nating alternative news and spreading rumors was to involve eyewitnesses, local 
interviewees, and invited ‘experts.’ The appearance of allegedly authentic people 
on screen opens up the possibility of transmitting statements about reality and 
expressing emotions that could never be articulated by the authoritative voice of 
state institutions. The montage of three women and their statements on the Odes-
san tragedy in the first news report, of 4 May, clearly shows how the voice of the 
‘people’ is deliberately used to shape public sentiment and to enhance circulating 
narratives.33 While the first woman embodies the popular outrage by demanding: 
“We are a peaceful city, we want to live here! We don’t want war!” The second 
voice names the crimes that have been committed by exclaiming: “People 
jumped out of the building, they murdered, they beat them, finished them off—
this is a genocide of their own people!” Finally, the third woman offers a rational 
explanation of what happened: “This is not accessible to the intellect. To detain, 
burn people, and to find pleasure in it. In order to do this, you have to be a fas-
cist.”34 (see Figures 2 and 3) 
 
                                                           
32  «В тылу нашего государства, точнее в центре Москвы орудует рупор ... Киевс-
кой Хунты или Европейского союза». – “Uzniki khunty: Za kem ochotiatsia kara-
teli?” (“Prisoners of the junta: Who are the chastisers hunting for?”), Priamoi ėfir, 27 
May 2014.  
33  See “Odessity shturmovali militsiiu, chtoby ottuda vypustili protivnikov Kievskoi 
vlasti” (“Odessans assaulted the police in order to release the opponents of the Kievan 
government”), Vremia, 4 May 2014. 
34  (1) «Мы мирный город, мы хотим здесь жить! Мы не хотим войны»; (2) «Люди 
выпрыгивали из зданий, они убивали, они их били, добивали ― это геноцид 
своего народа!»; (3) «Ведь это умом не достижимо. Взять, сжечь людей и полу-
чать от этого удовольствие. Для этого нужно быть фашистом». 





Vremia (News broadcast, 4 May 2014) Vremia (News broadcast, 4 May 2014) 
 
Talk shows exploit techniques of fictional genres and other TV formats and 
must, therefore, be situated in an interspace between the factual and the fictional. 
Although the invited guests are ‘real world’ people, they act as if they are on a 
stage and, thus, are subject to the rules of that particular talk show’s format. The 
oscillation between factual and fictional becomes particularly apparent in the 
huge number of guests invited for the Priamoi ėfir issue of 5 May, as well as in 
the roles they play in their ‘real’ lives and on stage. With regard to their ‘real 
life,’ they can be assigned to three different fields: The first group consists of 
‘experts,’ including journalists and writers; the second group are people involved 
in politics, such as activists from militias, armed volunteer groups, non-govern-
mental organizations, or deputies of the Russian Parliament; finally, there is the 
huge group of eyewitnesses. However, when taking a closer look at the latter 
group, eyewitnesses often turn out to also be members of militias, armed volun-
teer groups, or non-governmental organizations. By presenting and giving a 
voice to representatives of militias or NGOs, Russian TV demonstrates that there 
is an active mass movement against the Euromaidan in Ukraine. This stress on 
anti-Maidan-activism can be regarded as part of a general strategy which was, 
and still is, pursued in Russian political discourse and subsequently in mass me-
dia; it aims to confront Western democracies with their own “mirror image.”35 In 
the political crisis of 2014, this strategy inverted the Western perception of what 
was happening in Ukraine by asserting that fascists were the driving force at the 
Maidan in Kiev, and that pro-Russian democratic civic movement is being re-
pressed by those who came to power in Kiev after the Euromaidan. 
Although the talk show guests seem to only represent themselves, and are 
therefore regarded as authentic, their on-screen appearance is simultaneously 
clearly marked as theatrical—staged for the particular show the spectators ex-
pect. As actors on screen, they exhibit strong emotions like anger and grief by 
yelling, crying or jumping up with rage and in so doing heat up the atmosphere 
                                                           
35  Baunov 2016: 13.  
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in the studio. In addition to this, their performance is subject to the rules and 
techniques of a particular genre or format which, in our case, include hyperbole 
and the burlesque as characteristics. 
A vivid example of the blending of real-live-roles, staging, and genre rules is 
Tamerlan Surovyi, an activist of the self-defense militia in Odessa, as well as an 
alleged eyewitness of the events. He appears three times in three different talk 
shows addressing the Odessa events: first in the two Priamoi ėfir shows on 5 and 
12 May, and finally in the Spetsial’nyi korrespondent issue of 20 May (see Fig-
ures 4 to 6). The most obvious signal of his fictionality is the activist’s name: 
His first name, Tamerlan, is reminiscent of the fourteenth-century Turco-Mongol 
conqueror and military leader of the same name, while his surname, consisting 
of the adjective surovyi (harsh, severe), elicits associations with both heroic fig-
ures of medieval history (such as Ivan Groznyi) as well as the characters of pop-
ular fiction or comics.36 In this sense, Tamerlan Surovyi greatly resembles a 
character from a TV series who moves from one talk show to another and should 
be recognized as such by spectators. Furthermore, Tamerlan Surovyi’s appear-
ance is masked in a theatrical fashion, his face never being fully visible, but cov-
ered with a balaclava or by sunglasses. This mask, of course, also signals that 
Tamerlan has to conceal his ‘real’ identity so as not to run into danger. Similarly, 
other talk show guests are also disguised, their masks leaning towards the bur-
lesque, which is particularly true of the guests with head bandages—a blunt, ec-
centric sign of direct involvement. In this way, eyewitnesses combine the humor-
esque with the atrocious37 and function as one more means by which to trans-
form the real events of Odessa into attractions in Eisenstein’s sense and, as a 
whole, into a TV spectacle that is able to capture the spectators’ attention.  
 
 
                                                           
36  Tamerlan Surovyi is not the only nickname of this kind in talk shows. Another notable 
example is the allegedly wounded Vladimir Tverdyi (hard, strong) in Politika on 23 
April 2014. 
37  Aronson describes humor and atrocity as the two elements of Eisenstein’s attraction; 
see Aronson 2003: 212. 
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Figure 4: Tamerlan Surovyj 
and another eyewitness 
Figure 5: Tamerlan 
Surovyi 
Figure 6: Tamerlan 
Surovyi 
   
Priamoi ėfir  
(Talk show, 5 May 2014) 
Priamoi ėfir  
(Talk show, 12 May 2014) 
Spetsial’nyi korrespondent 
(Talk show, 20 May 2014) 
 
 
4. Atrocity Narratives 
 
Images and narratives that convey atrocity and horror form the core of the rhe-
torical-affective side of the Odessa coverage. With regard to impactful factors, 
the atrocity narratives developed for the Odessa events can be divided into two 
groups: First, the fire topos, which is represented by the numerous amateur shots 
of the burning building and, as such, is reminiscent of the visual memory of the 
Second World War that has been primarily shaped by cinema. Second, we en-
counter images and narratives of the alleged carnage that went on inside the 
building, which are characterized by a representational gap due to, on the one 
hand, the improbability that such a life-threatening situation would be filmed at 
all and the impossibility of representing a traumatic experience of this kind on 
the other.38 Therefore, it is worthwhile to ask how the news programs dealt with 
this specific gap, i.e., how they presented the unrepresented and unrepresentable. 
Regarding the fire topos, a strong focus lay on the discursive level, while the 
visual material of the Trade Union building in flames was impressive by itself 
and had a voyeuristic appeal of being able to watch the catastrophe from a safe 
distance. In the first news report of 3 May, which provides a description of what 
happened, the visual sequences and the verbal messages transmitted by the off-
voice commentary interact to create dense images of human suffering—of people 
“driven into a fire trap,” “burnt alive” or “jumping into death.”39 Visually, the 
                                                           
38  For questions concerning ‘media’ and their possible involvement in traumatic pro-
cesses see, e.g., Paech 2014. 
39  «загнанные в огненную ловушку», «сгорели заживо», «разбились насмерть». 
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people’s struggle to survive is represented by shaky amateur shots that show 
people escaping the fire by climbing the cornice. 
Apart from the present-tense immediacy that emanates from the sight of a 
burning building, the emotional impact of the fire topos is created by linking the 
fire of Odessa to the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during the Second 
World War. The point of reference is the well-known Belorussian Khatyn’, 
which has been commemorated in Soviet literature and cinema alike, as in the 
famous film Idi i smotri (Come and See, 1985) by Elem Klimov. In 1943, the 
German SS extinguished a whole village by locking the inhabitants up in a barn 
and setting it on fire. Those who were able to escape the flames were shot. 
The link between Khatyn’ and the burning Trade Union building was estab-
lished immediately, but while the source of the established reference was men-
tioned in the first news report of 3 May—“What happened then is already de-
scribed as a ‘New Khatyn’’ by journalists and bloggers”40—the similarities be-
came more self-evident with every further repetition. Important elements of the 
Khatyn’ mass murder were transferred to the present in order to enhance the cor-
respondence, when in the news report of 3 May news reporter Ol’khovskaia stat-
ed that “those who tried to escape were shot.”41 
In contrast to the news broadcasts, talk shows again maximize the affective 
potential by working in terms of exaggeration. The first talk show about the 
Odessa events on 5 May was entitled “Odessa in May—Khatyn’ of the twenty-
first century”42 and in the talk shows that followed—in Priamoi ėfir of 12 May, 
as well as in Spetsial’nyi korrespondent of 20 May—further parallels to Nazi 
crimes were drawn by asserting that people inside the building were gassed with 
Teren, Chloroform or Sarin in Odessa.  
The unrepresented and unrepresentable pictures of people dying in the fire or 
being—as the Russian TV news suggested to their spectators—slaughtered inside 
the building were substituted by presenting the result of the lethal fire. There is a 
set of about 15 different amateur photos depicting corpses, among them severely 
burnt bodies (see Figure 7). Together with the amateur footage of people stan-
                                                           
40  «То, что происходило дальше, журналисты и блогеры уже называют новой Ха-
тынью». – “V rezul’tate stolknovenii i pozhara v Dome profsoiuzov Odessy pogibli 
42 cheloveka, bolee 200 raneny” (“As a result of the clashes and the fire in the Trade 
Union building 42 people died in Odessa, more than 200 are wounded”), Vremia, 3 
May 2014.  
41  «Тех, кто пытался бежать, расстреливали». – ibid. 
42  See “Maiskaia Odessa: Khatyn’ XXI veka” (“Odessa in May—Khatyn’ of the twenty-
first century”), Priamoi ėfir, 5 May 2014.  
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ding on the building’s cornice, they form the visual core of atrocity images that 
were repeatedly presented in the news reports. Although the source of these pic-
tures is usually indicated,43 this does not tell us anything about their reliability or 
about who actually took them and where they were taken. The most controver-
sial photo from the Odessa series depicts the corpse of a woman, her body bent 
over a table, which, in the mode of sensationalism, was identified as the body of 
a pregnant woman who had been strangled with a wire (see Figure 8).44 In the 
Priamoi ėfir issue of 5 May—a day before the photo was shown on Pervyi 
kanal—the story of atrocity was unfolded by the alleged eye-witness Galina Za-
porozhtseva, a retired Colonel of the Militia in Odessa: 
 
She has been strangled with the cable of a teakettle. There were frames, when she was 
screaming, everybody was listening and yelling: “Shut her mouth!” She screamed: “Help 
me!” and then, they hang out a flag, a Ukrainian flag, from the window that the screams 
were coming from. That is to say that they strangled a pregnant woman under the Ukrai-
nian flag.45  
 
In comparison to news broadcasts, the effects of direct participation and giving 
evidence are enhanced in the talk shows. In Priamoi ėfir of 5 May, the set of 
atrocity pictures that circulated on facebook, YouTube, and numerous other web-
sites were projected onto the studio screen. While the talk show host Boris Kor-
chevnikov repeatedly requests the studio guests and the spectators to take a 
                                                           
43  Some of the indicated links are still valid, as the blog in Live Journal (http://rocor-
rus.livejournal.com/225528.html), others are of no value at all, such as “You-
Tube.com” or just “facebook.” 
44  The identity of the dead woman, her age (actually 59), and the real cause of her death 
was disclosed by the Ukrainian StopFake project; see “Russia’s top lies about Ukra-
ine. Part 2.” Stopfake.org, 10 July 2014. 
45  «Она была задушена шнуром от чайника. Были кадры, когда она кричала, все 
слушали и кричат: “Закройте ей рот!” Она кричит “Помогите!” и потом из этого 
окна, из которого были крики, выставили флаг, украинский флаг. То есть под 
украинским флагом задушили беременную женщину»; see footnote 40. It is worth 
noting here that in the news report of 6 May, the connection between the female 
screams, the flying of the Ukrainian flag and the photo of the strangled woman was 
established simply by montage; see “V Odesse kolichestvo pogibshikh v Dome prof-
soiuzov mozhet byt’ bol’she, chem utverzhdaiut ofitsial’nye vlasti” (“The number of 
dead people in the Trade Union building might be higher than the official authorities 
claim”), Vremia, 6 May 2014.  
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look—“Posmotrite!”—, the alleged eyewitnesses complement the visuals by re-
counting what they have seen with their own eyes. 
 
Figure 7: Pixelated shock picture of a dead body 
 
Priamoi ėfir (Talk show, 5 May 2014). The same picture was also shown in Vremia 
(News broadcast, 6 May 2014). 
 
In the news, an analogous voyeuristic effect is achieved—though by contrary 
means—when the news anchorman, right before the visual material is presented 
for the first time in the primetime news of 3 May, directly addresses the specta-
tors and expresses a warning: “We will show what has happened, but possibly 
not everybody should see it, particularly not children and sensitive people. Cer-
tain scenes are just not imaginable in a country in the middle of Europe in the 
twenty-first century.”46 
                                                           
46  «Мы сейчас покажем, как все происходило, но возможно, что не всем стоит это 
видеть. Детям и впечатлительным зрителям уж точно. Отдельные сцены просто 
не мыслимы для страны в центре Европы в ХХI веке». – “V Odesse boeviki Pra-
vogo sektora zazhivo sozhgli protestuiushchikh v Dome profsoiuzov” (“In Odessa 
combatants of the Right Sector burnt the protesters in the Trade Union building 
alive”), Vremia, 3 May 2014.  
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Figure 8: Strangled woman 
 
Vremia (News broadcast, 6 May 2014). The same picture was also shown in Priamoi ėfir 
(Talk show, 5 May 2014).  
 
Although the corpses in the pictures are pixelated, this does not lessen the emo-
tional effect emanating from these images. What is visually not represented and 
not representable, is filled in by the spectators’ imagination, and the particular 
thrill of these pictures that supposedly document the events definitely lies in the 
spectators’ knowledge that this is real—no matter what is actually visible. Addi-
tionally, particularly in the talk shows, the eyewitnesses provide atrocity narra-
tives to underline the visual material. Thus, in Priamoi ėfir of 5 May, there are 
claims that a man has been “raped” and that his face has been “beaten to a 
pulp.”47 Tamerlan Surovyi asserts that people inside the Trade Union building 
have been “doused with petrol”and “set on fire”.48 The mode of exaggeration 
again determines the atrocity narratives told in the Priamoi ėfir issue of 12 May, 
when the already mentioned Galina Zaporozhtseva asserts that cannibals have 
raged in the Trade Union building of Odessa: “Now we have the information … 
                                                           
47  «его изнасиловали», «разбили все лицо». 
48  «их сверху обливали бензином», «сжигали людей». 
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the factual information on cannibalism in the Trade Union building.”49 Subse-
quently, a video is shown, depicting a group of men screaming “Come here, we 
will slightly grill them!”50 and a man holding a pack of table napkins in his 
hands joins them. The burlesque display finally reaches its peak when artefacts 
are presented as evidence of the carnage, among them a sixteenth century torture 





Although manipulation by mass media is anything but a new phenomenon, the 
TV coverage of Odessa 2014 shows that there are new means and techniques, 
new formats and new strategies of making events visible and of representing the 
‘real.’ As our analysis shows these new techniques are, above all, the results of 
the technological innovations of the past two decades which, at the present mo-
ment, appear to be most powerful when digital new means of mass communi-
cation merge with supposedly ‘old’ media. While the most effective means of 
mass communication in Russia today remains state-run TV, the propaganda cam-
paign launched during the Ukraine crisis of 2014 heavily relied on social net-
works and internet platforms such as YouTube. Thereby, the production and dis-
semination of information was at least partly delegated to the users, proving 
themselves to be powerful instruments of manipulation, as were the textual strat-
egies of transmitting alternative news and atrocity narratives. Thus, Marshall 
McLuhan’s assumption that in the age of mass communication intensity and im-
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 “Uzniki khunty: Za kem ochotiatsia karateli?” (“Prisoners of the junta: Who are 






In early May of 2014, the city of Odessa became the scene of violent clashes be-
tween pro-Russian and pro-Ukraine activists, resulting in nearly 50 casualties. 
Commentators on Russian TV reacted immediately and presented a highly bi-
ased interpretation of what had taken place in Odessa. This article examines the 
representation of the events in Russian news broadcasts and TV talk shows. The 
focus lies on ‘alternative’ news and the ‘fabrication’ of facts on the one hand, 
and on atrocity narratives as a highly effective means of attracting and stimulat-
ing the viewers’ attention on the other. Furthermore, questions concerning the in-
teraction of the supposedly ‘old’ media of TV and the ‘new’ digital media will 
shed light on propaganda strategies and techniques, which while definitely not 
new in their general features, have changed significantly with respect to their po-





After the Final Full-Stop:  
Conspiracy Theories vs. Aesthetic Response 
in Miloš Urban’s Poslední tečka za rukopisy 




conspiracy theories; aesthetic response; Miloš Urban; Czech literature; nation 
building in literature 
 
 
On 16 September 1817, Czech linguist Vacláv Hanka discovered a medieval 
manuscript in the crypt of St. John the Baptist in the church of Dvůr Králové, 
Bohemia. The manuscript contained six poems about important events that took 
place throughout Czech history and a collection of folk songs; all of the texts 
were written in Old Czech. Hanka dated the manuscript back to the thirteenth 
century and used them as demonstrable proof of a long-lasting Czech literary 
tradition. He translated the texts into modern Czech, which in turn served as the 
basis for a German translation. This translation was published in 1819 and was 
well-received throughout Western Europe. The manuscript was integral to the 
shaping of the Czech nation; for example, it inspired historian František Palacký 
to write his history of Bohemia, and parts of it were set to music by world-
famous composer Antonín Dvořák. 
The manuscript’s authenticity was a topic that was heatedly debated from the 
outset; this was perhaps because Hanka’s discovery was not the only one from 
that time. In 1816, Josef Linda—a close friend of Hanka—found another manu-
script in Prague, and an anonymous scholar sent yet another manuscript, pur-
portedly from the eighth century, to the National Museum in Prague in 1817. A 
plethora of scholars from diverse disciplines, such as linguistics, literary studies, 
history, chemistry, forensics, paleography, etc. tried to prove or disprove the au-
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thenticity of the manuscripts; many prominent figures from Czech history had 
their say in the so-called “fight over the manuscripts” (spor o rukopisy). Nowa-
days, the various manuscripts ‘found’ by Hanka and Linda are considered to be 
fake, by and large, as a recent 900-page study argues;1 only the Czech Manu-
script Society (Česká společnost rukopisná) still insists on the benefit of remain-
ing doubt, as a fairly recent book entitled RKZ dodnes nepoznané (Manuscripts, 
to this Day Unrecognized, 2017) demonstrates.2  
Miloš Urban’s debut novel Poslední tečka za rukopisy (The Final Full-Stop 
After the Manuscripts, 1998) is based on this 200-year-long “fight over the man-
uscripts.” In the novel, the manuscripts are real and, therefore, an extra layer of 
conspiracy is added to the commonly accepted historical ‘truth.’ Hanka and Lin-
da made the manuscripts seem forged not in order to harm the nascent Czech na-
tion, but for another, even more sinister purpose: to abolish patriarchy. Moreo-
ver, the two scholars seem to have hidden identities. The novel’s protagonist 
Josef and his girlfriend Marie slowly uncover what actually happened by means 
of painstaking archival research, and then Josef uses their findings to further his 
academic career. 
Most critics view Urban’s novel as a typical example of postmodern, meta-
reflexive playfulness.3 Not only are the protagonists in literary mystery novels 
written by Umberto Eco and Dan Brown professional scholars familiar with 
reading and interpretation, but the narrator often self-reflexively addresses the 
novel’s readers. Moreover, the text offers meta-reflections on the process of 
reading, on the relationship between reader and text, and it also implicitly al-
ludes to Wolfgang Iser’s theory of aesthetic response.4 In my opinion, these re-
flections and the focus on reading are not just examples of postmodernism, but 
these features are closely interlinked with the novel’s plot-shaping conspiracy 
theory. Urban’s novel points out how reading and misreading reality can be used 
to create conspiracy theories and, at the same time, uses artistic devices to illus-
trate these processes; oftentimes, the text deliberately leads its readers astray. 
                                                           
1 Cf. Dobiáš et al. 2014. 
2 Cf. Nesměrák et al. 2017. 
3 Aleš Haman (1999: 11) sees the text as a post-modern literary game, Vladimír Stanzel 
(1999: 4−5) understands it as a game that Urban plays with the reader, and Jiří Peňás 
(2002: 89) points out that the text is, in many ways, playing with the various set-
pieces of the detective novel. 
4 Iser’s “Wirkungsästhetik” is often conflated with reader-response criticism, but Iser 
himself suggested translating the German term as “aesthetic response,” cf. Iser 1980: 
x. 
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Thus, the hunt to uncover the ‘truth’ becomes a reader-oriented phenomenon 
throughout the text’s multiple layers of truth and equally multiple layers of con-
spiracies.  
In this chapter, I will attempt to show what might happen after the final full-
stop of a “conspiracy narrative.”5 I argue that Iser’s theory of aesthetic response 
applies not only to literary texts but can also be instructive in the context of con-
spiracy theories. I use Urban’s novel as an example because it not only shows 
how readers shape a literary text to their liking, and how conspiracy theories are 
based on (mis-)reading reality, but it also intertwines these two strands. In the 
first section, I will focus on theories of conspiracy theories which I will then, in 
the subsequent section, examine alongside Iser’s theory of aesthetic response. 
Both literary texts and conspiracy theories rely on reader agency; the only appar-
ent difference is that in the case of conspiracy theories, it is not a text that is be-
ing (mis-)read, but all of reality. In the third section, I will summarize the plot 
and analyze Linda’s and Hanka’s feminist conspiracy in a close reading in-
formed by the theory of aesthetic response. In the fourth section, I will reflect 
upon the connections between fact and fiction and draw further examples from 
Urban’s novel.  
 
 
Conspiracy Theory Theories 
 
Before attempting to apply literary theory to conspiracy theories it is first neces-
sary to reflect on their mutual relationship. Are conspiracy theories literary texts, 
even just to a certain extent? Following philosopher David Coady’s definition of 
conspiracy theories, there are indeed certain links between them and fictional 
texts: 
 
A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of an historical event in which conspiracy 
(i.e., agents acting secretly in concert) has a significant causal role. Furthermore, the con-
spiracy postulated by the proposed explanation must be a conspiracy to bring about the 
historical event which it purports to explain. Finally, the proposed explanation must con-
flict with an ‘official’ explanation of the same historical event.6  
 
                                                           
5 Mark Fenster proposed the term “conspiracy narrative” to cover both fictional texts 
and real-world conspiracies, see Fenster 2008: 133−35. 
6 Coady 2006: 117. 
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In other words, there are at least two different narratives involved in conspiracy 
theories: An ‘official’ one and a conspiratorial one. Both ‘explain’ historical 
events, and in so doing contradict each other. Given that the official explanation 
is also a narrative, similar techniques as those used in the conspiracy-informed 
theory have to be used. This realization is reminiscent of Hayden White, who has 
pointed out the influences of narrative patterns on historiography;7 one should 
certainly not confuse an ‘official’ narrative with ‘truth’ or ‘historical reality.’ 
Following this understanding, the difference between conspiracy theories and of-
ficial explanations becomes blurry: neither of them ought to be considered ex-
clusively in terms of facts. However, there are differences to be found between 
official and conspiracy narratives. According to Brian L. Keeley, one key trait of 
conspiracy theories is that the conspirators have bad intentions.8 In a similar 
vein, Michael Butter boils conspiracy theories down to “a group of evil agents, 
the conspirators, has assumed or is currently trying to assume control over an in-
stitution, a region, a nation, or the world.”9 Mark Fenster speaks about the “per-
petrators of the evil conspiracy”10 and Brotherton and French call the conspira-
tors “a preternaturally sinister and powerful group of people.”11 The association 
of conspiracies with evil agents is not an unsurprising one: Following poststruc-
turalist theory, Jack Z. Bratich detects a power divide between official discourses 
and conspiracy theories: “The scapegoating of conspiracy theories provides the 
conditions for social integration and political rationality. Conspiracy panics help 
to define the normal modes of dissent.”12 Similarly, Joseph E. Uscinski interprets 
conspiracy theories as an “accusatory perception.”13 
But conspiracy theories are not merely counterpoints to, and at the same time 
cornerstones for, ‘official’ truth and power; they are also a narrative game. In a 
way, the conspiracy theories’ focus on evil makes for compelling stories; ‘offi-
cial’ explanations, on the contrary, often follow the ideal of scientific objectivi-
ty—although they also have to be considered an expression of a specific ideolog-
ical background. One constituent of a conspiracy theory’s narrative—or more 
specifically semiotic—game is misunderstandings, as Michael Butter points out: 
 
                                                           
7 Cf. White 1973. 
8 Cf. Keeley 2006: 51−52. 
9 Butter 2014: 1. 
10 Fenster 2008: 119. 
11 Brotherton and French 2014: 238. 
12 Bratich 2008: 11. 
13 Uscinski 2018: 235. 
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Conspiracy theories are an expression … of a semiotic [crisis of representation] ... As the 
conspirators constantly disavow the intentions that conspiracy theorists ascribe to them, 
they are producing signs which … are supposed to mislead their unsuspecting victims.14 
 
It has to be noted that Butter argues from the perspective of believers of conspir-
acy theories, i.e., the “unsuspecting victims.” But Brotherton and French under-
line the fact that a conspiracy theory’s success should not be attributed to the 
conspirators who are producing misleading signs; instead, it is the believers’ lack 
of reasoning skills which makes conspiracy theories believable. Brotherton and 
French outline the psychological background for the belief in conspiracy theories 
in the following manner: 
 
Under conditions of uncertainty, people’s statistical intuitions are often at odds with objec-
tive laws of probability. In particular, people often misperceive the co-occurrence of the 
ostensibly unrelated events as being more likely than the occurrence of either component 
alone. The current findings suggest that … conspiracy theories, similar with other anoma-
lous beliefs, are associated with reasoning biases and heuristics.15 
  
Bias, misperception, and misinterpretation are rife and a conspiracy theory is a 
misreading of reality that people fall for because of their cognitive biases. Simi-
lar ideas have been voiced by both Brian L. Keeley, who argues that conspiracy 
theories operate on “errant data” in official explanations and link unrelated 
events,16 and by Mark Fenster, who states that a “conspiracy narrative is compel-
ling … in its attempt to explain a wide range of seemingly disparate past and 
present events and structures with a relatively coherent framework.”17 Again, I 
wish to point out that the official narrative is by no means to be confused with 
‘truth’ or ‘reality.’ In fact, both the conspiracy theory and its conflicting official 
explanation are narratives that have a varying degree of realism and adherence to 
facts.  
In sum, a conspiracy theory is a narrative and, at the same time, it is a sign-
reading game. Thus, the connection between literature and conspiracy theories is 
twofold: On the one hand, a conspiracy theory is a narrative that resorts to strat-
egies and artistic devices from fictional texts. On the other hand, conspiracy the-
ories exemplify reading processes. They rely on the power of the (mis-)reader to 
                                                           
14 Butter 2014: 17−18. 
15 Brotherton/French 2014: 246. 
16 Keeley 2006: 51−52. 
17 Fenster 2008: 119. 
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connect dots which are not necessarily connected. It is precisely this focus on the 
reader and her/his perception which has led me to subscribe to Wolfgang Iser’s 
theory of aesthetic response which presents itself as a proper tool to analyze con-




An Aesthetic Response to Conspiracy Theories? 
 
According to Wolfgang Iser, the readers are responsible for the consistency of a 
literary text. This is especially true of longer texts where it is crucial that the 
readers be able to ‘connect the dots’: 
 
Large-scale texts such as novels or epics cannot be continually ‘present’ to the reader with 
an identical degree of intensity … The reader is likened to a traveler in a stagecoach, who 
has to make the often difficult journey through the novel, gazing out from his moving 
viewpoint. Naturally, he combines all that he sees within his memory and establishes a 
pattern of consistency, the nature and reliability of which will depend partly on the degree 
of attention he has paid during each phase of the journey.18 
 
The meanings that are produced from combining individual signs can, in turn, 
become signs which can be connected further. Textual elements may help the 
readers to associate individual signs of the text and, thus, bring forward the “ge-
stalt” of the text, i.e., a consistent interpretation as opposed to a connection of 
random elements that create arbitrary meanings.19 One of those textual elements 
that shapes text-reader interaction is the so-called “blank” (Leerstelle). In this 
case, the text ‘does’ nothing at all and leaves everything—i.e., its inner con-
sistency—up to the reader: 
 
The blank … designates a vacancy in the overall system of the text, the filling of which 
brings about an interaction of textual patterns. In other words, the need for completion is 
replaced here by the need for combination … They [the blanks—G.H.] indicate that the 
different segments of the text are to be connected, even though the text itself does not say 
so. They are the unseen joints of the text, and as they mark off schemata and textual per-
spectives from one another, they simultaneously trigger acts of ideation on the reader’s 
                                                           
18 Iser 1980: 16. 
19 Cf. ibid.: 120. 
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part. Consequently, when the schemata and perspectives have been linked together, the 
blanks ‘disappear.’20 
 
In a way, a text is a superposition of multiple possibilities and interpretations 
that collapse only when the readers have subconsciously decided how they want 
to fill in the blanks. As Iser notes, the blanks “marshal selected norms … into a 
fragmented, counterfactual, contrastive or telescoped sequence, nullifying any 
expectation of good continuation.”21 The reader then “cannot help but try and 
supply the missing links that will bring the schemata together in an integrated 
gestalt.”22 When conspiracy theories operate on “errant data” and focus on 
“blanks” in official narratives, it is not out of something like spite; this operation 
is simply a byproduct of the reading process. A conspiracy narrative is born 
when especially an official story cannot deliver what fulfills the readers’ afore-
mentioned “expectation of good continuation.” 
Iser also comments on the relationship between fact and fiction, between text 
and reality, which “are to be linked … in terms not of opposition but of commu-
nication, … fiction is a means of telling us something about reality.”23 However, 
the text can never make the connection to ‘real’ reality; instead, the reader can 
only 
 
… assemble the meaning toward which the perspectives of the text have guided him. But 
since this meaning is neither a given external reality nor a copy of an intended reader’s 
own world, it is something that has to be ideated by the mind of the reader. A reality that 
has no existence of its own can only come into being by way of ideation, and so the struc-
ture of the text sets off a sequence of mental images which lead to the text translating itself 
into the reader’s consciousness.24 
 
A few pages later, Iser once again stresses that “no literary text relates to contin-
gent reality as such, but to models or concepts of reality, in which contingencies 
and complexities are reduced to a meaningful structure.”25 A literary text cannot 
relate to ‘reality,’ but “must bring with it all the components necessary for the 
construction of the situation, since this has no existence outside the literary 
                                                           
20 Ibid.: 183, emphasis in original. 
21 Ibid.: 186, emphasis in original. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.: 53. 
24 Ibid.: 38, emphasis mine. 
25 Ibid.: 70. 
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work.”26 In this regard it is not possible to distinguish between literary texts and 
conspiracy theories: both are to be read as self-contained simulations of reality, 
but both stress their connection to a contingent reality to a certain extent. For 
conspiracy theories this relation is a necessity, but it is also heavily implied in 
some literary genres such as historical novels, autobiographies or documentary 
fiction. It seems a bit unfair to blame conspiracy theories for something that also 
applies to literary texts, especially given that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is of-
ten used as a discursive weapon. This realization opens up another parallel be-
tween conspiracy theories and literary texts: According to Iser, literary texts 
have a specific intention. Rather than trying to reproduce reality, literary texts 
strive to put meanings to the forefront that have been neutralized or negated in 
reality27 in order to “answer … the questions arising out of the system.”28 To a 
certain extent, literary texts provide narratives that oppose the ‘official’ stories, 
just as conspiracy theories do. Conversely, conspiracy theories may fulfill the 
same socio-critical functions as literature. In the following section I will try to 
further unravel these interferences. 
 
 
A Feminist Conspiracy 
 
Literary scholar Josef Urban, an assistant professor of Czech philology at 
Charles University in Prague, and his girlfriend Marie Horáková, a postdoctoral 
researcher, set out to find the truth about the manuscripts from Zelená Hora and 
Dvůr Králové. The main impetus comes from Marie, while Josef, who also 
serves as a first-person narrator and poses as the book’s author, acts as her side-
kick, her “Watson.” During archival work, Marie and Josef each uncover two 
letters from the correspondence of Vacláv Hanka, which provide further clues to 
the mystery of the manuscripts; however, Josef keeps one of them from both 
Marie and from the reader. More and more facts about the ‘real’ truth behind the 
manuscripts become uncovered; finally, Josef can solve the literary puzzle be-
cause of information provided in the last letter, a letter he alone knows about. He 
then goes on and (mis)uses Marie’s and his joint work to serve as his ‘habilita-
tion.’29  
                                                           
26 Ibid.: 69. 
27 Ibid.: 72. 
28 Ibid.: 73. 
29 A habilitation is a second thesis which is needed to get tenure in the Czech academic 
system. 
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In Urban’s novel, the manuscripts are real. Vacláv Hanka and Josef Linda, 
who were in fact both women, created the fabrication; they created errors and lit-
tle details that do not add up and which would then lead attentive readers to 
doubt the manuscripts’ authenticity. The goal of Linda, Hanka, and their fellow 
feminist conspirers—among them also Božena Němcová, the ‘godmother’ of 
Czech literature—was to sow the seed of doubt into Czech society so that Czech 
people would distrust everything and, ultimately, put an end to the patriarchy. In 
this context, Josef’s habilitation is a twofold “final full-stop”: Not only is the text 
intended to end all discussions about the manuscripts, given that it presents the 
‘full’ truth, but it also implicitly shows that the conspirers’ feminist dream has 
utterly failed: Josef harvests all of the academic glory, in spite of Marie being the 
driving force behind their shared research. Marie may be emancipated all right, 
but the old patriarchal hegemony is still going strong nevertheless. The last chap-
ter of Urban’s novel, consisting of the typescript of the introduction to Josef’s 
habilitation, even visually shows us how women are removed from academic 
discourse. In the sentence “the future of free male and female Czechs,”30 the part 
about female Czechs is crossed out in a handwritten comment (cf. Image 1). 
Hanka’s and Linda’s conspiracy has failed, the patriarchy is still in full effect 
and their carefully planted seed of doubt has been eradicated.  
 
Image 1: The typescript of Josef’s habilitation shows how women are removed 
from the story.31 
 
                                                           
30 “budoucnost svobodných Čechů a Češek” − Urban 2005: 225 (all translations G.H.). 
31 Urban 2005: 225. 
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The novel’s pivotal point is Josef’s realization that V. Hanka and J. Linda are ac-
tually women, namely Hanka V. (Vierteilová) and Linda J. (Jannowitzová). The 
forgers being female is a compelling twist which relies on a misreading of reali-
ty: Hanka’s and Linda’s surnames are misread as female first names. In this con-
text, it is no accident that gender equality is a recurring theme throughout the 
novel. Susceptibility to conspiracy theories, for example, is linked to gender: 
Marie states that: “I am a woman, who is able to create a complicated history out 
of naked facts … you are a man, a philologist with a clear mind … You like 
sharp contours, bright light and unambiguous concepts.”32 According to Marie, 
only the cold, rational man can uncover the truth, whereas women might trans-
form any fact into a “complicated history.” This idea of the ‘cold, rational man’ 
is subverted by the fact that Marie is the one who deciphers most of the clues 
under consideration, and that Josef is the one to actually solve the puzzle not by 
using his “clear mind” but more by using deception and outright treachery. Iron-
ically, Marie’s quote also applies to Hanka and Linda: In their feminist quest, 
they plant signs which are intentionally ambiguous and lead the readers astray. 
What is a fact in the novel—the manuscripts’ authenticity—becomes “compli-
cated” fiction, a fabricated fabrication.  
In a way, Urban’s novel also operates in a similar fashion, creating false 
leads and misdirecting the reader. The text occasionally presents fabricated his-
torical ‘facts’ which are not crucial to the story, but which challenge the reader’s 
historical knowledge. One such example concerns the burial place of Czech poet 
Karel Havlíček Borovský. In the novel he is buried in Slavín, the Czech ‘panthe-
on’ on Vyšehrad hill in Prague, but in reality he found his final resting place in 
Prague’s largest cemetery, Olšany.33 Another example of the novel engaging the 
reader is when Urban smuggles his literary inspiration, novelist Peter Ackroyd,34 
into a list of Marie’s favorite English-language authors: 
 
Swift, Fielding, Richardson, Sterne, Defoe, Austenová, Shelleyová, Radcliffová, Reevová, 
Eliotová, Gaskellová, Brontëovy, Dickens, Thackeray, Hardy, Scott, Carroll, Conrad, 
Wilde, Maugham, Bennett, Galsworthy, Lawrence, Joyce, Woolfová, Huxley, Lewis, 
Lehmannová, Compton-Burnettová, Forster, Westová, Wells, Waugh, Orwell, Rhysová, 
                                                           
32 “[jsem] ženská, co je i z holého faktu schopná udělat složitou historii ... Ty jsi 
mužský, filolog s jasnou myslí. … Máš rád ostré kontury, jasné světlo a jednoznačné 
pojmy.” − Urban 2005: 70−71. 
33 Cf. Slomek 1998. 
34 Peter Ackroyd’s novel Chatterton (1987) specifically served as an influence for Ur-
ban’s novel; cf. Nagy 1999: 19 and Ficová 2000: 13. 
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Murdochová, Sparková, Lessingová, Beckett, Durrell, Greene, Wilson, Golding, Hartley, 
Fowles, Johnson, Trevor, Wain, Braine, Amis, Amis, Burgess, Gray, Carterová, Bain-
bridgeová, Tremainová, Weldonová, Wintersonová, Byattová, Drabbleová, Brooknerová, 
Gallowayová, Barkerová, Rushdie, Barnes, Boyd, McEwan, Ackroyd, Miller, Swift ... .35 
 
Here, the reader needs to have extensive knowledge of English literature and a 
liking for close reading, otherwise this hint, which is hidden at the very bottom 
of the list, can be overlooked easily. Furthermore, Josef claims that “I never 
heard about most of them in my whole life,”36 so even this riddle on the meta-
level can only be solved by Marie. A final example of reader activation may be 
found in the acknowledgments section of Josef’s habilitation, which concludes 
the novel: 
 
I have the honor to add my thanks to a person, who stood right at the source of my interest 
for the described facts who during the course of the research activities kindly offered en-
couragement, always was willing to selflessly help and give good advice. This person, 
without whom my scientific work barely would have seen the light of day, is lecturer Dr. 
Jaroslav Sláma.37 
 
Josef claims that he could not have written his thesis without one very dear and 
special person. Of course the reader suspects that finally Marie will be recog-
nized for her contribution. This hope is fueled by the use of “osoba” for “person” 
which has a specific consequence: All verbs and participles have to be put in the 
female form (“stála,” “byla nakloněna,” “ochotna,” etc.). Thus, Marie is evoked 
in the reader’s mind. This expectation is crushed in the final sentence, when 
Josef enthusiastically thanks his nemesis, the department head Jaroslav Sláma. 
The use of feminine forms, however, ensures that at least some ambiguity is pre-
served: Perhaps Josef indeed wanted to thank Marie, but then he was too weak to 
fight academic tradition; maybe he did feel remorse for having ousted Marie and 
planted some hints in his habilitation which point to the ‘real’ author. In a similar 
vein, the previously mentioned use of gender mainstreaming in Josef’s habilita-
                                                           
35 Urban 2005: 145−46, emphasis mine. 
36 “O většině z nich jsem v životě neslyšel.” − Urban 2005: 146. 
37 “Dovoluji si připojit děčné poděkování osobě, jež stála u zrodu mého zájmu o popiso-
vané skutečnosti a v průběhu výzkumných a badatelských prací mi byla laskavě 
nakloněna svou přízní, vždy ochotna obětavě pomoci a dobře poradit. Tímto člově-
kem, bez něhož by má vědecká práce sotva spatřila světlo světa, je Doc. Dr. Jaroslav 
Sláma.” − Urban 2005: 229. 
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tion is removed by his advisor (cf. Image 1). Josef fights for gender equality, but 
only when it comes at no cost. As soon as he is opposed—mostly by more pow-
erful men than himself—he tucks his tail between his legs. 
That we are dealing with a feminist conspiracy as part of Urban’s conspiracy 
narrative does not come as a surprise, given that conspiracy narratives, as Mi-
chael Butter puts it, 
 
… articulate … conflicts between classes and religious denominations, concerns about 
proper political representation and the undue influence of certain groups, or anxieties 
about race and gender relations and ‘proper’ sexual behavior as fears of subversion and in-
filtration.38 
 
In Urban’s novel, the Czech feminists of the nineteenth century could not openly 
advocate feminism but resorted to “subversion and infiltration.” The “crisis of 
representation” mentioned previously applies in a twofold manner here: Czech 
nationalists agitated hard to establish a Czech nation; gender relations were not 
their primary concern. So, first there is the crisis of representation of the Czechs 
in the German-dominated Habsburg empire, and on top of that the crisis of rep-
resentation of women. Realizing this, Linda and Hanka piggybacked on the na-
tionalist cause to be able to realize their emancipatory goals in the long run. 
Worth mentioning here is that most conspiracies and conspiracy theories follow 
a specific pattern; they strive to take over the world which one could argue is a 
‘masculine’ idea. The feminist conspiracy presented in Urban’s novel just wants 
to position ideas in the official Czech discourse—and thus, not conquer, but ra-
ther subvert it; patriarchy should not be followed by matriarchy, but rather by an 
equal rights society. Hanka’s and Linda’s conspiracy is fueled by good inten-
tions and does not have negative consequences for anyone, which sets it apart 
from the majority of other (literary) conspiracies. 
 
 
Fact and Fiction 
 
Urban’s novel is not only about a feminist conspiracy, it is also about fact and 
fiction, which becomes evident when the question of genre is addressed. The 
novel itself claims to be an example of the “nolitfak” genre—an abbreviation of 
“New factual literature” (nová literatura faktu). This genre pretends to be as fac-
tual as possible and claims not to use any literary devices: “Everything is clear 
                                                           
38 Butter 2014: 283. 
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and authentic—nolitfak does not need any imaginary narrator or protagonist. 
Here, their roles are played by the author.”39 Furthermore, there is also no pro-
tagonist in the novel. Josef Urban poses as author, narrator, and protagonist; Mi-
loš Urban at first even used a pseudonym so that the novel itself would have 
been written by one Josef Urban. Of course, he could have named the prota-
gonist Miloš as well but then he would have lost a plethora of allusions: from the 
biblical Joseph and Mary to the forger Josef Linda and Božena Němcová’s hus-
band Josef Němec. Looking at these allusions it becomes immediately clear that 
“nolitfak” is in no way close to authenticity. Nonetheless, the text underlines that 
its author is not even an author, given that all he does is present facts and nothing 
more. The specific (invented) genre of “nolitfak” is a caricature of “litfak,” 
which at times dealt with the manuscripts, see, for example, Miroslav Ivanov’s 
book Tajemství rukopisů královédvorského a zelenohorského (The Secrets of the 
Manuscripts from Dvůr Králové and Zelená Hora, 1969).40 The genre implies a 
specific perspective of reception, or at least the “author” hopes that this reader 
position is invoked: “Who works with facts, has readers’ trust guaranteed.”41 
This is a very easy and lazy position: “You have to understand that I do not want 
to leave anything to the reader’s imagination. My life and my physiognomy are 
both naked facts.”42 The readers literally do not have to do anything, and they 
are specifically told to deactivate their imagination. This is a good thing, because 
then “the reader can concentrate … on the trustworthy narrator’s fluent delivery, 
a narrator of flesh and bones, who he or she actually can touch.”43 The “author” 
downplays his own influence on the text, while at the same time he tries to trick 
the readers into thinking that they do not have any control over the narrative. But 
the narrator’s claim that the text is solely fact-based soon crumbles, as his jeal-
ous personality comes to the fore: “When you are interested in what some novel-
ist or poet did and worked on for a living, … why are you all of a sudden acting 
as if you are not interested in my life?”44 Even a solely factual “nolitfak” cannot 
                                                           
39 “Vše je však ryzí a autentické—nolitfak žádného imaginárního vypravěče ani hrdinu 
nepotřebuje. Jejich roli zde zastává jen a jen autor.” − Urban 2005: 82. 
40 Cf. Machala 2008: 302; for the book, see Ivanov 1969. 
41 “Kdo pracuje s fakty, má důvěru čtenářů zaručenou.” − Urban 2005: 35. 
42 “Pochopte, že nechci, aby cokoli bylo ponecháno čtenářově fantazii. Můj život a má 
fyziognomie, to jsou přece holá fakta.” − Urban 2005: 31. 
43 “Čtenář … může se soustředit na plynulý přednes věrohodného vypravěče z masa a 
kostí, vypravěče, na kterého si může sáhnout.” − Urban 2005: 24. 
44 “Když vás zajímá, co dělal a čím žil kdekterý romanopisec a básník, … proč se najed-
nou tváříte, že vám nic není po mém životě?” − Urban 2005: 32, italics original. 
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force readers to accept everything, and when the narrator’s life is boring, the au-
dience does not have to like it.  
The novel’s specific—and cliché-laden—comments on the relationship be-
tween reader and text hyperbolically contradict Iser’s positions and, thus, seem 
to implicitly support them. At the same time, the text directly alludes to Iser’s 
idea of the “blank.” “Slender, not yet 30, … and, as you already know, with a 
prominent … nose... What? I haven’t told you about any nose? Why should I 
have? You imagined her being nose-less?”45 Although the narrator never men-
tioned any nose, the readers implicitly assume that Marie does have one and, in a 
similar fashion, they fill in all of the other blanks the text was not able, or did not 
care, to address. Of course the fact that Marie indeed does have a nose is in no 
way relevant to the plot; what happens here is a meta-reflection on the impos-
sibility of covering all of reality in a literary text. In this regard, the text traces a 
development: In the beginning, the narrator claims that it is possible to write a 
text which is completely factual without any fictional elements; for these texts he 
proposes the genre of “nolitfak.” However, soon Josef has to admit that “I was 
brought into the magical labyrinth of her narration, to the maze with two exits: 
truth and lie.”46 Here, the text is suddenly navigating the fringe between truth 
and lie. Finally, Marie comes to the realization that “we can finally stuff our-
selves with your gray Wahrheit, … Dichtung und Dichtung is her credo, Dich-
tung und Dichtung.”47 This is of course a variation on Goethe’s autobiography 
entitled Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit (From My Life: Poetry and 
Truth, 1811−1833). When “Dichtung und Wahrheit” becomes “Dichtung und 
Dichtung,” literature is marked as something entirely fictional; there might be 
connections to ‘real’ facts, but they are simply of no importance whatsoever. In 
what seems to be taken from post-structural theory, the signifier does not refer to 
any external object, but rather points to the world of signs. 
What led to the uncovering of the truth about the manuscripts is actually an 
arbitrary decision. “I could have chosen a different box … The world would 
                                                           
45 “Štíhlá, ještě ne třicetiletá, … a, jak už víte, s prominentním … nosem... Co prosím? 
Že jsem o žádném nose zatím nemluvil? A proč bych měl? To jste si ji představovali 
beznosou?” − Urban 2005: 40. 
46 “Já jsem byl volky nevolky nanovo natažen do kouzelného labyrintu jejího vyprávění, 
do bludiště se dvěma východy: pravdou a lží.” − Urban 2005: 61. 
47 “Máme se s tou svou šedivou Wahrheit konečně vycpat, … Dichtung und Dichtung, 
zní její krédo, Dichtung und Dichtung.” − Urban 2005: 149. 
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have kept turning, and you would have read a different factual text.”48 So there is 
no universal truth, everything is just a story which could have turned out other-
wise. Of course, from the reader’s perspective this decision is everything but ar-
bitrary. Josef has to find the clue, otherwise there is no conspiracy narrative or 
rather: there is no conspiracy narrative which is to be uncovered. In a similar 
vein, small clues are able to turn everything on its head: “In the air hangs a new 
puzzle, a brain-teaser, whose decipherment, if it happens sometimes, provides 
further knowledge, which root-and-branch overthrows our old certainties and 
turns many a belief upside down.”49 Urban’s novel puts this fragility of both the 
narrative and truth at the very forefront and thereby comments on the relation-
ship of fact and fiction in very much the same way as Iser does: fact and fiction 






Poslední tečka za rukopisy shows how conspiracy narratives work as a performa-
tive phenomenon of reception; what is interesting is that Hanka’s and Linda’s 
conspiracy does not follow common traits of conspiracy theories, but rather tries 
to anchor poststructuralist deconstruction in Czech society. Correspondingly, the 
novel itself is often considered to be a typical example of postmodern playful-
ness and irony; but as the application of aesthetic response has shown, there is 
more to the text. In many ways, the novel illustrates how conspiracy theories op-
erate and at the same time demonstrates that if literary texts overstress their con-
nection to facts, they fail miserably. As Iser put it, literary texts might operate 
with fragments from reality, and they might comment on reality, but they are not 
to be confused with ‘real’ truth and reality. The key difference between literary 
texts and conspiracy narratives, then, becomes the derogatory function of the lat-
ter. Urban, however, opposes this common interpretation of conspiracy theories 
as something sinister and negative by means of imagining a positive example. 
Hanka and Linda try to make the world a better place. Unfortunately, they ulti-
                                                           
48 “Mohl jsem si vybrat jinou krabici ... Svět by se točil dál a vy byste četli jinou literatu-
ru faktu.” − Urban 2005: 91. 
49 “Ve vzduchu visí nový rebus, hádanka, jejíž rozluštění, podaří-li se kdy, přinese po-
znatky, jež nám od základu převrátí staré jistoty a postaví na hlavu nejedno přesvěd-
čení.” − Urban 2005: 20. 
50 Cf. Iser 1980: 53. 
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mately fail. The continuation of the patriarchy is embodied by Josef, who is de-
pendent on Marie in every aspect, but nonetheless manages to betray her in the 
end. Though if we accept Josef’s habilitation—specifically the acknowledge-
ments—as a further puzzle piece in this ongoing literary mystery, then the circle 
of semiosis has not ended and doubt might still run rife. 
The way in which Urban plays with his readers is quite telling, as it mimics 
the way conspiracy theories are born and propagated further: false traces on the 
author’s part are complemented by misreadings on the reader’s part. In this con-
text, Iser’s theory of aesthetic response has proven helpful because it identified 
elements of the text which rely on reader participation. Especially significant are 
the parts where the narrator denies the readers’ control over the text, because in 
most of these cases he later has to admit that he was wrong.  
What happens after the final full-stop of a text has been written? As Urban’s 
novel points out, the final full-stop is only the beginning of a complex semiotic 
process of shifting meanings and reading between the lines. In a way the prom-
ised final full-stop, which would end the “fight over the manuscripts” once and 
for all, is misleading; most of the semiotic processes start to happen only after 
the final full-stop of a text has been written, after a conspiracy theory sees the 
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Miloš Urban’s debut novel Poslední tečka za rukopisy (The Final Full-Stop after 
the Manuscripts, 1998) retells the story of a central Czech nation-building myth: 
the manuscripts of Dvůr Králové and Zelená Hora. These two purported medie-
val manuscripts were used in the nineteenth century to demonstrate Czech litera-
ture’s long history and were later discovered to be fake. In Urban’s version, a 
feminist conspiracy is added to this already complicated story. The protagonist 
and his girlfriend, two philologists at Charles University in Prague, uncover that 
the manuscripts are real and that Božena Němcová, one of the most prolific 
Czech writers of the nineteenth century, simply tried to make them look fake to-
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gether with two other female conspirators. In this chapter, I study the fictional 
conspiracy as described by Urban. In so doing, I point out parallels between lit-
erary texts and conspiracy theories and show the advantages of applying Wolf-
gang Iser’s theory of aesthetic response to conspiracy theories. 
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Cultural traumas emerge when “members of a collectivity feel they have been 
subjected to a horrendous event,” but these “events do not, in and of themselves, 
create collective trauma.”1  
Instead, the process of the “socially mediated attribution” is what determines 
its generic identity and the extent of its dissemination.2 In this way, one could 
paraphrase the main argument of Jeffrey Alexander’s theory of cultural trauma, 
which, despite its sociological anchoring, also creates a good precondition for an 
exploration of the artistic representations of these traumas: “Representation of 
trauma depends on constructing a compelling framework of cultural classifica-
tion. In one sense, this is simply telling a new story.”3 
The question is what kind of story this would be. According to Alexander, it 
is a master narrative that combines four different elements: the pain, the victim, 
the wider audience, and the attribution of responsibility.4 Such a definition is in-
sufficient from the perspective of the analysis of concrete representations of cul-
                                                           
1  Alexander 2012: 6 and 13. 
2  Ibid.: 13. 
3  Ibid.: 17. 
4  Cf. ibid.: 17−19. 
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tural traumas, however, because it only describes the level of social communi-
cation within which the trauma is processed, not the level of the story itself. 
In order to define a traumatic story, we will first have to turn to a smaller an-
alytical unit, Gerald Prince’s term minimal story, for example, which defines the 
basic narrative sequence as follows: state A becomes non-A as a result of event 
B. In other words: “John was happy, then John met a woman, then, as a result, 
John was unhappy.”5 The traumatic story is specific in that it does not develop 
this basic scheme any further. John just remains sad. 
In one of his late works, Lubomír Doležel also noted the special nature of the 
fictional worlds that are generated by this kind of story. “Passive fictional 
worlds,” as he called them, “arise in such a way that the dominant component of 
the world moves away from the actions of the agents to the ‘passivity’ of the af-
fected characters.”6 According to his findings, such worlds are characterized by 
a “tendency to narrative staticness” and usually also by a “strong dynamic of in-
ner, mental life of fictional persons.”7 Despite all of these limitations, however, 
the passive worlds have “as strong narrative potencies and as rich diversity” as 
the worlds of action.8 
The traumatic story, thus, derives only from the first element of Alexander’s 
scheme, but the supposed source of this “pain” may actually be the starting point 
for a different type of story in which the main task is “to establish the identity of 
the perpetrator.”9 Detective stories are extraordinarily widespread and are for the 
most part completely independent of the original traumatic story. One of their 
variants is also a conspiracy story, which is based primarily on the impossibility 
of identifying or convicting the perpetrator. The reason for this is that it is not 
just an individual, but a whole network of perpetrators whose share in crime is 
difficult to detect and prove. As a social practice, this kind of story represents a 
“narrative structure capable of reuniting … the collective and the epistemo-
logical.”10 Conversely, the epistemological power of such a story is often un-
certain and may also result in the destruction of the scapegoat. 
                                                           
5  Prince 1973: 35. 
6  “Trpné fikční světy vznikají tak, že se dominantní složka světa přesunuje od akcí ko-
natelů k ‘trpení’ postižených postav.” – Doležel 2010: 423. 
7  “sklonem k narativní statičnosti”, “silnou dynamičností vnitřního, duševního života 
fikčních osob” – ibid.: 425. 
8  “stejně silné narativní potence a stejně bohatou rozmanitost” – ibid.: 439. 
9  Alexander 2012: 19. 
10  Jameson 1992: 9. 
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Contrary to Alexander’s idea of a single master narrative, which governs in-
dividual stories that are initiated by a particular trauma, these introductory re-
marks have shown that representations of cultural traumas operate in a far more 
complex narrative framework. However, in order to properly defend this thesis, 
first a concrete historical sample is needed. 
 
 
The Munich Crisis and Its Emplotments 
 
The political crisis of September 1938, which led to the loss of a significant part 
of Czechoslovak territory for the benefit of Nazi Germany, left a significant 
mark in the collective memory of the Czech nation and was, for some time, also 
the source of extensive cultural trauma. Historian Zdeněk Beneš, who examined 
the portrayal of this crisis in Czechoslovak and Czech history textbooks, dis-
covered three different narrative patterns through which this trauma was present-
ed over time. 
In the brief period of the Third Czechoslovak Republic (1945–48), when the 
Munich events were still “perceived as part of the present,” there were textbooks 
dominated by renditions of the crisis in the form of a traumatic story.11 However, 
a new emplotment was established in the textbooks after February 1948, when 
the political regime was changed. The conspiracy story, which formed the basis 
of the official interpretation of the time, was in fact realized in two different vari-
ants. On the one hand, it developed the story of the betrayal of the Western Al-
lies and, on the other hand, the story of traitors within the nation, whose roles 
were cast by some important representatives of the pre-war Czech bourgeoisie. 
In the new framework, the previous traumatic story has also lost its impor-
tance because the “new social order … has pushed the Munich crisis, its causes 
and immediate consequences, into the past.”12 After November 1989, long-recur-
ring conspiracy stories also followed the same fate and “Munich” took the form 
of a memento, which provided students with an opportunity to experience the 
fateful events from a distance and in a broad context. As one of the post-
November textbooks summarizes: “The adoption of the Munich decisions raises 
                                                           
11  “pociťované jako součást přítomnosti” – Beneš 2004: 282. 
12  “nový společenský řád, který Mnichov odsunul, jeho příčiny i bezprostřední důsledky, 
do minulosti” – ibid.: 286. 
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an eternal question: should we or shouldn’t we defend ourselves? There is no 
simple and clear answer.”13 
The research undertaken by Zdeněk Beneš has confirmed that cultural trau-
ma can be expressed in various emplotments. However, in addition to the trau-
matic story and the conspiracy story that we have inferred from Alexander’s 
scheme, he adds one more: memento. But is this really an emplotment? Is it not, 
instead, some broader narrative strategy? Can we also find the same time se-
quence in the history of artistic representations of the Munich events? A more 




Nine Years after the Crisis 
 
Uloupená hranice (The Stolen Frontier, premiered on 14 March 1947) was the 
feature-length neorealist debut of director Jiří Weiss (1913–2004), who worked 
in Great Britain during World War II, where he made a number of war documen-
taries as a member of the government’s Crown Film Unit. The screenplay for the 
film was based on a story by Miloslav Fábera (“Dny zrady”/“Days of Betrayal”), 
but Weiss intervened in the script while filming, removing unnecessary pathos 
and paper dialogues from the film.14 
The story of a local community living in the Czechoslovak border area in the 
Ore Mountains takes place at the time of the Munich crisis from 22 to 30 Sep-
tember 1938 (the passage of time is marked by a calendar hanging in the office 
of the local police station). The escalating relationships between the Czech mi-
nority and the German majority are depicted by the tragic fate of the Langer 
family. The German father and the Czech mother symbolize the bygone ideas of 
the mutual rapprochement of both nations, but their children face the current po-
litical struggle against each other. Anna Marie, who helps with cleaning at the 
local police station, tells the gendarmes that her brother is involved in smuggling 
weapons for German illegal troops. Her brother, Hans, explicitly emphasizes his 
chosen identity by using the German version of his first name: “I’m not Hon-
zíček, I’m Hans!”15 Eventually, he deceives his sister to get out of prison and set 
fire to the police station. 
                                                           
13  “Přijetí mnichovských rozhodnutí otevírá věčnou otázku: měli, nebo neměli jsme se 
bránit? Není na ni jednoduchá a jednoznačná odpověď.” – ibid.: 292. 
14  Cf. Weiss 1995: 96. 
15  “Nejsem Honzíček, jsem Hans!” 
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The story of the Langer family is a story about the separation of the German 
and Czech communities and it, rather characteristically, culminates at the end of 
the second third of the film. After an argument with Hans, Anna Marie runs 
away from the cottage where Old Langer is in a confrontation with the local 
“Ordner.” A random shot hits his wife, whose final words invoke the names of 
both of her children, as one of them, Hans, chases after his sister. 
The final third of the film is focalized only from the perspective of the local 
Czech community, which fortified the police station and took care of supplies 
needed for the incoming unit of the Czechoslovak army. The defensive fight, 
which is victoriously fought, eventually loses all sense when a message is re-
ceived from headquarters ordering the withdrawal of all Czech troops. The direc-
tor himself emphasized the emotional tone of the film’s conclusion: “When Ser-
geant Vrba lowered the flag of the Republic and the only sound was the creak of 
a pulley, we all had tears in our eyes. Spontaneous applause always broke out af-
ter the last words: ‘We’ll come back.’”16 
 
 
The Thirty-Fifth Anniversary 
 
Another Czech film, on the theme of the Munich crisis, was also based on the 
aforementioned short story by Miloslav Fábera, who in the meantime had be-
come—in 1970—the director of the Barrandov Film Studio. However, director 
Otakar Vávra (1911−2011) turned the story of the Czech border community into 
a minor episode and built his Dny zrady (Days of Betrayal, premiered on 27 
April 1973) as a three-hour documentary drama that gradually depicts the com-
plicated diplomatic negotiations that led to the Munich Agreement. 
Based on archival sources, the film shows the individual steps taken by Euro-
pean statesmen and Czechoslovak politicians and illustrates their implications 
for the domestic population through a series of fictional stories. Nevertheless, 
these stories and the selection of historical facts depicted already lead to a certain 
framework of interpretation. Its essence is the title theme of betrayal, which is 
realized in several forms throughout the film. 
First of all, one such betrayal can be seen in the treason committed by Kon-
rad Henlein, chairman of the Sudeten German Party, at his meeting with Adolf 
Hitler at the end of March 1938. Henlein promises to speak to preserve Czecho-
                                                           
16  “Když [četař Vrba] spouští vlajku republiky a jediným zvukem je vrzání kladky, měli 
jsme všichni slzy v očích. Po posledních slovech filmu ‘My se ještě vrátíme’ vždycky 
propukl spontánní potlesk.” – ibid.: 97. 
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slovakia’s territorial integrity, but at the same time steps up his demands so that 
the Czechoslovak government cannot meet them. The agreement between the 
Reich and Sudeten German leader is depicted at the very beginning of the film 
and, thus, represents the starting point of the entire drama. 
The next link in the chain are the steps taken by Czechoslovakia’s ally, the 
French government, which is in favor of the British position that Czechoslovakia 
must surrender its border territories in order to preserve peace in Europe. The 
situation escalates on 19 September 1938, when the French ambassador tells 
President Beneš that if these demands are rejected, he can no longer count on 
French military assistance. Beneš characterizes this stance in a subsequent meet-
ing of the Czechoslovak government: “It is treason! France betrayed us.”17 
Last, but not least, there are separate negotiations led by the chairman of the 
strongest Czechoslovak political party, Rudolf Beran, and influential financier 
Jaroslav Preiss. Their intentions are twofold; on the one hand, they want to settle 
on a new distribution of power in the state with representatives of Sudeten Ger-
mans, and on the other hand, they are trying to prevent the Soviet Union’s possi-
ble involvement in the conflict. The second of these demands is expressed very 
precisely by Preiss during one of the behind-the-scenes debates: “And if anyone 
wanted to call the Red Army for help, then we would open the border and let 
Hitler’s divisions into Bohemia.”18 
It is only by combining these individual betrayals and conspiracies that the 
film can present its basic thesis: “Although the individual participants in the 
Munich Agreement pursued their specific objectives, they were all jointly and 
integrally involved in the imperialist conspiracy against peace, the victim of 
which was Czechoslovakia.”19 This quotation comes from the book Zářijové dny 
1938 (September Days 1938) written by the Czech Marxist historian Václav 
Král, who also participated in Vávra’s film as an expert advisor. 
Král’s interpretation of the Munich crisis as a conspiracy relied on a careful 
study of archival sources, as evidenced by his publication on the political docu-
ments Politické strany a Mnichov (Political Parties and Munich; Král 1961) and 
the monograph Plán Zet (Project Z; Král 1973), in which he mainly used British 
diplomatic archival records. At the same time, however, he worked with a speci-
                                                           
17  “Je to zrada! Zrada Francie na nás.” 
18  “A kdyby někdo chtěl zavolat na pomoc Rudou armádu, potom otevřeme hranice a 
pustíme do Čech Hitlerovy divize.” 
19  “Jakkoli jednotliví účastníci mnichovské dohody sledovali své zvláštní specifické cíle, 
přece jenom se všichni společně a nedílně podíleli na imperialistickém spiknutí proti 
míru, jehož obětí se stalo Československo.” – Král 1971: 160. 
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fic framework of interpretation, the beginnings of which can be found in the tes-
timony of the direct witnesses to the Munich crisis. Czech communist journalist 
Julius Fučík spoke of the “world conspiracy of fascism”20 in his diary entry of 18 
September 1938 and the Communist Party chairman, Klement Gottwald, ex-
pressed something similar in his parliamentary speech a few days after the end of 
the crisis: “We have to do with a far-reaching conspiracy against the people, 
against the republic and against democracy.”21 
Vávra’s film also reflected the tension between the documentary point of 
view and the party interpretation within this conception of the crisis. It manifes-
ted itself as a clash between the faithful presentation of historical reality and the 
figurative rendition of some film characters: caricature for representatives of the 
bourgeoisie and pathetic for representatives of the proletariat. The latter feature 
of Vávra’s drama was also noted by contemporary Czechoslovak critics as being 
his aesthetic shortcomings.22 
The movie ends, like Uloupená hranice, with the departure of Czechoslovak 
soldiers and the Czech minority from the borderland. Given the earlier detection 
of the specific perpetrators, however, this farewell to the lost territory sounds far 
more determined. As one of the soldiers says: “We must expel them. But every-
one, who caused that.”23 Moreover, this is not the very end of the story, given 
that Dny zrady is only the starting point for the entire film trilogy. The follow-up 
wartime film Sokolovo (The Battle of Sokolovo, premiered on 9 May 1975) de-
picts the formation of the Czechoslovak combat battalion in the Soviet Union, 
and the final film Osvobození Prahy (The Liberation of Prague, premiered on 6 
May 1977) tells the story of the Prague Uprising and the arrival of the Red Ar-
my. Its intervention also completed the seven-year dramatic arc of Vávra’s trilo-
gy which told a grand narrative about the demise of a Czechoslovakia that was 
betrayed by the Western Allies and anticipated its post-war reconstruction within 
the Eastern Bloc. 
 
                                                           
20  “Will [the nation] break this world-wide plot of fascism?” (“Zlomí [lid] včas ten svě-
tový komplot fašismu?”) asks Fučík in his diary. – Fučík 1958: 9. 
21  “Máme co činit s dalekosáhlým spiknutím proti lidu, proti republice a proti demokra-
cii.” – Gottwald 1953: 269. 
22  Cf. Lachman 2004: 280. 
23  “Musíme je vyhnat. Ale všechny, co to zavinili.” 
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Seventy Years Later 
 
This master narrative lost its attractiveness after the collapse of the bloc, of 
course, but it took a surprisingly long time for filmmakers to return to the Mu-
nich events. It was not until around the seventieth anniversary of the Munich 
Agreement that Miloš Forman, together with Jean-Claude Carrière and Václav 
Havel, began working on a screenplay for a film based on the novel Le Fantôme 
de Munich (The Specter of Munich; Benamou 2007). Its author Georges-Marc 
Benamou, co-author of the memoires of François Mitterrand and advisor to an-
other French President Nicolas Sarkozy, captured the Munich crisis in the book 
through the lens of French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier. Although the 
film’s preparations had reached their final stage, the French production company 
Pathé failed to raise enough money to produce it. The filmmakers still tried to 
rescue the project, but director Forman had to resign in the end: “In addition, a 
movie about the Munich Agreement could be unpleasant to the Germans, the 
French and the English, so certain people’s thinking is that they could lose mon-
ey.”24 
Five years later, another, albeit less ambitious attempt was successful. Czech 
documentary and fiction film director Robert Sedláček (1973), in collaboration 
with popular Czech historian Pavel Kosatík, produced a one-hour television 
drama Den po Mnichovu (A Day after Munich, premiered on 3 November 2013). 
It was the second episode of the quality TV series České století (Czech Century, 
2013−14), which mapped important moments of Czech history from its esta-
blishment as an independent state in 1918 to the break-up of the Czechoslovak 
Federation in 1992. 
Sedláček’s drama is built around a question that has already been cited from 
a post-November textbook on Czech history: “Should we or shouldn’t we defend 
ourselves?”25 The first solution is sought by Czech military commanders, while 
the opposing position in the dispute is represented by President Edvard Beneš. 
The first clash between them takes place in the opening, eight-minute sequence 
of the film. On 21 September 1938, after the British-French ultimatum, the Presi-
dent informs members of the General Staff that France will not fulfill its allied 
obligations and that the state’s military situation is hopeless. Officers blame the 
President for not having sufficiently informed them previously of how serious 
                                                           
24  “Film o mnichovském diktátu by navíc mohl být Němcům, Francouzům i Angličanům 
nepříjemný, takže úvaha určitých lidí je taková, že by na tom mohli prodělat.” − Kai-
lová 2011. 
25  “[M]ěli, nebo neměli jsme se bránit?” − Beneš 2004: 292. 
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the situation was: “You lied to us!”26 Some officers even openly threaten him: 
“You have agreed to curtail the Republic. You should be arrested, the whole 
government!”27 But their proposals are ultimately constructive: they want a new, 
military government and a declaration of mobilization. 
Indeed, in the days that followed, both requirements would be met, but the 
diplomatic situation was escalating. As the negotiations of the four Great Powers 
are beginning in Munich, President Beneš reunites with the members of the Gen-
eral Staff to tell them that the loss of territory is inevitable. The only hope is a 
pan-European conflict, which the President expects sooner or later: “War will be, 
gentlemen. It will be, but not now. I promise you the greatest war ever.”28 Staff 
officers proclaim that they want to defend their country now, and that the Presi-
dent’s decision will not stand. This creates a discernable tension, explicitly ex-
pressed in a scene in which the most radical officers are smoking in the toilets. 
After a while, Beneš comes in and heads to one of the stalls. He sees the officers 
and stops. One of them says “I will never forget this.”29 And the President leaves 
silently.  
The second meeting with the General Staff represents the whole drama’s plot 
culmination, only after that the Munich Agreement is just implemented. How-
ever, the final third of the film is primarily devoted to another theme: the unful-
filled effort to reverse an already made decision. Dissatisfied officers meet with 
politicians to discuss a possible coup. In any case, these are purely theoretical 
considerations, given that it is difficult to find anyone among them who would 
announce their fundamental disapproval to Beneš. Finally, Colonel Moravec, 
lecturer at the military school, whose fate has been followed by the film in paral-
lel with that of Beneš, agrees to take on the task. Their final encounter is primari-
ly a battle of arguments. While Moravec invokes moral values, mainly related to 
the ethics of struggle (“Your great, glorious victory over Adolf Hitler will be 
useless, because people will only remember how they did in 1938.”),30 Beneš de-
fends his strategic thinking: “You have to understand that this is not about the 
mental health of one nation, but about the question of who will rule Europe.”31 
                                                           
26  “Lhal jste nám!” 
27  “Odsouhlasili jste okleštění republiky, za to by vás měli zavřít. Celou vládu.” 
28  “Válka bude, pánové. Bude. Ale ne teď. Slibuji vám tu největší válku, jaká kdy byla.” 
29  “Tohle vám nikdy nezapomenu.” 
30  “Vaše velký, slavný vítězství nad Adolfem Hitlerem bude k ničemu, protože lidi si 
budou pamatovat jenom to, jak se v roce 1938 podělali.” 
31  “Musíte pochopit, že tady se nehraje o duševní zdraví jednoho národa, ale o to, kdo 
bude vládnout Evropě.” 
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The final headline of Sedláček’s drama recalls that Beneš’s opponent, Mora-
vec, became the Czech Quisling during the German Protectorate, and this implic-
itly supports Beneš’s views. The logic of the story, however, requires that Czech 
passivity be somehow corrected and that the victim eventually become an active 
participant in historical events. This task was fulfilled by Sokolovo in Vávra’s 
trilogy, and in the case of Sedláček’s series, the next part Kulka pro Heydricha 
(A Bullet for Heydrich, premiered on 3 November 2013) sees a Czech political 
exile based in London, led by Beneš, prepare to assassinate the Deputy Protector 
of Bohemia and Moravia. 
 
 
Lost in Munich as a Counterexample? 
 
Each of the films studied uses the emplotment of the Munich crisis, which was 
dominant at the time of its creation. Weiss’s Uloupená hranice tells the story of 
a double trauma: the separation of the Czech-German community and the ex-
pulsion of Czechs from the border areas. Vávra’s Dny zrady depicts a complex 
international and class complot that leads to the demise of Czechoslovakia. Sed-
láček’s Den po Mnichovu recalls the historical alternatives that were offered 
thereafter: acceptance of forced conditions or armed struggle. There is, however, 
another film about the Munich Agreement which is beyond this typology, at first 
glance at least. It is an allegorical comedy entitled Ztraceni v Mnichově (Lost in 
Munich, premiered on 22 October 2015), written by Czech screenwriter, play-
wright and director Petr Zelenka (1967). 
Zelenka’s film consists of three distinct parts: a short introductory sequence 
that recalls the basic dates of the Munich crisis and their traditional interpretation 
in the form of a weekly film; a half-hour crazy comedy in which a Czech jour-
nalist abducts an eighty-year-old parrot, who belonged to French Prime Minister 
Daladier at the time of the Munich events and makes shocking statements, such 
as “Hitler is a good fellow,”32 with his voice today; finally, a 70-minute making-
of that shows why filming this crazy comedy in a Czech-French co-production 
eventually failed. 
The storyline of the making-of film shows that difficulties in filming begin 
when the lead actor becomes allergic to feathers. This requires a number of ad-
justments because the parrot is his main acting partner. Alas, when the problem 
is finally solved, the actor becomes allergic to metals and then to colored sub-
stances. The chain of allergic reactions is only explained after a visit to a home-
                                                           
32  “Hitler je kámoš.” 
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opath who tells the actor that his body is responding to the Munich theme itself. 
It soon becomes apparent that the lead actor suffers from Munich’s third-gene-
ration trauma. As he explains: “Grandpa was mobilized and suffered terribly that 
we could not defend ourselves in 1938. He even wanted to return the distinction 
he received as a legionnaire in France.”33 
The main star’s psychological troubles cause the director of the film to be-
come more familiar with historical interpretations of the Munich crisis. An essay 
Mnichovský komplex (The Munich Complex) written by Czech historian Jan 
Tesař, an emigré in France at the beginning of 1989, which was originally in-
tended only for a narrow circle of friends and was not published until ten years 
later, becomes a source of fundamental importance for the director. In his work, 
Tesař tries to deconstruct the two cornerstones of what he calls the Munich 
myth; on the one hand, there is the so-called betrayal of the Western Allies, and 
on the other, we find the question of whether or not Czechoslovakia should de-
fend itself. According to Tesař, both are mere pseudo-problems that are not sup-
ported in a real historical situation.34 On the contrary, it is essential that while the 
Czech nation has been carried away by military mobilization and hope to defend 
their state borders, its political leadership, led by President Beneš, only tries to 
negotiate the most advantageous compromise that would achieve a “partial satis-
faction of the aggressor.”35  
Zelenka’s film reproduces these arguments and, in the final part of the mov-
ie, allegorically represents them too. Just as the emptiness of the Czech-French 
military alliance was revealed during the Munich crisis, it also shows that the es-
sence of Czech-French co-production was completely illusory. The producer 
tells the filmmakers that working together was just a trick to get a grant from the 
European Cinema Support Fund. Since this subsidy was not awarded, there is no 
money left to complete the film. The anger of the crew members who think that 
a foreign co-producer withdrew from the film turns against everything “French,” 
including the poor parrot, and the production manager is saved from prosecution 
only by the accidental death of one of the main actors, because this becomes a 
false pretext to stop the production of the movie. Zelenka’s allegory is based on 
informational inequalities between leaders (politicians and producers) who play 
complex games and simple pawns of history (the Czech nation and film crew), 
                                                           
33  “Děda byl mobilizovanej a strašně trpěl tím, že jsme se tenkrát v osmatřicátým ne-
mohli bránit. Dokonce chtěl vrátit vyznamenání, který dostal jako legionář ve Fran-
cii.” 
34  Cf. Tesař 2000: 11. 
35  “částečného uspokojení agresora” − ibid.: 91. 
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who do not know the essence of these games and believe in various myths. The 
consequence is what the director emphasizes as the main thesis of Tesař’s essay: 
“The fact that the Czech nation does not participate in its own history.”36 
Does this mean that Zelenka’s film should be understood as a conspiracy sto-
ry that reveals the mechanisms of the intrigues that the powerful are fabricating 
at the expense of the powerless? Or is it the story of the trauma with which third 
generation carriers are dealing? Both motifs undoubtedly play an important role 
in the film but are subject to a more general narrative strategy. This strategy is 
strikingly similar to what we find in Sedláček’s drama. As previously indicated, 
the Day after Munich represents the Munich crisis as a memento; it reenacts 
Munich events to draw some lessons for the present. Zelenka proceeds in a simi-
lar way, but he does not seek lessons in the historical event itself, only in its in-
terpretations. In doing so, he seeks to distinguish true interpretations from false 
ones, which obscure the essence of the Munich events and, thus, prevent their 
full understanding. Or as the figure of the director utters in the movie: “The trag-





The analyzed film and TV representations of the Munich crisis follow the same 
developmental pattern that Zdeněk Beneš discovered in the textbooks of Czech 
history. This is a much smaller sample than in the case of the textbooks, but if 
we compare their production costs, these films represent a much more powerful 
social force. Rather than this correlation, however, this conclusion will concern 
itself with the consequences of this study’s findings, which could be followed up 
by further research. 
First of all, reflection is needed on the fact that it has not been possible to de-
fine the narrative form of the last phase more precisely. It is typical for the “me-
mento” that it connects two time planes—the past with the present, and tries to 
revive past events through their reenactment, that is, to create the appearance 
that the events are still unsettled. However, this is not a specific narrative pat-
tern, but rather a broader narrative strategy that governs individual stories in a 
given work. This also implies a hypothesis that would need to be verified on a 
larger body of material. The memento represents a transitional phase between 
the period at which the narrative of a cultural trauma is determined by the logic 
                                                           
36  “To, že se českej národ nepodílí na svejch vlastních dějinách.” 
37  “Tragédie je až ten mýtus, kterej z toho vzniknul.” 
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of Alexander’s scheme, and the moment it becomes an entity in itself inde-
pendent from the original painful experience, thus opening itself up to a far more 
diverse spectrum of emplotments. 
On a more general level, this hypothesis could be expressed as a transition 
between communicative and cultural memory. According to Assmann’s estima-
tion, communicative memory as a process lasts “80−100 years,” which repre-
sents “a moving horizon of 3−4 interacting generations.”38 If this estimate is ac-
curate, then our sample is at the final stage of its development, but it is still un-
finished. However, this does not mean that we have to wait another twenty years 
before the story of the Munich events finally becomes part of cultural memory. 
Rather, it calls for the results of our research to be verified in representations of 
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The Munich crisis of September 1938, resulting in the Munich Agreement be-
tween the Nazi Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy and causing the 
loss of a significant part of Czechoslovak territory, is historically a proof of ap-
peasement policy failure and one of the starting points of World War II. For the 
Czech population, however, it meant above all a traumatic experience, which 
was the driving force of its depiction in numerous literary and film works. Four 
of these film representations of the Munich crisis are analyzed in the present 
chapter, namely Jiří Weiss’s neorealist debut Uloupená hranice (The Stolen 
Frontier, 1947), Otakar Vávra’s documentary drama Dny zrady (Days of Be-
trayal, 1973), Robert Sedláček’s quality TV drama Den po Mnichovu (A Day af-
ter Munich, 2013), and Petr Zelenka’s allegorical comedy Ztraceni v Mnichově 
(Lost in Munich, 2015). Their interpretation focuses on answering two basic 
questions: First, how these films use the basic narrative patterns associated with 
telling a certain cultural trauma, that is, the traumatic story and the conspiracy 
story. And secondly, to what extent the representation of the Munich events in 
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The historically documented folk figure of Sava Chalyi (d. 1742) is connected to 
the Haidamak uprisings of the eighteenth century. He first appeared alongside 
the early stages of these peasant revolts, not their climax—specifically, the siege 
of Uman and the massacre that took place there in 1768. The literary echo of 
these events has undergone significant transformations between Ukrainian and 
Polish literature on the one hand, and Russian literature on the other.1 In the case 
of Sava Chalyi, this transfer has occurred in only one direction, from the Ukrain-
ian to the Polish. It is a transfer that is quite complex, insofar as it also involves a 
transfer from folklore to higher literature, with Ukrainian epic folk songs becom-
ing transformed into Polish art ballads. However, little attention has been paid by 
relevant scholars to the migration of the Sava Chalyi story from the literature of 
Ukraine to that of Poland.2 
The reasons for this migration are complex: On the one hand, East Slavic 
folklore was commonly picked up in Polish literature, particularly during the Ro-
mantic period. In this regard, one need only mention the well-known “Ukrainian 
                                                           
1  Cf. Woldan 2016. 
2  Ievhen Rykhlyk (1929) was the first to investigate this topic ninety years ago. Dec-
ades later, Roman Kyrchiv (1965) examined it in a different context. Other relevant 
works pass over the story of Chalyi, e.g., Herrmann 1969. George Grabowicz (1983) 
also neglects to mention Chalyi in his contribution to the ninth International Congress 
of Slavists. 
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school” in Polish Romanticism. On the other hand, the Haidamak uprisings rep-
resent a common historical heritage, a heritage that experienced a reappraisal 
during the Romantic period. The last of these uprisings, in 1768, represents the 
final major conflict between Poles and Ukrainians, at least while Old Poland, the 
Rzeczpospolita obojga narodów (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of Two 
Nations), still existed. This tragic conflict left its mark in the historical con-
sciousness of both nations.3 This earlier conflict took on a new meaning, espe-
cially after Poland’s defeat in the November Uprising against the Russian Em-
pire of 1830−31. Polish émigrés, exiled to France, accorded the failure of Polish-
Ukrainian conciliation a major role in their reflections on history (one example 
being the prophecies of Wernyhora,4 which first became popular among these 
exiled Poles). The assimilation of the Sava Chalyi narrative into Polish literature 
also falls into the post-1831 period. 
It is noteworthy that the literary processing of the Haidamak rebellions began 
half a century earlier than the historic one. Historiographically, examinations of 
the Haidamak uprisings only begin to appear in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, which is when the first major texts on this topic were written.5 It is in 
this context that the first scientific works about Sava Chalyi appear, works still 
based strongly on folkloric traditions and, therefore, they portray an exaggerated 
heroism.6 It was only later that these embellishments were rectified by V. Anto-
novych and V. Shcherbina on the basis of previously undiscovered documents.7 
However, the legend of Sava Chalyi had already appeared in the first published 
folklore collections more than half a century previously.8 
                                                           
3  “In Polish historical consciousness, the Cossacks … and, most obviously, the bloody 
events of 1768 which presaged the first partition, were closely associated with the de-
cline and fall of the Polish state.” − Grabowicz 1983: 174. 
4  These prophecies were given by a legendary figure, half Pole and half Cossack, and 
deal with Poland’s decline and rebirth; they were first written down before 1800 and 
played a particular role in Polish historic consciousness until World War II. − Cf. Ma-
kowski 1995. 
5  Cf. Mordovtsev 1884, Rawita-Gawroński 1899. 
6  Cf. Skal’kovskii 1845 and 1846.  
7  Antonovych 1897, Shcherbina 1891. 
8  The oldest evidence of the Sava narrative in folklore is placed significantly earlier 
than the published editions that circulated in the early nineteenth century. Mykhailo 
Vozniak (1922) already found such a story in a handwritten collection of songs from 
around 1760. 
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Returning to Sava Chalyi and his biography,9 his date of birth is unknown; as 
a young man he entered the Cossack militia of Prince Czetwertiński, but later (in 
1734) he defected to the rebellious peasants under their leader, Verlan. With 
Verlan’s band of raiders, he robbed merchants and took part in various plunder-
ing raids. After the uprisings were suppressed, the Polish commander Malinow-
ski announced an amnesty for the band’s ringleader and offered their members 
the possibility of serving in the Polish army. In 1736, Chalyi pledged an oath of 
allegiance to the Rzeczpospolita. From this point in time, he led successful cam-
paigns against his former comrades and persecuted the Haidamaks. From 1737 
onward, Sawa stood in the service of the crown. He was promoted by Hetman 
Józef Potocki to colonel in the latter’s private Cossack militia, and was invested 
with two villages. He undertook raids and pilfering skirmishes on Zaporozhian 
territory, in which he sacked a number of winter storage sites and burned a 
church down. It was this last misdeed that seems to have been the straw that 
broke the camel’s back: the Cossacks swore revenge. Led by Hnat Holyi, a for-
mer comrade-in-arms, a small troop attacked Chalyi’s farmstead in the village of 
Stepashky. Chalyi was killed; his wife was able to escape with their infant son. 
Sava Chalyi’s son is historically much more well-documented than his father 
and is sometimes confused with him. Sawa Caliński Józef (ca. 1736‒1771)10 
grew up in his Polish stepfather’s house, who turned the boy into a Pole. Calińs-
ki’s activities are marked by the last three years of his life when, as a young 
man, he led a very successful fight for the Confederation of Bar against the Rus-
sian troops in Poland, making him a legend in his own lifetime. In May 1771, 
Caliński was badly wounded in a battle and fell into the hands of the enemy. He 
died shortly thereafter. Unlike his father, Sawa junior was neither a defector nor 
a traitor, and he did not die as a result of a conspiracy, but fell while fighting for 
his political beliefs. 
 
 
Sava’s Transfer from Ukrainian to Polish Folklore 
 
The first written account of Sava’s story in Ukrainian folklore can be found in 
Mykhailo Maksymovych’s famous collection Malorossiiskiia Piesni (Little Rus-
sian Folksongs, 1827). Bearing the title “Duma o Kazakie Savie” (Duma11 of the 
                                                           
9  An overview of Ukrainian and Russian historical studies on the biography of Chalyi is 
found in Rychlyk 1929: 66−67; for Polish works cf. Korduba 1938.  
10  Cf. Szczygielski 1994.  
11  A duma is a kind of epic song. 
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Cossack Sava), it is quite close to a ballad, with its division into twenty-one 
four-line stanzas,12 and ballads were a popular genre during the Romantic era, 
even in Slavic literature. The ballad’s plot is mostly told in the form of dia-
logues, which is characteristic of this genre. These can be broken down into the 
following sections: 
 
1. Sava returns home from a spree with the Poles in Nemyriv; 
2. Suspicious things happen around his farmstead; 
3. Sava writes letters while his wife rocks the child; 
4. He sends a maid to the cellar to fetch horilka, beer and wine; 
5. The avengers, who have broken into the house, ask about Sava’s riches; 
6. While fighting with them, Sava is killed; 
7. His wife flees through a window, a maid hands her the little child; 
8. Sava’s son plays the kobza. 
 
Sections 3 and 4 do not really promote the active storyline; instead they serve the 
function of slowing down the plot progression. Sava has drinks brought from the 
cellar three times to entertain his uninvited guests, something typical of both 
folkloric poetry and fairy tales. While the boy is still in a cradle in section 2, by 
section 8 he is already an independent young Cossack playing the kobza, un-
doubtedly a sign that the legend originally spread as a folksong: the legacy of 
Sava lies in the continued existence of his legend.13  
Sava’s historic betrayal is barely mentioned in this ballad; it is assumed that 
this is already well-known. The question of the source of Sava’s riches is alluded 
to midway in the text: “What have you taken, enemy son, from the Cossacks’ 
goodwill?!”14 Clear references to a conspiracy, however, are found in the steps 
leading up to Sava’s murder. The conspirators first pretend to be guests, then tell 
their host to say goodbye to his wife and child, and finally demand several times 
                                                           
12  Rykhlyk sees the breakdown into 4-line stanzas with a line length of 8 or 6 syllables 
as a constitutive factor in the folkloristic Sava narrative − cf. Rykhlyk 229: 68. How-
ever, he does not consider that the so-called “Galician variant” of the narrative does 
not have a stanza structure and contains long lines of more than 10 syllables. This cir-
cumstance is probably due to the differences between the folkloric forms of song and 
epic. 
13  For Rykhlyk, the last section is not part of the basic Sava narrative and seems to have 
been mechanically adopted from other songs − сf. Rykhlyk 1929: 70. However, this 
does not explain the possible meanings latent in this section. 
14  «Що ты нажив, вражiй сыну, зъ козацъкои ласки!» − Maksymovych 1962: 36.  
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that Sava reveal where his riches are hidden. But this, too, is just a pretext to dis-
guise the actual purpose of the visit—revenge for his having turned traitor. Ac-
cordingly, in Ukrainian folklore, the story pivots around the conspiracy against 
Sava and his murder. The hero is at least partially justified throughout the pro-
cess. He is portrayed as a defenseless victim who is given no chance by his 
avengers. His real offense, defection to the Polish enemy, is only hinted at; unin-
formed readers might consider the conspiracy as a form of common robbery. 
A quite similar version of the Sava narrative can be found in Iakiv Holovats’-
kyi’s large collection Narodnyia piesni Galitskoi i Ugorskoi Rusi (Folk Songs of 
Galician and Hungarian Ruthenia, 1878). The author was told the story by a 
blind singer in Zolochiv, that is, in Galicia—far from the scene of the Haidamak 
rebellions.15 This means that the Sava narrative was also solidly situated in West 
Ukrainian folklore by 1878. Holovats’kyi does not specify when he recorded the 
text, but it was certainly long before he published it. The author undertook field-
work in Austrian Galicia while still in his youth. This transcription is also 
strophic, but has only fifteen stanzas and is, therefore, much shorter than the var-
iant recorded by Maksymovych. The relatively short length of the verse lines (7–
9 syllables) points to their song-like character. 
The narrative handed down by Maksymovych, with its dramatic insertions 
and echoes of the art ballad genre, was taken up by Polish folklore collectors. 
Kazimierz Władysław Wójcicki included it in his collection Pieśni ludu Bia-
łochrobatów, Mazurów i Rusi znad Bugu (Songs of the White Croats, Mazurians 
and the Rus at the Bug, 1836), under the title “O Sawie” (“About Sawa”) and al-
so identifies its source, Maksymovych’s collection. It is a faithful transcription 
of the text in Latin script according to the rules of Polish orthography, a practice 
customary in Galicia in the first half of the nineteenth century. The transcription 
is conspicuous in that it follows phonetic principles, in contrast to Maksymo-
vych, who for the most part uses historic orthography (cf. “w kincu stola” in 
Wójcicki, “в концѣ стола” in Maksymovych). Otherwise, this version is an ex-
act copy of the Ukrainian original, which serves to integrate it into the collec-
tion: a Ukrainian song that is also part of the folklore of the regions mentioned in 
the collection’s title. 
More interesting still, however, is the so-called “Galician variant” of the Sa-
va narrative, which can be found in the famous collection Pieśni polskie i ruskie 
ludu Galicyjskiego of Wacław z Oleska (pseudonym of Wacław Zaleski, Polish 
and Ruthenian Songs of the Galician Nation, 1833); this earliest Polish record in 
                                                           
15  «Записана отъ слѣпца лирника Фомы Зеленчука въ Золочевском Уѣздѣ». − 
Golovatskii 1878b: 10. 
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Latin letters also reflects a Ukrainian text. It is surprising that Sava Chalyi shows 
up in Galicia: although he came from Podolia, his part in the Haidamak uprisings 
took place much further east than that. Apparently, his figure was so popular 
nevertheless that he also found a place in the folksongs of the West Ukrainian 
Galicians. This corresponds to the lively presence of the Haidamak uprisings in 
Galician literature in the first half of the nineteenth century.16  
Zaleski’s variation on the Chalyi narrative was not given a title, but is re-
ferred to as a text accompanied by music.17 The strikingly long lines (14 sylla-
bles, with a break after the 8th) are not divided into verses and have paired 
rhymes. On the one hand, this is reminiscent of folkloric epics, but it is also sim-
ilar to the syllabic tradition of Polish poetry on the other. In terms of the plot, 
this variation deviates only slightly from that handed down through Maksymo-
vych: upon his return home, Sava learns that his wife has given birth to a son; he 
sends a servant, not a maid, to the cellar for the drinks; before he is back, the 
avengers have already surrounded the house; it is the maid who helps his wife 
escape, handing the newborn baby through window.  
Strikingly, the text extends further than the end of the plot—one third of the 
narrative consists of rhetorical questions about the whereabouts of his treasures, 
posed to Sava as he lies in his own blood.18 An allusion is also made to the his-
torically documented destruction of a nearby church: “You should not have 
robbed a church, Sir Sava!”19 In the description of Sava’s funeral in the final 
lines, folkloric images are linked to those of Christian burial ceremonies: a 
Ukrainian owl brings the murdered man’s burial shroud (“Many people saw the 
Ukrainian owl / bringing the burial shroud to Sir Sava.”)20 and then all of the 
church bells in the village start ringing (“All the bells in the village rang for Sir 
Sava.”)21 This reference to Christian burial rites may also serve to indicate the 
hero’s moral exoneration.22  
                                                           
16  Cf. Woldan 2017. 
17  “Z muzyką” − z Oleska 1833: 502. 
18  Rykhlyk explains this break in the action’s logic by stating that these questions were 
added later − cf. Rykhlyk 1929: 73. 
19  “Oj ne bulo, pane Sawa, cerkow rabowaty!” − z Oleska 1833: 503. 
20  “Hej baczyly mnohi lude wkrainsku sowoczku, / szczo prynesla panu Sawi smertelnu 
soroczku.” − z Oleska 1833: 504. 
21  “Zadzwonyły panu Sawi razom we wsi dzwony.” − z Oleska 1833: 504. 
22  Rykhlyk refrains from interpreting these images: in his opinion, they are merely set 
pieces, as are often found at the end of Polish and Ukrainian folk songs − cf. Rykhlyk 
1929: 74. 
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This addendum, which underlines the ballad’s dramatic character, is of great 
importance for the judgment of Sava: Sava is not a defector, he is a wealthy rob-
ber who has plundered his own land and amassed a great fortune. The conspira-
tors are thus not coming to take revenge, but to rob him: “The Cossacks came to 
rob Sava.”23 Although Sava has committed a sacrilege by destroying a church, 
the Christian bells—together with the heathen birds—provide him his funeral 
cortege and contribute to his absolution. There is no longer any mention of trea-
son. From the short dialogue between the murderers and their victim it is not 
made clear why Sava must die; only a reader familiar with the Sava tradition 
would know the connotations of the conspiracy against him. 
The popularity of this “Galician” variant of the Sava narrative, with its spe-
cial inflections, is also supported by the fact that it is included, albeit in a Cyrillic 
version, in Holovats’kyi’s collection from 1878, although the source mentioned 
is Zaleski’s transcription.24  
Of particular interest is a variation of this “Galician version” found in the 
aforementioned collection by Wójcicki (his collection contains even two Sava 
tales!). This one, however, is a Polish translation and takes the form of a ballad, 
with stanzas of four to eight lines and dialogue passages (in which the person 
who is speaking is called “Sawa” or “Sawicha”) which emphasizes the dramatic 
character of the narration. Striking in contrast to the Ukrainian model is the he-
ro’s lamentation, which has been inserted by the translator: Sava, lying on the 
ground in a pool of his own blood, laments not only his fate, but he prays and 
commends his soul to God. He is, thus, clearly stylized as a penitent sinner: “But 
Sir Sawa weeps and lies on the ground: / and he prays and commends his soul to 
God the Lord.”25 With this version, which the collection’s publisher no longer 
calls a Ruthenian duma, but now just a historic song,26 we actually find the first 
treatment that goes beyond the mere adoption of a folkloric text. The anonymous 
translator from Ukrainian not only translated the original tale, but also revised it. 
This variation—which is no longer the folkloric text, strictly speaking—stands at 
the transition between the adoption of texts from folklore by editors and their lit-
erary paraphrasing by authors. In this Polish appropriation, Sava’s redemption is 
more thorough than in the original Galician variant. The list of his thefts is short-
er, any reference to the church desecration is absent, and no mention is made ei-
                                                           
23  “Pryjichaly kozaczeńki Sawu rabowaty.” − z Oleska 1833: 503. 
24  Cf. Golovatskii 1878a: 18. 
25  “A Pan Sawa płacze sobie leżący na progu: / i modli się, i poleca duszę Panu Bogu.” − 
Wójcicki 1976: 28. 
26  “duma ruska”, “piesń historyczna” − Wójcicki 1976: 299−303, 26−29. 
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ther of Sava’s treason or his having become a renegade. Instead, the penitent sin-
ner prays in his final hour, with all the bells ringing at his funeral.  
 
 
Shifts in Polish Romantic Fiction 
 
The first adaptations of the Sava legend by representatives of Polish Romanti-
cism also appear in the 1830s. In 1838, a “Duma o Sawie Czałym Kozaku” 
(Duma on Sawa Czały, the Cosack) was published by Adam Pieńkiewicz. As is 
apparent from its subtitle (“Based on a Little Russian sketch”)27 it is close to the 
original from the collection by Maksymovych. But this version not only para-
phrases the original, it also places new emphases on different aspects of the sto-
ry. From a formal point of view, the model’s literarization has also now become 
clear. 
The four-line stanzas follow the trochaic meter typical of Polish verse and 
have an alternate rhyming structure; the regular meter and stanzas suggest the 
genre of the ballad. As for the sequence of the plot, Pieńkiewicz initially follows 
Maksymovych’s model. However, he expands the conversation between Sava 
and his murderers to emphasize Sava’s guilt and thus to provide a motive for the 
subsequent revenge. Here, the betrayal Sava has committed for the sake of mon-
ey is described explicitly: “Where is the gold / that the enemy pays you, / so you, 
villain, betray your Cossack brothers.”28 Instead of pursuing a common cause—
not mentioned in detail here—with his Cossack brothers, Sava let himself be 
dazzled by the Poles’ gold. This is why he cannot buy his life back now with his 
treasures, which is what he would like to do. An example must be set so that 
other Cossacks do not come up with similar ideas: “As an example for our com-
patriots, / you will pay for blood with blood.”29 The last stanza makes the matter 
of why Sava has to die clear from the narrator’s perspective. It is the just reward 
for someone who has sold out his brother: “Sooner or later, that will be / the lot 
of anyone / who, instead of spilling blood for a man, / sells his brother.”30 
The author modifies the model to make it clear to his reader that the murder 
of Sava is a punishment; Sava is also negatively judged from a patriotic-moral 
                                                           
27  “Ze szkicu małoruskiego”− Pieńkiewicz 1838: 152. 
28  “Gdzie jest złoto, / Co wróg tobie płaci, / Abyś zdradzał, ty niecnoto, / Twych koza-
ków braci?” − Pieńkiewicz 1838: 154. 
29  “Dla przykładu zaś rodakom, / Krwią za krew zapłacisz!” − Pieńkiewicz 1838: 155. 
30  “Prędzej, pózniej, tego czeka / Taka to zapłata, / Kto, zamiast krew lać za człeka, / 
Zaprzedaje brata.” − Pieńkiewicz 1838: 156. 
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viewpoint—he is someone who has betrayed and sold out his brothers.31 This 
point of view, here presented by a Polish author attempting to put forward a ra-
tionale for the Ukrainian struggle for their cause, can be generalized in both di-
rections, as the last stanza shows. This is the reward for any traitor, no matter 
whether Ukrainian or Pole. This clear rejection of treason, according to Rykhlyk, 
is related to Pieńkowski’s general political belief in Polish-Ukrainian accord, in 
which the betrayal of either partner was unacceptable.32 Concentrating on the 
protagonist, as a negative example of fraternal behavior, is sufficient reason not 
only to drop the conspiracy’s background, but also the rescue of Sava’s wife and 
son—they are unimportant aspects for the example being set by the Sava tale.  
A few years before the appearance of this ballad, in which Sava is stamped a 
traitor, August Bielowski (1806‒1876), a well-known representative of the Lviv 
Pan-Slavic group Ziewonia (the name of a Slavic deity), modified the Ukrainian 
model in another way. His ballad “Sawa” (1834) consists of twenty-two four-
line stanzas, these again with an alternate rhyming structure in trochaic meter. 
While the plot also follows the known model quite closely, there is a significant 
deviation in the last section: Sava’s wife does not flee with the small child, but 
invites her husband’s murderers to a banquet: “With not a worry, the young 
woman / calls to the servant: / ʻCome with me, we want to live comfortably, / 
happily and cheerfully.ʼ”33 And after they have plundered and burned down the 
farmstead, this woman finds herself in the company of the head of the robbers, 
together with Mykita, the man who killed her husband: “In the midst of the 
horde the lyre is played, / the drunken mob leaps about; / But at the head of the 
dance / is Mykita with Sawicha.”34 Now another form of betrayal has been intro-
duced: the young woman, apparently was also part of the conspiracy against her 
husband and is also a traitor. Sava appears as a victim of this conspiracy,35 mur-
dered for his treasures, not as punishment for his treason. It is unclear where Bie-
lowski found this variant of the Sava narrative, but it seems unlikely that he in-
                                                           
31  For Kyrchiv, one reason for a positive reception of this paraphrase of the Sava narra-
tive is that the act of treason is emphasized − cf. Kyrchiv 1965: 70. 
32  Cf. Rykhlyk 1929: 79. 
33  “Młoda żona niestrwożona / Woła ku czeladi: / ʻChodźcie ze mną, żyć przyjemno, / 
Weseli i radzi.ʼ” − Bielowski 1962: 280. 
34  “Między zgrają kobzy grają, Skacze czerń popita; / A na przedzie rej im wiedzie / Z 
Sawichą Mykita.” − Bielowski 1962: 280. 
35  For Kyrchiv, this positive portrayal of the protagonist is a reason for evaluating Bie-
lowski’s treatment negatively − cf. Kyrchiv 1965: 58.  
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vented it himself.36 Commenting on this duma, he writes, “our people sing vari-
ous songs about Sava, each quite different.”37 In West Ukrainian folklore, a 
woman who betrays her lover is found in the Dovbush tradition—it is con-
ceivable that this was a source of contamination in this text. 
This pattern of using other sources had at least one other adherent in the 
Polish tradition of transcribing Ukrainian folklore namely Wiktoryn Zieliński. In 
1841 he published a poem entitled “Ataman Sawa. Duma Ukraińska” (Ataman 
Sawa, Ukrainian duma), which due to its length (54 stanzas of 6 lines each) 
combines several storylines. In the first part (verses 1–12), Sava, a proud ataman 
and dreaded ringleader in the fight against the Haidamaks, has evil forebodings 
about his wife while dining with friends in Niemirów. In the second section (ver-
ses 13–16), she receives her lover at the distant farmstead. In the third section 
(verses 17–25), while Sava is on his way home, his ride through the night is dis-
turbed by evil omens. In the fourth section (verses 26–34), the Haidamaks attack 
the farmstead, kill Sava and abduct his wife. In the fifth section (verses 35–42), 
the leader of the Haidamaks, who is also the lover of Sava’s wife, ties her to a 
tree in the middle of the forest as punishment for betraying her husband. In the 
sixth section (verses 43–48), Sava is mourned and buried by his people. And in 
the seventh and final section (verses 49–53), Sava’s wife suffers a gruesome 
death—she is eaten by wolves, and birds of prey pick at the remains of her body. 
In the final stanza, the narrator lets the ‘veil of forgetfulness’ drop over his char-
acters. 
This narrative’s focal point is clearly the betrayal of Sava’s wife, who is a 
member of the Haidamak band and thus part of the conspiracy. However, the 
motives of the individual conspirators differ: the head of the Haidamaks is Sa-
va’s wife’s lover, which is why she wants to get rid of her husband. But the Hai-
damaks, who storm the farmstead with her help, want to take revenge on Sava, 
since he has killed so many of them (“Do you remember, devilish spawn, / how 
many of ours you buried, / faithful servant of the Poles? / May the muck of your 
blood / flow over their graves / to rectify them.”).38 Sava’s wife, in turn, be-
comes a betrayed betrayer, left behind in the middle of the forest tied to a tree; 
                                                           
36  Also Rykhlyk believes that Bielowski based this motif on various other folklore ver-
sions − cf. Rykhlyk 1929: 77.  
37  “Lud nasz spiewa o Sawie kilka piesni, wcale od siebie róznych” − Bielowski 1962: 
280. 
38  “A pamiętasz, bisów plemię, / Ileś naszych posłał w ziemię, / Lachom wierny sługa? / 
Niechajże nad ich mogiłą / Płynie im pociecha miła / Twojej juchy struga!” − Zielińs-
ki 1841: 671. 
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she is called a serpent that the leader does not want by his side (“No snake shall 
be near my heart...”).39 It is she who is responsible for Sava’s untimely death, 
because she incited the Haidamaks to attack her husband; this is evident from the 
funeral lamentations of Sava’s companions: “The scandalous deed of a wicked 
woman / drove the band of murderers on you.”40 Sava, through his death, goes to 
the afterlife almost a martyr: “You already have a wreath in heaven / … may 
your soul find peace!”41 There are no such statements about the wife; while she 
has also been punished for a betrayal, any of her bones not eaten by wild animals 
have been scattered in the forest. Drastic descriptions of violence and torture, 
even in the portrayal of Sava’s murder, give the ballad a melodramatic atmos-
phere. Betrayal and conspiracy, central motives in the Sava narrative, are here 
shifted to Sava’s wife, who has become the protagonist. Treason is punished in 
any case. But the wife, the main culprit, is also responsible for her husband’s 
death; her punishment as the betrayed betrayer is particularly cruel and even af-
ter dying, she is not forgiven. 
Another paraphrasing of the Sava narrative, the 1841 “Kozak Sawa” (Sawa 
the Cossack) by Michał Jezierski,42 has departed furthest from the original 
Ukrainian folktale. The plot revolves around a love triangle: Sava, returning 
from a campaign, learns that a Polish nobleman has kidnapped his beloved, Fe-
dora, and imprisoned her in his palace. Sava decamps with his division, attacks 
the palace, frees Fedora, and flees with her on his stallion. A sorceress helps him 
escape his pursuers, who in turn have the sorceress hanged. In a sort of epilogue, 
the narrator visits the cross that Sava erected on the grave of the sorceress and 
discovers that she still haunts the site as an owl. 
Apart from the protagonist’s name, almost nothing remains of the Ukrainian 
original, but there are considerable echoes of a well-known work by the so-cal-
led “Ukrainian School” of Polish Romanticism, Seweryn Goszczyński’s Zamek 
Kaniowski (The Castle of Kaniów, 1838). This text contains the same triangular 
constellation of a Polish-Ukrainian competition for a Ukrainian girl, but the nar-
rative ends tragically in this case. In the case of Jezierski’s ballad, the plot leads 
to an adventuresome chase in which the protagonist is able to escape through 
magical means, a literary model borrowed from motifs in folklore and folktales. 
The story’s open end is balanced by the conclusion, which the narrator arrives at 
                                                           
39  “Ja przy sercu nie chcę węża...” − Zieliński 1841: 673. 
40  “Złej niewiasty hydny srom, / Zwiódł na ciebie zbójczy grom, / Młodych zbawił lat.” 
− Zieliński 1841: 674. 
41  “Ty już w niebie wieniec masz, / … pokój duszy twei!” − Zieliński 1841: 674. 
42  Jezierski 1841: 211–16. 
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Sava as a Hero of Ukrainian and Polish Drama 
 
Appearing at the same time as various Polish paraphrases of the Sava story was 
the first play in Ukrainian literature about our protagonist, Mykola Kostomarov’s 
Sava Chalyi. Dramatichni stseny (Sava Chalyi. Dramatic scenes, 1838).43 It is 
one of Kostomarov’s earlier works, dating back to before 1847 when the later 
historian was still publishing his poems and plays under the pseudonym “Ieremi-
ia Halka.” 
Kostomarov has his hero change sides because of disappointed ambitions: 
Sava’s father Petro is elected hetman, not the popular and youthful hero, so Sava 
defects to the Poles (with regard to the historical Sava, the position of hetman 
plays no role). The Polish side, represented by St. Koniecpolski, offers Sava the 
hetmanship, but on one condition—he has to introduce the Union to Ukraine 
(this refers to the Church’s Union of Brest). But this is not something that Sava 
will do. Although a traitor in the political sense, he would never be unfaithful to 
the beliefs of his fathers. Thus, in the depths of his soul, Sava is not a traitor, but 
remains true to at least one principle of Cossack-Ukrainian identity—the Ortho-
dox Church. 
The real traitor in this play is Hnat Holyi, Sava’s former friend and comrade-
in-arms. He convinces Sava to defect to the Poles, only to discredit him a little 
later among the Polish rulers as an unreliable partner; on the Ukrainian side, 
Holyi incites the Cossacks against Sava and they organize a conspiracy to mur-
der him. As soon as Sava is dead, Holyi’s intrigues come to light, whereupon he 
receives his just punishment as well. There are also unfulfilled passions behind 
Holyi’s maneuverings—he has lost out in the competition for a woman, Katery-
na, who prefers Sava, and thus avenges himself by hatching the plot against Sa-
va. 
Sava, however, is a tragic figure44—it is no coincidence that Kostomarov’s 
play has five acts, which is reminiscent of the structure of a tragedy. Having 
committed a grave error, he must pay with his life. There is no way to rectify this 
error, not even by refusing to support the Union. The conspirators also kill his 
                                                           
43  Halka 1930: 141–84. 
44  Shamrai has compared the titular hero of Kostomarov’s play to tragic figures in 
Shakespeare, such as Caesar and Coriolanus − cf. Shamrai 1930: 9. 
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wife and young son, which proves their brutality and makes the scale of the trag-
edy greater still. 
There is one more Polish voice in this polyphony of interpretations. One of 
the central texts in Polish literature about the Haidamak uprisings is Juliusz 
Słowacki’s play Sen srebrny Solomei (The Silver Dream of Salomea, 1843), 
which as far as the chronology is concerned, is the last significant text on the 
subject. In its list of characters, there is also one Sawa Caliński, whose name at 
least indicates that he is Sava Chalyi’s son. But here Caliński is not fighting on 
the side of the Confederation of Bar against the Russians, as is historically doc-
umented, but instead takes part in the Haidamak uprisings against Poland, thus 
moving him closer to his father. Słowacki’s Sawa, a Ukrainian in Polish service, 
is also reminiscent of his father because he then pursues the Haidamaks, his 
compatriots, with extreme severity, thus helping the Poles defeat the rebellion. In 
so doing, Caliński is transformed into a committed supporter of the Poles: “This 
is what I swore!!! That Polish heroism / dispels the Cossack blood [in me ‒ 
A.W.]! / That the Ukrainian girls will weep / and throw curses and spells against 
my sword, my horse: / For I will be like the sword of revenge, / the scythe that 
reaps the meadow…”45 He also has to become Polish, because only as a Polish 
nobleman can he win the hand of his beloved lady. George G. Grabowicz has 
shown that this play is also constructed at the level of its characters, with its 
mythological structure of opposing pairs.46 For example, in the play’s constella-
tion of figures, there is one Ukrainian who can be regarded as Sawa’s counter-
part, namely, the defector and conspirator Semenko. He is first a servant of a 
Polish gentleman, but then changes sides to lead the Haidamaks on their vendet-
ta, as a bloodthirsty avenger with the new name Tymenko. Both of the Ukrainian 
tactics combined in the single person of Sava Chalyi—defecting to the opposite 
side and fighting on the Polish side against the Ukrainian Haidamaks—are found 
in Słowacki’s play, but have been split between the two protagonists. 
Semenko/Tymenko, traitor to the Poles and defector to the Haidamaks, re-
ceives a just punishment: he is cruelly executed, his strategy has failed. Sava 
Caliński, who fought with all his might for the Polish cause, is rewarded—
documents are found that prove his aristocratic blood and so he can marry the 
woman he desires. Here again the clear rejection of treason and conspiracy, as it 
seems at first glance, is relativized by the traitor’s end, as has been pointed out 
                                                           
45  “Przysiągłem!!! Że kawalerstwo / Polskie wygna krew kosaczą! Że Ukrainki zapłaczą 
/ Na mój miecz, na mego konia / Rzucają klątwy i czary: / Bo ja bedę jak miecz kary, / 
Kosa ścinająca błonia.” − Słowacki 1983: 150–51. 
46  Grabowicz 1987: 23–60. 
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by Edward Kasperski.47 When Tymenko is burned alive, two streams of blood 
flow from his body, forming the sign of the cross: “A specter haunted me: / And 
only here, in front of the farmstead, / did it fall into the golden sand, spilling two 
coral red / streams … which, as it seems, inscribe the most holy shape of Jesus’ 
cross…”48 At least a partial rehabilitation of the traitor can be seen here and this 






What was the appeal of Sava Chalyi for Polish literature? The story of few other 
figures in Ukrainian history were adopted or paraphrased as often as his, be it in 
folklore or in fiction. Of course, the Polish Romantics had a general interest in 
Ukraine—one need think only of the so-called Ukrainian School or the Pan-
Slavic oriented Lviv authors in the Ziewonia circle—but there seems to be other 
reasons too, political ones. Sava Chalyi embodies a model of Polish-Ukrainian 
coexistence that was reconsidered following the lost November Uprising (all of 
the texts analyzed here were written after 1831), not only by the émigrés in Par-
is, but also within both countries, Galicia and Congress Poland. In these ac-
counts, treason plays a special role, a role in politics that had been discussed 
since Mickiewicz’s Konrad Wallenrod (1828). Sava is not a traitor in the sense 
of Wallenrod, who furtively goes over to the stronger enemy only to go on to de-
feat it through treachery. Sava openly changes fronts, defects to the side of the 
stronger, whether due to the promise of material benefits or because he sees this 
position to be the right one. This corresponds to the traditional view of the supe-
riority of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic: as a non-Pole in this state, one also 
had to adopt the Polish ideology. There was only subordination to this hegemo-
ny, other political positions did not have equal status. 
This idea lost its validity during the Romantic period. Moreover, the catastro-
phe of the partitions was reconsidered, and reasons were sought for the Polish 
state’s downfall. These could be found in the eighteenth century, not only in the 
decline of aristocratic democracy, but also in the Polish dealings with their 
Ukrainian neighbors: Polish obtuseness and Polish rigidity had led to pivotal 
                                                           
47  Kasperski 2012: 390. 
48  “Goniło za mną widziadło: / I aż tutaj, pode dworem, na piasek złoty upadło, / Wy-
lawszy dwa koralowe / Strumienie… co zda się piszą / Prześwięte Y Jezusowe…” − 
Słowacki 1983: 233−34. 
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conflicts with the Ukrainians, although they would have been ideal allies against 
the superior forces of the Muscovites. 
Against this background, Chalyi’s treason was the wrong path to take, even 
if he is considered positively as a person. This is because he sacrificed the inter-
ests of his own people to Polish rationality. Treason is no longer a path to politi-
cal success; treason is denounced, even if some of the texts incriminate the wife 
more than the hero. Here, treason leads to conspiracy, which in turn leads to the 
murder of the protagonist and, ultimately, to a dead end: the two sides are still 
bitterly facing each other after Chalyi is dead, just as they were at the starting 
point of the narrative. There would be new Haidamak uprisings, and indeed this 
happened, as we know from history. 
Kostomarov’s tragedy also somehow confirms, from the Ukrainian side, this 
assessment of the person of Sava and the program he represents—he will fail, 
even if he recognizes his mistake and is not ready to hand himself over to the 
Poles at every point. The tragedy of someone who switches sides is testimony to 
the futility of such a political program. This is clear in Słowacki’s play as well—
the Ukrainian traitor Semenko fails in his Wallenrod strategy against the superior 
Polish opponent, although he is rehabilitated in death. His opponent, Sava, the 
Pole of Ukrainian descent who has completely gone to the stronger side, will 
clearly not succeed with his program, as is expressed by the author in the Werny-
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Sava Chalyi was a historic person from the Haidamaks’ uprisings in the late 
eighteenth century, who defected from the Ukrainian to the Polish side. In the 
early nineteenth century his story gradually moved from Ukrainian folklore to 
Polish folklore and fiction. While the initial Polish versions of this tale (word-
for-word transliterations into Latin characters) still concentrate on betrayal and 
revenge, later versions turn out to be paraphrases rather than translations of the 
original and focus on new topics like Sava’s wife, who then became the real trai-
tor. Sava Chalyi is not only a hero of folklore and literary ballads, but has been 
made the hero of two plays, Slowacki’s Sen srebrny Salomei (The Silver Dream 
of Salomea) in Polish and Kostomarovs Sava Chalyi in Ukrainian literature, both 
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Critical remarks on conspiracy are ubiquitous in the writings of the Polish late 
Romantic Cyprian Norwid (1821–1883). An inquiry into this network of re-
marks, both discursive and poetic, could commence, in a way, from any point. I 
suggest entering it through a literary text, Quidam (1862), to then consider, in 
various nineteenth-century contexts and with a flexible conceptual framework, 
Norwid’s prose writings, i.e., letters, essays, and scattered notes on conspiracy 
and “openness” which he passionately advocated as an antidote to secret agita-
tion.1 
Quidam is one of Norwid’s most important and original works. If this digres-
sive Roman epic has any external organizing factor or graspable “motor” of the 
plot then it is, interestingly enough, a conspiracy, namely the conspiracy that (ac-
cording to the fictional world of Quidam) led to the Jewish revolt of Bar Kokhba 
(AD 132).2 Rome’s decadent elite, including Caesar Hadrian, is incapable of 
                                                           
*  This article was written during an “Advanced Postdoc.Mobility” fellowship of the 
Swiss National Science Foundation at the University of Chicago. I would like to thank 
Michał Kuziak and Jared Warren for their helpful comments on previous versions of 
this paper. 
1  I should point out that my treatment of conspiratorial motifs in Norwid’s work is any-
thing but exhaustive. Instead, I will focus on particularly productive passages. For an 
excellent advanced key word search see the internet-based dictionary of Puzyni-
na/Korpysz. 
2  Cf. Fieguth 2011: 300. 
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anything but “idle” gestures and is provoked by news of riots from the province 
of Judea to mobilize its power. As a result of this declaration of the state of war, 
two of the main characters, the Greek philosopher Artemidor and Rabbi Jazon 
Mag, are expelled from Rome. The anonymous fictional protagonist Quidam, 
this truth-seeking “someone,” loses his life in an out-of-control ritual bull sacri-
fice at the Roman Forum Boarium (Plac Przedajny), which had probably been 
organized for the sake of the enhancement of social cohesion, again, as a reac-
tion to the threat to imperial integrity from the margins.3 One could even say that 
conspiracy has the last word in Quidam, given that it closes with an exclamation 
by the Roman statesman, Lucius Pomponius Pulcher, to the conspirators, “I did 
not know you, Jews.”4 
The Christians have a remarkably small impact on the plot of the epic, even 
though the reader clearly feels that they represent the Empire’s actual new force 
and enjoy the author’s sympathy. Their appearances are sparse. The parable of 
the mustard seed from the Gospel according to Matthew (Mt 13:31–32)—spread 
throughout the text as a leitmotif5—shows how Norwid conceives of the mission 
and transmission of the Christian message: as careful labor within the realm of 
the small. However, this carefully circumscribed labor, in an inverse propor-
tionality, is supposed to bear all the more fruit, in analogy with the tree in the 
parable of the mustard seed.6 
Zygmunt Krasiński, the third “bard” (wieszcz) of Polish Romanticism and a 
more or less close friend of the notorious outsider Norwid, reportedly called Qui-
dam utterly obscure and incomprehensible to the Parisian salon worlds of the 
Polish émigré community.7 Moreover, Krasiński might have also criticized the 
fact that Christianity was not triumphant in Quidam. Norwid’s epic referred to 
                                                           
3  Cf. Fieguth 2011: 301. For a comprehensive study of the Bar Kokhba revolt see Mor 
2016. As Mor (ibid.: 2) notes: “It is not surprising that the enigmatic character of Bar 
Kokhba and the lack of sufficient sources to understand him have fired the imagina-
tion of writers and led to a rich flowering of literary works on this subject in Israel and 
around the world.” 
4  Norwid 1971–76/III: 232 (Song XXVIII, v. 59). All translations are mine, Ch. Z. All 
emphasized passages from Norwid are original. 
5  Cf. “Kto siał gorczyczne ziarno, zgorzknił, zbawił: / Gorczyczne ziarno liche i piep-
rzowe, / Prochowi równe, który noga zwiewa, / Lecz wyżej serca urasta, nad głowę, / 
I tak się staje podobieństwem drzewa, / Że ptak niebieski gniazdo na nim miewa.” – 
ibid.: 146 (Song XIII, vv. 305–10). 
6  Cf. Trybuś 1993. 
7  Cf. Chlebowski 2014: 132. 
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Krasiński’s own Roman drama, Irydion (1836),8 in which a Christian perspective 
did triumph insofar as the failing conspirator Irydion, a pagan, was resurrected 
by the author in the epilogue and sent from Ancient Rome to nineteenth-century 
Poland with a Christian mission.9 While intervening through his epilogue, as a 
deus ex machina, Krasiński eventually gave Christianity a national scope in his 
drama.10 Irydion’s revengefulness towards imperial Rome (he has a Greek father 
and a “barbarian” mother) and his plan to murder Caesar Heliogabal is not effec-
tively conducted but, in a way, perpetuated through the trick of the epilogue. In 
the preface to Quidam, presented in the form of a “fragment of a letter” to Kra-
siński, Norwid, then, reacts not only to Krasiński’s objection but also to the very 
premises of Irydion. He writes: “Civilization and its Christian womb are made 
up of the achievements of Israelite, Greek and Roman knowledge, and do you 
indeed believe that, in the self-conscious reality, it [Christianity] has already 
been triumphantly revealed?”11 
Now, the fact that in Quidam the Jews act “cabbalistically” (the term appears 
several times) in the “shadows” must surely be viewed from the context of nine-
teenth-century anti-Judaism and its set of stereotypes. However, Norwid is clear-
ly not in line with the anti-Semitic theory of Jewish world conspiracy, for which 
no one other than Zygmunt Krasiński had provided the founding myth with his 
Nie-boska komedia (Un-Divine Comedy, 1835).12 The key difference between 
Krasiński and Norwid, in that regard, lies in the fact that Quidam does not sug-
gest infiltration and subversion as features of the Jewish conspiracy. Rather, 
it is depicted as an anti-imperial emancipation movement, that is, as at least a 
partially legitimate answer to the despotic (religious) policy of the Roman Em-
pire under Caesar Hadrian.13 
With “prophetic words” (słowa wieszcze), Jazon Mag sends his disciple Bar-
chob to Judaea to make him the leader of the uprising and, what is more, the 
longed-for Messiah.14 Thus, the conspiratorial complex of motifs related to Ja-
                                                           
8  See, among others, Rzońca 2005: 76–85; Fieguth 2014: 172–78. 
9  Krasiński 1967: 159–68 (“Dokończenie”). 
10  See, for example, Śliwiński 1992: 130–31. 
11  “Cywilizacja składa się z nabytków wiedzy izraelskiej – greckiej – rzymskiej, a łono 
Jej chrześcijańskie, czy myślisz, że w świadomej siebie rzeczywistości już tryumfal-
nie rozbłysło?” Norwid 1971–76/III: 80 (“Do Z.K. Wyjątek z listu”, 79−80). 
12  Cf. Janion 2014: 90–115. 
13  For a recent discussion of Norwid’s peculiar stance between “philo- and anti-Semi-
tism” see Samsel 2017. 
14  Norwid 1971–76/III: 170 (Song XVI, v. 169). 
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zon’s mission inevitably, if summarily, makes the reader think of Polish Roman-
ticism and of Adam Mickiewicz’s Romantic politics in particular with its combi-
nation of Messianism and an anti-colonial agenda.15 It is plausible, then, that 
Krasiński found Quidam to be not only confused literarily but also unacceptable 
in its conceptual layout: the Bar Kokhba revolt parallels the rebellious Polish 
Romanticism—at least potentially so—whereas there are no allusions to Polish 
patriotic features whatsoever in the representation of the early Christians.  
If the Jewish conspiracy in Norwid’s epic nonetheless turns out to be evalu-
ated as clearly negative, that is, as a particularistic endeavor, then this is a Chris-
tian and quite clearly anti-Judaistic criticism. Still, it should be noted that Nor-
wid directed the reproach of particularism, in a broadly homological way, at 
Polish Romanticism throughout his oeuvre. He had accused many of the expo-
nents of Polish “Romantic” nationalism precisely of a lack of public spirit, of a 
narcissistic understanding of emancipation and of a glorification of violence. At 
the same time, the fact that Norwid mostly writes konspiracja when dealing with 
what the Polish language calls spisek (‘conspiracy’) points to a virulent Europe-
an dimension of the problematic including, for instance, the iconic nineteenth-
century conspirator Giuseppe Mazzini and his myriad of secret actions all over 
the continent. Mazzini not only had lively connections to clandestine Polish ac-
tivists, but was also an admirer of Adam Mickiewicz.16 Norwid, by contrast, 
praised himself for having fought the revolutionary movement, as represented by 
Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Mickiewicz, on Pope Pius IX’s side (he ran on the Quir-
inal Hill trying to stop the surging crowds of demonstrators in April 1848 to-
gether with Zygmunt Krasiński).17 
In Quidam, while relating Barchob’s acceptance of his “messianistic” mis-
sion to the Province of Judaea, the narrator asks: “What did he feel?”18 The an-
swer the narrator provides is: “Ardor” (żar), but, again, a kind of ardor that lacks 
both “sails” and “anchor” as it knows neither authentic “inspiration” (zapał) nor 
                                                           
15  Mickiewicz’s specific traits within the descriptions of Jazon have been repeatedly 
identified by Norwid scholars. See, among others, Zaniewicki 2007: 28; Zieliński 
2011: 386. Norwid’s association of Mickiewicz with Jewish characteristics is no sur-
prise if one thinks of the fact that he harshly rejected Mickiewicz’s idea that Israel was 
an equal “elderly brother” in faith for the Church (in the latter’s 1848 “Skład zasad”). 
On this problematic see Piechal 1937: 72. 
16  Cf. Koropeckyj 2008: 399−400. 
17  Cf. Trojanowiczowa/Dambek 2007: 312; and Walicki 1983: 296–98. 
18  “Co czuł?” – Norwid 1971–76/III: 169 (Song XVI, v. 161). 
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a foundation in scrupulous and constant labor.19 The narrator’s comment on Bar-
chob’s last walk to the city of Rome goes: “Obscurity—and a new abyss became 
visible. / Thoughts, uncertain of shape, though sublime in content.”20 Clearly, 
the narrator is hinting once again at the mustard seed, which would eventually 
“grow beyond the heart, beyond the head”:21 the Christians’ public confession of 
faith, their martyrdom, is compared to a “kernel” (gorczyczne ziarno), an ele-
mentary form out of which things most “elevated” may grow one day. By con-
trast, the idea of an insurrection, motivated both politically and messianistically, 




The Conspirator as Monk and Tightrope Walker 
 
To widen the perspective and to turn from Quidam to a broader corpus of prose 
pieces, one can say that the most common feature of Norwid’s conceptualization 
of conspiracy is that he places himself, his narrator or his lyrical speaker outside 
of it as a non-participating observer. By virtue of this attitude, he creates space 
for both the devastating rejection of, and a sympathetic testimony to, conspiracy. 
Norwid wrote in a letter in 1866, during the Austro-Prussian War and three years 
after the failed January Insurrection in Poland, that: 
 
So much do I think it is right (in unjust ages) to be on the side of the vanquished and the 
non-triumphant that I am not only today with Austria, but that I almost went deaf in a wet 
prison together with Polish conspiracy … so much … that, of course not as a martyr and 
confessor, but why not ... as an amateur.22 
                                                           
19  “bo nie zapał – żaglem, trud – kotwicą” – ibid.: v. 163. 
20  “I mrok – i znowu otchłań rozwidniona. / Myśli, niepewne kształtem, treścią szczyt-
ne” – ibid.: 170 (Song XVI, v. 166–67). 
21  “wyżej serca urasta, nad głowę” – ibid.: 146 (Song XIII, v. 308). 
22  “Tak dalece (w Epokach-niesprawiedliwych) uważam za słuszne być po stronie zwy-
ciężonych i nietryumfujących, że nie tylko jestem dziś z Austrią, ale nawet straciłem 
słuch w wilgotnym więzieniu z konspiracją polską … tak dalece … naturalnie, że nie 
jak męczennik i wyznawca, ale tak sobie … jako amator.” − Letter to Karol Ruprecht, 
soon after 8 April 1866; Norwid 1971–76/IX: 214. This letter refers to Norwid’s im-
prisonment in Berlin in June–July 1846 after he helped two compatriots escape from 
the Kingdom of Prussia in 1845 and 1846 respectively. To one of those fugitives, 
Maksymilian Jatowt, he had handed over his very own passport. When Jatowt later 
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To return to Quidam once again, the historical age narrated in it—Rome under 
Hadrian—is undoubtedly precisely one instance of such an “unjust age.” Ac-
cordingly, there is, as sketched out above, a kind of sympathy with the conspir-
ators, the critical distance notwithstanding.23 The point is, however, that accor-
ding to the epic’s logic, conspiracy would be a false “martyrdom” at best. This is 
made manifest in contradistinction to the Christians’ genuine (to Norwid) mar-
tyrdom. In his many comments on conspiracy, he seems to know exactly how to 
regulate his “amateurism” (amatorstwo) and not to let himself go with it. In that 
context, a letter from 1863 is of particular interest, in which he portrays the con-
spirator as a hybrid being: 
 
There is only one thing [the Poles] estimate higher than bigos and sauerkraut soup: tech-
nical conspiracy—but! Any juggler can do the same on the hippodromes. I (as you know) 
have always avoided conspirators. I sat at the edge of the table … and drew something in 
the sand … but to listen to them, I was never unhappy about that – – – – – – 
The technical conspirator of the nineteenth century (a Titan) is something between a monk 
and a ballet dancer, and just as it is impossible to combine the rigor of a monk with the 
elasticity of a tightrope dancer and juggler, so if you nonetheless do, you give up your loy-
alty and you become, without knowing it, a hybrid being. – 
(No one has ever brought a monk and a dancer into one without charlatanism.)24 
 
                                                           
identified himself with this document at the Russian Embassy in Paris, Norwid—who 
was staying in Berlin—came to the attention of the Prussian authorities and was ar-
rested. – Cf. Trojanowiczowa/Dambek 2007: 183–228; and Trojanowiczowa 2010. 
23  The way Norwid works his way through conspiracy is, in a way, reminiscent of Ma-
hatma Gandhi, who essentially developed his program of non-violent, anti-colonial re-
sistance in critical confrontation with the notorious conspirator Giuseppe Mazzini – 
see Donno 2008. I thank Thomas Newbold for pointing this parallel out. 
24  “[Polacy] [u]mieją nad bigos i kapuśniak cenić tylko jedną rzecz – konspirację tech-
niczną – – ale! na hipodromach toż samo umie każdy saltymbanka. Konspiratorów 
(jak wiesz) zawsze unikałem – siedziałem w kącie stołu …, rysując sobie coś na 
piasku.... ale ich słuchać nierad byłem nigdy – – – – – / Konspirator-techniczny XIX 
wieku (Tytan) jest to coś między mnichem a baletnikiem, et comme il est impossible 
de réunir la sévérité d’un moine avec l’élasticité d’un danseur de corde et saltim-
banque, il en résulte qu’en réunissant l’impossible on devient peu loyal et sans le 
savoir sujet à la duplicité. – / (Mnicha i baletnika w jedno bez szarlatanizmu nie zebrał 
nikt.)” – Letter to Karol Ruprecht, March 1871; Norwid 1971–76/IX: 481. 
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It is remarkable how carefully, or should we say how amateurly, Norwid devel-
ops the image of the monk and the tightrope walker only to then denounce that 
“hybrid being” more mercilessly. Anyone familiar with Norwid’s poetics will 
hardly deny the coexistence of asceticism (stylistic and ethical) on the one hand 
and a tricky playfulness (most notably, a powerful paronomastic predilection) on 
the other; they are deeply characteristic of his work. He was a “voice in the wil-
derness”25 within the Paris salon or, as Jan Zieliński once aptly described him, a 
“Christ figure with a cigar.”26 There is something deeply oxymoronic about Nor-
wid, both in style and behavior. As a matter of fact, is not the seemingly cool 
“listener” to the conspirators precisely a ludic rigorist? 
I believe that one need not have recourse to psychoanalysis or deconstruction 
to notice in Norwid’s letter the expression of a faible for something that he de-
nounces in the very same paragraph as “charlatanry.” Just as a Jewish conspiracy 
could become an allegory of Polish political Romanticism in Quidam, so here 
conspiracy as such, apparently so “disloyal” to the truth, becomes a plausible, 
however subliminal, description of Norwid’s own poetic outlook. 
 
 
“Openness” versus “Machination” 
 
It is not my intention to diminish Norwid’s rejection of conspiracy. This rejec-
tion is, more often than not, completely unambiguous. To mention just a few ex-
amples: In his early drama Zwolon: Monologia (Zwolon: A Monologue, 1851) he 
subjects the second Romantic generation to a devastatingly pejorative portrait. 
The young conspirators follow a blind compulsion for revenge and the hero, 
Zwolon (roughly meaning, the “excepted”) objects that they transform life into a 
“cemetery.”27 More than twenty years later, Norwid dramatically wrote: “Peo-
ples in decline have only conspiratorial or machinating reason, there is no his-
torical and open [jawna] reason in them, for if there were any their nation would 
                                                           
25  Cf. the title poem of Norwid’s famous collection of verse Vade-mecum (1866), “Klas-
kaniem mając obrzękłe prawice…” (With swollen hands from clapping…): “He [the 
finger of God] commanded me to live in the desert of life!” (“Żyć mi rozkazał [Boży-
palec] w żywota pustyni!” − Norwid 1971–76/II: 15, v. 10). 
26  Zieliński 2002. 
27  Cf. Kubale 1983: 53, 56. 
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still be alive.”28 What is necessarily omitted in conspiratorial reason is—and 
here we are at the heart of Norwid’s criticism—an open engagement with history 
and historicity. The Polish term for openness, jawność, can be translated as ‘pub-
lic,’ ‘medial discourse,’ ‘free press,’ and the like. However, I hold that it is im-
portant to capture in this concept the very idea of open appearance. In what fol-
lows, I therefore suggest not translating, and not rendering too specific, the con-
cept of jawność. 
By the end of the 1840s, Norwid called jawność a “cornerstone of this age”29 
and counted it among men’s “most conservative instincts.”30 His position in that 
regard certainly seems to be conservative. As Stefan Chwin has shown in his 
book Literatura i zdrada (Literature and Betrayal, 1993), conservatives catego-
rically refused so-called “Wallenrodism,” i.e., the strategy of infiltration of the 
enemy labelled after Mickiewicz’s epic tale Konrad Wallenrod (1829) as irre-
concilable with the Polish gentry’s old republican virtues.31 Any mimicry of the 
hegemonic power would be in discordance not only with an aristocratic codex of 
honor, but it would also affect the moral integrity of the conspirator himself. The 
latter argument strongly resembles Norwid’s reproach of machination, disloyalty 
and charlatanry; it is not by chance that all of these are moralistic categories. 
When he affirmed: “It was Mickiewicz’s right to say, Wallenrodism, I say [fol-
lowing Słowacki], Winkelriedism,”32 he puts the readiness to self-sacrifice in 
Juliusz Słowacki’s Kordian (1834) above the longing for revenge in Mickie-
wicz’s Konrad Wallenrod. It may be assumed, however, that Norwid is pointing 
specifically to the ambivalence of Słowacki’s own representation of conspiracy. 
In the conspiratorial scene in the crypt of Warsaw’s Saint John Cathedral from 
Kordian, Słowacki had the leader of the young conspirators say the following 
                                                           
28  “U ludów gasnących jest tylko inteligencja konspiracyjna albo intrygancka, ale histo-
rycznej i jawnej nie ma – bo, gdyby była, naród żyłby.” − Letter to Józef Bohdan 
Wagner, early December 1874; Norwid 1971–76/X: 33. 
29  “… probierczy kamień wieku: jawność!” − Letter to Stanisław Egbert Koźmian, Sept-
ember 16, 1847; Norwid 1971–76/VIII: 53. 
30  “Ale emigracyjne wszystkie ruchy niewczesnymi będą (tak jak były), póki z miejsca 
warunków wyprzągnięte, a w czas jedynie – że tak powiem abstrakcyjnie – rzucone 
wychodźców umysły przeciw-wagi w pracy, w prawdzie, w jawności, w konserwa-
tywniejszych (że tak nazwę) obudzeniach instynktów – mieć nie będą.” − Norwid 
1971–76/VII: 23 (“Listy o Emigracji” – Letters on the [Polish] Emigration). 
31  Cf. Chwin 1993: 25−29 (ch. “Etos rycerski wobec etosu maski”). 
32  “Mickiewicz miał prawo mówić: Wallenrodyzm, ja mówię: Winkelrydyzm.” − Nor-
wid 1971–76/VI: 444; in the 1860 Paris Lectures on Słowacki. 
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words: “May the black face of conspiracy not see the light of the world, / For 
there the sun of God shines over the wide world!”33 Norwid’s emphasis on 
jawność, then, has to be understood not only “civically” but also metaphysically, 
as an option for the divine law, as an approval of the biblical commandment 
“You shall not kill,” and as a call for spiritual purity. It is not by chance that 
Zwolon, the saintly but tragic hero of Norwid’s eponymous drama, ends up be-
ing walled up (rozmurowano) after boldly speaking out against the lethal logic of 
his young fellow activists.34 That is, both the conspirators and the state fail to 
recognize the liberating power of jawność. In this context, one should recall the 
juxtaposition of the Jewish conspiracy and Christian martyrdom in Quidam. 
What is at stake here is precisely Norwid’s distinction between a problematic la-
tency and the courage to disclose oneself. Thus, we read in Quidam: “The Jew 
remained silent in his chambers contained like coffins. / The Christian vanished, 
but publicly [jawnie] and actively.”35 
I hasten to add that poetically, jawność is not the only or perhaps not even 
the most crucial principle for Norwid. In his short essay “Jasność i ciemność” 
(“Clarity and Darkness,” 1850), in which he defends himself against the accusa-
tions of being “obscure,” he reverses the logic of those objections and calls dark-
ness “the outline and contour of the shape of truth.”36 The tension between aus-
terity and playfulness mentioned above then seems to be doubled by a differen-
tiation within Norwid’s very rejection of obscurity. He argues that clarity too is 
only a “quality” (przymiot) of truth, namely its “color,” not an end in itself. As a 
poet he holds that truth in order to be grasped needs both clarity and obscurity. 
Now, this dialectical view of the transparent and the opaque, I assume, does not 
invalidate or fundamentally undermine the functioning of the positive concept of 
jawność. Still, Norwid’s fascination with conspiratorial obscurity and its use as a 
means for jawność, reflect the aesthetic, epistemological, and hermeneutical ar-
gument of “clarity and darkness” to a certain degree. 
                                                           
33  “Wstrzymać ich na Boga! / Niech myśl młodych, ciemnicy nie przestąpi proga, / 
Niech spisek z czarną twarzą na świat nie wychodzi, / Bo tam na świecie białym 
błyszczy Boga słońce!” − Słowacki 1986: 83; Act III, scene IV, v. 148–51. 
34  Norwid 1971–76/IV: 78 (v. 44). 
35  “Żyd – milczał w izbach zawartych jak trumny; / Chrześćjanin znikał, lecz jawnie i w 
czynie.” − Norwid 1971–76/III: 61; Song XIII, v. 60−61. 
36  “obrysowaniem i konturem kształtu prawdy” − Norwid 1971–76/VI: 599−600. The 
text is addressed to “A. C.” and “Z. K.”, that is, to August Cieszkowski and Zygmunt 
Krasiński. 
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To conclude this section, I will mention that Adam Mickiewicz, in his Paris 
Lectures in the early 1840s, had introduced the highly interesting paradox of an 
“open conspiracy.” On the Decembrists’ plot against the Tsar in the 1820s he 
remarked that: “They were conspiring openly [in French, On conspirait ouverte-
ment; in Polish, Spiskowano jawnie] …; officers and civil servants gathered in 
houses with windows overlooking the streets. Public opinion … imposed more 
than government threats.”37 To be sure, Mickiewicz judged “open conspiracy” to 
be too dangerous and eventually irresponsible (he had witnessed the Decemb-
rist’s plot at close range while being exiled in Saint Petersburg). Still, Mickie-
wicz was able to describe it with admiration. By contrast, even the possibility of 
such a conspiracy, worn and covered by public opinion, is nowhere to be found 
in Norwid’s writings. I suppose (had he commented on it) that he would have 
condemned it on the basis of his radically binary thinking to be a risky “hybrid.” 
Both the oxymoronic and the dialectical dimensions, although they may conside-




To Make Use of One’s Freedom 
 
I will now address a second point of reference for jawność in Norwid’s writings. 
Because many of his remarks on conspiracy date from the 1860s and 1870s, it is 
hardly plausible to conceptualize them within the framework of Romanticism 
solely, or even against the background thereof. They should also be seen in the 
context of a new system, namely Positivism. I would like to briefly discuss this 
reframing with reference to Eliza Orzeszkowa’s notion of “simple virtues.” Ac-
cording to Orzeszkowa, the great female writer of Polish Positivism/Realism, the 
disregard for the “simple virtue of sincerity”38 lies at the root of any societal evil. 
The topic of Orzeszkowa’s essay is not conspiracy, but rather the culture of in-
formality in a broader sense, which she argues undermines the possibility of 
agreements and in particular renders the observance of contracts impossible. In 
Norwid’s analysis of conspiracy, however, there is a highly similar strand of cri-
tique: the idea of the right use of legality. Thus, in 1869, he emphatically recalls 
“that nations have been wiped out as a result of their non-sensitization to, and 
non-use of, laws and/or rights, their distrust of legal institutions, and instead, 
                                                           
37  In Polish: Mickiewicz 1952: 338. In French: Mickiewicz 1849: 289. Cf. Chwin 1993: 
30−36, especially 33 (“Psychospołeczny paradoks ‘jawnego spiskowania’”). 
38  “prost[a] cnot[a] uczciwości” − Orzeszkowa 1884: 35. 
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confidence in rumors and chatter and their crystallization, i.e., conspiracies.”39 
Norwid—like Orzeszkowa—deplores the lack of what we today call civil socie-
ty. Conspiracy, conversely, becomes a metaphor for the voluntary renunciation 
of a public sphere. “[H]ere,” he notes in the 1870s, “here … where no one wills 
to make use of his freedom—here no one, too, reveals himself.”40 Norwid de-
scribes this shortcoming as a specific form of an abuse of power. Conspiracy 
turns out to be self-enslavement.41 Elsewhere, as early as in 1851, Norwid re-
marked, “he who does not fulfill his civic vocation will sink into the deeper cate-
gory of those dissatisfied or of the conspirators who did not use their power by 
truth and by jawność.”42 Here, the warning about the “black face” of conspiracy 
from Słowacki’s Kordian is once again palpable. On the whole, however, the 
call to make use of the law and of one’s rights and the idea of a cultural flourish-
ing within a given legal framework (as rudimentary as it may have been in parti-
tioned Poland), is obviously far removed from the “Prophetic” model of Roman-
ticism.43 To make use of the law and of one’s rights in a non-subversive way 
                                                           
39  “narody bywają z historii wymazane za nieczujność, za nieużywanie praw, nieufanie 
władzom prawnym, a ufanie plotkom, gawędkom i ich krystalizacji, to jest konspi-
racjom.” − Norwid 1971–76/VII: 170 (“Kwestia bieżąca Zmartwychwstańców” – 
“The Current Question of the Resurrectionists”). 
40  “u nas … gdzie nikt wolności nie używa – nikt nie objawia się.” − Norwid 1971–
76/VII: 190 (“Dopiski na egzemplarzu broszury ‘Pożegnanie pułkownika Adama 
Kozłowskiego’” – “Postscript on a Copy of the Brochure ‘Farewell to the Colonel 
Adam Kozłowski’”). 
41  Cf. “Polak tylko jest w stanie coś podobnego wypowiedzieć! Trzeba na to być sto lat 
niewolnikiem i kilkadziesiąt konspiratorem, aby … coś podobnego napisać … Tak 
powiedziałby Anglik, Amerykanin, Szwajcar, Grek Peryklejski i Rzymianin za Scy-
pionów – ale tak nie powie Polak dzisiejszy żaden, dlatego że się rodzi z niewol-
ników, a zenitem jego myśli jest personalna konspiracja.” − Letter to Józef Rusteyko, 
February 1870; Norwid 1971–76/IX: 445−46. 
42  “nie spełni swojego Obywatelskiego powołania i przejdzie na kategorię niższą mal-
kontentów lub konspiratorów, którzy władzy swojej w prawdzie i jawności nie użyli.” 
− Norwid 1971–76/VII: 110 (“Memoriał o młodej emigracji” – “The Young [Polish] 
Emigration Memorial”). 
43  Adam Mickiewicz, like many after him, including Norwid, analyzed the partitions of 
Poland as cynical instantiations of legalism and thus stressed the perverse potential of 
the “written law” (prawo pisane). That does not mean, however, that Mickiewicz sim-
ply dismissed legal considerations. He was obviously an heir of the (French) natural 
rights tradition: According to him, the Poles should make reference to their “innate 
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must be tantamount to unoriginality when measured by a worldview of the “re-
volt against the mediated world” (to put it alongside a phrase by contemporary 
German writer Botho Strauß).44 By contrast, Norwid is a poet and intellectual 
who in the context of late Romanticism is trying to save the honor of the mediat-
ed world, that is, of law, diplomacy, journalism and so forth. This is, to be sure, a 
peculiar enterprise, for it soon becomes clear that his way of thinking remains in-
compatible with Positivism in a crucial respect. Thus, in the poem “Prac-czoło” 
(“The-Forehead-of-Labor,” 1858), the Positivist approach to economic matters is 
referred to derogatively as “your real-school of the day”45 doomed to “shallow-
ness” and “insincerity.” There is a deep-seated skepticism towards institutions 
and institutional rationalization in Norwid, which in the end is certainly still ro-
mantic, and it even leads him to severely limit his mantrically repeated ideal of 
jawność.46 
Norwid wrote in 1849 that “jawność is the only remedy in the political 
sphere—for what is jawne is not addressed to anyone personally, but only to this 
time as such.”47 The category of “impersonality” (impersonalność) appears to be 
the condition of possibility for jawność. However, impersonality in Norwid’s 
lexicon also designates an anti-expressivist stylistic ideal, which shows that it 
can hardly be meant to propagate technocratic neutrality. Instead, he suggests a 
series of polemical counter-concepts to institutionalism with regard to French 
public life all of which directly attack the reduction of jawność to daily news. 
Still in 1849, he wrote: 
 
                                                           
right” (prawo przyrodzone, prawo wrodzone) in their struggle for freedom. See the 
seven-page entry on “Prawo” in the Słownik języka Adama Mickiewicza (Górski/Hra-
bec 1969). Typically, late German Romanticism is considered to mark the end of natu-
ral rights universalism in the name of the “national spirit” (Volksgeist). Mickiewicz’s 
position could be, then, defined as a complex mix of the natural rights tradition and 
national spirit historicism. − See Gottfried 1968 and Lizisowa 1994. 
44  Strauß 1999. Strauß’s text was first published as an afterword to the German edition 
of George Steiner’s Real Presences (1989; Von realer Gegenwart, 1990). 
45  “wasza dziś realna-szkoła”, “zarówno płytka, jak nieszczera”− Norwid 1971–76/II: 92 
46  For a general account of civilizational skepticism in nineteenth-century Poland see 
Jedlicki 1999: 140−41 and passim. 
47  “jawność jedynym jest lekarstwem na fata morgana polityczne – bo co jawne, to nie 
jest do nikogo osobiście zmierzonym, ale do czasu tego tylko.” − Norwid 1971–
76/VII: 31 (“[Odpowiedź krytykom ‘Listów o emigracji’]” – “Reply to the Critics of 
the ‘Letters on the [Polish] Emigrationʼ”). 
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Jawność, which is in particular the quality of being present, has enclosed the French mind 
in that interim state, in that slimming of the present that is becoming a daily fact and ac-
cordingly, is of ephemerous value. 
For the present (i.e., for jawność)—the link with the relatively non-present, i.e., with the 
non-obvious, i.e., with both the past (tradition) and the future (addition) is broken—there 
is virtually no sequence, or if there is, then only a governmental and mechanistic one—
which is why everything becomes sequence-less.48 
 
Public life in the West would be that which is evident right now, regardless of 
both the origin and possible anticipations of the outcome, a kind of pre-stabilized 
interplay of politics and journalism or an institutional self-reproduction. Norwid, 
then, is seeking a stance on the narrow ridge between the unreliability of “per-
sonal conspiracy” (personalna konspiracja49) in Polish communities on the one 
hand and the all too “impersonal” public life in the West on the other. How can 
we make sense of this “third” position? What is clear is that it would have to an-
swer the two key criteria of (a) openness and (b) the ability to make use of one’s 
rights. But that openness would have to be non-sensational and, instead, embrace 
an archeological dimension, that is, a readiness to “dig” into cultural memory. 
Similarly, the use of one’s rights would have to be distinguished from the pre-
tense of individualistic and hedonistic consumption. 
 
 
Jawność between Utopia and Prophetic Pragmatism 
 
We now begin to see that the sphere that Norwid is trying to occupy as an intel-
lectual has not yet been defined—unless we admit very generally that the eleven 
or eighteen volumes (Pisma wszystkie or the more recent Dzieła wszystkie re-
spectively) of his Collected Works sufficiently represent that sphere. Again, that 
                                                           
48  “Jawność, będąc przymiotem obecności szczególnie, zawarła tu umysł francuski w tę 
doraźność, w te obecności zeszczuplenie, które dniowością już się staje i efemeryczną 
też ma wartość. / Dla obecności (to jest jawności) – z nieobecnym-względnie, to jest z 
niejawnym, to jest z przeszłym (z tradycją) i z przyszłym (z addycją) pozrywano – se-
kwencji nie ma prawie żadnej, albo guwernemantalna i mechaniczna tylko – nie-
konsekwentne zatem wszystko.” − ibid.: 32. 
49  See n. 41. Maria Janion has shown, on the basis of confessions made by members of 
the “Association of the Polish People” (Stowarzyszenie Ludu Polskiego, second half 
of the 1830s), how shallowly their “conspiratorial ethics” was often rooted and how 
easily it could be “broken” during interrogations. − Janion 1976: 33−35. 
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would be inappropriate even from Norwid’s own perspective because his writ-
ings remained largely unpublished during his lifetime. One of his many remarks 
on journalistic issues may give us an indication. He wrote: 
 
There is not one single [Polish journal] that would, I do not even dare to say, answer the 
question, but that would even ask it, What is man? What is life? What is time? What is la-
bor? What is money? What is the higher? What is harmony? What is jawność?50 
 
What Norwid is imagining here is a fundamental journalism of essences. My 
proposal would be, then, that the sphere of jawność clearly bears “metaphysical” 
traits, as I mentioned above while discussing Norwid’s high esteem for Słowac-
ki’s Kordian. Moreover, that sphere in a political sense reveals many utopian 
features and therefore programmatically escapes graspable concretizations to a 
certain extent. This tendency may be illustrated by the fact that Norwid often de-
liberately seems to ignore the tight limitations of engagement in the partitioned 
Poland of his times. In so doing, he presents jawność as radically possible even 
if it in fact was not. Now, it might be helpful to understand this utopia more as a 
hypothetical or even counterfactual strategy with a very practical aim; namely, 
to persuade (future) readers to completely exhaust the limits of what can be done 
legally. Consequently, a utopian interpretation of jawność would make way for a 
“prophetic pragmatism” reading of sorts—to use Cornel West’s paradoxical 
phrase.51 
                                                           
50  “Ani jednego [pisma polskiego] nie ma, które by, nie powiem już: odpowiedziało, ale 
zapytało przynajmniej: co jest człowiek? co jest życie? co jest czas? co jest praca? co 
jest pieniądz? co jest wyższość? co jest ład? co jest jawność? – – – zatracają Serio!!” 
− Letter to Marian Sokołowski, 2 August 1865; Norwid 1971–76/IX: 184. 
51  To be sure, the social philosopher Cornel West introduced the concept in a completely 
different context historically, politically, and religiously. West defines prophetic prag-
matism as “a form of American left thought and action in our postmodern moment,” 
inspired by prophetic Christianity, especially the black liberation movement (Martin 
Luther King Jr. and others). Prophetic pragmatism’s aim is the “reinvigoration of a 
sane, sober, and sophisticated intellectual life in America and … a regeneration of so-
cial forces empowering the disadvantaged, degraded, and dejected.” − See West 1989, 
239. The emphasis on sanity, sobriety, and sophistication in public discourse is remi-
niscent of Norwid indeed. The advocacy for the disadvantaged is too, to a certain de-
gree. One cannot fail to think of Norwid’s two poems on the abolitionist John Brown 
which are marked by a deep sense of solidarity (“Do obywatela Johna Brown” [To the 
Citizen John Brown, 1859]; “John Brown” 1863). − See also Dickenson 1990. 
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The conspirator in the epic Quidam was characterized by a one-sided, self-
encapsulating “gloom.” The Romantic conspirator, Norwid’s contemporary, is a 
“hybrid” of monk and tightrope walker, an obscene mix, according to Norwid, of 
ascetic rigidness and the agility of a trickster. But even that irreconcilability may 
not have been foreign to Norwid the poet. One could put it as follows: just as 
there is a kind of metaphorical intimacy with conspiracy in his writings, there is 
also a certain vagueness about Norwid’s panacea, jawność. But there is a perfor-
mative power to this vagueness, a power to enact the very process of disclosure, 
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This chapter addresses a series of critical statements about conspiracy, both as a 
political means and as a social attitude, made in the writings of the Polish late 
Romantic Cyprian Norwid (1821–1883). “Peoples in decline,” he notes, “have 
only conspiratorial or machinating reason, there is no historical and open reason 
in them.” Norwid laments the existence of an informal system of gossip that 
“crystallizes” into conspiracies. With regard to nineteenth-century Poland, his re-
jection of conspiracy is tantamount to a strong critique of political Romanticism, 
i.e., of some key aspects of the Polish insurgent tradition. What Norwid calls for 
instead is a culture of “openness” and a transparent, non-revolutionary, truth-
seeking ethos. However, one cannot fail to observe a kind of fascination with 
conspiracy in his writings. This ambiguity, the chapter argues, reflects Norwid’s 
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1. Introduction: On the Genesis of Conspiracy Theories 
 
In a 2001 essay about conspiracy theories in Poland, journalist Teresa Bogucka 
writes that the word conspiracy does not have a bad connotation in Polish, quite 
the opposite. Since the eighteenth century, the country’s history has abounded 
with conspiracies, both real and fictitious.1 After describing a series of real and 
alleged conspiracies involving Freemasons and Jesuits during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Bogucka mostly dwells on the avalanche of anti-Jewish 
propaganda launched by the Polish communists in 1968. This campaign dealt 
with an alleged plot by the enemy of the classes—including Jewish residents 
who remained in the country after the Holocaust—against the Polish state. Bo-
gucka proclaims that after the fall of communism, the era of politically instru-
mentalized conspiracy narratives had come to an end in Poland. Fortunately, the 
times in which the government actively reinforced hatred in public campaigns, 
fueling unjustified fears against whole groups of the population are long gone.2 
But is this statement, made in 2001, still true today in a country that has under-
gone significant change? 
                                                           
1  Cf. Bogucka 2001: 125. 
2  Cf. ibid.: 135. 
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In this chapter, I contend that Poland’s present situation does not allow one 
to diagnose the end of conspiracy theories or their instrumentalization for politi-
cal purposes. Quite the converse, conspiracy theories have been en vogue in Po-
land again since at least 10 April 2010. On that day the plane TU-154M, which 
was supposed to carry Polish President Lech Kaczyński to the city of Smolensk 
in Western Russia for a commemoration ceremony, crashed in the course of a 
tragic catastrophe, claiming the lives of all 96 people on board. The fact that an 
important part of Poland’s military, political, and religious elite fell victim to the 
catastrophe was a huge shock for the Polish public. After a phase of mourning, 
however, the length of the investigation, the inefficient cooperation between Pol-
ish and Russian authorities, as well as political strife within Poland all contribut-
ed to a heated atmosphere; finally, it was claimed that the plane crash had actual-
ly been the result of a plot. Different theories emerged to explain the catastrophe 
in the wake of the investigation, each supported by different political and social 
groups. The decisive question was of course: was it an assassination attempt or 
just a mere accident? 
The following analysis does not try to answer the question of which version 
of the events about the Smolensk plane crash is true or false. Such an under-
taking would go far beyond the scope of this chapter and the expertise of its au-
thor. This chapter’s objective is rather to shed light on the genesis of discourses 
commonly labelled as conspiracy theories, and to do so under a variety of differ-
ent aspects. The Smolensk catastrophe and the conspiracy theories it spawned 
are suitable for conducting such an analysis for a simple reason. The Smolensk 
incident is a single, distinguishable event that happened quite recently. This 
makes it easy to access contemporary reactions, media reports, and other publi-
cations about it. This enables us to document various stages of the event’s cover-
age in the media, speculations about the course of events, and eventually the 
emergence of two opposing theories, each accusing the other of a lack of truth. 
Thus, the following pages are an initial attempt at describing and analyzing dis-
courses that can be described as being at least partially conspiratorial.  
In order to achieve this objective, the first part of the chapter contains a theo-
retical overview of the concept of a conspiracy theory. This analysis aims to re-
frain from any form of value judgement and—drawing on an approach adopted 
by the sociology of knowledge—to define conspiracy theories as an additional 
form of knowledge or discourse existing alongside other forms.3 The following 
section deals with the historical context of the Katyn massacre, which plays an 
important role in the construction of conspiratorial discourses surrounding the 
                                                           
3 Cf. Anton/Schetsche/Walter 2012. 
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2010 plane crash. Then follows a description of the catastrophe based on the 
Polish Lasek report (at the time of its publication, the official government ver-
sion). In the course of the lengthy investigations, this initial document was fol-
lowed by many other reports and commissions that were increasingly character-
ized by political conflicts, including accusations that important information had 
been concealed or destroyed and that the plane crash was in fact an orchestrated 
operation planned by a foreign power. Thus, the present chapter aims to give a 
comprehensive overview of the whole process of the genesis of a conspiracy 
theory: from the event itself until the complete discourse that develops its own 
dynamics within society and media. 
 
 
2. Conspiratorial Discourses and the Smolensk Plane Crash 
 
2.1 Conspiracy Theories as a Form of Unorthodox Knowledge 
Conspiracy theories are a topic that is hard to deal with in a neutral way. There-
fore, the academic treatment of this phenomenon has frequently been character-
ized by the preconceived notion of conspiracy theories as morally “wrong” or 
manipulative knowledge. This kind of knowledge not only serves as a fertile 
ground for all kinds of political and religious extremism, it also allows for rather 
explicit conclusions regarding the intelligence, rationality or even assertions 
about the mental health of its adherents.4 This view of the term conspiracy theo-
ry is also popular outside of the academic context, where such theories are often 
qualified as “bizarre private opinions” whose followers advocate “stereotypical 
and monocausal worldviews”; many critics argue that it would be better if these 
people did not take part in public debate in a rational society.5 Thus, the fact that 
people increasingly accuse each other of believing conspiracy theories is an indi-
cator of increased aggression in current public discourse today. If conventional 
criticism does not suffice, then it is still possible to accuse your opponent of be-
lieving in conspiracy theories, trying to completely exclude them from the dis-
cussion. 
Let us now take a closer look at the structural features of conspiracy theories 
and conspiratorial discourses. Historical experience, ranging from the plot 
against Julius Caesar to the Watergate affair, shows that the topic of such theo-
ries—i.e., conspiracies—is a very real phenomenon. Conspiracies, defined as 
“secret, planned agreements between a group of several participants, aiming at 
                                                           
4  Cf. Anton/Schetsche/Walter 2014: 10. 
5  Cf. Lau 2016: 11. 
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their own advantage to the detriment of the majority of people” have always 
been a part of human life.6 Knowledge about real conspiracies inevitably leads to 
speculations about other, more secret ones which have simply gone undiscovered 
to date. These speculations are referred to as conspiracy theories in everyday 
language as well as in academic discourse. However, the expression theory is ac-
tually a misnomer, since they are not theories in a strictly scientific sense: con-
spiracy theories cannot be disproven by falsification, as is the case in natural sci-
ences. Instead, more or less empirical data are connected into statements that are 
not to be doubted and single incidents are often read as indicators for all-encom-
passing conspiracies. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that some researchers prefer the term conspira-
cy myth to the conventional conspiracy theory.7 Here, the term myth should be 
associated with a pre-scientific, quasi-religious, and uncritical worldview. This 
automatically stigmatizes the search for alternative explanation models of events 
practiced by conspiracy theorists as dubious, if not outright dangerous. The same 
theorists often attribute the development of conspiracy theories to psychological 
or social effects, like e.g., cognitive dissonance reduction.8 This term, taken 
from psychology, means that certain individuals—overwhelmed by the complex-
ity of the modern world—search for simple explanations and solutions to their 
problems. As a consequence of this, multi-faceted phenomena like wars, eco-
nomic crises or catastrophes are often viewed as elements of a ‘big plan,’ while 
certain social minorities, e.g., Jews, communists or Freemasons, are blamed as 
having orchestrated these situations. 
However, this depiction of conspiratorial thought presents two significant 
weaknesses. The first problem is concerned with the relationship between reality 
and fiction in a broad sense, the second one arises because the expression con-
spiracy theory is not a neutral term, but a derogatory term. As for the first point, 
Karl Hepfer in his introductory work Verschwörungstheorien. Eine philosophi-
sche Kritik der Unvernunft (Conspiracy Theories: A Philosophical Critique of 
Irrationality, 2015) remarks that since the time of René Descartes, the question 
of truth can no longer be answered unequivocally. Descartes, by systematically 
questioning the validity of human perception and empirical knowledge, left hu-
manity his famous cogito ergo sum as the only and last certainty, shattering the 
then-prevailing notion that one only had to find out the truth about the world by 
                                                           
6  Johannsen/Röhl 2012: 24−25. 
7  Cf. Lau 2016: 11. 
8  Cf. Anton/Schetsche/Walter 2014: 11. 
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means of empirical observation.9 Today it is a commonsense notion that human 
beings—up to a certain degree—construct their subjective realities and truths 
themselves. Consequently, no propositions can be made with absolute certainty, 
which also holds for the perception of the world surrounding us every day. There 
always exists a possibility of deception, inaccuracy of our own perception or of 
misinterpretations. Taking this into account, Hepfer arrives at two remarkable 
conclusions. First, he does not view conspiracy theories in an entirely negative 
light, asserting that—with their doubt of firmly established beliefs and narra-
tives—they stand in a long tradition which he connects with Descartes and to 
other rationalist philosophers.10 Thus, it is possible that at least some conspiracy 
theories are triggered by emancipatory thinking in accordance with the values of 
the Enlightenment. Second, in a world without final certainties, it is logically 
impossible to completely and absolutely refute conspiracy theories. As Hepfer 
stresses, there always remains a lingering doubt as to whether the conspiratorial 
interpretation of an event might be true after all, even if it sounds outrageously 
ridiculous in the beginning.11 Moreover, as historical experience shows, there are 
numerous examples of unlikely scenarios and interpretations that nonetheless 
eventually turned out to be true. 
The second drawback of the conventional understanding of conspiracy theo-
ries is that researchers always a priori depict them as a reaction by individuals 
unable to cope with the complexity of the world, or as a consequence of social 
disappointment. In other words: the world is evil, unfair and meaningless, which 
is why people come up with their own simple explanations. However, this claim 
is not valid for two reasons: first, the complexity or simplicity of a theory does 
not contain any direct information about its probability. Simple explanations for 
complex events, such as plane crashes, economic crises or military conflicts are 
not automatically wrong, nor can they always be excluded as improbable. Fur-
thermore, an approach that categorically rejects alternative explanations as pa-
thological, supports the development of unreflective political and psychological 
ideas of normality. Thus, the participants in the discourse—implicitly or explicit-
ly—adopt common sense classifications offered by mainstream media and the 
majority culture.12  
What follows from this? It is of crucial importance that we be aware of the 
fact that neither conspiracy theories nor their academic treatment in the humani-
                                                           
9  Cf. Hepfer 2015: 52−53. 
10  Cf. Hepfer 2015: 54. 
11  Cf. ibid.: 55. 
12  Cf. Anton/Schetsche/Walter 2014: 12. 
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ties are located outside of social reality. The mere labelling of ideas and opinions 
as a conspiracy theory already has a delegitimizing effect, striving to exclude 
adherents of such theories from public discourse. The analysis of conspiracy 
theories should, therefore, observe one basic principle: conspiracy theories, as 
with any other form of discourse, cannot be evaluated by an ideal and neutral 
“außersoziales Realitätsverständnis” (extra-social understanding of reality), op-
erating with absolute values of truth and fiction. Conspiracy theories are part of 
social knowledge inventories and, therefore, we always have to analyze them in 
relation to this knowledge.13 This leads us to a notion of conspiracy theories as 
just one more type of social knowledge among many others. 
In their monograph on the sociology of conspiratorial thought, Anton/Schet-
sche/Walter describe conspiracy theories as nothing other than a heterodox form 
of knowledge, one that is in contradiction to socially recognized and convention-
al forms of knowledge, which they call orthodox.14 Hence, a sociological ap-
proach to conspiracy theories has to place its focus on the processes which gen-
erate and facilitate differences between heterodox and orthodox—i.e. alternative 
and conventional respectively—forms of knowledge in discourses. In this con-
text, concrete social factors always play a crucial role: which population groups 
and/or institutions are involved in the creation of heterodox forms of knowledge, 
who tends to adopt them and who rejects them?15 In conducting such an analysis, 
one has to keep in mind that it is not possible to confirm or refute a discourse—
be it heterodox or orthodox—simply by analyzing it. Instead, the sociological 
approach presumes that knowledge in the form of public discourse is produced 
throughout the course of a social process, one which is not directly linked to the 
extra-discursive world. 
Taking the abovementioned points into account, this chapter is based on 
three main methodological principles. The first principle is the impossibility of 
proving or refuting assumptions about the real world with absolute certainty. 
Therefore, the focus of this chapter rests on the origin and the structure of con-
spiracy theories as discourse, rather than the relation of this discourse to the ex-
tralinguistic world to which it refers. Second, it is necessary to liberate the term 
conspiracy theory from its negative connotation as deliberately wrong, potential-
ly extremist manipulation. Rather than that, we have to view them as a special 
type of socially constructed discourse concerned with the interpretation of histor-
ical events or current processes, described by them as the direct results of con-
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spiracies. Conspiracy theories are also subject to the same processes that any 
other form of discourse is. The only difference is that a conspiracy theory per 
definition represents a discourse that is publicly unaccepted and, hence, consti-
tutes a form of alternative or heterodox knowledge. The third principle of the 
present analysis is its diachronic approach. As Johannen and Röhl remark, con-
spiracy theories always have to fit into the collective imagination of a certain 
group or society in order to tap into previously existing fears and stereotypes.16 
Hence, the analysis of a conspiracy theory originating in Poland should take the 
prevailing moods, underlying sentiments, social fears and the attitude towards 
conspiratorial ideas within Polish society into account. Without such informa-
tion, any description of conspiratorial discourses will be incomplete. Therefore, 
the next section begins with a short historical contextualization of the dramatic 
events of 10 April 2010. 
 
 
2.2 Katyn: Trauma with Consequences 
It seems necessary to first provide a short historical overview of the massacre of 
Katyn, a Soviet war crime committed during World War II, given that is not only 
directly connected to the Polish President’s journey to Smolensk on 10 April 
2010, but also plays at least an indirect role in the emergence of related conspir-
acy theories. 
The massacre of Katyn is the most prominent incident in a series of political-
ly motivated war crimes committed by the Soviet People’s Commissariat for In-
ternal Affairs (NKVD) in April and May 1940 against more than 25,000 Polish 
citizens—mainly soldiers, but also representatives of the social elite.17 The rea-
son for this war crime can be found in the aftermath of the Soviet annexation of 
Eastern Poland in 1939, in accordance with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression 
Pact. 250,000 Polish soldiers found themselves in Soviet camps, causing prob-
lems for the Soviet authorities who were not prepared for such high numbers of 
prisoners.18 The head of the People’s Commissariat, Lavrenty Beria, turned to 
the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, asking him for permission to execute the Polish 
prisoners by firing squad in a letter dated 5 March 1940. Stalin and the Politburo 
gave their consent and ordered Beria to treat the cases of 25,700 Polish prisoners 
of war by means of a special procedure—i.e., without any legal procedures at 
                                                           
16  Johannsen/Röhl 2010: 29. 
17  Cf. Zaslavsky 2007: 9. 
18  Cf. ibid.: 21. 
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all—and to apply the maximum sentence: death by firing squad.19 Immediately, 
the Poles were removed from the camps. More than four thousand Polish officers 
were brought into a forest near the village of Katyn in the Smolensk district from 
one of the main camps in the Russian city of Kozelsk; here NKVD officials 
killed 4,143 Poles through shots in the back of the head.20 Moreover, the Soviets 
killed many more Polish prisoners in other places throughout the Soviet Union. 
The propagandistic abuse of the massacre that followed can be taken as a 
typical example for the deliberate construction of orthodox discourse in a totali-
tarian society, showing that the mainstream interpretation of an event does not 
necessarily have anything to do with historical facts. When Nazi-German sol-
diers discovered the mass graves in Katyn in the course of their war against the 
Soviet Union in 1943, they announced this to an international public, hoping to 
instrumentalize the massacre for their own propagandistic purposes.21 Among 
the Western allies, neither the US nor the UK were interested in an investigation 
of the matter—the alliance with Stalin to fight Hitler was more important. When 
the Prime Minister of the Polish government in-exile confronted the British 
Prime Minister Churchill with proof that over 15,000 Polish officers had been 
killed by the Soviets, the latter is reported to have answered: “If they are dead, 
there is nothing that will bring them back to life. ... We must beat Hitler, this is 
not the right time for bickering and accusations.”22 
Still during the war, two investigative commissions—one that was set up by 
Nazi Germany and one by the Red Cross—arrived at the same conclusion: the 
Polish officers were shot in the spring of 1940, i.e., at a time when the area was 
still under Soviet rule.23 Soviet authorities appointed their own investigation 
committee immediately after the Soviets had liberated the region from the Nazis, 
which carried the lengthy name Special commission for the assessment and in-
vestigation of the circumstances leading to the shooting of Polish prisoners of 
war by fascist German invaders in the Katyn forest.24 Unsurprisingly, this com-
mission came to the conclusion that the executions were carried out over one 
year later by the Germans. In the course of events, this version became part of 
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official Soviet as well as official Polish (communist) historiography. Until the 
end of the 1980s, it was not possible to officially and publicly talk about the 
causes for the massacre, neither in the Soviet Union nor in Poland. It was only 
Mikhail Gorbachev that publicly declared the NKVD’s responsibility for the ex-
ecutions.25 In 1989, the Russian public office of military prosecution even under-
took steps to resume the investigation of the massacre. However, this came to an 
abrupt halt in 2004, the justification being that investigative action had not con-
firmed that a genocide of the Polish people had taken place.26 
It is not hard to understand that this event, along with the subsequent efforts 
to cover up everything, have remained in the collective memory of Polish society 
up until today. Zaslavsky, among many other researchers, contends that the 
Poles never believed the Soviet version. An overwhelming majority of the Polish 
population never doubted that the Soviets were responsible for the killings.27 
Their experience of a historical truth was suppressed and could not even be men-
tioned, while the official version was a blatant lie. This went down in Polish his-
tory as the ‘Katyn lie.’ It is a topic that still casts its shadow upon Polish-Russian 
relations today. Moreover, the history of the Katyn massacre serves as bitter 
proof that cover-ups and historical lies do exist in the real world and that one 
should never blindly believe in an official version, simply because it comes from 
the authorities. In this context, knowledge of the Katyn massacre is necessary for 




2.3 The Plane Crash of 10 April 2010—an Overview 
The immediate cause for the Polish President Lech Kaczynski’s journey to Rus-
sia was the seventieth anniversary of the Soviet massacre of Katyn. The Polish 
government decided to hold the official ceremony on 7 April 2010 in the course 
of a meeting between the Prime Ministers of both countries—Vladimir Putin and 
Donald Tusk. Since this event was scheduled to take place in the absence of the 
President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński had scheduled his own visit to take place 
three days later.28 Commentators attributed the reason for the President’s and his 
Prime Minister’s separate visits to the existence of a political conflict between 
them. Tusk, a member of the liberal-conservative Platforma Obywatelska (PO, 
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Civic Platform), advocated a more moderate relationship towards Russia, while 
Kaczyński of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) party was 
known for his anti-Russian sentiment. There were reports circulated in the media 
that talked about political games through which Tusk and the PO wanted to harm 
the President to keep him away from the remembrance ceremony. In a report 
published by Antoni Macierewicz, a PiS politician and member of the Polish 
Parliament, it states: 
 
From 2009 onwards, the Polish council of ministers was playing a game together with the 
Russians in order to prevent President Kaczynski from taking part in the Katyn anniver-
sary. The representatives of the council of ministers agreed to a script devised by the Rus-
sians only to denigrate the President of the Polish Republic.29 
 
Roth also writes that the Tusk government actively tried to exclude the Presi-
dent—who was known for his anti-Russian stance—from the meeting in order to 
improve Polish-Russian relations.30 In any case, the question of setting the date 
for the visit was already a matter that gave rise to speculations and heterodox 
explanatory models. 
According to official information, the president’s plane, a Russian Tupolev 
TU-154M, took off from Warsaw Chopin Airport at 7:27 AM (Central European 
Time). Its destination was the military airport Smolensk-North located near Ka-
tyn. At about 10:24 AM (Moscow Time), the aircraft was approaching the desti-
nation airport for landing; however, the ground personnel informed the crew that 
a landing was not possible at that moment due to bad visibility conditions. None-
theless, the captain asked the head of the tower crew for permission to try out a 
landing approach in order to determine the exact conditions. At the same time, 
however, he informed the diplomatic chief of protocol that they probably had to 
prepare for a landing in one of the Belorussian airports of Minsk or Vitebsk, as 
the weather conditions and especially the thick fog did not allow for a landing.31 
Nonetheless, the aircraft tried out a landing approach with the consent of the 
Russian ground crew. Problems arose during the initial descent towards airstrip 
D 26. The internal TAWS (Terrain Awareness and Warning System) indicated a 
                                                           
29  “Od połowy 2009 r. Rada Ministrów RP prowadziła grę ze stroną rosyjską zmie-
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31  Cf. Komisja Laska 2015. 
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higher flight altitude than was actually the case. At 10:40:50 local time, the pilot 
eventually wanted to end the landing approach, giving the order “Initiate a go-
around.”32 Only a few seconds later, at 10:41:00, the plane came into contact 
with objects on the ground, due to its low altitude. Despite a slow rise in altitude, 
the relative height of the plane did not increase due to the composition of the ter-
rain. At 10:41:02, the plane hit a birch tree that ripped off about a third of the left 
wing and made the aircraft unmaneuverable, tilting it to the left. After a final or-
der by the ground crew to abort the landing approach, the plane hit the ground at 
10:41:07 at a speed of 260 km/h. It was completely destroyed through the colli-
sion and none of the crew or the passengers survived the accident; 96 people 
died, including the President of the Republic of Poland.33  
This version is a broad summary of the results published by the Polish feder-
al commission for the investigation of the catastrophe; it is, however, not the on-
ly version of the events, as will be shown in the following section. 
 
 
2.4 A War of Commissions: Conflicts about  
the “Truth of Smolensk” 
Although not everybody would agree with the description of the events provided 
above, it is largely based on observable data such as recordings of the communi-
cation between the plane crew and the ground personnel or the technical instru-
ments of the plane. Of course, this version does not provide a full explanation for 
the reasons for the catastrophe. Many questions remain unanswered: why did the 
pilots try to land despite the bad conditions? What exactly was the effect of the 
damaged TAWS system? Might there have been any other factors that played a 
role? Moreover, one has to take into account that in the days and weeks directly 
after the plane crash, there had not been any official version yet. From a socio-
logical view, this is an interesting point in time: a tragic event took place, the in-
terpretation of which is still completely open. There are no orthodox mainstream 
versions and no heterodox alternatives to them. Society awaits a narrative that 
consistently explains how the tragedy could happen. 
A common means to fabricate such narratives are investigative commissions. 
They are not only official in nature, but also consist of reputable experts and pol-
iticians who do extensive research into the matter and publish a report at the end 
of their work that sums up their findings. These reports have a huge influence on 
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the way certain events are perceived in public—one might think about the report 
by the Warren Commission about the assassination of President Kennedy or the 
9/11 Commission Report. Nonetheless, it is clear that all of the different groups 
that were somehow involved in the plane crash immediately started to support a 
discourse that would show themselves in a more positive light. Therefore, the 
best way to conduct an investigation into a matter like the Smolensk plane crash 
is to call upon an uninvolved third party, which can best guarantee the neutrality 
and independence of the process. However, in the case of the Smolensk incident, 
no investigation was carried out by a third party, e.g., an international commis-
sion. On the contrary, it was a federal Russian commission that mostly did the 
work of investigation. This in turn led to constant skepticism on the part of the 
Poles who questioned the neutrality of the Russian experts from the outset. 
The first Russian commission that dealt with the Smolensk plane crash was 
set up by the Russian civil aviation committee MAK.34 It presented its final re-
port on 12 January 2011 in Moscow.35 This report was neither accepted by the 
Polish public nor by the Polish political elites, since it placed the sole responsibi-
lity for the accident on the Polish pilot and the cabin crew. According to the 
MAK report, the main reasons for the catastrophe were failure to abort the land-
ing approach earlier, in spite of bad weather conditions, ignoring the internal 
warning systems as well as psychological pressure exerted on the pilot by the 
Diplomatic Chief of Protocol, Mariusz Kazana, and the Commander of the Pol-
ish Air Force, Andrzej Blasik. Moreover, the speed of the descent was much too 
high. Apart from that, Commander Blasik supposedly had alcohol in his blood.36 
The commission asserted that Blasik had a blood alcohol level of 0.06 percent 
when he forced the pilots to try a landing approach. The tower crew in Smolensk 
also offered the Poles an alternative airport. They had not given explicit permis-
sion for landing.37 Prime Minister Donald Tusk described the MAK-report as in-
complete: “The MAK-report is incomplete, there will be talks with Russia about 
the creation of a common version. … The other side should also have the cour-
age and readiness to show the whole picture.”38 Jarosław Kaczyński, member of 
parliament and the late President Lech Kaczyński’s brother, called the MAK-
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report a “derision of Poland” and the then Defense Minister Klich stated that the 
MAK-report was politically motivated and that its aim was to embarrass the 
Polish nation by depicting one of the most important commanders of its army as 
a drunkard.39 Despite this harsh criticism, the MAK-report quickly obtained a 
quasi-official status, not only in Russia but also in a broader international public. 
In Poland, however, it was not only members of the national conservative PiS 
that rejected the Russian report, but the ruling Civic Platform also expressed its 
dissatisfaction. 
In addition to the investigation of the plane crash undertaken by the Russian 
MAK, the Poles set up their own federal commission to look into the case—the 
Committee for Investigation of National Aviation Accidents.40 This commis-
sion—better known by the name of its chairman, Jerzy Miller, minister of the in-
terior at the time—published its own closing report about the causes of the plane 
crash on 29 July 2011.41 Although the report does not substantially differ from 
the Russian MAK commission’s findings, it does place an emphasis on the par-
tial responsibility of the Russian ground crew, due to inadequate communication 
between the tower crew and the pilot as well as the airport’s bad equipment.42 As 
opposed to the Russian version, the Miller Commission was not able to detect 
any direct psychological pressure that was exerted on the pilots. However, the 
Polish report mentions indirect pressure because of the importance of the state 
visit: 
 
What can, however, be confirmed, is that there was pressure which influenced the crew in 
an indirect way, and was connected with the rank of the flight, presence of the most im-
portant people of the state onboard and importance of the ceremonies in the Forest of Ka-
tyn.43 
 
The publication of the Miller report represents an interesting point in Poland’s 
internal debate about the Smolensk plane crash. While most Polish experts and 
all political parties had agreed upon the incompleteness of the MAK-report, 
there were very different positions concerning the validity of its findings after 
the publication of the Miller report. These differences are mostly connected to 
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the political or ideological opinions of groups and institutions. Liberal media like 
the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and government politicians praised the com-
mission’s work, highlighting in particular the independence and high qualifica-
tions of its members who investigated the catastrophe for over a year and who 
were on the site of the plane crash in Smolensk only a few hours after the disas-
ter took place.44 However, the conservative PiS and other opposition parties 
harshly criticized the report from the very beginning. The main reason for their 
discontentment was the fact that the members of the Miller Commission were, to 
a large extent, the same politicians that were politically responsible for, or at 
least involved in, the president’s flight to Smolensk—among others the Chief of 
the Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, and the 
Minister of Defense. They should not have been chosen for these positions, since 
this entailed a conflict of interests.45 Moreover, Russian authorities had not en-
abled Polish investigators to access the original flight recorders, which led to the 
Polish commission writing its report without the original equipment at hand. The 
Russian MAK also withheld numerous documents and means of evidence neces-
sary for a detailed investigation.46 Therefore, some political commentators de-
scribed the Miller report as, at best, worthless if not actively manipulated: the 
daughter of one of the victims stated in an interview: “The whole report belongs 
in the trash can.”47 Without any access to original documents and evidence, the 
commission had not even properly conducted any investigative action, some 
claimed: “This is probably the only commission of this type in the whole world 
that investigated a catastrophe without even getting up from their desks.”48 
Dissatisfied with the investigations’ development, and skeptical about the ac-
tions of the Russian side, the opposition party PiS initiated its own parliamentary 
committee for the investigation of the TU-154M crash in Smolensk. This group 
was led by Antoni Macierewicz, PiS politician and member of the Polish Parlia-
ment. It published its first report, entitled Biała księga smoleńskiej tragedii 
(White Book of the Smolensk Tragedy), on 29 June 2011. Although it did not of-
fer any new narratives or changes to the findings of the previous reports, the ba-
sic message of the White Book was that the MAK report, as well as the work of 
the Miller Commission, were incomplete and faulty. According to the opposition 
                                                           
44  Cf. Roth 2015: 195. 
45  Wierzchołowski/Misiak 2013: 18. 
46  Cf. Roth 2015: 195−96. 
47  “Cały raport nadaje się więc do kosza.” − Wassermann/Rymanowski 2015: 161. 
48  “To chyba jedyna taka komisja na świecie, która badała katastrofę, nie odchodząc od 
swoich biurek.” − Wassermann/Rymanowski 2015: 163.  
Conspiratorial Discourses after the Smolensk Plane Crash | 293 
report, the government either had not taken into account serious facts or—worse 
still—had deliberately suppressed them. In the report, it states: 
 
Polish public opinion and the parliament were systematically given wrong information by 
the Russian side and by the government of Donald Tusk, concerning the catastrophe and 
the course of the investigation. This behavior points towards a deliberate cooperation be-
tween the government of Donald Tusk and the authorities of the Russian Federation to the 
detriment of Polish investigative efforts in order to make it impossible to find the truth.49 
 
With this document, the open conflict about the truth of Smolensk and—con-
sequently—the orthodox explanation of the plane crash gained momentum. In 
the beginning, the main goal of Macierewicz’s parliamentary group aimed main-
ly at refuting the findings of both the MAK report and the Miller Commission, 
e.g., the notion that psychological pressure on the pilots had contributed to the 
catastrophe or the assertion that the Commander of the Polish Air Force had al-
cohol in his blood. However, in the course of its existence, Macierewicz’s group 
conducted a variety of (sometimes controversial) experiments, published inter-
views with scientists and other experts and offered a number of alternative sce-
narios concerning the course of events leading up to the plane crash. All of these 
efforts were intended to disprove the official, governmental version about the pi-
lots’ main responsibility. Among these efforts were some that were viewed as re-
spectable and reasonable by the public. Other efforts, however, instead served 
the opposite purpose and made the group a laughingstock in the media; their at-
tempt to simulate the plane crash using sausages and empty beverage cans for 
example. The Polish journalist Bogdan Rymanowski described the government’s 
and of parts of the public reaction, towards these experiments in the following 
way: “They are pseudo-scientists compromising themselves with experiments 
using sausages and empty cans of energy drinks.”50 
It is important to note that from that point onwards both narratives, the ver-
sion of the government and the opposition’s alternative, were developing more 
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and more in different directions. The first version—supported by the ruling PO 
party, Prime Minster Donald Tusk, and many of the country’s most important 
media outlets—talked about the primary responsibility of the Polish cabin crew 
and about an unfortunate landing approach that was not stopped until it was too 
late. The second version—advocated by the largest opposition party PiS, some 
scientists, as well as the conservative Catholic environment—emerged as a criti-
cal response to the government report and the report by the Russian MAK Com-
mission. Even after the government’s official conclusion of the investigation, the 
Macierewicz group carried on its work, introducing a further element into the 
debate that can probably be described as the focal point of most alternative ex-
planations of the plane crash. The group raised the question: “Was there an ex-
plosion onboard the plane that led to the crash?”51 In order to promote and dis-
cuss his theories, Antoni Macierewicz has regularly held so-called “Smolensk 
Conferences” since 2012. After the first conference, his parliamentary group 
published a new report titled 28 Months after Smolensk, in which he claimed that 
the plane had not crashed because of bad weather or the pilots’ mistakes, but be-
cause of explosions in the aircraft.52 
Macierewicz’s parliamentary group’s actions forced the government to de-
fend its own version of the events, as described in the Miller report. Consequent-
ly, the Prime Minister set up another government commission in 2013, headed 
by engineer Maciej Lasek. This commission was expected to answer the last re-
maining questions concerning the Smolensk catastrophe beyond any doubt.53 
The name of the commission “Parliamentary group for the clarification of public 
opinion, information, and materials concerning the reasons and circumstances of 
the Smolensk catastrophe”54 already hints at the fact that the sole purpose of this 
commission was to inform the public about the ‘real’ background of the events. 
Since the Lasek Commission, as it came to be known, did not conduct any new 
investigations, the opposition did not take it seriously and ignored its reports. 
Thus, the frontlines between the government and the opposition were hardening 
even more. 
After a PiS victory in the parliamentary elections of 2015, Antoni Maciere-
wicz became defense minister and turned his parliamentary group for the inves-
tigation of the plane crash into an official commission run by the defense minis-
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try; its task has been to continue investigating the matter and it is still in opera-
tion today.55 In an article published on the Polish news site oko.press, the authors 
list twenty four conspiracy theories, most of which are supposed to have been in-
fluenced directly or indirectly by Antoni Macierewicz. They write: “Without 
doubt, most credit for the creation, finding and propagation of conspiracy theo-
ries must go to Antoni Macierewicz. For five years he has been looking for an 
appropriate explanation for the tragedy.”56 It is also interesting which of the 
Polish media outlets are associated with the propagation of various conspiracy 
theories. Apart from the Macierewicz commission’s website, they also list some 
very right-wing newspapers and magazines like Nasz Dziennik (Our Daily), Ga-
zeta Polska (Polish Newspaper) or the online portal wPolityce.pl. These con-
servative media outlets have supposedly adopted the ‘Smolensk tragedy’ as one 
of their main topics in order to gain political capital from it.57 
The basic situation has remained more or less unchanged in Poland. Howev-
er, the change of government in 2015 initiated an interesting turn concerning the 
interpretation of the events in the Polish public from a sociological point of 
view. Whereas the theory of an assassination attempt was only supported by op-
position parties and some experts prior to 2015, now it was the Polish govern-
ment that officially casted doubt upon the findings of the Miller Commission 
published by its predecessor. Jarosław Kaczyński, Chairman of the ruling PiS 
party, continues to speak of a conspiracy in his speeches, stressing that the truth 
has not yet been uncovered: “Truth is constantly concealed … . We know with a 
high degree of certainty that it came to an explosion.”58 Thus, an alternative the-
ory that emerged out of doubt towards an official version has itself become offi-
cial. A heterodox version has become orthodox. At the same time, however, the 
Civic Platform clings to the version of the events as described in the Miller re-
port and defended by the Lasek Commission.  
In conclusion, two possible observations might be made here. First, the Smo-
lensk catastrophe is being instrumentalized in the current political climate in Po-
land, a climate characterized by grave tensions and severe conflict. Second, the 
last word about the events leading to the Smolensk plane crash has not yet been 
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uttered. It seems that a lot of time will have to pass until Polish society can agree 
upon one version of the events. At present, political conflict and mutual suspi-
cion prevent the responsible forces from such an agreement. 
 
 
3. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
In a 2010 monograph, Wolfgang Reintaler put together a collection of twenty-six 
theses concerning conspiracy theories. One of them reads: “Conspiracy theories 
are no impartial instruments of knowledge, but rather ideological and political 
tools serving to determine one’s enemies.”59 This thesis is true in a double sense: 
first, it depicts conspiracy theories as ‘instruments of knowledge’ by means of 
which we are enabled the construction of meaning from the often enigmatic 
events and phenomena surrounding us. Second, the thesis disputes the impartia-
lity of these instruments—they a priori always respond to an internal scheme of 
‘friend’ and ‘enemy.’ It has not been my objective in this chapter to refute this 
thesis, but rather to extend it in order to include not only conspiracy theories 
but—at least partially—all forms of discourse. In the first section, the difference 
between heterodox and orthodox ‘instruments of knowledge’ turned out to be a 
merely gradual one. Even theories that are socially endorsed and supported can-
not be completely impartial and always carry traces of ideological and political 
influences within them. 
The topic of the Smolensk plane crash as well as the ensuing controversies 
concerning the investigation of the catastrophe, the supposed or real motives be-
hind different social and political groups, and the alleged hush up of important 
information, work well to illustrate this point. Taking the burdensome historical 
background of the Katyn massacre as described in the first section into account, 
the death of many members of the Polish elite in the Smolensk plane crash and 
the complex judicial, political, and medial aftermath provided a fertile ground 
for the emergence of conspiratorial discourse. The political constellation of two 
rivalling parties, gradually building up and promoting their own version of the 
events, just accelerated this process. The Civic Platform (PO) stressed its excel-
lent cooperation with the Russian authorities and the responsibility of the Polish 
pilots; the Law and Justice (PiS) party in turn sharply rejected this version. The 
main responsibility for the tragedy, they maintain, lies with Russia and the 
                                                           
59  “Bei einer Verschwörungstheorie handelt es sich nicht um ein unparteiisches Erkennt-
nisinstrument, sondern um ein der Feindbestimmung dienendes ideologisch-politi-
sches Werkzeug.” − Reintaler 2010: 150. 
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Polish government who obstructed a full and effective investigation for political 
reasons. Eventually, the Law and Justice party came up with an alternative ex-
planation model: there had been explosions onboard the plane. PiS is striving to 
prove this version even today, with the help of parliamentary commissions and 
conferences. 
One of the most striking turning points in the aftermath of the Smolensk ca-
tastrophe is the rise to power of the Law and Justice party in 2015. Thus, a party 
promoting a heterodox explanation model for the Smolensk tragedy—in other 
words, a conspiracy theory—took over the government. Time will tell if the PiS 
will be able to turn its narrative of the explosions and of a political assassination 
into a dominant, orthodox discourse. In this context, it would be interesting to 
conduct further research into the social preconditions for the genesis of conspira-
cy theories. Which conditions must be fulfilled in a society to make it vulnerable 
to conspiratorial thinking? Which types of discourse spread particularly fast? 
And which factors decide if a theory is heterodox or orthodox? It is especially 
the more recent cases of conspiracy theories—the Smolensk plane crash for ex-
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There has probably been no event more tragic in Poland’s recent history than the 
crash of the presidential airplane, Tupolev TU-154M, that took place near the 
Russian city of Smolensk on 10 April 2010. The aircraft was supposed to carry 
the Polish President Lech Kaczyński along with a delegation of politicians, mili-
tary officers, and state officials to Smolensk. Kaczyński travelled there to attend 
a ceremony marking the seventieth anniversary of the Katyn massacre, a series 
of mass executions of members of the Polish mass exectutions of Polish military 
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officers carried out by the Soviets in 1940. However, after a series of unfavour-
able circumstances including thick fog, technological trouble and communica-
tion problems with the ground crew, the aircraft descended far below the expec-
ted approach path, collided with a tree and crashed into the ground. All members 
of the delegation—including President Kaczyński and his wife—died in the 
crash. Poland declared a three-day national mourning period; for once, the Polish 
people as well as members of all political camps were united in sorrow and re-
membrance of the dreadful events. Yet, when it came to examining the exact 
course of events and answering the question of who was responsible for the tra-
gedy, a bitter conflict ensued over the causes of the tragic plane crash. While 
some believe that the Polish pilots were responible, others maintained that the 
catastrophe could not have been a mere accident and that there must be more to 
the matter. Many people believed an act of political violence or a terrorist attack 
had taken place, one that had probably been coordinated by Russia. Thus, the 
question of the truth behind the Smolensk plane crash has not only become a 
question of political beliefs in today’s Poland, but it is also a fertile ground for 
alternative explanation models and conspiracy theories. This chapter takes a clo-
ser look into the creation and circulation of some of these narratives and poses 
the question of how a certain discourse can change its status from a marginal one 




Wallenrodian Conspiracy Revisited Twice  
and Not Quite: Marcin Wolski’s Wallenrod  








The story of Adam Mickiewicz’s Konrad Wallenrod (1828)—a Lithuanian boy 
grows up to become Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, which, after he finds 
out his true identity, he betrays in an act of national fervor before committing 
suicide—might at first not appear to be much more than an unremarkable, typi-
cally romantic story that could have come straight from a Walter Scott novel. 
However, due to Mickiewicz’s choice to tell the story as a narrative poem and in 
a highly achronological fashion, and supported by the historical context—it was 
published in 1828 Saint Petersburg for a Polish audience under a Russian yoke—
it became both highly regarded and highly influential. 
Adam Mickiewicz was a trendsetter in Polish literature in more than one re-
spect. He was certainly one by 1832 when, in the prologue of Dziady III (Fore-
fathers Eve III), he revisited his earlier work Konrad Wallenrod with the famous 
scene in which his protagonist, Gustaw, declares his resurrection as Konrad on 
his prison walls. This is commonly regarded as a reference to Konrad-Wallen-
rod-the-character’s patriotic altruism, which now takes the place of Gustaw’s 
romantic individualism. While these two characters share the same name and 
might be alike, they are far from being one and the same and differ in many oth-
er respects. The former is merely an adaptation of the latter, an intertextual refer-
ence, albeit a highly relevant one. This change emphasizes the widespread ‘noto-
riety’ that the protagonist of Konrad Wallenrod had already gained in the four 
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years since its publication. Mickiewicz would have been sure that his readers 
understood the point that Gustaw was making in shuffling off his nomenclative 
coil and exchanging it for a different one: they would have known it was not just 
any name.  
Authors writing adaptations of their own work or referencing it is, of course, 
nothing new, nor is it at all that remarkable when other authors do likewise. It ei-
ther becomes interesting when the narrative of a certain work becomes a literary 
topos or when an existing literary topos becomes associated with a certain work 
to such an extent that the two appear synonymous. Within Polish literature, this 
seems to have happened with Konrad Wallenrod and the Wallenrodian treason 
for the national cause derived therefrom.  
While foreign critics, such as Ukrainian poet Ivan Franko, see Wallenrodism 
as a typically Polish cult of treachery for which Mickiewicz himself is solely to 
blame,1 and while it figures frequently in conspiracy theories concerning Poland, 
Polish critics see it mostly as an inadequate form of resistance, draining power 
from more overt forms. This did not diminish the role of Mickiewicz’s paradigm 
that “the slaves’ only weapon is deceit”2 in Poland itself. However, the—at first 
glance at least—remarkably positive view of such conspirational thought in Po-
land offers possibilities for instrumentalization abroad. One can observe this af-
ter the 1830−31 November Uprising, when the attitudes of Russian intellectuals 
such as Pushkin or Bestuzhev towards Poles generally soured considerably: they 
saw their assumptions about Polish “untrustworthiness” confirmed. 
This chapter can, of course, not sound the length, breadth and depth of Polish 
literary history in its entirety for works that take up this topos, nor is this neces-
sary in the first place: most of this monumental task has already been completed 
by Polish literary scholar and author Stefan Chwin in his 1993 work Literatura i 
zdrada (Literature and Treason).3 I would instead like to analyze two of the 
most recent traces that Mickiewicz’s Konrad Wallenrod has left during its al-
most 200 year march through Polish literary history—two works that Chwin, for 
the obvious reason that they were published almost twenty years after his mono-
graph, did not take into consideration: Szczepan Twardoch’s Wieczny Grunwald, 
powieść zza końca czasów (Eternal Grunwald, A Novel from Beyond the End of 
Times, 2010) and Marcin Wolski’s Wallenrod (2010). Both of these works ap-
                                                           
1  Cf. Franko 2016. 
2  “… jedyna broń niewolników – podstępy.” Mickiewicz 1997: 290−91. All translations 
in this chapter are mine, B.M. 
3  Cf. Chwin 1993. 
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peared in the National Center of Culture’s alternate history series Zwrotnice cza-
su (The Switching Points of Time).4 
The fact that the National Center of Culture propagates alternate history writ-
ing with its own book series should be viewed in the light of a wider trend in Po-
land where alternate history has flourished since 1989—not only in literature, as 
Netflix’s first Polish original series 1983 has shown. As Magdalena Górecka 
pointedly notes, this is in part because utopias of the future have been discredited 
in Poland since the failure of the last utopian project that was attempted within 
its borders—that of Communism. According to her, the place of utopias has been 
relocated from the future to the past.5 
 
 
Wallenrod or The Double Wallenrod 
 
The first novel, Marcin Wolski’s 2009 Wallenrod, is a spy novel set in an alter-
nate history whose point of deviation is Piłsudski’s death; thanks to treatment by 
a mysterious French doctor, the Marshal of Poland, instead of passing away in 
1935, lives until 1941, which changes the course of history. Under Piłsudski’s 
continued guidance Poland complies with German demands for Danzig and a 
road and train connection between Germany proper and East Prussia, cooperat-
ing with Germany in a “Zerschlagung der Rest-Tschechoslowakei” (its Czech 
parts become a German protectorate while Slovakia becomes a Polish one) even-
tually partaking in a successful invasion of the Soviet Union together with Fran-
coist Spain, Italy, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. After a war in the West 
against the Netherlands, Belgium and most importantly Great Britain and 
France, which is easily won by mostly German troops, the novel comes to its 
grand finale—Hitler gathering Europe’s heads of state in the city of “New Jeru-
salem,” built on the shores of the Dnieper River. This city is intended to serve as 
the capital of a newly established “Jewish Republic,” on which he plans to use 
the first atomic bomb. Thanks to the bravery of a Polish fighter pilot who is 
smuggled aboard the plane that is carrying this deadly weapon, the bomb oblite-
rates not Europe’s heads of state and a large part of its Jewry, but instead annihi-
lates practically the entirety of Nazi German leadership. After a successful Oper-
ation Valkyrie, Germany subsequently slides into a civil war which ends in the 
restoration of German democracy.  
                                                           
4  For a greater overview of this series, cf. Lemann 2011. 
5  Górecka 2014: 12. 
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The novel is told from the perspective of Halina Silberstein, the daughter of a 
Jewish communist and a Polish szlachcianka (‘noblewoman’) who becomes Hit-
ler’s private secretary as a part of the Polish secret service and under the guise of 
the German Helena Wichmann. Aware of Hitler’s “New Jerusalem” plot, she ini-
tiates its reversal under “my new pseudonym, which is close to the heart of every 
Pole: ‘Wallenrod’!”6 The fighter pilot who carries out the eventual bombing is 
Silberstein’s cousin, who himself has to betray his gay lover: the German pilot 
assigned for the job. 
Wallenrod is embedded in several significant traditions. Firstly, and most 
obviously, a Wallenrodian one—this is alluded to as early as in the work’s title– 
which seems, of course, to be closely connected to the genre of the spy novel 
more generally. The novel’s ‘novelty’ lies in its doubling: both the protagonist 
and Poland itself play Wallenrodian roles and achieve the right ends by the 
wrong means. Silberstein is the microlevel; Poland the macrolevel. This is made 
explicit in Silberstein’s, sometimes ruthless, methods on the one hand and by 
Hitler himself repeatedly raping her on the other: both are mirrored in the novel 
by Poland’s Realpolitik. Moreover, like Mickiewicz’s Konrad Wallenrod, both 
Silberstein and Poland wait many years for the right time to strike. 
The second tradition concerns World War II alternate history writing which, 
as Kathleen Singles notes, “constitute[s] perhaps the largest ‘cluster,’ related by 
choice of historical subject, of such works from about 1940 to present in the 
Western world.”7 As Singles points out, the most convenient and most popular 
events that serve as so-called points of deviation are “those which have been 
emplotted in history as having the most significant and wide-reaching conse-
quences: wars, assassinations, inventions, elections,”8 and World War II simply 
stands out as an event of singular importance in history in general and in Polish 
history in particular. The connection of Piłsudski’s postponed death to World 
War II consists in his leadership steering Poland in a different direction in this 
conflict than its historical leaders had, radically changing the course of the war. 
Piłsudski’s vision is emphasized time and again in the novel—examples of this 
are Winston Churchill’s last words, spoken in a bunker underneath Whitehall in 
an all but occupied United Kingdom, shortly before his suicide: 
 
                                                           
6  “… moim nowym pseudonymem, bliskim serca każdego Polaka: ‘Wallenrod’!” − 
Wolski 2012: 384.  
7  Singles 2013: 50−51. 
8  Ibid.: 49. 
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“We are all guilty of what happened. When, in the afterlife, I shall meet Piłsudski, I shall 
congratulate him on his choice and his farsightedness—only he was right when he pro-
posed stopping Hitler before he grew strong.”9 
 
Halina Silberstein’s thoughts, as she looks out at a London in ruins, play into 
that, too: 
 
As I gazed upon this destroyed and humiliated city, my heart grew heavy and I thought of 
those Polish cities, flowering Warsaw, bustling Lwów and romantic Wilno. What would 
have become of them if we had not had Piłsudski’s plan?10 
 
The reader, of course, knows what would have happened to them, because it did: 
Warsaw was “destroyed and humiliated” instead of London; Lwów became a 
Ukrainian city and Wilno a Lithuanian one. 
This brings us to the third tradition from which Wolski is writing and which 
is already present in the paratext: the novel is dedicated to Paweł Wieczorkie-
wicz (who also appears as one of its characters: “the famous historian”11 by the 
same name). It is Wieczorkiewicz, a historian from the University of Warsaw 
and the Academy of Humanities in Pułtusk, who propagates the idea that Polish 
cooperation with Nazi Germany had been “the better choice” leading up to 
World War II in his 2004 story “Rydz-Śmigły na Placu Czerwonym w Moskwie 
w 1940 roku. Co by było, gdy Polska przyjęła żądania niemieckie?” (“Rydz-
Śmigły on Moscow’s Red Square in 1940. What if Poland had accepted the Ger-
man demands?”). This idea, however, is older than Wieczorkiewicz. One of its 
most prominent proponents was Jerzy Łojek in his study Agresja sowiecka 17 
września 1939. Studium aspektów politycznych (“The Soviet Aggression of 17 
September 1939. A Study of its Political Aspects”), which appeared in the Polish 
underground press in 1979.12  
One example of this school of thought’s survival beyond Wolski’s novel is 
referred to on the back of its second edition: the blurb, which laments the fact 
                                                           
9  “Wszyscy jesteśmy winni temu, co się stało. Kiedy w zaświatach spotkam się z Pił-
sudskim, pogratuluję mu wyboru i dalekowzroczności – on jeden miał rację, propo-
nując powstrzymanie Hitlera, póki nie urósł w siłę.” − Wolski 2012: 286. 
10  “Gdy patrzyłam na ten obraz zniszczonej I upokorzonej stolicy, ściskało mi się serce I 
myślałam o polskich miastach, o kwitnącej Warszawie, gwarnym Lwowie i roman-
tycznym Wilnie. Co stałoby się z nimi, gdyby nie plan Piłsudskiego?” − ibid.: 299. 
11  Ibid.: 399. 
12  Cf. Łojek 1979. 
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“that professor Wieczorkiewicz [who passed away before the novel’s publica-
tion] could no longer read it,” is provided by Piotr Żychowicz. This history writ-
er, who was also one of the initiators of the campaign “Against Polish Camps,” 
caused some controversy with his book Pakt Ribbentrop-Beck czyli jak Polacy 
mogli u boku Trzeciej Rzeszy pokonać Związek Sowiecki (The Ribbentrop-Beck 
Pact or How Poland could have defeated the Soviet Union side by side with the 
Third Reich, 2012), in which he attempts to counter several “myths of Polish vic-
timhood,” by showing how the Polish minister of foreign affairs Józef Beck sup-
posedly time and again made fatal assessments and by highlighting the advan-
tages of Polish cooperation with Nazi Germany which included saving parts of 
its Jewish population. 
Żychowicz’s book was highly criticized, by fellow historians Stanisław Sal-
monowicz13 and Andrzej Nowak for example, who claim that this book 
 
… fulfills the wish of Russian and other propagandists, who want to show that Poland 
wholeheartedly wanted to join Hitler to murder Jews but did not do it because of its own 
stupidity. As such Poland (in this worldview) is both malicious and stupid. 
Mr. Piotr Żychowicz wants to save Poland from the charge of stupidity, but, in fact, em-
boldens it with his considerations … . Considerology, whatifology cannot, in the end, be 
verified or not. But one can practice it more or less responsibly. Mr. Piotr Żychowicz 
practices it very irresponsibly. I think that his master, Mr. Paweł Wieczorkiewicz, even 
though he started these considerations, would not have agreed with them. Surely, he 
would not have taken them this far, to such a treatment of Polish history, as Żychowicz 
has.14 
 
                                                           
13  Willma 2013. 
14  “Realizuje ona dokładnie, dokładnie, zamówienie propagandystów rosyjskich i tych z 
innych narodów wrogich Polsce, którzy chcą pokazać, że Polska z całej swojej duszy 
chciała iść z Hitlerem i wymordować Żydów. I tylko z własnej głupoty tego nie zro-
biła. A więc Polska jest (w tej wizji) połączeniem podłości z głupotą. 
 Pan Piotr Żychowicz chce ratować Polskę przed oskarżeniem o głupotę, ale de facto 
pogłębia to oskarżenie swoimi rozważaniami … . Historyczna mniemanologia, gdybo-
logia, nie ma ostateczne warsztatowej weryfikowalności. Ale można ją uprawiać w 
sposób mniej lub bardziej odpowiedzialny. Pan Piotr Zychowicz uprawia ją w sposób 
bardzo nieodpowiedzialny. Myślę, że jego mistrz, pan Paweł Wieczorkiewicz, choć 
zaczął te rozważania, nie pochwalałby tego. Na pewno nie posunąłby się do tego, do 
takiego traktowania polskiej historii jak Zychowicz.” https://wpolityce.pl/polity-
ka/140224-prof-andrzej-nowak-o-ksiazce-pakt-ribbentrop-beck-piotra-zychowicza 
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Nowak clearly sees Żychowicz’s use of the conspiratorial Wallenrodian idea as 
grist for the mill of conspiracy theorists targeting Poland, who see their assump-
tions about supposedly maliciously scheming Poles confirmed. One example of 
such thinking includes Russian ambassador to Poland Sergei Andreev’s 2015 in-
terview with Polish television station TVN, in which he judged Poland as guilty 
for starting World War II.15 Another example is that of Russian ambassador to 
Venezuela Vladimir Zaemskii’s article in the Venezuelan state-owned newspa-
per Correo del Orinoco from that same year, in which he alleged that Poland had 
wanted to be an ally of Nazi Germany and that Poland’s Nazi-friendly politics 
had rendered cooperation between the USSR, France, and Czechoslovakia im-
possible.16 At the same time, both ambassadors denied the 1939 Soviet invasion 
of Poland as such. Both ambassadors caused diplomatic upheaval with their 
claims. In any case, Nowak’s words on Żychowicz could also be said about 
Wolski’s novel (which, as should be stressed, is presented as a work of fiction 
and not as an assessment of a historical situation claiming scientific merit) alt-
hough in less radical terms. 
In his novel, the romantic idea that literature should not describe reality, but 
prescribe the future, from which Wallenrodism stems, has shifted: history is not 
described as it has been, but as it could have been—implying that this is also 
how it should have been. This carries in itself the risk of crediting the wrong 
means employed and discrediting the right ones (regardless of the ends). It also 
complicates a differentiated view of the Second Polish Republic, as it becomes 
the alternate version of the current Third Polish Republic that came into being 
after the democratic transition in the years 1989−91. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the Wieczorkiewicz school of thought, including his apostle Łojek and his 
disciples Wolski and Żychowicz, enjoys a certain popularity among the Polish 
far right—it figures prominently in right-wing newspapers like (formerly) Uwa-
żam Rze (whose editor in chief was Żychowicz), Do Rzeczy (for which he is cur-
rently an author) and Gazeta Polska Codziennie, as well as far right websites 
such as www.nacjonalista.pl. This is certainly a setting in which one is tempted 
to repeat Ivan Franko’s harsh words about Mickiewicz’s Konrad Wallenrod: 
“this grisly masterpiece … has for decades been dripping corrupting poison into 
the souls of the Polish youth.”17 
 
                                                           
15  Cf. Grysiak 2015. 
16  Cf. Zaemskiy 2015. 
17  “[D]ies grausige Meisterwerk … träufelt seit Dezennien verderbliches Gift in die See-
len polnischer Jugend ein.” − Franko 2016: 260.  
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Wieczny Grunwald or Not Quite Wallenrod 
 
Twardoch’s novel Wieczny Grunwald, which he claims was the one “in which I 
found my own voice and thanks to which I thought for the first time that I might 
actually be a writer,”18 appeared on the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle 
of Grunwald, which gives the novel its name, and is cut from a wholly different 
cloth than Wolski’s Wallenrod. Its narrator and protagonist, Paszko, is the bas-
tard son of Casimir III the Great, King of Poland, and a Silesian girl, who grows 
up in medieval Nuremberg and eventually dies in the Battle of Grunwald, as Ka-
tarzyna Śliwińska phrases it, “fighting everyone.”19 He is, however, condemned 
to reliving the Polish-German conflict, as symbolized not only in the Battle of 
Grunwald, but in many other historical and future conflicts too, as well as eter-
nally re-dying during these conflicts, playing roles on both the Polish and the 
German sides.  
With his novel, Twardoch also takes up Mickiewicz’s Wallenrodian glove, 
but not in such an obvious fashion as to allude to it in his title, as Wolski had 
done. Instead, the Wallenrodian scheme is deconstructed and subverted. This is 
initially made possible by Paszko’s incessant doubt about his nationality. While 
Twardoch’s hero and Wolski’s heroine have their mixed heritage in common—
Paszko is half Polish, half German and Silberstein is half Polish, half Jewish—
they draw an entirely different conclusion. Silberstein, like Mickiewicz’s Wal-
lenrod after he rediscovers his national identity, is wholly committed to the cause 
of her nation and neither questions her inclusion therein nor others’ exclusion 
therefrom. Paszko, who grows up in Nuremberg with some notion of his father’s 
identity, is neither German nor Polish initially, i.e., he is both. In stark contrast to 
Wolski’s Halina Silberstein, who might also have had reasons to doubt her sense 
of national belonging but does not, Paszko does. This priori undermines the 
Wallenrodian scheme. 
Following this line of thought, whereas Wallenrod ends in a decisive Polish 
victory, Wieczny Grunwald is a novel-length stalemate that lasts until the final 
pages, where Paszko—who has become an “aanthropic” (sic!) half-human, half-
robot—has had enough of the both senseless and ceaseless Polish-German con-
flict: 
 
                                                           
18  “... w której znalazłem swój własny głos i dzięki której po raz pierwszy pomyślałem, 
że może rzeczywiście jestem pisarzem.” − Szczepan Twardoch on his Facebook ac-
count, 27 March 2019. 
19  Śliwińska 2015: 290. 
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And suddenly I understand: I remember the myriads of my Grunwalds and Tannenbergs, 
and I remember all my deaths and not-dyings, and after myriads of times—I understand. 
And suddenly I understand: I do not have to do what I want to do and always will do. I 
drop my sword, throw off my kettle hat, I catch the reins of a horse, not mine, I catch the 
reins of a horse, whose owner is lying here, sinking into the field, I mount his horse and 
ride off.20 
 
If we are to better understand Wieczny Grunwald, Jan Zając’s view of the novel 
as the culmination, both in scope and the author’s skill, of Twardochs earlier sto-
ries Obłęd rotmistrza von Egern (The Insanity of Captain von Egern, 2003) and 
Otchłań (Oblivion, 2005) as well as his novel Sternberg (2007), is helpful.21 
These two stories and this novel are all situated in an alternate history in which 
the French Revolution did not happen in France, but in Austria, and their protag-
onists—von Egern in Obłęd and Otchłań, the brothers Alexander and Carl Stern-
berg in their eponymous novel—are all conservative opponents of this revolu-
tion. Just one of these three manages to even remotely reach his own goals: Carl 
von Sternberg. He does so by means of compromise. These means seem to be 
unknown to von Egern, who goes insane, kills himself and, like Paszko, is con-
demned to re-living and re-dying, although not on the grand scale of Wieczny 
Grunwald. Alexander von Sternberg continues to fight a guerilla war without 
any hope of victory. The conservative attitudes expressed by all three protago-
nists can, of course, not be attributed to the author himself, but they do highlight 
that Twardoch is seeking a confrontation with the conservative, right wing 
school of thought in Poland. 
He sought such a confrontation rather vehemently in 2011 after being hon-
ored by the Józef Mackiewicz Literature Prize committee for Wieczny Grun-
wald: in an essay entitled “Mackiewicz jako atrapa” (Mackiewicz, the Dummy) 
he writes that the Polish right’s reading of Mackiewicz “can hardly be called a 
reading at all”22 and, according to him, is a misreading and that Mackiewicz 
                                                           
20  “I nagle rozumiem: przypominam sobie miriady moich Grunwaldów i Tannenbergów, 
i przypominam sobie wszystkie moje śmierci i moje nieumarcie, i po miriadach razy – 
rozumiem. / I nagle rozumiem: nie powinienem robić tego, co chcę zrobić i co zawsze 
robię. Odpinam miecz, zrzucam kapalin, chwytam wodze konia, nie mojego, chwytam 
wodze konia, którego właściciel leży już tutaj i wsiąka w to pole, dosiadam tego konia 
i jadę.” − Twardoch 2013: 208−09. 
21  Cf. Zając 2016. 
22  “Gwałtem tym jest potoczne odczytanie Mackiewicza, chociaż trudno tutaj w zasadzie 
mówić o czytaniu” – Twardoch 2011. 
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does not fit the one-dimensional image purported by the right. In the framework 
of this essay, he also comments on his own novel: 
 
My Wieczny Grunwald is among other things a phantasmagoric attempt to face the prob-
lem of humanity ruthlessly confronted with national identities, be they Polish or Ger-
man.23 
 
While one should hesitate to cite auctorial self-analyses, in Wieczny Grunwald 
this confrontation is, to a large extent, certainly achieved. In placing the possibly 
problematic nature of national identity at the center of his novel, a novel which 
has everything in common with a Wallenrodian story at first glance, Twardoch 
not only undermines the Wallenrodian scheme, as stated previously, but also 
pinpoints how this scheme works: those striving to be “Wallenrod” have to be 
perfectly sure of their national identity. This correlates with what Chwin calls 
Mickiewicz’s “forgetfulness” in creating his own Wallenrod—anything positive 
concerning the Teutonic Order, anything negative about Lithuania is simply not 
mentioned, so as not to tarnish his protagonist’s commitment.24  
Perhaps it would be a little far-fetched to draw any wide-reaching conclu-
sions from this brief commentary. It is, however, safe to say that Wallenrod and 
Wieczny Grunwald are indeed variations of the same Wallenrodian theme: Wols-
ki’s novel emphasizes and doubles it, Twardoch’s novel negates it and renders it 
impossible. Even though it is tempting to conclude that this opposition has to do 
with the political standpoints of the two authors, the least we can say is that nei-
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Since its publication in 1828 the material of Adam Mickiewicz’s Konrad Wal-
lenrod has frequently been taken up and used by other authors. This chapter 
explores two of the most recent examples of this, Marcin Wolski’s Wallenrod 
(2010) and Szczepan Twardoch’s Wieczny Grunwald (2010), and tries to answer 
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the question how Wolski and Twardoch confirm and/or subvert Mickiewicz’s 





“The Conspiracy, or The Roots of the 
Disintegration of European Society.”  
Danilo Kiš’s Fictionalization of the Protocols 
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Conspiracies have probably been a part of life ever since societies started to be-
come more complex and at a time when those in power developed conflicting in-
terests. The basic, literal meaning of the verb conspire (from the Latin conspira-
re and its derivative, conspiratio, “agreement, union, unanimity”) is “to breathe 
together,” whereby breathing together was taken to mean “to agree, to concur to 
one end,” whether that purpose be good or evil (e.g. Genesis 37,18; “They con-
spired against [Joseph] to slay him”). Since the middle of the fourteenth century 
conspiracy has been used in English to mean, first and foremost, “a plotting of 
evil, unlawful design; a combination of persons for an evil purpose.” The word 
conspire has, thus, assumed primarily negative connotations: “to secretly plot or 
make plans together, often with the intention to bring bad or illegal results.”1  
Most conspiracy theories are generated in times of crisis. They occupy the 
space between political constellations and psychological mechanisms. They have 
much in common with paranoia: the loss of one’s ability to put things into per-
spective, a static perception, the narrowed outlook of an extremely egocentric or 
                                                           
1  See “conspire” in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/con-
spire  
314 | Burkhart 
group-driven point of view.2 One of the conspiracy theories that has been most 
relevant in building an enemy stereotype is based on anti-Semitism, which sup-
plied the greatest impetus for the persecution of Jews and legitimated the use of 
violence against them. Johannes von Frankfurt published his Malleus Iudaeorum 
(Hammer of the Jews) in 1420, in which he elaborates upon the pejorative figure 
of thought portraying the Jew as a corrosive force striving for domination.3 This 
attitude was adopted in later writings, such as the Judenspiegel (A Mirror of the 
Jews) by Hartwig von Hundt-Radowsky (1821). The term “anti-Semitism” be-
came popular for a hatred of the Jews based on race in the territory of the Ger-
man Empire, founded in 1871; it was sparked by historian Heinrich von Treit-
schke’s polemical works and pamphlets by the journalist Wilhelm Marr such as 
Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum (The Victory of Judaism over 
Teutonism, 1879). After the First World War, Germany was flooded with anti-
Semitic pamphlets. During the Weimar Republic, the ‘völkisch’ or populist or-
ganizations mounted campaigns aimed at defaming the first democratic state on 
German soil as a “Jewish Republic.” Anti-Semitic works started to appear, such 
as Arthur Dinter’s best-selling novel Die Sünde wider das Blut (The Sin Against 
the Blood, 1917) or Paul Bang’s Judas Schuldbuch (The Dept Register of Judah) 
published in 1919 under the pseudonym Wilhelm Meister, or the first non-
Russian edition of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, published by Gottfried zur 
Beek and titled Die Geheimnisse der Weisen von Zion (The Secrets of the Wise 
Men of Zion). The second edition in German was published in 1920 by Theodor 
Fritsch’s anti-Semitic publishing house in Leipzig, the “Hammer-Verlag,”4 enti-
tled Die Zionistischen Protokolle: Das Programm der internationalen Geheim-
regierung. (The Zionist Protocols: Program of the Secret International Govern-
ment). Walther Rathenau, a German Jew and Foreign Minister of Weimar Ger-
many, was targeted by anti-Semitic terrorists. He was murdered in 1922 by right-
wing radicals who saw him as one of the “Elders of Zion,” a conspiratorial group 
they believed really existed. By the time the Nazis seized power in 1933, 33 edi-
tions of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion had been published in Germany. 
Starting in 1920, translated versions of the Protocols were also circulated in 
                                                           
2  Cf. Jaworski 2001: 22. 
3  Cf. Schreckenberg 1994: 502. 
4  The völkisch Hammer-Verlag, the publishing house Theodor Fritsch founded in 1902 
(the name alluding to the inflammatory anti-Semitic Mallus iudaeorum/Judenhammer 
(Hammer of the Jews) also produced a magazine called Der Hammer: Blätter für 
deutschen Sinn (The Hammer: The Paper for German Essence) for which Fritsch per-
sonally penned the lead articles. 
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France, Great Britain, other European countries, and in the USA (funded by 
Henry Ford).5  
 
 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Their Fateful 
Propagandist Success 
 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is the most widely read anti-Semitic publica-
tion. One major reason why the conspiracy tale was, and continues to prove so 
successful, is because it presents a simple explanation of the world owing to the 
fact that all manner of unpopular phenomena (e.g. the trappings of moderniza-
tion) may be blamed upon on a single scapegoat, the Jews. The Protocols first 
appeared in the early 20th century—the first Russian edition was published in 
1903 in Tsarist times: the anti-Semitic journalist and member of the Duma, Pavel 
A. Krushevan, published the work under the title Programa (sic!) zavoevan’ia 
mira evreiami (Programme for the Conquest of the World by the Jews) in Au-
gust/September 1903 in the St. Petersburg newspaper Znamia (Banner) no. 190–
200 (10 September 1903–20 September1903). In 1905, Sergei Nilus, an impov-
erished landowner turned mystic, published Protokoly sobranii Sionskikh mudre-
cov (Protocols of the Meetings of the Elders of Zion), an expanded version of 
Krushevan’s text, in the appendix to the second edition of his apocalyptic work 
Velikoe v malom i Antikhrist, kak blizkaia politicheskaia vozmozhnost’ (The 
Great within the Small and Antichrist as an Imminent Political Possibility) in 
Tsarskoe Selo. Another edition was printed in Moscow in 1911.  
At the heart of this text is a secret Jewish association whose alleged aim is to 
corrode Christian peoples through materialism and atheism, and to wear them 
down by revolution and anarchy in order to attain world dominion. The final 
stage would be reached when all peoples submit to a Jewish king from the Da-
vidic line who would then rule over a perfectly controlled, but contented, world 
as a benevolent dictator. 
The text is divided into 24 “meetings,” each chapter purporting to be the 
minutes of a speech given before the “Elders of Zion.” Presenting the text as 
minutes, or “protocols,” is intended to make the content more credible. Never-
theless, doubts were soon voiced about the veracity of the text. As early as 1921, 
Philip Graves wrote a series of articles in The Times in which he revealed the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion to be forgeries. Between 1933 and 1935, the doc-
ument was examined by a Swiss court which concluded that the text was to be 
                                                           
5  Cf. Abbott 2004: 129–31. 
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classed as “pulp fiction” and was a plagiarism. The authors of the Protocols had 
plagiarized and changed the intention of works such as the satire by Maurice 
Joly Dialogue aux enfers entre Montesquieu et Machiavel (Dialogue in Hell be-
tween Machiavelli and Montesquieu) published in 1864 and directed at the au-
thoritarian policies of Napoleon III. They also probably borrowed from Herzl, 
Sauvages, Barruel, Sue and Dumas.6 Crucially, the narrative setting is taken 
from one of Ottomar Friedrich Goedsche’s novels, who used the pseudonym Sir 
John Retcliffe and worked for the Prussian secret service. The scene is found in 
his novel Biarritz (1868) which is set in the Jewish cemetery in Prague. Every 
hundred years, according to the novel, representatives of the twelve tribes of Is-
rael meet there to discuss progress towards global conquest. The author attrib-
utes the key political and economic developments of the second half of the nine-
teenth century to conspiratorial activities on the part of the Jewish minority. He 
thus provided a reference text on which other authors could base their writings. 
From 1881 onwards, this particular scene was published separately as Rede eines 
Oberrabbiners in geheimer Versammlung (The Speech by a Chief Rabbi at a Se-
cret Meeting) and was translated into numerous languages. To this day, the loca-
tion, the means by which the Protocols were written, and how they were dissem-
inated remain unknown; however, fabrications and false assertions abound on 
the topic. Therefore, they are surrounded by “an aura, which is both stigmatizing 
and fascinating.”7 
Even though the Protocols had been shown to be forgeries and a plagiarized 
fabrication in 1921, with the help of Mikhail Raslovlev, the text nevertheless 
continued to be widely read. In terms of the propaganda effects of the Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion, however, whether they are genuine or not is of secondary 
importance. Evidence that the Protocols were fake was dismissed (by Hitler and 
others) as lies spread by Jewish media moguls, and this phantasm itself became 
part of the legend disseminated. 
In the Protocols of the Elders of Zion one reads of an alleged Jewish global 
conspiracy, a concept also anchored in the thought structures behind Nazi anti-
Semitism. Leading National Socialists repeatedly referred to the Protocols in 
their own speeches and writings, e.g., Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf (1925) or 
when talking to close companions. Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg devoted 
numerous articles in the party newspaper to this topic and also wrote a book on 
the subject, Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion und die jüdische Weltpolitik 
(The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Jewish Global Policy) which was re-
                                                           
6  Cf. Horn 2012: 9−10. 
7  Hagemeister/Horn 2012: VIII. 
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printed many times from 1923 onwards. The Protocols were printed as a popular 
edition by the NSDAP party publishing house and were required reading in 
schools, and the Nazi propaganda machine distributed the book as far afield as 
Japan and South America. After the end of the Second World War, right-wing 
extremist groups in Europe and the USA cited the Protocols to support Nazi 
genocide. The work was, in some cases still is, used by governments in Arabia 
and Eastern Europe as a propaganda instrument in the struggle against the state 
of Israel, founded in 1948, and the alleged center of a Zionist conspiracy. 
Conspiracy theories are expressed in texts that are passed on orally or in 
writing. The question is, where do they fit into narrational, fictional systems, and 
in particular, what place does a forgery such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zi-
on occupy? In his book, Das Fiktive und das Imaginäre (The Fictive and the Im-
aginary), Wolfgang Iser replaces the simplifying dyad reality/fiction with a tri-
adic model of the real, the fictive and the imaginary: 
 
• The “real should be understood as referring to the empirical world, which is a 
‘given’ for the literary text and generally provides the text’s multiple fields of 
reference.”8 
• The fictive, that which is made up or shaped as fiction yet possesses object 
reference, i.e., relates to the extra-textual world.9 
• The imaginary, that which is dreamt up, imagined, possessing no object refer-
ence, that manifests in seemingly arbitrary conditions or as a stream of decon-
textualized associations.10 
 
The real or factual claims to be something true or genuine, whereas the fictive 
and the imaginary do not. If one subsumes a forgery (akin to the fantastical) into 
the “imaginary” category, because it possesses no object reference and given that 
it is purely a product of fantasy, then it represents a kind of counter-fiction: un-
like the fictive and the fantastical, it does indeed claim to be both true and genu-
ine. 
The word Protocol is deliberately chosen in the title Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion because it signalizes writing that is authentic. Authentic protocols can 
take the form of minutes that record the proceedings of a meeting or an interro-
gation and are presented as an objective rendering of the attested truth of the 
facts. An authentic protocol, thus, categorically precludes all elements of the 
                                                           
8  Iser 1993: 305 (note to p. 2). 
9  Cf. ibid.: 2. 
10  Cf. ibid.: 3. 
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symbolical, metaphorical, or imaginary. Two types of protocols (or minutes) 
may be found in literature; the fictive, with no claim to be true such as Albert 
Drach’s Das große Protokoll gegen Zwetschkenbaum (The Grand Protocol 
against Zwetschkenbaum) (1939/1964), and pseudo-protocols (from the Greek 
pseudos “lie, falsehood”), which claim to be true and genuine; the Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion belong in this category. 
 
 
Faction and Thanatopoetics: Danilo Kiš and the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion  
 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion have entered literature by being taken as the 
basis for an artistic text by authors including the Serbian Jew Danilo Kiš.11 
As Kiš writes in the “Post Scriptum” to the last of his books published during 
his lifetime, Enciklopedija mrtvih (The Encyclopaedia of the Dead, 1983), it had 
been his intention in the early 1980s to write an essay about the genesis of the 
Protocols and their publisher and commentator Sergei Nilus. However, he then 
decided to complement, from his imagination, the story with parts that the histo-
riography had left open: 
 
My intention was to summarize the true and fantastic, “unbelievably fantastic,” story of 
how The Protocols of the Elders of Zion came into existence … The intended essay on the 
Protocols fell apart the moment I tried to supplement it by imagining the parts of the 
book’s history which have to this day remained obscure and will probably never be clari-
fied … and I started imagining the events as they might have happened.12 
                                                           
11  Danilo Kiš (born in Subotica 1935, died in Paris 1989) was the son of a Montenegrin 
mother and Hungarian Jewish father. He grew up speaking Serbian and Hungarian. 
After laws were passed in Hungary in 1938 and 1939 to drastically curtail the rights of 
Jews, Danilo Kiš’s parents had their son baptized in order to protect him. In January 
1942, the family was living in Novi Sad when a massacre of the Jews and Serbs be-
gan; it lasted several days but Kiš’s father survived and the family moved to Hungary. 
In 1944, during the German occupation, Kiš’s father was deported to the death camp 
at Auschwitz where he and most of his relatives were killed. After the war, Danilo and 
his mother and sister were repatriated to Yugoslavia. 
12  Kiš 1991b: 196–97. “Namera mi je bila da izložim ukratko istinitu fantastičnu, ‘do 
neverovatnosti fantastičnu’, povest nastanka Protokola Sionskih mudraca … Taj za-
mišljeni esej o Protokolima raspao se sam od sebe onog časa kada sam pokušao da 
dopunim, da domislim, one delove te mutne povesti koji su do dana današnjeg ostali u 
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 When facts or documents are mixed with fiction a hybrid text emerges, namely 
“faction,” in which the imagined material enters into a correspondence with the 
historical material. This is the case in “Knjiga kraljeva i budala” (“The Book of 
Kings and Fools”), the eighth of nine tales published in the compilation Enci-
klopedija mrtvih. Kiš explains the isotopy, i.e., “death,” underlying all nine tales 
and the reason for the title of the Encyclopedia of the Dead in the self-referential 
“Post Scriptum”:  
 
All the stories in this book, to a greater or lesser extent, come under the sign of a theme I 
would call metaphysical: ever since the Gilgamesh epic, death has been one of the obses-
sive themes of literature.13 
 
Kiš’s poetics, focusing on the metaphysical phenomenon of death, is thanatopo-
etics par excellence. In “Knjiga kraljeva i budala” (hereafter abbreviated to 
KKB), it manifests itself in the framework into which the tale is inserted. In the 
beginning (framework section I) therefore, there is a reference to A. P. 
Krushevan, who incited the pogrom at Kishinev (with fifty fatalities) and was the 
first publisher of the Protocols, which—and of this the narrator is convinced—
were responsible for Nazi crimes 40 years later:  
 
The crime not to be perpetrated until some forty years later, was prefigured in a Petersburg 
newspaper in August 1906. The articles appeared serially and were signed by the paper’s 
editor-in-chief, a certain Krushevan, A. P. Krushevan, who, as the instigator of the Kishi-
nev pogroms, had a good fifty murders on his conscience.14 
 
Thanatopoetics also colors the end of the tale in its cyclical framework, because 
KKB is constructed according to the principles of cause and effect. The circle 
closes (framework section II) with a description of the scene in a death camp 
                                                           
senci i koji, po svoj prilici, neće nikad biti razjašnjeni … i kada sam počeo da zamiš-
ljam dogadjaje onako kako su se mogli dogoditi” – Kiš 1999b: 244–45.  
13  Kiš 1991b: 191. “Sve priče u ovoj knjizi u većoj ili manjoj meri u znaku su jedne teme 
koju bih nazvao metafizičkom; od speva o Gilgamešu, pitanje smrti jedna je od opse-
sivnih tema literature” – Kis 1999b: 237. 
14  Kiš 1991a: 135. “Zločin koji će se dogoditi nekih četrdeset godine kasnije bio je na-
govešten u jednom peterburškom listu avgusta hiljadu devetsto šeste godine. Članci su 
izlazili u nastavcima a potpisivao ih je glavni urednik tih novina izvesni Kruševan, A. 
P. Kruševan, koji je kao podstrekivač pogroma u Kišinjevu imao na duši pedesetak 
ubistava.” – Kiš 1999a: 165. 
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(Bełżec is meant) in 1942 and of Captain Wirth, the man responsible for stage-
managing the deaths, and who carries a talisman15 in his breast pocket—a leath-
er-bound version of the Protocols:  
 
In the middle of it all stands Captain Wirth. And in the upper left-hand pocket of his tunic 
is a leather-bound copy of The Conspiracy published by Der Hammer in 1933. He had 
read somewhere that the book saved the life of a young non-commissioned officer at the 
Russian front: a bullet fired from a sniper’s rifle lodged in the pages, just above his heart. 
The book makes him feel secure.16 
 
The first word in the story KKB, covering some 40 pages and divided into 20 
parts, is “zločin” (crime), and the last is “sigurnost” (security). Looking at these 
two words together, there are two interpretations: The first is that Kruševan’s 
publication of the Protocols was undoubtedly a crime, because, in the narrator’s 
view, it led to the extermination of Jews by Nazis like Wirth. The second focus-
ses on the irony of fate: one of the main perpetrators of the crime, such as camp 
commandant Christian Wirth, gives himself a false sense of security. The “astute 
reader”17 challenged by the “appellate structure”18 of the open ending, easily 
picks up the information that Wirth was shot and killed in 1944 fighting Yugo-
slavian partisans, and that the bullet hit him in the back. 
The story’s two thanatopoetic framework sections (I and II) are complemen-
ted by scenes of violence: there is initially an imagined horror scene in section I: 
“Throughout the darkened rooms, mutilated bodies lie in pools of blood and 
raped girls stare wild-eyed into the void from behind heavy, rent curtains.”19 
                                                           
15  The motif of an apotropaic object that protects its bearer from stab or gun wounds or 
works as a lucky charm, is common in literature, cf. Conrad Ferdinand Meyer’s novel-
la Das Amulett (The Amulet, 1873), Johann Nestroy’s musical farce Der Talisman 
(Talisman, 1840) et al. 
16  Kiš 1991a: 174. “Na sred kruga stoji kapetan Virt. U gornjem džepu vojničke bluze, 
na levoj strani, drži primerak Zavere u kožnom povezu, izdanje Der Hammera iz 
godine 1933. Negde je pročitao da je ta knjiga spasla na ruskom frontu mladog pod-
oficira: metak ispaljen iz snajperske puške zaustavio se izmedju stranica, tik iznad 
srca. Ta mu knjiga uliva sigurnost” – Kiš 1999a: 217. 
17  Kiš 1991b: 198. 
18  Cf. Iser 1970. 
19  Kiš 1991a: 135. “Po polumračnim odajama leže u lokvama krvi unakažena tela muš-
karaca, a silovane devojčice izbezumljenih očiju zure u prazno iza teških pokidanih 
zavesa” – Kiš 1999a: 165. 
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This is followed by a verbatim excerpt (marked by quotation marks) taken from 
a text (an article published in the New York Times of 7 December 1903, cf. Zip-
perstein 2018: 10): “Pieces of furniture, broken mirrors and lamps, linen, cloth-
ing, mattresses, and slashed quilts are strewn about the streets. The roads are 
deep in snow: eiderdown feathers everywhere; even the trees are covered with 
them.”20 
In section II, prior to the last scene with camp commandant Wirth, there is an 
extract from an authentic document (which Kiš names in the “Post Scriptum”). 
The text in question is a report21 about Kurt Gerstein, the “tragic hero of the Ger-
man resistance”22 and eyewitness of the mass murder of the Jews in the gas 
chamber of the Bełżec camp in 1942, “thirty-six years after Krushevan’s articles 
first appeared”:23 
 
“They remain standing”, the unfortunate Kurt Gerstein wrote, “like basalt pillars; they 
have no place to fall or lean. Even in death, one can make out families holding hands. It is 
hard to separate them when the room must be cleaned for the next load, blue bodies tossed 
out, soaked with sweat and urine, legs stained with excrement and menstrual blood. Two 
dozen workers check the mouths, prying them open with iron levers; others check the anus 
and genitals, looking for money, diamonds, gold. In the middle of it all stands Captain 
Wirth...”24 
 
Semantically, the two scenes are heightened by a kind of refrain that closes the 
ring, in which the explicit insistence that the corpses are actual facts offers 
thanatopoetic reinforcement: 
                                                           
20   Kiš 1991a: 135. “Po ulicama, razbacani komadi nameštaja, ogledala, razbijenih 
lampi, rublje i odeća, madraci, razvaljeni perine. Ulice su pokrivene snegom: svuda je 
popadalo perje, pa i po drveću” – Kiš 1999a: 165. 
21  Cf. Poliakov/Wulf 1955: 107−08. 
22  Kiš 1991b: 198. 
23  Kiš 1991a: 173. 
24  Kiš 1991a: 174. “‘Kao bazaltni stubovi’ – zapisuje nesrećni Kurt Gerštajn – ‘ljudi još 
stoje uspravno, nemajući ni najmanjeg mesta da bi se srušili ili nagnuli. Čak i u smrti, 
još se mogu prepoznati porodice, po stisku ruku. S mukom ih rastavljaju, kako bi is-
praznili prostoriju za nov tovar. Onda bacaju modra tela, vlažna od znoja i mokraće, 
nogu uprljanih izmetom i menstrualnom krvi. Dvadesetak radnika proveravaju usta, 
otvarajući pomoću gvozdenih poluga. Drugi proveravaju anus i genitalne organe, tra-
žeći novac, dijamante, zlato. Zubari čupaju kleštima inleje, mostove, krunice. Na sred 
kruga stoji kapetan Virt…’” – Kiš 1999a: 216–17. 
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• in part 1 of the KKB: “The scene is real enough, as real as the corpses”25  
• in part 20 of the KKB: “But the stage is real, as real as the corpses”26 
 
Within this framework formed by parts 1 and 20, the genesis, passing down, and 
use of the Protocols is recounted. First and foremost, the poetic method chosen 
by Danilo Kiš is that of defamiliarization, and this estrangement of facts and 
names acts to fictionalize his KKB. For example, the name of the actual histo-
rical figure Pavel A. Krushevan becomes A. P. Kruševan; he in fact published 
the Protocols in August/September 1903, not in August 1906, and the first po-
grom in Kishinev took place at Easter, namely from 19 to 20 April 1903.27  Pre-
sumably Kiš chose the year 1906 in “summary,” because around 650 pogroms 
were launched in the Russian empire between 1903 and 1906, claiming thou-
sands of victims.28 As further defamiliarization, the Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion are not given their usual title in the story KKB.29 The unnamed narrator 
figure of the KKB speaks instead of a “book” to which he gives the fictitious, 
but meaningful, title of The Conspiracy, or The Roots of the Disintegration of 
                                                           
25  Kiš 1991a: 135. − “Prizor je, medjutim, stvaran, kao što su stvarni i leševi” − Kiš 
1999a: 165. 
26  Kiš 1991a: 174. − “Scena je medjutim stvarna, kao što su stvarni i leševi” − Kiš 
1999a: 216. 
27  Steven Zipperstein argues that the vehement global reaction to the pogrom, which was 
in most cases also directed against the Tsarist regime and conservative practices in 
Russia, bolstered the anti-Semitic attitudes of the Russian nationalist forces and con-
tributed to the spread of anti-Jewish conspiracy beliefs: “Kishinev, as they saw it, was 
an ideal launching pad for Jewish designs on world domination” (2018: xix). To sup-
port his arguments, Zipperstein takes a closer look at the role played by Pavel Kru-
shevan. The latter is, according to Zipperstein, a crucial link between the pogrom and 
the Protocols. Despite the fact that he was the publisher of Kishinev’s daily news-
paper Besarabets (The Bessarabian), in which numerous anti-Semitic articles ap-
peared claiming that a Christian boy had been the victim of a ritual murder, Krushe-
van denied any responsibility for the pogrom. Instead he believed that a Jewish con-
spiracy was behind the media discourse in which articles were directed against Rus-
sian conservatism in general and against Krushevan personally.  
28  Cf. Grill 2017: 471. 
29  In his KKB, Kiš avoids words such as “Zion” or “Jew/ish” because he does not want 
to be labelled a “Jewish author” but seeks recognition as a European writer. 
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European Society.30 The change in designation from “protocol” to “book” sig-
nals the fictionalization of a factual text on the one hand. On the other hand, 
though, “book” is a word with a special aura, above all when it refers to an en-
igmatic or unique book such as Conspiracy (Zavera), which is compared several 
times, in ironic manner, with the Bible and whose origins and propagation re-
main largely in the dark. Thus, the well-known saying by Terentianus Maurus 
“Habent sua fata libelli” (Books have their own destinies) is very pertinent to the 
origins and fateful effects of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Moreover, the 
book Conspiracy (Zavera) proves the opposite of “the commonly accepted no-
tion that books serve only good causes.” Both religious and political fanatics 
have always claimed one book as their authority: “Books in quantity are not 
dangerous; a single book is.”31 Finally, it is significant that the story “Knjiga 
kraljeva i budala” places the lexeme knjiga (book) at the beginning of the title, 
i.e., of the first paratext. “Post Scriptum,” i.e., “Addition to a text/book,” is the 
title of the second paratext, which is an explanatory metatextual supplement to 
the book Knjiga kraljeva i budala and ensures that the recipient’s attention is re-
peatedly drawn to the transformation of the factual into literature.32 
So, in Kiš’s story a key topic is the relationship between a person and a book, 
whereby the person may be the author, compiler, translator, someone reading to 
himself or to an audience, the buyer or the seller. The opening protagonist in 
KKB is Sergei Nilus, author of the apocalyptic piece Antikhrist to which the 
Protocols, taken from Krushevan, formed the appendix. Here Nilus refers to 
himself as a reader and a “holy fool,” i.e., as one able to reveal the truth: “Wher-
ever he went, he studied the lives of saints and holy fools, and discovered in 
them analogies to his own spiritual life.”33 The fictionalization of historical fig-
ures extends to the Tsarina; after her death at the hands of the Bolsheviks it is al-
leged that a copy of Conspiracy (Zavera) marked with “a swastika, symbol of 
happiness and divine grace”34 was found among her personal effects. Likewise 
fictionalized is an officer in Denikin’s forces, who incites his soldiers to launch 
pogroms by reading to them from the book. Above all, the figure of the unknown 
person X is fictionalized. A figure who in Constantinople in August 1921 buys a 
                                                           
30  Kiš 1991a: 136. “Zavera ili Gde su koreni rasula evropskog društva” − Kiš 1999a: 
166. 
31  Kiš 1991b: 197.  
32  Cf. Petzer 2008: 115. 
33  Kiš 1991a: 138. “Izučavajući po lavrama životopise svetaca i jurodivih, otkriva u nji-
ma analogije sa svojim sopstvenim duhovim životom.” – Kiš 1999a: 168.  
34  Kiš 1991a: 144. 
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leather suitcase full of books from a Russian émigré called Arkadii Ipolitovich 
Belogorcev. There is a long list of the book titles in part 9 of KKB, which serves 
to characterize the owner. Among the books thus acquired is a copy of Maurice 
Joly’s book. When the nameless X discovers remarkable similarities between 
Conspiracy (Zavera), with which he is familiar, and Joly’s Dialogue aux enfers 
(Dialogue in Hell) he contacts the Istanbul correspondent of The Times who then 
writes a “sensational” series of articles in August 1921 proving that the Con-
spiracy is a forgery. In Kiš’s story, the mysterious Mr. X—actually the poet and 
translator Mikhail Raslovlev, a Russian nobleman and monarchist who died in 
1987 in exile in France—becomes a figure whose thought processes and memo-
ries are known. For example, he remembers the cavalry colonel Dragomirov, 
who read aloud from his softcover copy of Conspiracy and thereby provoked the 
pogrom in Odessa.35 Because it is such a significant aspect of the conspiracy 
theme, this description is set exactly half-way through KKB, in part 10, and the 
description of the Kishinev pogrom in part 1 is repeated in paraphrases. Here 
too, poetic use is made of snow, the leitmotif running through the text and a 
symbol for Russia. Mr. X’s hopes are dashed now that the book compiled by 
“the talented and ill-fated”36 Petr Rachkovskii,37 head of the Russian secret ser-
vice in Paris, has been exposed as a forgery; the book will cease to have any ef-
fect and even serve to exonerate the alleged conspirators. The spread and malev-
olent effects of Conspiracy (Zavera) continue unabated. Even Hitler and Stalin, 
the representatives of evil, not mentioned by name, but instead described as, “the 
amateur painter who wrote the infamous Mein Kampf” and the “anonymous 
Georgian seminary student who was yet to be heard from,”38 are influenced by 
the book. Part 19 of KKB thus closes, in order to emphasize the authenticity of 
the document, with five consecutive verbatim examples from Conspiracy (Zave-
ra), chosen because “they will demonstrate why the text has had so fateful an 
                                                           
35  To the “informed reader,” to whom the narrator of KKB refers repeatedly, “Odessa” 
means the great pogrom of 1905 in which more than 400 were killed, innumerable 
women and girls raped and 1,600 homes destroyed. 
36  Kiš 1991a: 163. 
37  With this version of how the Protocols originated in France, Kiš is referring to the 
book by Norman Cohn written in 1967, which is mentioned in the “Post Scriptum.” 
Most recent research (De Michelis, Hagemeister) has, however, shown that the Proto-
cols were probably written in the Russian Empire. A number of Ukrainianisms in the 
text could serve as proof. 
38  Kiš 1991a: 171−72. 
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impact”:39 “Men with evil instincts outnumber men with good instincts. Gov-
erning by violence and terror therefore yields better results than governing by 
academic argument.”40 Or “Our right lies in might,” and “our duty is to spread 
discord, strife and animosity throughout Europe and then to other continents” 
because “politics has nothing in common with morality. … We shall therefore 
punish mercilessly any armed opposition to our power.”41 
As mentioned previously, Kiš wrote in his “Post Scriptum” about why, in re-
lation to the topic of death, the collection was called Enciklopedija mrtvih. How-
ever, he offers no explanation for the title of the eighth story, “Knjiga kraljeva i 
budala” (“The Book of Kings and Fools”). As far as I am aware, those who study 
Kiš have skirted around this topic. The title is so ambiguous that a number of in-
terpretations are possible. Firstly, the title “The Book of Kings and Fools” is 
evocative of the Old Testament “Book of Kings,” which is divided into two parts 
concerning the lives of King David, his son Salomon and his successors and re-
counts the history of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah. That Kiš’s reference to 
the Old Testament “Book of Kings” (“Knjiga kraljeva”) stands for Judaism is 
apparent in the ninth story of the Enciklopedija mrtvih, in which he speaks of 
“royal blood” (with reference to the Jewish-Russian poet Osip Mandel’shtam).42  
The Fools in the title of KKB refer, inter alia, to the numerous passages in 
the Bible in which fools are contrasted with wise men, e.g., “The wise in heart 
will receive commandments: but a prating fool shall fall.”43 Or, “wise men lay 
                                                           
39  Kiš 1991a: 172. “Svedoče o sudbonosnom uticaju te lektire” − Kiš 1999a: 214. 
40  Kiš 1991a: 172. “Treba primetiti da je više ljudi sa zlim nego sa dobrim instinktima; 
stoga se u vladanju s njima postižu bolji rezultati nasiljem i strahovladom nego aka-
demskim raspravama … ” − Kiš 1999a: 214. 
41  Kiš 1991a: 172−73. “Naše je pravo u sili … Naša je dužnost da u celoj Evropi, a 
posredstvom nje i na drugim kontinentima, izazovemo nemire, razdore i neprijateljst-
va … . Politika nema ničeg zajedničkog sa moralom. … Stoga ćemo nemilosrdno 
kažnjavati sve one koji se našoj vlasti suprostave s oružjem u ruci” − Kiš 1999a: 
215−16. It would seem that Kiš used a Croatian translation of the Protocols published 
in 1929 in Split by M. Tomić, although in KKB this reference has been defamiliarized 
and given the title “Prave osnove” (“The True Foundations”) written by a certain “A. 
Tomić” − Kiš 1999a: 211. The narrator quotes from this with page references 216, 
218, 235 and 268. In my copy of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion by J. Sammons, 
these quotations may be found in the first, seventh, fifteenth, and nineteenth meetings, 
pages 29, 31−32, 77−78, and 95−96. 
42  Kiš 1991c: 188; “carska krv” − Kiš 1999c: 233. See also Delić 1995: 332. 
43  Proverbs 10:8 (Twenty-First Century King James Version). 
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up knowledge, but the mouth of the foolish is near destruction.”44 By the end of 
the Middle Ages, a “Literature of Fools” had become popular with works such as 
Sebastian Brant’s Narrenschiff (Ship of Fools, 1494) or Erasmus’s Encomium 
moriae (In Praise of Folly, 1509) in which human follies are caricatured and sat-
irized.  
A crucial role in Kiš’s choice of title was most probably played by the (iden-
tical) Psalms 14:1 and 53:2, in which the fool is not only stupid, but, above all, a 
disbeliever, someone evil who denies the existence of God: “The fool hath said 
in his heart, ‘There is no God’. They are corrupt and have done abominable iniq-
uity; there is none that doeth good.”45 Illustrations for Psalm 53 in Mediaeval 
psalters (L. “Dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus”) show a figure standing 
opposite a king. This figure is the fool, the unwise man (L. insipiens) mocking 
King David, the wise man (L. sapiens) who stands for faith.  
Since God created Man in his likeness, according to Gen. 1:27, such an im-
perfect, perverse creature as the fool could not possibly be in the likeness of 
God. Therefore, the fool, being distanced from God, became a negative figure 
more akin to the Devil, considered the origin of all foolishness. Opposition to the 
wise king (David) on the part of the fool (the atheist) is really about the struggle 
between the forces of order/orthodoxy against those of disorder/heterodoxy and 
it is this aspect that Kiš addresses by taking the symbolic antithesis kings/fools 
as the title of his story. Describing the (alleged) creators of the Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion as “wise” is to be seen as irony against the backdrop of the dis-
course on fools, and this bitter irony is what characterizes the subtext in Kiš’s 
KKB.  
The combination of secular kings and fools also alludes to the king-fool duo-
poly that has existed since antiquity: as part of the king’s retinue, it is the fool’s 
job, through his own imperfections, to remind the king that power and fame (Lat. 
vanitas) are transient. He is the wise fool, the only person allowed to tell the rul-
er the truth to his face without having to fear punishment, the “fool in Christ” 
(Russ. iurodivyi). In this sense of the fool’s license not only Nilus, who sees 
himself as a “holy fool,” gives his version of the truth but also the author by pre-
senting historians and readers with his truth, namely poetic veritas. 
 
 
                                                           
44  Proverbs 10:14. 
45  Psalms 14:1 and 53:2. 
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The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as Integral Element of the 
Discourse about the Shoah 
 
The phantasm of the Protocols and their fateful effect does not stand in isolation 
in Danilo Kiš’s works but is an integral element of how he deals with the Shoah 
(Holocaust). In 1971, he wrote a letter to the magazine Ovdje (Here) in which he 
called the Protocols a “knjiga-ubica,” a “murderous book” because in his view 
it—together with the Malleus Iudaeorum (Hammer of the Jews) and Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf or Céline’s Bagatelles pour un massacre46—was partly responsible 
for the Shoah.  
This discourse about the Shoah was manifest in his first prose work the Psa-
lam 44 (Psalm 44)47 that was published in 1963. It is especially pronounced in 
the last part of his trilogy, ironically termed a “Family Circus,” in the 1972 text 
Peščanik (Hour-Glass) about the life and fate of his father, whose real name was 
Eduard Kohn (later Kiš), but in Danilo Kiš’s books is called Eduard Sam or E.S. 
In Peščanik, roof beams and tiles come crashing down when Eduard Sam’s 
house in Novi Sad collapses and he narrowly misses the fate of the “senior phy-
sician Dr. Freud,” whose brains spilled out of his smashed skull onto the street in 
the massacre of 1942. He compares these scenes to the ice pick brought down on 
the head of Leo Bronstein, alias Leon Trotsky. It is the hammer of a “vengeful 
fate” or, in other words, the Malleus Iudaeorum, that smashes Jewish skulls: 
“The roof beams and tiles would have crashed onto his head (like the ice pick 
onto the head of Lev Davidovich Bronstein), onto the clearly visible tonsure in 
his ash-gray hair, a tonsure pre-destinated, as it were, to receive the ice pick of a 
vengeful fate: malleus Iudaeorum.”48 Naming in Peščanik the book Malleus Iu-
daeorum, in the same context as roof beams and an ice pick, serves to identify it 
as a likewise potentially lethal instrument. Moreover, the name of the book 
evokes associations with the Hammer publishing house that issued the Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion. As the protagonist E.S. in Peščanik explains to a Jesuit 
during a train journey, this Protokol (sic!) sionskih mudraca, is a fabrication, an 
                                                           
46  Cf. Petzer 2003: 335. 
47  As a code name for Auschwitz, the title Psalm 44 points above all to verses 9 and 11: 
“But thou hast cast off, and put us to shame”; “Thou hast given us like sheep ap-
pointed for meat.” 
48  My translation, D. B, of: “Grede i cigle srušile bi se na njegovu glavu (kao pijuk na 
glavu Lava Davidoviča Bronštajna), na tek označenu tonzuru njegove pepeljaste kose, 
tonzuru koja kao da beše predodredjena za pijuk osvetničke sudbine: malleus iudeo-
rum” − Kiš 1983: 116. 
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evil pastiche of a Utopian text that appeared in 1864 in Brussels entitled Dia-
logue aux enfers entre Montesquieu et Machiavel, written by Maurice Joly.49  
Umberto Eco has also worked the Protocols into his literary output, e.g., into 
the 1988 novel Il pendolo di Foucault (Foucault’s Pendulum) and again in 2010 
in the novel Il cimitero di Praga (The Prague Cemetery); as well as in the sixth 
of his Harvard lectures Six Walks in the Fictional Woods (1994) about narrative 
theory including the attempt to reconstruct a “genealogy” of the Protocols. 
Whereas Eco, the Italian semiotician and novelist, is primarily interested in con-
spiracy texts as a phenomenon of intertextuality, their ramifications and inter-
pretation, Danilo Kiš sees them as a “a parable of evil”50 and real historical 
threat. As people marked by their Jewish destiny, Kiš’s “characters cannot afford 
the playful and ambiguous repertoire of Eco’s computer games.”51 The immedi-
ate effect and personal impact of the edition of Conspiracy (Zavera), i.e., of the 
Protocols, that was published in 1944 in Hungary is treated in an autoreferential 
pointer by the first-person narrator of KKB, behind whom the author Danilo Kiš 
and his own biography remain hidden. The boy (nine at the time) personally ex-
periences—literally “in his own skin” (“moje kože”)—an anti-Semitic attack 
when someone fires a rifle into his parents’ home: 
 
The editorials provoked by the Hungarian edition (1944), which includes the woolly wis-
dom of a certain László Ernö,52 were directly responsible for a hunting rifle’s being fired 
at the windows of our house. (So, one might say, the Conspiracy affair closely concerns 
me, too.53  
                                                           
49  Cf. ibid.: 106. 
50  Kiš 1991b: 197. “parabola u zlu” − Kiš 1999b: 244. 
51  Boym 1999: 114. 
52  Shortly before World War II broke out László Endre, whose name Kiš alters to László 
Ernö, an anti-Semitic propagandist, published a book arguing in defense of the Proto-
cols as a genuine record. In 1944 he became Secretary of State in occupied Hungary 
and Adolf Eichmann’s right-hand man who ordered the deportation of Hungarian 
Jews. Endre organized the deportations which began on 15 May 1944 and within six 
weeks 450,000 Jews had been transported to Auschwitz, including Kiš’s father. 
53  Kiš 1991a: 171. “Novinski komentari, koje izazvalo madjarsko izdanje (1944), popra-
ćeno mudrovanjem nekog Lasla Ernea, imali su neposredan odjek: hitac ispaljen iz 
lovačke puške u prozore naše kuće. (Tako bi se, dakle, moglo reći da se stvar Zavere 
tiče i moje kože)” − Kiš 1999a: 213. − I (D. B.) believe the English translation “close-
ly concerns me, too” to be too unspecific, because it does not give any weight to the 
elementary, bodily witnessing of the deed. 
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Just as the historical experience of the persecution of the Jews was written on the 
skin of the witness (testis) and left deep scars (testimonium), so too have the Pro-
tocols left significant tracks in Kiš’s works. Whereas Umberto Eco’s work is 
based on mythopoetics, Danilo Kiš is dedicated to a thanatopoetic process, 
which leads him to inscribe the victims of pogroms and death camps onto man-
kind’s cultural memory. In his narratives, starting with Psalam 44, progressing 
to Grobnica Borisa Davidoviča (A Tomb for Boris Davidovič) and thereafter in 
“Knjiga kraljeva i budala,” he erects a cenotaph to these victims, to save them 
from being forgotten: it is literary remembrance performed as an ethical act with 
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Abstract 
Danilo Kiš wrote from memory and for our collective memory—in the tradition 
in which the written and spoken word is set against the backdrop of death and 
decay. But there is also a horrific and intimate connection between his memories 
and death, from which his specific thanatopoetics emerged. A book title such as 
The Encyclopedia of the Dead indicates that the contents concern an age when 
an unparalleled descent from civilization to barbarity turned half of Europe into 
a slaughterhouse. Kiš’s elaborate poetic language neither embellishes nor takes 
anything away from his account and has few peers in the post-Auschwitz age. 
Taking the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as his example, Kiš shows in his short 
story “Book of Kings and Fools” how the belief in a conspiracy can so mani-
pulate people’s thoughts and actions that it paves the way to violent pogroms and 




Spying on the Balkan Spy. Paranoia and 




Yugoslav drama; paranoia; comedy; political satire 
 
 
The Balkan Spy revisited 
 
Dušan Kovačević (b. 1948) is more than just a prominent playwright in contem-
porary Serbia; he is also a prominent figure in ex-Yugoslav culture. Used almost 
daily, many sentences from his plays or film scripts have become a part of every-
day language, so much so that speakers often do not even know of their actual 
origin. Kovačević’s theater plays1 and the films based on his screenplays are 
among the unforgettable classics of Serbian and Yugoslav cinema.2 Therefore, it 
is not at all simple to create a critical distance when speaking of his dramatic 
oeuvre. The widely popular film adaptations of his plays seem to have somehow 
“sealed” the texts, not just for new stage productions, but also for critical read-
                                                           
1  Selected plays: Maratonci trče počasni krug (The Marathon Family, 1972), Radovan 
Treći (Radovan III, 1973), Sabirni centar (The Gathering Place, 1981), Klaustrofo-
bična komedija (Claustrophobic Comedy, 1987), Profesionalac (The Professional, 
1989), Urnebesna tragedija (Tragedy Burlesque, 1990), Kontejner sa pet zvezdica 
(Five-Star Dumpster, 1999), Doktor Šuster (Doctor Shoemaker, 2001), Generalna 
proba samoubistva (Dress Rehearsal for a Suicide, 2009) 
2  Selected film scripts: Ko to tamo peva (Who’s Singin’ Over There?, S. Šijan, 1980), 
Balkanski špijun (Balkan Spy, B. Nikolić and D. Kovačević, 1984), Underground (E. 
Kusturica, 1995), Profesionalac (The Professional, D. Kovačević, 2003), Sveti Geor-
gije ubiva aždahu (St. George Kills the Dragon, S. Dragojević, 2009) 
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ings of those texts. However, when it comes to Balkanski špijun (The Balkan 
Spy, 1983), the new staging of the play at the National Theater in Belgrade3 
changed not only the play’s plot, but also its entire social context was transferred 
from the early 1980s to the end of the 2010s. This aided and abetted the redis-
covery of the work’s semantic flexibility and openness. 
Ilija Čvorović, the main protagonist of Kovačević’s play, is an everyday Bel-
grade man residing there in the times of Socialist Yugoslavia. At the beginning 
of the plot, he is invited by the police to an “informative talk.” The new subten-
ant in Ilija’s house, Petar Markov Jakovljević, attracts the police’s interest be-
cause he recently returned to Yugoslavia from France. The conversation triggers 
a paranoia in Ilija and he begins to secretly spy on the subtenant, convinced that 
he is a professional spy from the capitalist “imperialist powers” and is, as such, a 
part of a wide-ranging conspiracy against socialist Yugoslavia. Gradually, both 
his wife Danica and his twin brother Đura also succumb to Ilija’s paranoia, while 
their daughter, Sonja, worries about her father’s mental health. This tension 
leads to a conflict between the daughter and the mother. In the play’s closing 
scene, Ilija and Đura interrogate and torture the subtenant in order to obtain a 
confession from him about his alleged espionage activities. During the interroga-
tion, Ilija suffers a heart attack and this is how the play ends. 
 
 
Amateur Spy as (Anti-)Detective 
 
Balkanski špijun is a parody of both detective and spy stories, with the main 
protagonist playing the comical character of a self-conceited, incompetent and 
incapable detective. Not only does he have an inappropriate, exaggerated self-
perception that is far from reality, he also simultaneously has a similar paranoid-
augmented perception of the subtenant as a professional spy and as his fierce 
opponent. The protagonist’s paranoid worldview is reflected in the structural and 
generic levels of the play as it becomes a parody of a detective story over time. 
The classical work of this genre “should present a problem, and the problem 
should be solved by an amateur or professional detective through processes of 
deduction.”4 The spy story, conversely, does not usually contain a puzzle. The 
detective genre is based on the questions Who?, Why? and How?, whereas the 
                                                           
3  The play premiered on 1 October 2018, directed by Tatjana Mandić Rigonat, who also 
adapted the text. 
4  Symons 1992: 13. 
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spy story only concerns the last one—How?.5 In Balkanski špijun, Ilija’s investi-
gation turns out to not just be an incompetent search for truth and a failed at-
tempt to solve a mystery, but, due to its paranoid roots, it becomes increasingly 
complicated as his quest progresses. This moves the protagonists away from the 
solution to the mystery (which actually would be a realization that there is no 
real mystery at all and that the subtenant is not actually a dangerous spy). 
The boundaries between paranoia and the mechanisms found in classical 
crime fiction are actually much more permeable than is often thought. In his de-
tailed and convincing study of crime fiction, paranoia and the modern society, 
French sociologist Luc Boltanski argues that a detective character in crime fic-
tion behaves essentially like a paranoid person, with the difference being that de-
tectives are not only considered to be mentally healthy by society, but that they 
are also usually appointed to conduct their investigations by the state.6 Both the 
detective and the paranoid person strive to solve a mystery; both are trying to 
expose the deeper, (supposedly) real reality that lies behind the superficial, visi-
ble one and both are doing their best to identify and defeat the hidden causes of 
evil in their society. In this sense, Boltanski argues that when it comes to the 
structural level of their investigative quest, the detective, the paranoid and the 
social scientist are all dedicated to similar studies of their respective social reali-
ties. 
The genre of the Anglo-American detective story traditionally stands 
“strongly on the side of law and order,”7 at least in its classical form. The detec-
tive is perceived as society’s agent, he is a hero and savior of society, is general-
ly super-intelligent, though often eccentric. He is the one who is allowed to even 
go above and beyond the law in order to keep society from danger. The prime 
example of this type is Sherlock Holmes, who is also a role model for the char-
acter of the detective as a private person, i.e., one who does not act as a state’s 
official.8 Probably the best-known character of the other type—i.e., the profes-
                                                           
5  Ibid.: 15–16. 
6  Cf. Boltanski 2013: 46. Crime fiction emerges and develops as a genre simultaneously 
with the invention and description of the phenomenon of paranoia in 1899, by the 
German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926); see ibid.: 45–46. 
7  Symons 1992: 20. 
8  Cf. Boltanski 2013: 128. Boltanski generally sets the anglophone tradition of crime 
fiction apart, in which the detective is almost exclusively a private person, i.e., an am-
ateur detective, in contrast to the French tradition in which the detective is a profes-
sional, a member of the police or of official security forces with few exceptions; ibid.: 
151–52. 
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sional detective as an official of the state—is Georges Simenon’s commissioner 
Maigret. When it comes to the comparison of those two characters, it should also 
be noted that Maigret is an ordinary official, as well as a very ordinary, down-to-
earth person, unlike the aristocratic and intellectual detective (like Sherlock 
Holmes). The character of Ilija Čvorović encompasses and parodically under-
mines features of both of the aforementioned types: firstly, he is an amateur de-
tective and, secondly, he is an ordinary, lower-middle-class man, undoubtedly 
petit bourgeois in his education, essentially proletarian in both his manners and 
taste. Both Ilija and his twin brother Đura have some character features that are 
reminiscent of a comic type of yokel or agroikos.9 Ilija’s violent nature, which 
surfaces at the end of the interrogation scene, corresponds to Commissioner 
Maigret’s “petit bourgeois sadism,” as Boltanski formulates it.10 
 
 
Behind or Within the Social Reality 
 
Boltanski states that a detective story or a crime novel—unlike the fantasy fic-
tion or picaresque novel—is not possible without a predefined social reality in 
which the plot is situated.11 The plot of Balkanski špijun takes place in Belgrade, 
the capital of former Yugoslavia in the early 1980s, which means that the play 
referred to the actual political situation of the time. The 1980s were a time of 
deep economic and social crisis in the country. The Socialist Republic of Yugo-
slavia existed for another decade after Tito’s death in 1980. Holm Sundhaussen 
describes this period as the country’s “self-destruction.” Economic growth 
slowed dramatically, the number of registered unemployed increased, large parts 
of the population were rapidly pushed into poverty, inflation soared and the 
mismanagement and corruption of the Communist officials destroyed the poli-
tical elite’s credibility. The technological backwardness, the International Mone-
tary Fund’s drastic repayment requirements and the Yugoslav economy’s lack of 
liquidity boosted the crisis and social tensions increased.12 The social and eco-
nomic crisis had radical ideological and political consequences: ethnic nation-
alisms (and partly racism) increased and the rapid erosion of Communism, as 
well as the idea of Yugoslav unity, continued unabated. 
                                                           
9  Cf. Kuzmić 2014: 121–22. 
10  Boltanski 2013: 201.  
11  Cf. ibid.: 36–40. 
12  Cf. Sundhaussen 2007: 379. 
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Kovačević’s play was written in 1982 (and was premiered one year later), at 
a time when these processes, which would end in the Yugoslav wars, were just 
beginning. This backdrop of the political “self-destruction” of Serbian (i.e., Yu-
goslav) society is the context in which the play is set and it decisively framed the 
context in which Ilija’s paranoia emerges. 
The “re-coding of the past,”13 which also took place during the 1980s, had 
many aspects. A series of taboos were broken, primarily started in fictional lite-
rature. These included: the unmasking of the partisan myth, the distancing of it-
self from Tito’s cult of personality and the rehabilitation of various quisling or-
ganizations and “war criminals” from the Second World War, etc.14 The re-
construction of the historical and political background of Balkanski špijun must 
also include the taboo of Goli otok. In the initial years after Tito’s death, the 
breaking of the taboo of silence concerning the prison and work camp on the 
small Adriatic island Goli otok—which had been installed immediately after Ti-
to’s break with Stalin in 1948 with the official aim of “re-educating” the Sta-




Suspicious Persons, During Communism and Previously 
 
An analysis of Balkanski špijun cannot avoid comparing Kovačević’s play with 
two other canonical texts from the Slavonic drama tradition, namely Nikolai 
Gogol’s Revizor (The Government Inspector, 1835) and Sumnjivo lice (A Suspi-
cious Person, 1888/1923) by Serbian author Branislav Nušić. The character of 
the subtenant in Balkanski špijun, Jakovljević, along with the characters of 
Khlestakov (by Gogol) and Đoka (by Nušić), belong to the comical tradition of a 
suspicious person, a stranger that suddenly appears in a closed community, 
bringing turmoil and causing trouble. The alleged identity of all three characters 
                                                           
13  Ibid.: 380. 
14  Cf. ibid.: 379. 
15  Following the argumentation of contemporary Yugoslav literary critic Predrag Matve-
jević, Nicole Münnich analyzes the novels by Branko Hofman Noč do jutra (Night till 
Morning, 1981), Antonije Isaković’s Tren 2 (The Moment 2, 1982) and Slobodan Se-
lenić’s Pismo/glava (Heads or Tails, 1982) as the seminal texts of the so-called Goli 
otok literature. She also adds Dušan Jovanović’s theater play Karamazovi (The Kara-
mazovs, 1981) and Vitomil Zupan’s novel Levitan (Levitan, 1982) to the “broader 
core” of this canon; see Münnich 2006: 209–10. 
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is not of their own construction, but the identity that has been imposed on them 
from the outside by others, or more precisely, by the paranoid others.16 Like 
Balkanski špijun, the plays by Gogol and Nušić are also examples of a hybrid 
drama genre that encompasses both a comedy of manners and political satire, 
meaning that the characters are primarily representatives of the state apparatus, 
and only secondarily are they private persons and family members.  
The outline of the plot in Gogol’s play is as follows: After receiving a confi-
dential announcement that the state government’s inspector will soon arrive to 
their town, the town’s mayor and clerks, in a paranoid hysteria, start to believe 
that the unknown young man from St. Petersburg—actually an adventurer who 
accidentally happened to arrive in this town—is none other than the inspector, 
who—for the sake of his investigation—arrives incognito. Nušić modified this 
plot primarily with respect to the fact that the assumed identity of the suspicious 
person is not actually a representative of the state, but its enemy. The comical 
confusion outlined by Nušić lies in the fact that the alleged political criminal and 
dangerous anarchist is actually the secret fiancé of the mayor’s daughter, who al-
so arrived in town incognito.17 
According to the Russian playwright, the falsely identified stranger stands 
for the public order established and maintained by the state, while the alleged 
spy represents the enemy of the state and a threat to the public and national order 
according to his Serbian successors. In other words, Gogol’s work is the jumping 
off point where the object of the paranoia is a part of the state; according to 
Nušić and Kovačević this individual is the enemy of the state. At the same time, 
while Ilija Čvorović is portrayed as morally faultless, his character is ethically 
completely transparent, thus resembling the classical tragic hero. The characters 
as outlined in Gogol’s and Nušić’s plays, on the other hand, are morally corrupt 
and hypocritical, which makes them typical comical characters.18 Although 
                                                           
16  Cf. Zelinsky 2012: 168. 
17  Sumnjivo lice was written by Nušić in 1888 but didn’t have its premier until 1923. In 
1928, the author wrote a preface stating that the subtitle of the first draft version of the 
play was “A gogoliad in two acts,” which was later changed in the final one to “A 
comedy in two acts.” – cf. Nušić 1957: 161–62. 
18  The parodied figure of a spy also appears as an episode character in Nušić’s Sumnjivo 
lice. Aleksa Žunjić has a business card that openly states that he is a “county spy.” He 
did this for strategic reasons, as explained by the captain’s assistant: “He [the spy] 
says, when he was hiding himself, he couldn’t find out anything, and now everybody 
is telling him details directed against each other.” (“Он каже, пре док је крио није 
могао ништа да дозна, а сад му сви казују један против другог.” – Nušić 1957: 
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Gogol’s Khlestakov is not a deliberate trickster or even self-consciously manipu-
lative, he also cannot be considered to be a positive character either.19 Neverthe-
less, according to Kovačević, all characters in Balkanski špijun are per se actu-
ally positive, morally impeccable and faultless. In this respect, all members of 
society in Balkanski špijun are allegorically represented as victims of the system 
which is itself corrupt, full of inherent aberrations and structural injustices. 
In the works of both Gogol and Nušić, the rivalry between the mother and 
the daughter is no more than a conventional comical motif. In the work by Ko-
vačević, however, the conflict between Sonja and Danica represents a deep gen-
erational and ideological fracture in the family as well as a metaphorical fracture 
in society. In this respect, Nikola Janković argues that Ilija’s paranoia could it-
self be understood as a consequence of this generational gap, i.e., the conflict be-
tween the generation that created the Socialist state and the subsequent one that 
would later decisively contribute to its dissolution.20 
The other important difference between the plays by Gogol and Nušić and 
the one by Kovačević, is that in Balkanski špijun there is no peripety in the plot, 
there is no sudden discovery about the true identity of the main character (Gogol 
and Nušić include an intercepted letter to achieve this effect). Until the last sec-
onds of the play Ilija Čvorović believes that the subtenant is a professional spy. 
According to Kovačević, the subtenant is nevertheless the figure of reason in 
the play (a typical figure in a classicist comedy), while Gogol deliberately con-
structed his main character in a domain beyond that tradition. One could argue 
that the only element that stays inviolable, honest and decent in Gogol’s work is 
actually the state itself.21 However, the local civil officials are also representa-
tives of the state, which is thereby also being portrayed and satirized by Gogol as 
corrupt and immoral; they are actually being represented as malfunctional parts 
of the state that should be removed by the real government inspector as the true 
representative of the state. The inspector’s message for the mayor occurs in the 
play’s last lines. Khlestakov is just a projection surface, a “phantom,”22 his inter-
cepted letter to his friend in St. Petersburg is literally a sort of moral mirror for 
all of the town’s inhabitants. In the last scene of Kovačević’s play, however, the 
                                                           
193–94. All English translations of the original quotations in the text are mine, G.L.) 
The parody is even more striking, considering that it is actually the spy Žunjić who 
brings the—false—information about the arrival of the alleged terrorist. 
19  Cf. Zelinsky 2012: 167. 
20  Cf. Janković 2011: 69. 
21  Cf. Zelinsky 2012: 177. 
22  Ibid.: 185. 
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shifting of the dialogue towards Ilija’s monologue automatically pushes the sub-
tenant’s position into the role of the rational(izing) mirror, a mirror through 
which Ilija’s paranoia is reflected. 
 
 
Paranoia and Conspiracy, in Communism and Beyond 
 
Conspiracy theories—the “belief that powerful, hidden, evil forces control hu-
man destinies,” as Michael Barkun concisely defines the phenomenon23—are 
usually significant subcultural phenomena in a social sense, the emergence of 
which are connected with existential anxieties and shocking and traumatic 
events. However, conspiracy theories are becoming more than just a subcultural 
form of escapism or paranoia observed in some socio-historical contexts or some 
political and ideological systems; rather, they are often becoming a powerful dis-
cursive instrument of political populism. 
The literal and clinical use of the term paranoia notwithstanding, there is al-
so its metaphorical meaning. In his essay “The Paranoid Style in American Poli-
tics” (1964), Richard Hofstadter uses the notion in this symbolic meaning in or-
der to analyze the right-wing extremism in the United States after the Second 
World War (most notably McCarthyism). Hofstadter distinguishes, on the one 
hand, the clinical paranoiac as a person who believes to be a target of a personal 
conspiracy, one that is “directed specifically against him,” and the political para-
noiac, on the other hand, as the person for whom the conspiracy threatens the 
whole society. It is in other words, “directed against a nation, a culture, a way of 
life.”24 
Another symbolical use of the notion of paranoia can be found in some semi-
nal theoretical works on postmodernism.25 In this theoretical context, paranoia is 
usually regarded as a symptom of a counter-Enlightenment, anti-rationalist post-
modern worldview. In postmodern fiction, which in this case correlates almost 
exclusively to the late capitalist societies of the West, paranoia first stands for a 
                                                           
23  Barkun 2006: 2. 
24  Hofstadter 2008: 4. In his essay, Hofstadter draws a line tracing the diachronic succes-
sion in American conspiracism from anti-Catholicism, anti-Masonry and on to anti-
Communism. 
25  See Hutcheon 2000 and Lucy 1997. Some other influential critics, however, consider 
the phenomenon of paranoia to be a part of the “epistemological” paradigm of high 
modernism, the phenomenon thereby laying beyond the “ontological” interest of post-
modernism; cf. McHale 1996: 23–24. 
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hyperactive individual imagination and it is a kind of substitute for the stable ex-
planation of the world that has been lost. As Patell puts it, “the only way to be 
‘inside, safe’ and thus simulate the benefits of community is to pick your own 
metaphor and your own paranoia.”26 In this way the common perspective is re-
versed; conspiracy theories are not perceived as a result of paranoia, but paranoia 
gradually becomes a means of defense, even a strategy for a cynical counter-
attack against conspiracy theories that are imposed and instrumentalized by the 
power structures and systems of total control.27 
The epistemological structure of paranoia is spiral. It usually begins with an 
ordinary everyday fact or action, but it turns out to be a trigger, prompting the 
paranoid person irreversibly into the spiral of paranoia. From that moment on, 
everything that the person experiences automatically becomes part of the para-
noid construction, everything becomes connected to everything, everything 
seems to be part of a certain conspiracy, or as Niall Lucy formulates it: 
 
A feature of paranoia is its potential to become a totalizing discourse, a discourse with no 
‘outside.’ For the paranoid, everything can count as evidence of a particular theory of the 
truth, a theory that is otherwise (from outside the space of paranoia, to which the paranoid 
is blind) understood to be grounded on a false assumption and so the ‘truth’ it sees is only 
a delusion based on a miscalculation or a misreading. But the theory itself, as a set of rules 
and procedures, is not necessarily wrong.28 
 
This collision of the paranoid perception of the outer world with an objective re-
ality—or at least with the one considered by the society/theater audience to be 
objective and true—makes a sharp counterpoint that Kovačević often uses in the 
play as a source of humor. 
According to Barkun, the core principles of every conspiracy theory are the 
following:  
 
1. Nothing happens by accident.  
2. Nothing is as it seems.  
3. Everything is connected.29  
 
                                                           
26  Patell 2001: 150. 
27  Cf. Lucy 1997: 229–30 and Hutcheon 2000: 120. 
28  Ibid.: 13. 
29  Cf. Barkun 2006: 3–4. 
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Conspiracy theories are purely Manichaean in their structure and strictly dualis-
tic in their worldview. When it comes to their scope, Barkun distinguishes three 
types of conspiracies: 
 
1. Event conspiracies  
2. Systemic conspiracies  
3. Superconspiracies30  
 
Hofstadter’s definition of the paranoid political worldview actually comprises 
the second and the third of Barkun’s types postulating namely that  
 
… the distinguishing thing about the paranoid style is not that its exponents see conspira-
cies or plots here and there in history, but that they regard a “vast” or “gigantic” conspira-
cy as the motive force in historical events. History is a conspiracy set in motion by demon-
ic forces of almost transcendent power, and what is felt to be needed to defeat it is not the 
usual methods of political give-and-take, but an all-out crusade.31  
 
In Balkanski špijun, the starting point of Ilija’s paranoia is his retort to Danica 
given at the very outset of the play: “When did the police ever care about a nor-
mal and decent person?!”32 After the briefing in the police station, he is absolute-
ly convinced that the subtenant has worked against Yugoslavia abroad. The spi-
ral of paranoia starts to progress and quickly absorbs Ilija’s entire psychical real-
ity. His credo become two sentences that actually paraphrase Barkun’s descrip-
tion of paranoia: “Everything is the opposite of what it seems to be”33 and “The 
spies are among us, all you need to know is how to recognize them.”34 He soon 
develops a fixed version of a vast conspiracy around the subtenant’s activity, 
reaching the proportions of Barkun’s systemic type of conspiracy: “He was sent 
from abroad to organize enemy units. He brought money to buy and bribe peo-
ple.”35 Towards the end of the interrogation scene, Ilija offers the subtenant a 
                                                           
30  Ibid.: 6. 
31  See Hofstadter 2008: 29. 
32  „Када се милиција интересовала за обичног и поштеног човека!“ − Kovačević 
2002: 76. 
33  „Све је супроптно од онога што изгледа да јесте.“ – ibid.: 110. 
34  „Шпијуни су међу нама, само их треба знати – препознати.“ – ibid.: 112. 
35  „Он је послат из иностранства да организује непријатељске групе. Донô је паре 
да купује и подмићује људе.“ – ibid.: 89. Danica is wondering who sponsors all of 
this, to which Đura replies: “The one they work for is paying. CIA, my sister, CIA. 
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chance (as a kind of compromise, as seen from his perspective) to surrender to 
the authorities, and then to start to work for the Yugoslav secret police as a re-
penting double-spy. The culmination of Kovačević’s parody of political paranoia 
is the point at which Ilija’s conspiracy theory practically matches Hofstadter’s 
definition and becomes a version of a superconspiracy. After he discovers two 
badges of the Polish civil movement “Solidarity” among the subtenant’s person-
al belongings, Ilija tells him: 
 
“And do you know, sir, who organized those young people on the Square of Marx and 
Engels to carry a banner with this sign? Huh? You don’t know that was the idea of your 
Professor friend… And do you know who brought the foreigner Pope, after six hundred 
years, to the Vatican throne? Huh? Not only a stranger, but a Pole? Huh?”36 
 
As mentioned previously, the paranoia and conspiracy narratives in Balkanski 
špijun are induced in the specific, highly contradictory social and ideological 
context of Yugoslav Socialism. The main features of this political system, in the 
way in which they are represented in Kovačević’s play, show some striking simi-
larities with the basic thesis of Milovan Đilas’ book The New Class.37 One could 
argue that Ilija’s paranoia is, in fact, the logical and unavoidable consequence of 
the Communist “tyranny over the mind,” as Đilas calls it.38 
Once Communism consolidated its power, it established Marxism and foun-
ded its so-called dialectical materialism as the dogma and the universal intel-
lectual method of a society. As a result, the system “pushes its adherents into the 
                                                           
They’ve destroyed a half of the world!” („Плаћа онај за кога раде. ЦИА, снајка, 
ЦИА. Уништили су пола света!“ – ibid.: 113) 
36  „А да ли ти је познато, господине, ко је организовô оне омладинце, на Тргу 
Маркса и Енгелса, да носе транспарент са овим знаком? А? Није ти познато да је 
то смислио твој пријатељ професор... А да ли ти је познато ко је довео Папу-
странца, после шесто година, на престо Ватикана? А? Ем странац, ем Пољак? 
А?“ – ibid.: 136.  
37  Milovan Đilas (1911–1995) was a Yugoslav revolutionary, a highly ranked Commu-
nist official at the time, but by the end of his life he was viewed as a dissident. The 
New Class was written in 1955 and 1956; it was first published in English in the USA 
in 1957. Đilas was sentenced to seven years in prison in Yugoslavia for publishing the 
work. The first legal edition of the book in Yugoslavia was published in Belgrade in 
1990. 
38  Cf. Djilas 1962: 124–46. 
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position which makes it impossible for them to hold any other viewpoint.”39 
Moreover, as with any other totalitarian ideology which tries to represent itself 
as the only true and universal explanation of the world, Communism became 
“increasingly one-sided and exclusive” over time and “created half-truths and 
tried to justify them.”40 This makes Communist society a very fertile soil for var-
ious conspiracy theories: anyone can turn out to be an enemy, and the enemy 
could be everywhere and attack at any time. Instead of the presumption of inno-
cence, the presumption of guilt becomes ubiquitous: 
 
A citizen in the Communist system lives oppressed by the constant pangs of his con-
science, and the fear that he has transgressed. He is always fearful that he will have to 
demonstrate that he is not an enemy of socialism, just as in the Middle Ages a man con-
stantly had to show his devotion to the Church.41 
 
For Gogol, conversely, the social context and preconditions for the paranoid in-
clination of the town’s inhabitants are not only historically contingent and more 
specific but are also a result of their personal shortcomings and moral transgres-
sions (simply the offender’s fear of being caught). The comical plot of Revizor, 
based on the mistaken identity (qui pro quo) of the alleged inspector, was, how-
ever, not just one unique anecdote from the Russian province of the time. Unex-
pected, unannounced state inspections to provincial towns were not actually unu-
sual and were a consequence of the efforts by Emperor Nicholas I (1825–1855) 
to sharpen the control of the administrative system in the provinces. Moreover, 
the inspectors were sometimes disguised as strangers or travelling incognito 
through the provinces in order to investigate the situation in the communities 
more efficiently and objectively. This was the precondition for the emergence of 
a type of constant, latent paranoia among the civil servants in the provinces of 
being constantly under secret surveillance. Over time this could make the towns-
people suspicious of contact with any stranger.42 
                                                           
39  Ibid.: 124. 
40  Ibid.: 129. 
41  Ibid.: 132. 
42  Cf. Zelinsky 2012: 165–66. However, an indication of a broader paranoid vision of 
the events can also be found in Gogol’s play. At the very outset of the plot, the local 
judge Ammos Fiodorovich Liapkin-Tiapkin warns the mayor that the situation with 
the inspector is probably part of a large-scale secret political strategy by the govern-
ment: “In my opinion, Anton Antonovich, the situation is complex and rather political. 
It means that Russia… yes… intends to start a war, and the Government has secretly 
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The paranoid predisposition of Ilija Čvorović seems to be a consequence of 
the very essence of the political system in which he is living. The worldview and 
the way of thinking of the ordinary citizens under Communism, as well as of in-
tellectuals, always has “two faces—one for themselves, their own; the other for 
the public, the official.”43 The collective, but also individual, schizophrenia 
seems to be an inevitable consequence of the ideological dogmatism and totalita-
rian control.44 
According to the official ideological worldview, which corresponds—at least 
publicly—with Ilija’s personal point of view, the subtenant is not only a suspi-
cious stranger, but moreover, due to his family origin, he belongs to a defamed, 
perilous social class from the time prior to the Second World War, namely the 
bourgeoisie from the Yugoslav Monarchy. As Đilas emphasizes: 
 
Communists settle accounts with their opponents not because they have committed 
crimes, but because they are opponents. … From the Communist point of view, these op-
ponents are punished by ‘due process of law,’ although there may be no legal basis for 
their being convicted.45 
 
This is the essence of Ilija’s paranoia: firstly, it is perceived as “normal” to pre-
ventively act against potential or real opponents; secondly, this action is per-
ceived not only as morally unproblematic and justified, but also as completely 
legal and ideologically advisable. The typical mechanism of political processes 
in Communism, as described by Đilas, includes organized provocateurs and the 
fake, illegal organizations led by the secret police as a trap for possible dissi-
dents and opponents of the system. This mechanism can be clearly recognized in 
the way in which Ilija—locked within his paranoid conspiracy narrative—sees 
his situation with the subtenant and in how he conducts his investigation. 
One could argue that, if the subtenant is chiefly the rational(izing) mirror 
from which Ilija’s paranoia is reflected, then Ilija’s character itself is, to some 
extent, primarily the projection field for Communist ideology, the body and the 
mind upon which the ideology is being imprinted and operating through. 
                                                           
commissioned an inspector to find out if there is any treason anywhere.” («Я думаю, 
Антон Антонович, что здесь тонкая и больше политическая причина. Это значит 
вот что: Россия... да... хочет вести войну, и министерия-то, вот видите, и подо-
слала чиновника, чтобы узнать, нет ли где измены». – Gogol 1985: 11) 
43  Djilas 1962: 132. 
44  See also Deutschmann 2006. 
45  Cf. Djilas 1962: 90–91. 
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Between Comedy and Tragedy 
 
Balkanski špijun is a dark comedy or absurdist tragicomedy for the great major-
ity of critics.46 This is yet another link that connects Kovačević with Gogol, 
whose Revizor is often interpreted as an essentially modern example of drama in 
which the tragical potential of the play is being induced out of and through the 
comedy.47 According to Zoran Milutinović, Balkanski špijun ought to be labeled 
as a tragicomedy, unlike Sumnjivo lice by Branislav Nušić which is a true come-
dy.48 As Milutinović emphasizes, the tragicomedy in twentieth century drama 
differs from earlier examples of the genre; the main feature of the newer form 
lies in the fact that “the tragical content is being represented using the traditional 
means of comedy, but thereby, however, not losing its tragical quality.”49 Nu-
šić’s character of the town mayor, Jerotije Pantić, is based on a drastic, comical 
portrayal of someone who is disproportionately and unrealistically ambitious. 
However, this ridiculous character is not actually dangerous for those around 
him.50 Ilija Čvorović, on the contrary, is a “man of ideology,” his ideological 
blindness is comical in the first place, but it turns out to be very dangerous in the 
end, not only for him personally and for his family, but also for the entire socie-
ty.51 After the premiere of the play in 1983, theater critic Jovan Ćirilov empha-
sized the metaphysical aspect of Ilija’s paranoia comparing Kovačević to Kafka: 
If Der Process (The Trial) is “a tragedy of one causelessly persecuted,” then 
Balkanski špijun is “a comedy of a persecutor without a cause,” wrote the crit-
ic.52 At the archetypal level, Ilija’s character is an example of a shunned individ-
ual or former delinquent who seeks to redeem himself by accomplishing an ex-
traordinary endeavor, and in so doing might regain his status within the commu-
nity that expelled him.53 
In the list of dramatis personae, Ilija is ironically described as “the owner of 
the house, the garden, his wife, and the idea of a free man and a free country.”54 
                                                           
46  Cf. Simović 2002: VII; Jakšić Provči 2012: 51–52; Pantić 2013: 233. 
47  Cf. Zelinsky 2012: 52–53. 
48  Cf. Milutinović 2010: 95–96. 
49  Ibid.: 99. 
50  Ibid.: 97. 
51  Cf. ibid.: 99–105. 
52  As cited in Jakšić Provči 2012: 72. 
53  Cf. Kuzmić 2014: 85. 
54  „Газда куће, окућнице, жене и идеје о слободном човеку и слободној земљи“ – 
Kovačević 2002: 72. 
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The fact that Ilija is called “the owner of his wife” is only partly related to the 
patriarchal order that prevails within the family: Ilija is the owner of Danica be-
cause she is trapped in the spiral of his paranoia. The statement that he is “the 
owner of the idea of a free man and a free country” turns out to be an ironic jux-
taposition: Ilija is being governed by an ideology that is only nominally based on 
freedom. In fact, he is a marionette, an object—in the Foucauldian sense—of the 
ideology. 
The character of an ideological paranoiac could be paradigmatically com-
pared with a classical tragic hero. The predestined, unchangeable fate of the trag-
ic hero, upon which he cannot have any influence no matter what decision he 
makes or what action he undertakes, and which inevitably leads him to catas-
trophe and death, appears at the structural level to be identical with the obsession 
of a paranoid with a particular idea or ideology and his inability to escape the 
spiral of paranoia in which he is encapsulated. One could, therefore, argue that 
Ilija Čvorović, when it comes to the inherent structure of his character, repre-
sents a tragic hero placed in the structural context and poetical mechanisms of 
comedy. In this respect, Petar Marjanović’s thesis is very intriguing as he points 
out that even if every trace of Ilija’s Stalinist complex would be removed from 
the play, the plot would still function in the same way.55 
In the closing interrogation scene, Kovačević’s tragicomical character ends 
up in a kind of self-analysis and he tries to deal with the principal reasons for his 
own paranoia. The subtenant gives him the friendly advice that he should imme-
diately undergo psychiatric treatment. Ilija begins this by trying to defend and 
justify himself, more or less directly speaking about the psychological, but at the 
same time the socio-historical and ideological causes which made him suitable to 
fall into such paranoia. These include his deep, innate hatred and frustration with 
the fact of being born in the inferior, exploited social class, his resentment of the 
fact that he had become, without being asked to, the cannon fodder of the vast 
totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century. 
 
 
The Other New Class 
 
“It has been said in jest that the Communist leaders created a Communist socie-
ty—for themselves. In fact, they do identify themselves with society and its aspi-
                                                           
55  As cited in Kuzmić 2014: 85–86. The thesis, which indirectly proved to be correct, 
was carried out by T. Mandić Rigonat in the aforementioned adaptation of the play in 
2018. 
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rations. Absolute despotism equates itself with the belief in absolute human hap-
piness, though it is an all-inclusive and universal tyranny.” This is how Đilas de-
scribes the position of the new class in Communist countries.56 He uses this no-
tion with respect to the political bureaucracy of the Communist party, which 
transforms into the ruling oligarchy in those allegedly classless countries. The 
power itself becomes the aim for the Communist political leaders, instead of be-
ing the means through which to develop a classless society. Đilas rejects the crit-
ical definition of real socialism as a “total state capitalism,” arguing that it is not 
the state who owns and runs the public property, but it is the new class. In that 
sense, he sees the reality of communism at that point (the end of the 1950s) as a 
peculiar hybrid form that absorbs various “feudal, capitalist, and even slave-
owning” elements.57  
In addition to Đilas’s analysis, Kovačević’s play reveals the deep ideological 
contradictions that reside in the foundations of socialist Yugoslavia, e.g., the 
sharp ideological divisions that were only temporarily vanquished by the Com-
munists on the surface of the society. These controversial events include the lib-
eration of the country in 1945 and Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948, with the sub-
sequent persecutions of Stalin’s followers. The most notable labor camp of this 
time, which later took on great symbolical meaning within the anti-communist 
narratives, was Goli otok, as mentioned previously. Nicole Münnich notes, for 
example, that after Tito’s death, at the beginning of 1980s, the taboo of Goli otok 
was primarily and decisively broken in literature. This phenomenon was initially 
part of liberalizing tendencies, but by the end of the decade, in the wake of 
emerging nationalism, the topic lost its subversive role.58 
After the Second World War Ilija was—like his brother Đura—a keen and 
enthusiastic Stalinist, which was in accordance with the newly established of-
ficial state ideology at that time. However, since they did not change their politi-
cal beliefs and inclinations after Yugoslav official state policy underwent a radi-
cal turnaround in 1948, they ended up spending a couple of years in prison. Ilija 
tells the subtenant the following about his relation to Stalinism: 
 
                                                           
56  Djilas 1962: 131. 
57  Ibid.: 172. 
58  The narrative of Goli otok was hardly suitable for national(istic) attribution, unlike, 
for example, Jasenovac, a concentration camp for Serbs, Jews and Roma led by the 
Ustashe in the fascist Independent State of Croatia, or Bleiburg, where members of the 
Ustashe movement were massacred shortly after the end of the Second World War; 
see Münnich 2006: 217–18. 
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“You know for sure, your people told you when you moved in with me, that I had served 
two years in prison. You know that. I don’t know if they told you about Đura, probably 
they did, he was also there for over three years... . Yes, I loved him the way someone 
loves God, or, say, children, mother... Stalin was everything for me. He is credited with all 
sorts of things today: some things are true and some things are not. He is being charged 
with crimes he did not commit. Some of that he did. That is well-known and I admit it. 
However, then, at that time, I thought he was sinless. I was young, stupid, angry, I would 
take a gun and go fighting. I would die thinking I was dying for a great, universal justice. I 
needed sobriety, and that was a good one, to stop, think a bit, and tell myself: who im-
prisoned you, wished you well, not to haste and to suffer. And today I am grateful to 
them.”59 
 
After spending years in prison, Ilija is terrified of any state institution and scared 
to death of just the idea of having anything to do with state authorities. This con-
stant fear is the actual birthplace of his paranoia. Therefore, he impulsively, from 
pure survival instinct—one could argue even consciously and strategically—
unquestioningly appropriates the official ideological point of view and he un-
conditionally subjugates himself to the ruling political discourse. “Ground in the 
wheels of ideology, ‘re-educated’ and tamed into a subject,”60 Ilija finally, so 
one could ironically remark, became a good and exemplary citizen in the Com-
munist system. 
The key question of Kovačević’s political satire is the following: How could 
it happen that an apparently normal person starts to behave like Ilija Čvorović? 
In which ideological system is that possible? Ilija and his brother are represented 
as both perpetrators and victims of that ideological system. However, the ques-
tion of whether the system has created Ilija Čvorović or Ilija Čvorović, being an 
                                                           
59  „Вама је сигурно познато, то су вам ваши рекли, када сте се усељавали код мене, 
да сам одлежô две године затвора. То знате. Не знам да ли су помињали и Ђуру, 
вероватно јесу, и он је био преко три године... . Јесте, волео сам га кô што неко 
воли Бога, или, рецимо, децу, мајку... Стаљин је за мене био све и свја. Њему 
данас приписују свашта: и што је истина и што није. Оптужују га за злочине које 
није починио. Нешто јесте. То се зна и ја то признајем. Међутим, онда, у оно 
време, мислио сам да је безгрешан. Био сам млад, глуп, љут, узô би’ пушку и бо-
рио би’ се. Погинô би’, мислећи да гинем за велику, светску правду. Требало ми 
је отрежњење, и то добро отрежњење, да станем, размислим, и да себи кажем: ко 
те је затворио желео ти је добро, да не срљаш и не страдаш. И данас сам им за-
хвалан.“ – Kovačević 2002: 138. 
60  Pantić 2013: 227. 
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avid Communist and Stalinist, helped to create the system remains open. In other 
words, to what extent does Ilija bear responsibility for the emergence of such a 
system to which he himself falls victim in the end? Towards the end of the inter-
rogation scene he admits to the subtenant: “My whole life I have been on the 
verge of killing someone, armed with many rights, including nobody having the 
right to blame me. Don’t make me let you pay for all those who have insulted, 
humiliated and trampled on me.”61 
In his intriguing allegorical interpretation, Nikola Janković sees Stalinism 
(Ilija) and Liberalism (the subtenant) as the play’s two dominant ideologies. 
Pushed to the periphery or even outright demonized and persecuted during Tito-
ism, these ideologies started to show up again on society’s surface with the eco-
nomic crisis and the changes underway after Tito’s death. In this respect, at the 
time of its premiere at the beginning of the 1980s, Balkanski špijun “confronted 
the then-actual ideology of liberalism with the seemingly anachronistic ideology 
of Stalinism.”62 According to Janković’s interpretation, Ilija is a former, subju-
gated enemy of the system, and the subtenant is the current, approaching one 
(though in a broader historical respect he would actually be an old, originally de-
feated enemy). Just as Ilija got a “second chance” after being “re-educated” on 
Goli otok, now, in the course of his own “re-educating” of the subtenant, he of-
fers him a “second chance.”63 
The tragic feature of Ilija’s character lies in the fact that those who oppressed 
and exploited him (before the Second World War) and who sent him to jail (after 
the war) even though he was innocent—at least in a structural sense—did not 
disappear when one political and social system (monarchy, capitalism) was re-
placed by another (Stalinism, followed by Yugoslav socialism). Deceived and 
manipulated by the ideological fog of the new system, Ilija is unable to compre-
hend that his oppressors actually belong not only to the ruling class, but also to 
the old capitalist system. In his concluding monologue, Ilija fathoms—albeit un-
consciously—the imminent contradictions of Yugoslav Socialism, primarily the 
opportunism of the Yugoslav political elite. In the social reality of the country, 
the emancipation narrative of the working-class gradually became an empty slo-
gan, and the workers’ self-management project turned out to be practically dys-
                                                           
61  „Ја сам цео живот био на ивици да неког убијем, са пуно права, чак да ми нико 
не замери. Немојте ви да ми платите за све који су ме вређали, понижавали и 
газили.“ – Kovačević 2002: 140. 
62  Janković 2011: 56. 
63  Cf. ibid.: 68. 
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functional and a sort of rhetorical mask used by the ruling new class to retain its 
own positions and privileges. As Đilas points out: 
 
Despite oppression, despotism, unconcealed confiscations, and privileges of the ruling 
echelons, some of the people – and especially the Communists – retain the illusions con-
tained in their slogans. Although the Communist revolution may start with the most ideal-
istic concepts, calling for wonderful heroism and gigantic effort, it sows the greatest and 
the most permanent illusions.64 
 
One could argue that Ilija’s character stands for a convinced, idealistic Com-
munist, while the Yugoslav Communist elite gave up its declared ideological 
principles. His ardent belief in the ideal of a Communist society—contrasted 
against the pragmatism and opportunism of the social setting in which he is liv-
ing—is the crucial feature of both the comic and tragic sides of his character. 
 
 
Conclusion: Towards the Political, in the 1980s and Beyond 
 
The comical subversion of Communist ideology, as well as the sociopolitical sat-
ire of the practical failures of Yugoslav Socialism are the main topics in several 
other plays by Dušan Kovačević, particularly in those written during the turbu-
lent period starting from the end of the 1980s until the mid-1990s, such as Klaus-
trofobična komedija (Claustrophobic Comedy, 1987), Profesionalac (The Pro-
fessional, 1989), Urnebesna tragedija (The Tragic Burlesque, 1990) and Lari 
Tompson, tragedija jedne mladosti (Larry Thompson, the Tragedy of a Youth, 
1996). Zoran Milutinović labels these four plays as Kovačević’s series of “socio-
political and satirical plays” and points out that a concrete political topic, as well 
as specific and local political context lie in the very core of each of those 
works.65 
The alleged spy conspiracy in Balkanski špijun is the result of Ilija’s ideo-
logically induced paranoia, and with the aim of opposing and stopping it, he ac-
tually starts to behave and to act as a professional detective. In the background of 
the plot, Kovačević is satirically targeting the corruption and malfunctioning bu-
reaucracy; his targets are the double moral standards of the country’s political 
elites, but also the social impact of the severe economic crisis in the early 1980s 
in Yugoslavia. This is the reason why some other critics, unlike Zoran Milutino-
                                                           
64  Djilas 1962: 30. 
65  Cf. Milutinović 2010: 7. 
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vić, argued that, for instance, Balkanski špijun and Profesionalac are the two 
paradigmatic plays for Kovačević’s political and satirical works.66  
To label Balkanski špijun as a political satire might not in itself be incorrect, 
but the crucial question is then: What is the exact target of the author’s satirical 
intention? If it is a general critical subversion of Yugoslav Socialism, as an ideo-
logical and sociopolitical system, then one must conclude that Kovačević’s sat-
ire, at the time of its publication in the early 1980s, was rather indistinct and 
simplifying. This satirical image of Communism, allegorically derived from Ili-
ja’s fictional biography, would correspond to a historical moment in the years 
following Tito’s break with Stalin. In this sense, Balkanski špijun is pendant of 
The New Class: Kovačević’s picture of communism is fundamentally in line 
with the analysis given by Đilas, or more precisely, it could be seen as its artistic 
transposition. The play, however, centers on the opposite pole of the social sys-
tem, on the other new class, not on the one of the exploiters in communism (red 
bourgeoisie), but on the one of the exploited (red petite bourgeoisie). Within the 
analysis of Milovan Đilas, the historical praxis of communism—as of the mid-
1950s—is principally seen as a development “from a revolutionary dictatorship 
to a reactionary despotism.”67 One could argue that Kovačević, writing his play 
at the beginning of the 1980s, generally essentializes communism as an ideolog-
ical and socio-historical system, without making any practical or crucial differ-
ence between Stalinism and Titoism. This is in fact similar to Đilas’ perspective, 
who also—although he details some differences between Yugoslavia and the 
other countries of the Eastern Bloc—ultimately generalizes his diagnosis for all 
socialist and communist systems of the time. These views are perceived of—to 
summarize—as examples of basically one system that has an inherent structural 
failure that cannot be fixed and which inevitably led to its paradoxes, misfor-
tunes and, ultimately, to its crimes. 
But if Đilas’s critique corresponded with the actual moment of its publication 
and offered an accurate and lucid diagnosis of contemporary communism, Kova-
čević’s critique of Yugoslav socialism would prove to be anachronistic and by-
passes the complexity of this system, as if nothing had happened and changed in 
the social and ideological respect in Yugoslavia between the late 1940s and early 
1980s. This is already evident in the reception of the two works, or rather in the 
status of their authors: Đilas’s book was banned and he ended up in prison for 
seven years, while Kovačević’s play was premiered in one of the most renowned 
Belgrade theaters, and shortly afterwards, its film adaptation was widely popular 
                                                           
66  Cf. Pantić 2013: 226–27. 
67  Djilas 1962: 90–91. 
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and won several awards at prestigious Yugoslav festivals. One could argue that 
some clichés and schematization of the characters were necessary to create the 
comic effects, but on the other hand, they set some limits and simplifications 
when it came to the representation, or better to say, to the narrative deconstruc-
tion of the contemporary political and social system in the play, as well as in the 
movie. 
In this respect, the play is much more relevant and significant as a socio-
psychological drama study of a character than it is as a socio-political satire. 
Such an interpretation would (incidentally) also be in line with the author’s 
openly declared intention. In an interview given in 2003, Kovačević specifically 
stated that his goal in the play was not to make “a political poster, but to analyze 
paranoia and the mentality of the people who, out of fear, become police collab-
orators.”68 The character of Ilija Čvorović is typical, or even symptomatic, for 
one social milieu and for one ideological totalitarianism (Stalinism), but is based 
on his fictional life trajectory, whereas the social system of Yugoslav socialism 
cannot be appropriately satirically dissected. The lack of deeper characterization 
and the dramaturgical neglect of Sonja and the subtenant further substantiate 
such argumentation. As mentioned previously, the main function of those per-
sons in the play is to comically contrast Ilija’s character. However, a more com-
plete and complex satirical allegory would have to also actively include the fic-
tional representatives of such social positions. 
The later historical development, which brought about the breakup of social-
ist Yugoslavia and the nationalist-inspired wars, opens up new interpretive per-
spectives into Balkanski špijun. Situating the play within the canon of the so-
called Goli otok-literature is also not unproblematic; if this view is adopted, then 
it could find its place only in the broader corpus of that canon, as Nicole Mün-
nich defines it. This is simply because there is no detailed treatment of that his-
torical complex in the play, it is not even directly named in the text. One possible 
interpretation could be—in fact at the metadramatic level—to read the biography 
of Ilija Čvorović as an allegory of the very emergence of Goli otok-literature it-
self in the early 1980s. The structure is clear: suppressed trauma, external cir-
cumstances allow it at some point to ascend to the surface, which is then fol-
lowed by the search for its own articulation, i.e., for the appropriate narrative or 
literary form (the conspiracy theory in the play). Such an allegorical reading 
from the current perspective, following the collapse of Socialism and the Yugo-
slav wars of the 1990s, must also encompass the later, post-communist legacy of 
anti-communism: the fact that the narratives about the victims of communism 
                                                           
68  Cit. after Janković 2011: 41. 
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were instrumentalized in inciting ethnic hatred and in justifying new, nationalist-
inspired crimes and genocide. 
As an anti-communist satire, Balkanski špijun has lost its political subver-
siveness today. This can be seen most clearly in the aforementioned current set-
ting of the play in the National Theater in Belgrade, in which the causes of Ilija’s 
paranoia no longer have anything to do with either Stalinism or with Titoism but 
lie in the post-Yugoslav transitional totalitarianism of social hopelessness. As a 
tragicomical character study, the indisputable artistic mastery and actuality of 
Balkanski špijun can be found in the conveying of one historically specific psy-
cho-pathology—in a somewhat Kafkaesque manner—not only at the universally 
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This chapter focuses on the play Balkanski špijun (The Balkan Spy, 1982) by 
Serbian author Dušan Kovačević. The play’s principal subject concerns a gro-
tesque tragicomedy with ideologically induced paranoia in Socialist Yugoslavia. 
The play’s main character is examined based on the typological and generic dis-
tinction between the figure of an amateur and a professional detective/spy, and in 
his relation to similar characters in the drama tradition of Eastern Europe (Gogol, 
Nušić). Paranoia, as a political and ideological phenomenon, is analyzed firstly 
in general theoretical terms and then within the specific socio-historical contexts 
of (Eastern European) Communism and Yugoslav Socialism. The relation of the 
play with the corpus of the so-called literature of Goli otok in Yugoslavia is also 
discussed. Concluding remarks concern the play’s political significance and im-





Books and Leeches: Conspiracy Theory  




Danilo Kiš; David Albahari; fiction and conspiracy theories; paranoia; desinte-
gration of Yugoslavia 
 
 
Conspiracy and Crisis 
 
When Reinhart Koselleck published his influential study Kritik und Krise (Cri-
tique and Crisis) in 1959, it was immediately clear that it would open a new 
chapter in Western European historiography. The complex argumentation deve-
loped in the book is difficult to summarize without weakening its validity and 
expressiveness. Still, there are some moments in it that could be stressed and 
taken out of its overarching context in order to approach general questions con-
cerning societal conditions in nineteenth-century Europe. Koselleck writes: “Eu-
ropean history has broadened; it has become world history and will run its course 
as that, having allowed the whole world to drift into a state of permanent crisis.”1 
He finds the origin of that crisis situation in the period of transition from absolut-
ism to Enlightenment. The enlighteners are those who rose up against the royal 
power and caused a crisis by doing so. According to Koselleck, this initial situa-
tion is conditioned by the European Enlightenment’s utopian belief in the unity 
of the world. While absolutism can be understood as one, almost necessary, reac-
tion to the atrocities of civil war, the political theory of the Enlightenment was 
                                                           
1  Koselleck 1988: 5. “Die europäische Geschichte hat sich zur Weltgeschichte ausge-
weitet und vollendet sich in ihr, indem sie die ganze Welt in den Zustand einer perma-
nenten Krise hat geraten lassen” − Koselleck 1973: 1. 
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formed as a reaction to the aberrations of that same sort of absolutism itself. The 
political theory of the Enlightenment is particularly directed at reducing state 
power to single persons. This is a situation in which the crisis of society seems to 
be inevitable. According to Koselleck, the enlighteners understood the crisis in 
this manner and criticized it in their publications. His main thesis is as follows: 
 
[T]hat the critical process of enlightenment conjured up the crisis in the same measure in 
which the political significance of that crisis remained hidden from it. The crisis was as 
much exacerbated as it was obfuscated in the philosophy of history. Never politically 
grasped, it remained concealed in historico-political images of the future which caused the 
day’s events to pale—events that became so much less inhibited in heading for an unex-
pected decision.2 
 
Koselleck’s thesis was already understood as an expression of cultural criticism.3 
However, one of the book’s dimensions went unnoticed for quite a long time. It 
was Dieter Groh who first drew attention to the fact that Koselleck’s book can be 
read using a different code. He stresses: 
 
Critique and Crisis is a highly sublime form of conspiracy theory. The book propagates, 
in seductive formulations, the conviction that the critique by enlightenment philosophers, 
the process that they strove for in the name of reason, and in secret circles against the 
absolutist princely state and their arcana imperii led causally to the crisis of the Ancien 
Régime and aggravated it further. Eventually, the French Revolution, with which the pa-
thogenesis of the bourgeois world begins to be universal, is itself a consequence of the 
crisis initiated through the critique. Considering the findings of political and social history, 
this derivation, based on historico-philosophical premises of Carl Schmitt, seems to be 
exaggerated.4 
                                                           
2  Koselleck 1988: 9. “[D]er kritische Prozess der Aufklärung hat die Krise im gleichen 
Maße heraufbeschworen, wie ihr der politische Sinn dieser Krise verdeckt bleibt. Die 
Krise wird so sehr verschärft, wie sie geschichtspolitisch verdunkelt wird; sie wird nie 
politisch erfaßt, sondern bleibt verborgen in geschichtspolitischen Zukunftsbildern, 
vor denen das Tagesgeschehen verblaßt: umso ungehemmter konnte dieses auf eine 
unerwartete Entscheidung zusteuern” − Koselleck 1973: 5−6.  
3  Cf. Müller 2003. 
4  “Kritik und Krise [ist] eine höchst sublime Form von Konspirationstheorie … Das 
Buch propagiert nämlich in bestechenden Formulierungen die Überzeugung, die Kri-
tik von Aufklärungsphilosophen, der Prozeß, den sie im Namen der Vernunft und im 
geheimen Zirkel gegen den absolutistischen Fürstenstaat und dessen arcana imperii 
Conspiracy Theory in Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav Literatures | 359 
The crisis caused by the critique is a part, moreover a central component, of the 
conspiracy that the enlighteners forged against the absolutist state. That is the 
core of Groh’s interpretation. In this sense, he incorporates the element of crisis 
in the intellectual activity of criticizing and transfers the achievements of philo-
sophers to an overarching conspiracy which is, in a concrete historical event, 
realized as an activity, an occupation almost, by conspirators who are actually 
the revolutionaries. 
Yet there are some more moments connecting the crisis with conspiracy that 
should be taken into account. “Times of crisis are times of conspiracy,”5 em-
phasizes Wolfgang Wippermann in his pertinent book Agenten des Bösen (The 
Agents of Evil). Unlike Koselleck, he does not say that the conspiracy theories 
are indeed the cause of the times of crisis. To the contrary, he thinks, and this is 
a reversal much more appropriate for our epoch, that the conspiracy theories can 
serve as an explanation for precarious conditions we are witnessing nowadays 
because of the already existent crisis. Wippermann states: 
 
‘Conspiracy theories’ or ‘conspiracy myths’ always have an ideological character. There-
fore they can be appropriately denoted as ‘conspiracy ideologies’. The origin of every 
conspiratorial ideological thought is the belief that the absolute evil—the devil—is re-
sponsible for every malady in the world. But the devil—the personified, incarnated evil—
cannot do all of the devils work on his own. He needs accomplices: the agents of evil.6 
 
Koselleck writes accordingly of one mild conspiracy that is, in the strong sense 
of the word, not a conspiracy at all. Conversely, Wippermann postulates unambi-
                                                           
angestrengt haben, hätte die Krise des Ancien Régime ursächlich herbeigeführt und 
dann weiter verschärft. Letztendlich sei auch die Französische Revolution, mit der die 
‚Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt universal zu werden beginne, Folge der durch die 
Kritik initiierten Krise. Angesichts des politik- und sozialgeschichtlichen Befundes er-
scheint eine solche, auf geschichtsphilosophischen Prämissen Carl Schmitts basieren-
de Ableitung jedoch übertrieben” − Groh 1992: 278.  
5  “Krisenzeiten sind Verschwörungszeiten” − Wippermann 2017: 160. 
6  “‘Verschwörungstheorien oder ‘Verschwörungsmythen’ haben immer einen ideologi-
schen Charakter und sind daher treffender als ‘Verschwörungsideologien’ zu bezeich-
nen. Ausgangspunkt allen verschwörungsideologischen Denkens ist der Glaube, dass 
für jegliches Übel in der Welt der Böse schlechthin – der Teufel – verantwortlich ist. 
Doch kann der Teufel – das personifizierte, das leibhaftige Böse – nicht alles Teufels-
werk allein tun. Er braucht Helfershelfer: die Agenten des Bösen” − Wippermann 
2007: 7−8. 
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guous theses about cancerous conspiracy theories that, like a real plague, are in-
fected with examples drawn from different parts of the world. Can we find a 
position that is able to unite the two positions or makes them at least compatible? 
I think that it is possible. To prove this, I will take an example from Yugoslavia 
and Yugoslav literatures. Moreover, I will use two different periods in the coun-
try’s historical and political development, from the two respective lands that 
were created in its aftermath. In a sense, Yugoslavia is a litmus test to show how 
the conspiracy theory could be entangled in a web of lies and how the conspi-
ratorial arrangements can be revealed as, not necessarily world-shaping, but still 
existent and thoroughly effective.  
If one follows the history of Yugoslav disintegration, it is almost immedia-
tely obvious that its history is comprised of a sequence of narratives representing 
a continuous line of cumulating political and economic crises. They exploded in 
an apocalypse that had a devastating effect, for those involved at least, followed 
by a discourse of criticism that was to be found in every spectrum of political 
theory, from nationalism to leftist liberalism. This history offers an open field for 
conspiracy theories that deliver an alleged explanation, albeit the most prominent 
one, for catastrophic occurrences. The most pronounced conspiracy was the one 
purportedly created by the Vatican and Freemasons against Serbia. It is not ne-
cessary to emphasize that this theory was used as a pretext for starting the war 
against Croatia. But this theory was only one, if most prominent, of many that 
were brought into circulation during the late eighties to late nineties of the last 
century. Even after the official end of hostilities, conspiracy theories could be 
observed all over former Yugoslavia. Literature reacted to this development in 
society with unique vehemence.7 In the following sections, I will concentrate on 
two texts, written at different times, but which are capable of delivering a plau-
sible clarification for the proliferation of conspiracy theories in Yugoslavia and 
states that emerged in the wake thereof.  
The first text that I will deal with here is the story “Knjiga kraljeva i budala” 
(“The Book of Kings and Fools”) from the collection Enciklopedija mrtvih (En-
cyclopaedia of the Dead, 1983) by Danilo Kiš. In a broader context it could be 
considered to have anticipated the attempts at conspiracy theories mentioned 
previously in Yugoslavia from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
Kiš takes the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion as his starting point. In so 
doing, he does not refrain from transforming it into a text with universal mea-
ning. He uses them as a universal metaphor, as an original text, of an all-encom-
                                                           
7  On the role of literature in disintegration (and integration too) of the Yugoslav society 
see Wachtel 1998. 
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passing conspiracy theory. At the same time, it serves as a projection surface for 
the broadening of his specific literary practice and correlates with the role of the 
document in literary text. Here it is important to note that Kiš recognizes the fact 
that conspiracy theories are inevitably connected with production of scientific 
discourse which is eventually revealed as a pseudo-scientific discourse. “The 
fact that the conspiracy theories often use a considerable inductive safeguarding 
suggests the suspicion that for them it is important to retain at least the outer 
semblance of scientificity.”8 Kiš’s literary representation of conspiracy theory 
applies a pseudo-scientific method (documents as a paradigm of historicity) to 
call into question this very method, or to show how its abuse can lead to pure 
falsification and deep falsehood. 
The second text that I will deal with in this essay was written by David 
Albahari, a representative of the new generation of Serbian-Jewish authors. Un-
like Kiš, who died in 1989, Albahari was personally affected by the catastrophe 
of the disintegration to a large extent. Therefore, he draws on an alternative 
literary procedure. His novel Pijavice (The Leeches) written in 2006 is set in the 
Zemun district of Belgrade. From there, the allegedly Jewish conspiracy spreads 
around the whole world. Its roots are to be sought in the deeper layers of history, 
in Ottoman Hapsburg times specifically. Back then, the local Jews gained their 
wealth in trading leeches from the Danube. This story examines the twentieth 
century to determine if there is any possibility of saving the world from the 
mischief that threatens to destroy it. The good conspirators are, however, con-
fronted by the evil that wants to annihilate the fine social fabric of the world and 
throw it off course. Consequently, Albahari multiplies the possibilities of the ex-
pansion of conspiracy theories and intensifies the literary analysis of their 
devastating results, but at the same time asks if there is something positive we 
can gain from their impact. In short: Is there a benign conspiracy, a conspiracy 
that could lead to something that is ultimately good?  
Examples from these two texts will help me to show how conspiracy theories 
played a role in the process of Yugoslavia’s destruction and became extremely 
powerful as well how they managed to substitute the foundation of society, 
grounded on the socialist belief in the strength of science and in its ability to 
explain everything, with a new foundation made of prejudices and, last but not 
least, based on pseudo-scientific conspiracy theories. 
 
                                                           
8  “Die Tatsache, dass Verschwörungstheorien oft mit einer umfangreichen induktiven 
Absicherung aufwarten, legt den Verdacht nahe, dass ihnen wenigstens der äußere 
Anschein der Wissenschaftlichkeit wichtig ist” − Hepfer 2015: 69.  
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Conspiracy Disguised as a Book  
 
As I have mentioned previously, the book The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 
the urtext of the modern conspiracy theories, provides the foil for Kiš’s story that 
tries to reveal the core of the way of thinking in the mode of conspiracy. The 
book itself has long since been exposed as a forgery, but it is still vehemently 
accepted and received as veritable.9 Kiš denotes the book as Zavera (Conspi-
racy) and the title “The Book of Kings and Fools” is a periphrastic signature. 
Hidden behind this disguise is deep irony, probably even sarcasm, against a text 
that is suitable for all kinds of readers, regardless of level of education. At the 
same time, it indicates that no one can be safe from being fooled by this forgery. 
Kiš uses a strategy of shortening and omitting, which accelerates the narration 
and offers a summary of the genesis and dissemination of the book, in order to 
represent this forgery in a plausible way in literature as well. Svetlana Boym 
describes Kiš’s literary procedure in the following way: 
 
Kiš … insists on the need to return to self-reflexive modernist literature and the practices 
of estrangement and perspectivism in order to think through ethical ways of confronting 
the absurdity of evil and politics of paranoia that haunted much of Eastern European wri-
ting and life.10 
 
What Boym here denotes as “self-reflexive modernist literature” can be, in Kiš’s 
case, understood as “postmodernism.” Kiš produces the estrangement effect ad-
dressed by Boym through the application of a non-literary practice within a 
literary text—a strategy that can be identified with metatextuality. Kiš had pre-
viously applied it masterfully in his A Tomb for Boris Davidovich (1976).  
To explain the conspiracy theory par excellence, he narrates the history of 
that theory in a manner that is in itself strangely distorted or, to use Boym’s ter-
minology, estranged. The estrangement emerges out of the hybrid mixture of 
diverse styles within the text. The parts written in a pseudoscientific style col-
lapse because they collide with parts of the text that are marked as strongly 
lyrical. Those parts are displaced in their own right, put unexpectedly in brackets 
                                                           
9  Numerous books revealed the fictional character of the book, found its sources and 
showed the ways in which it emerged from the marginal position to unbelievable pro-
minence in the anti-Semitic circles. The most important of which are Cohn 1970 and 
Ben-Itto 2005.  
10  Boym 1999: 99.  
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or in footnotes. Here is an example of the first discursive structure, the characte-
ristic pseudo-scientific style:  
 
We shall now try to investigate the origins of this text, glancing briefly at those who crea-
ted it (endowing my insolent procedure with the prerogatives of divine anonymity), and, 
finally, pointing out the devils that followed from it.11  
 
And here is the one determined by lyrical literariness: “When chance, fate, and 
time meet in a favourable constellation, their point of intersection shall fall on 
that book and, like a sunbeam, illuminate it ‘with a great light’ and save it from 
oblivion.”12 
If we now compare these two modes of literary discourse, we will see that 
the first one tends to be impersonal,13 while the second operates with an in-
creased amount of rhetorical devices that are prone to the production of pure 
literary discourse.14 The result is astonishing and harrowing. On the one hand, 
there is the objectivization of something that withdraws from that very objec-
tivity. On the other hand, there is the subjectivization of something that cannot 
be explained in terms of subjectivity. The impact of the intention hidden behind 
this technique of mixing different discourses cannot be easily explained at first 
glance. Svetlana Boym stresses that The Protocols of the Elders of Zion would 
                                                           
11  Kiš 2015: 110. “Ovim tekstom pokušaćemo da istražimo njeno poreklo, da bacimo 
jedan letimičan pogled na one koji su je stvorili (pridavši svom bezočnom postupku 
prerogative božanske anonimnosti) i, najzad, da ukažemo na pošasti koje su proistekle 
iz ovog gesta” − Kiš 1983: 150. The neutrality of discourse is slightly disorderly in the 
translation due to the introduction of the possessive pronoun “my” which is not pres-
ent in the original and implementing “the devils” on the place of “pestilence” in origi-
nal.  
12  Kiš 2015: 130−31. “Kada se slučaj, sudbina i vreme nađu u povoljnoj konstelaciji, 
presek tih sila pašće na tu knjigu, osvetliće je kao sunčana zraka ‚svetlošću jakom‘ i 
izbaviti je od zaborava” − Kiš 1983: 176. 
13  The best proof of impersonality is of course the use of the first person plural which is 
the marker of scientific objectivity. On the general role of tenses in “The Book of 
Kings and Fools,” their change from present to future and past, see Beganović 2007: 
174−75.  
14  The indications of this, even in this short passage, are numerous. For example, the in-
version “svetlošću jakom” or the mixture of “chance, fate, and time” find themselves 
in astronomic constellations and are capable of enlightening the book and saving it 
“from oblivion.”  
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remind somebody more of a premodern than of a modern collage, written “in 
Borgesian fashion.” Nevertheless, “their ‘translator’/publisher Nilus is a modern 
author who appropriated contemporary means of technological reproduction in 
order to propagate a radically antimodern message.”15  
Kiš’s narrative strategy is to be found exactly here. He dismantles a modern 
text that stages itself as premodern. The new interpretation emerges from this 
exposure. It clearly (and very persuasively) represents the clarified backgrounds 
of the cruel forgery and incredibly bold plagiarism in a new and illuminating 
light and does so multiple times. The story is situated at the threshold between 
the fictional and factual.16 It maneuvers between two poles and, in so doing, un-
folds the possibility of retelling the old and well-known story in an innovative 
way, so innovative that it can experience unknown and hitherto unforeseen her-
meneutical turns. Kiš’s provocative and ironic narrator acts as if he himself does 
not realize whether he operates in fiction or writes about the facts only. On the 
one hand, he writes a scientific explanation of the conspiracy; on the other hand, 
it seems to him that historiography itself became unreliable and consequently 
unable to deliver a plausible explanation of the improbable, even fantastical 
events. The scientific or documentary discourse is shaken by the introduction of 
obviously fictional characters who appear in the enumeration of conspirators as 
well as parts of the story constructed in narrative mode.  
 
From the treasury of its ‘irresponsible and occult organization’ comes funding for such ad-
versaries of law and faith as Voltaire, Rousseau, Tolstoy, Wilson, Loubet, Clemenceau, 
Eduard Sam, and Lev Davidovich Bronstein. Among those who fell prey to its intrigues 
are Tsar Alexander II, General Selivyortsov, and Archduke Ferdinand. Its members, the 
executors of its will, include Machiavelli, Marx, Kerensky, B. D. Novsky and Maurice 
                                                           
15  Boym 1999: 105. 
16  Renate Lachmann emphasizes the importance of mixture of fact (document) and fic-
tion in Kiš’s texts as follows: “In Kiš’s prose we are dealing not only with a more or 
less transparent combination of factography and fiction, but also with the complicated 
semantics of fabricated documents, originating from the knowledge about the factual; 
it has something to do with the production of an artefact” − Lachmann 2011: 107 (“Es 
geht bei Kiš nicht nur um eine mehr oder weniger transparente Kombination von Fak-
tographie und Fiktion, sondern auch um eine komplizierte Semantik fingierter Doku-
mente, die dem Wissen ums Faktische entstammen, und es geht um die Herstellung 
eines Artefakts”).  
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Joly himself (a pseudonym, an anagram in fact, whose origins are easily decipherable in 
the name Maurice).17  
 
The characters from Kiš’s previous texts found their place in the present one. 
Eduard Sam is the father from the Family Trilogy and Boris Davidovič Novski is 
the hero of the title story in Tomb of Boris Davidovich. The effect is ironical in 
two directions. The book, Conspiracy, is made ridiculous; but at the same time 
the narrator directs his irony to the supporters of the conspiracy theory, showing 
them how unsubstantiated their worldview is.  
Two distinctly fictional characters operating in the factographic part of the 
story are Mister X. and the German officer Wirth. Mister X. is a white emigrant 
who bought the private library of the white officer Arkadij Ipolitovič Belogorcev 
in Istanbul. Belogorcev himself was an agent of the Russian Secret Service. In 
the library he finds two books—one is without a front page and the other is the 
Antikhrist by Father Sergei Nilus. The first book is of course, The Protocols. 
Through meticulous philological analysis, caused by accident, Mister X. dis-
covers that the book by Nilus is a forgery of the second one. Only through their 
parallel existence in the personal library of a stranger—that leads to simulta-
neous reading—can he be sure that these two books remain in ominous relation 
to each other. He confides this discovery in a journalist from the London Times. 
The actual conspiracy that involves the plagiarism is in that way finally revealed. 
The second book, the one without a front page, is the anti-Napoleonic script Dia-
logue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu by the Belgian Maurice Joly 
which was mostly destroyed by French police who hindered its smuggling into 
France. One copy left was subsequently used by the Russian Foreign Intelligence 
Service in order to construct the alleged Jewish conspiracy, the ostensible aim of 
which was to rule the world. Kiš conveys his overarching idea in concealed 
form: although it is clear that the book is a plagiarism, it is nevertheless accepted 
and received with enthusiasm and credulity by adepts. That is exactly the central 
paradox of all texts at whose core there is a conspiracy theory. The more their 
falsehood is revealed, the more they are taken for truth. 
                                                           
17  Kiš 2015: 141. “Ta ‘okultna i neodgovorna organizacija’ plaća iz svojih mračnih fon-
dova rušioce vere i zakona, na njenoms e spisku vode Volter, Ruso, Tolstoj, Vilson, 
Lube, Klemanso, Eduard Sam, Lav Davidovič Bronštajn. Kao žrtve njenih intriga pali 
su car Aleksandar II, general Selivestrov, nadvojvoda Ferdinand; njeni su članovi i 
izvršioci njene volje Makijaveli, Marks, Kerenski. B.D. Novski, pa i sam Moris Žoli 
(to je lažno ime, anagram, čije je poreklo lako dešifrovati u imenu Moris)” − Kiš 
1983: 193. 
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How is the circle of conspiracy closed in this multi-layered and extremely 
complex narrative? In the end, one character appears who was until then not 
mentioned at all. He is introduced without warning, obviously without any direct 
contact with previous events represented in the text. This character is the Ger-
man officer Wirth. His function in the narrative economics of the story lies in the 
final fusion and negation of the documentary and factography. He confirms the 
book’s double structure, its fictionality and facticity. In a sense, he makes a holy 
object of it, something that reaches its fulfilment in a higher mission. Wirth car-
ries the book as an amulet:  
 
In the middle of it all stands Captain Wirth. And in the upper left-hand pocket of his tunic 
is a leather-bound copy of The Conspiracy published by Der Hammer in 1933. He has 
read somewhere that the book saved the life of a young non-commissioned officer on the 
Russian front: a bullet fired from a sniper’s rifle stuck in its pages, just above the heart. 
The book makes him feel safe.18 
 
The “truth” of the conspiracy theory finds its verification in the applicability of 
the book, as an object nota bene, in the salvation of human life. In an inverted 
ethical position, the narrator, who is once more revealed as highly ironic, re-
moves any doubt that the book, The Conspiracy, is authentic. Its authenticity is 
achieved through utility. Moved back from the abstract world of conspiracy, the 
book has arrived in reality. It becomes the symbol of survival, the saving object, 
in the literal as well as figurative sense. That is a sad conclusion embedded in the 
generally pessimistic attitude of the Encyclopaedia of the Dead. In the all-
encompassing tragic structure of the book, “The Book of Kings and Fools” ap-
pears as the climactic moment of revelation: the power of conspiracy that uses a 
forged conspiracy as a carte blanche for its misdeed is unabated, steady, and 
more stable than ever. And if we realize that Kiš wrote his story in 1983, we can 
see that he reports about the old evil book, predicting the future of the history of 
the world. We are now inhabiting this future and know that his prophecy has 
become truth. 
                                                           
18  Kiš 2015: 146. “Na sred kruga stoji kapetan Virt. U gornjem džepu vojničke bluze, na 
levoj strani, drži primerak Zavere u kožnom povezu, izdanje Der Hammera iz 1933. 
Negde je pročitao da je ta knjiga na ruskom frontu spasla mladog podoficira: metak 
ispaljen iz snajperske puške zaustavio se između stranica, tik iznad srca. Ta mu knjiga 
uliva sigurnost” − Kiš 1983: 195.  
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Conspiracy in the Aftermath of Yugoslavia 
 
David Albahari writes in another epoch. He paradoxically arrived in the bleak 
future that was proclaimed and expected by Kiš in the eighties, and conspiracies 
and conspiracy theories had become a part of everyday life. Yugoslavia has dis-
integrated, existing only in vague and dazzled memories. Serbia finds itself in 
the middle of the dark era of Milošević’s government. The starting point of The 
Leeches is 8 March 1998. On that day, the narrator goes for a walk in Zemun 
along the Danube riverside. He witnesses a peculiar incident there: a young man 
slaps a young woman across the face without any visible reason. The narrator’s 
curiosity is piqued; he follows her through the entangled lanes in the inner town. 
He loses sight of her during the pursuit, but resumes his stalking on the fol-
lowing day. While stalking her, he discovers various traces that suggest her pres-
ence. The main point of reference is one button. “The button was still there, in 
the exact same spot. I picked it up, then noticed a little sign under it, probably 
written with a felt tip pen: a triangle inscribed in a circle, and inside it, another 
triangle pointing the other way.”19 The narrator becomes obsessed with the sign. 
He loses control of his conduct and tries to discover the secret meaning behind it. 
At the beginning of the novel the suspicion is already aroused that the slap was 
not accidental but happened with the purpose of bringing him into play. He 
suspects a conspiracy behind this act but is still not sure, what it might be about. 
He mentions this possibility to his friend Marko. Marko plays the part of the 
sceptic and is therefore not suitable to offer help in the complex situation. For he 
thinks:  
 
People who buy into conspiracy theories … have a void in their head and don’t know what 
to do with it. So they fill it with junk, and sooner or later, they become victims of sketchy 
plots, secret organizations with one goal only: to drag that person into something that 
promises to undermine the very foundation of the world.20 
 
                                                           
19  Albahari 2012: 5−6. “Dugme je ležalo na istom mestu. Vratio sam se i podigao ga, i 
tada sam ispod njega ugledao mali znak, napisan verovatno flomasterom: krug u koji 
je bio upisan trougao sa obrnutim trouglom upisanim u njega” − Albahari 2006: 9.  
20  Albahari 2012: 17−18. “Svako ko veruje u teoriju zavere … ima praznine u glavi sa 
kojima ne zna šta da radi, pa ih onda popunjava zakukuljenim pričama u kojima, 
ranije ili kasnije, postaje žrtva nekih nejasnih okolnosti, nekih tajanstvenih organiza-
cija koje imaju samo jedan cilj: da tu osobu uvuku u nešto što preti da podrije temelje 
strukture sveta” − Albahari 2006: 20.  
368 | Beganović 
The text’s essentiality is defined from the very beginning. From this moment on, 
the whole structure of the novel develops as one construction that is completely 
directed towards the conspiracy, its potentials, and the realization of exactly 
those potentials. Everything else is overshadowed.  
The events and signals amass that indicate that the narrator is increasingly 
blundering into something that eludes common sense. He receives secret mes-
sages that he has already deciphered using advertising sections of different news-
papers and a manuscript entitled “The Well” (serb. “Bunar”) reaches him in a 
clandestine way. But it is not just him. The origin of the text, and the way it was 
treasured, testify to its special nature. It originated in seventeenth-century Zemun 
and has had a special function in the Kabbalistic tradition from the beginning of 
time. The manuscript was found in the legacy of a Belgrade Jew whose wife 
donated it to the local Jewish museum. The title was given because the first word 
in the manuscript, which was delivered without its front page, was “bunar.”21 
“Bunar” materializes as the second stream within the novel. In itself, it is an 
intricate text that ultimately is constrained in two narrative threads: The history 
of the Jewish community in Zemun on the one hand and “a collection of several 
Kabbalistic threads that kept tangling and untangling”22 on the other. The origin 
and the significance of the manuscript are discovered only later, according to the 
interpretation of Margareta, the young woman who had been slapped and who 
explains the manuscript’s importance to the narrator. An examination of the text 
leads the narrator to the contemporary Jewish community in the town. But this 
activity is not without consequences. He feels that he is being observed and is 
                                                           
21  “In that case, Margareta told me she’d read me a part of the translation of the text, 
which, as she had mentioned, began with the words ‘The Well’, words that, it bears 
saying, no matter what changes appeared in the text, always were first. It is not entire-
ly clear to me what they mean, but perhaps, she said, the initial mechanism is con-
cealed in those words, a given sequence of letters or sounds that set in motion what we 
have described as the program that changes the text” − Albahari 2012: 232−33 (“U 
tom slučaju, rekla je Margareta, može da mi pročita deo prevoda teksta koji, kao što je 
pomenula, počinje rečju 'bunar', rečju koja, treba to naglasiti, uprkos svim promenama 
u tekstu uvek ostaje prva reč. Nije sasvim jasno šta to znači, ali može da se 
pretpostavi, rekla je, da se u toj reči na neki način sakriven inicijalni mehanizam, 
određeni raspored slova ili glasova koji pokreće ono što smo nazvali programom koji 
modifikuje sam tekst” − Albahari 2006: 216).  
22  Albahari 2012: 35. “Skup nekoliko kabalističkih niti koje su se stalno zaplitale i 
rasplitale” − Albahari 2006: 35. 
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confronted with anti-Semitic watchwords written on the walls of his house. His 
friend Marko comments on his condition as paranoid.  
Renate Lachmann has emphasized the relation between conspiracy and para-
noia in a pointed way: “The complot figure as a deceptive meaning or as a mean-
ing phantasm in literary texts, in the psychopathographic text as delirium or 
paranoia.”23 The topic of paranoia becomes particularly interesting if one as-
sumes that the literary text does not necessarily have to be fantastic in order to 
represent a paranoid plot that is actually a complot. The narrator of The Leeches 
seeks the help of another friend, the mathematician Dragan Mišković, to solve 
the riddle of the mathematic form that follows the appearance of the signs.24 He 
successfully explains to him the mathematic dimension of the riddle, but answers 
the question of how everything is related to everything else, with a clear denial 
of further explanation: “It is late for a conversation about paranoia.”25 The nar-
rator has been, thereby, already designated as potentially paranoid by two textual 
instances. 
One question still remains. Why is this Jewish alliance in Zemun so impor-
tant, important enough to suppose conspiracy behind it? Even to forge one? This 
is precisely because of the fact written in the manuscript:  
 
Today, it says in this chapter, somewhere in Zemun is a place where the forces of good 
and evil intersect, and where it is possible, if a person knows the right words, to pass from 
one world into the other, and even to move into the realm of endless possibilities, or into 
the realm of endless worlds that emanate from ten divine Sephirot, endlessly multiplying 
and forging anew the reality we dwell in.26 
 
Its Kabbalistic nature becomes more than clear. Here a mixture of two possible 
                                                           
23  “Als Trugsinn oder Sinnphantasma figuriert das Komplott im literarischen, als Deli-
rium oder Paranoia im psychopathographischen Text” − Lachmann 2002: 140.  
24  It will become clear, only later in the novel and very slowly, that Mišković himself is 
a part of the “positive” conspiracy, the one aiming to save the world.  
25  Albahari 2012: 45. “Kasno je za razgovor o paranoji” − Albahari 2006: 44. 
26  Albahari 2012: 53. “I danas, piše u tom odeljku, negde u Zemunu postoji mesto u 
kojem se ukrštaju sile dobra i zla, i gde je moguće, ukoliko čovek zna prave reči, preći 
iz jednog sveta u drugi, pa čak i stupiti u područje bezbrojnih svetova koji zrače iz 
deset božanskih sefira, neprekidno se umnožavajući i iznova stvarajući stvarnost u 
kojoj prebivamo” − Albahari 2006: 52. 
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conspiracies takes place that I can denote as “positive” and “negative.”27 On the 
one hand there are Jews from Zemun who supplied the narrator (who himself, 
and this is crucial for their plans, is not a Jew) with a manuscript; on the other 
hand there are Serbian racists who are unhappy with his activities (especially 
with journalistic articles that condemn anti-Semitism in Serbia) and who threaten 
him physically. Are they conspirators too? Marko is once more the one who ne-
gates the possibility of a conspiracy in Serbia. He increasingly assumes the role 
of advocatus diaboli who transfers the narrator back to reality, but whose state-
ments produce insecurity too, especially because they are often induced under 
the influence of drugs. The danger that the trust between them would deteriorate, 
that the narrator’s confidence would be diminished, that he would follow the 
signals indicating that Marko is probably on the other side, the side of evil, that 
he himself is maybe part of the complot, is hidden by Marko’s central position as 
an adviser and auxiliary in the narrator’s life. Again one has to pose the question 
whether the narrator is becoming increasingly paranoid or if his perception is in 
accordance with reality. Again, it is impossible to answer the question unambi-
guously. It remains a matter of “hesitation” (to use Todorov’s terminology).28 
The narrator increasingly addresses the distance between the narrated time 
and the time of narration. The narrated time covers a period of approximately six 
years, stretching out between the events and their representation in the narrative. 
The narrator conveys the impression of prudence and authenticity that is able to 
take away suspicion from the recipient of the narrative, concerning the latter’s 
version of the conspiracy theory. This suspicion should be furthermore authenti-
cated by the manner in which the narrator slowly advances to the secret of the 
“conspiracy.” As he peruses the clandestine text, the conspiracy becomes in-
creasingly clear to him—which means that truth is conveyed in written form. 
However, the text also results from the perception of the conspiracy through 
Margareta’s reading out loud—which means that the conspiracy stems from one 
                                                           
27  Again, one important fact must be mentioned here. If I talk about a “positive” con-
spiracy, I find myself on a slippery slope. Namely, the “positive” side of conspiracy is 
almost always related to the weak. But how can the weak be the bearers of such a 
powerful action as a conspiracy? “The weak and marginalized are rarely seen as able 
to pull off a successful conspiracy. If they are, it is because they are assumed to have 
much more power than they actually have” − Uscinski 2018: 235. 
28  As is well-known, Tzvetan Todorov (1975) defined fantastic literature as a moment of 
hesitation between the marvellous and uncanny that can be determined by the reader 
as well as the narrator or characters. For a potential reading of the “Book of Fools and 
Kings” as a fantastic text, see Beganović 2007: 173.  
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person transmitting it orally. Consequently, a mixture of media is produced that 
retains the conspiracy. The obvious result is a hybrid confrontation with a reality 
that additionally complicates, but also emphasizes and amplifies, the interpreta-
tion of the narrator’s possible paranoia. Margareta’s explanations deviate slightly 
from the manuscript, its archaic structure, and move in the direction of the pres-
ent time. The endangered Jewish community must find a savior, the precise one 
that was described by the anonymous author of “The Well.” Therefore, the slap 
was meant to serve as bait29 that should have led the narrator to the corres-
ponding person. This person, the savior, is the narrator himself. His non-Jewish 
status helps to prepare him as an ideal candidate for this responsible role.  
But, as I have stated previously, we can now see that here is the clue to the 
entire novel. Parallel with this “positive”30 conspiracy, which aims to save the 
Jewish people, the “negative” conspiracy proceeds in Serbia, led by local fascists 
who aim for the eradication, or at least expulsion, of those same people. Accor-
ding to the expectations founded on symbols within the text, the negative part 
wins the day and the pessimistic interpretation of history prevails once more. 
                                                           
29  Mamac (Bait, 1996) is the name of an important autobiographic novel by Albahari in 
which he describes the destiny of his family during and after WWII. Bait is often a 
strong symbolic lure that involves an attraction to some object, person or event which 
is then used to manipulate the victim of the bait and lead him/her in the desired direc-
tion.  
30  The narrator summarizes one more time here: “Finding an enemy in such places is a 
favourite pastime, relished in equal measure by ordinary people, the political elite, in-
tellectuals and artists. There is nothing better than a well laid-out conspiracy, for eve-
ryone except those singled out as the conspirators, whose repeated denials are seen as 
proof of the very opposite intentions. [The more you defend yourself, the more you 
prove that something is out of order, why should you defend yourself so frantically if 
you were not guilty. – This sentence is left out in the translation; the translation here 
is mine, D. B.] Of course it’s one thing to practice this as a theoretical discourse and 
another to be part of it at the crossroads of converging hatreds” − Albahari 2012: 264 
(“Nalaženje neprijatelja je u takvim okruženjima najomiljenija zabava, kojoj se s pod-
jednakom strašću prepuštaju običan svet, politička elita, intelektualci i umetnici. Ništa 
nije lepše od dobro pripremljene zavere o postojanju zavere, izuzev za one koji su 
izdvojeni kao nosioci navodne zavere, i u čijim se poricanjima pronalaze dokazi su-
protnih namera. Što više se braniš, time u većoj meri dokazuješ da nešto ipak nije u 
redu, jer zašto bi se toliko grčevito branio ako nisi kriv. Naravno, jedno je znati to kao 
teorijski diskurs, a drugo je biti deo praktične razrade i naći se na vetrometini mržnje” 
− Albahari 2006: 242−43).  
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The narrator is forced to flee, first in the underground then in exile. The news-
paper for which he worked, and where he supported minority rights, was at-
tacked and its offices destroyed. His Jewish friends went underground. Some of 
them were killed. The conspirators who fought against the real conspiracy, as 
well as the narrator who was promoted from journalist to the book’s author, 
leave the country. Nothing else remains for him but to write his story from Cana-
dian exile and to convince his readers that he was not paranoid and that he did 
not become paranoid. But before he departs, he must accept still one more disap-
pointment: towards the end of the novel, Marko disappears in a mysterious way. 
The narrator does not want to believe in his departure and makes a call to his 
apartment. He sees lights and hears the voices there. The local fascists threaten 
him again and after this scene he goes to the studio of one of the conspirators, a 
painter by the name of Jaša Alkalaj, only to find that he has been murdered. Two 
hooded men leave the rooms. One last time the narrator goes to Marko’s apart-
ment:  
 
I could hear footsteps and laughter. Marko opened the door and squinted, as if trying to 
make me go away. Behind me, on the coat rack, hung a black hooded sweatshirt. From in-
side the apartment a man’s voice asked who was there. No one, said Marko, and opened 
his eyes wide. We stared at each other for a few moments, then he slammed the door with 
all his might. Crumbs of plaster sprayed the floor, the light in the hallway went out, I 
sprinted down the stairs in the dark and didn’t stop until I was back at my apartment.31  
 
It is obvious that Marko was either one of the killers or that the killers are in his 
apartment. Marko’s treason is the pivotal point of the text; there is no longer 
anything to be narrated, but there is nothing to be learned either. The only exit 
for the narrator is exile in Canada. From there he writes his book about the con-
spiracies.  
The crisis that haunted Yugoslavia, from the historical point of view, and 
since the beginning of the 1980s, climaxed in the bloody wars of the 1990s. That 
crisis produced a multitude of conspiracy theories that found their way into 
                                                           
31  Albahari 2012: 307−08. “Čuli su se koraci i smeh, a onda je Marko otvorio vrata i, 
ugledavši me, zažmurio, kao da bi to učinilo da nestanem. Iza njega, na čiviluku, visio 
je crni duks sa kapuljačom. Iz unutrašnjosti stana muški glas je pitao ko je došao. Ni-
ko, rekao je Marko i polako raširio kapke. Gledali smo se još nekoliko trenutaka, 
potom je on svom snagom zalupio vrata. Mrvice maltera pale su na pod, svetlo u hod-
niku se ugasilo, u mraku sam strčao niz stepenice, i nisam stao sve do moje kuće” − 
Albahari 2006: 283.  
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literature as well. Conspiracy theories, according to Fredric Jameson, possess a 
collective character. It is necessary to examine them “to test the incommensura-
bility between an individual witness—the individual character of a still anthro-
pomorphic narrative—and the collective conspiracy which must somehow be 
exposed or revealed through these individual efforts.”32 In the two texts that I 
explored, the discrepancy between the individual effort to overcome thinking in 
terms of conspiracy theories or to reveal them in their falsehood, and the collec-
tive unwillingness to accept these endeavors, cannot be overstated. Yugoslav 
literature triumphs in the representation of conspiracy theories and their disas-
trous consequences. However, this is a rather sad success, since literature cannot 
do anything to prevent these consequences. In the beginning, there was a long-
lasting political and economic crisis. It was followed by a strong critique of the 
all-encompassing situation. The people who brought it up came from diverse so-
cietal strata. In the end, the nationalists prevailed and brought about the demise 
of society. At least some signals indicate that there was a real conspiracy behind 
their actions and deeds. Still it would be too simple to say that conspiracies de-
stroyed Yugoslavia.33 There was enough potential within it to resist the acts of 
destruction. Conspiracy, or some variation thereof, was just one of them. The 
“task” of literature was to describe this. And it accomplished that task in an ef-
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Following Koselleck’s thesis that every critique is at the same time in crisis, in 
this chapter I try to prove the ways in which these concepts correspond with the 
assumption that the Enlightenment itself aimed at the production of crisis. Kosel-
leck’s thesis was already taken up by Groh who concludes that the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment were themselves apologists of conspiracy theories. The 
historical conclusion could be that times of crisis are times of conspiracies. I take 
examples from two texts from Serbian literature—the story “The Book of Kings 
and Fools” by Danilo Kiš and the novel The Leeches by David Albahari—to 
show that the time of crisis in Yugoslavia was ripe with conspiracies. These two 
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texts help to show how conspiracy theories became extremely powerful in the 
process of the destruction of Yugoslavia and how they managed to substitute the 
foundation of society, which had been grounded on the socialist belief in the 
strength of science’s ability to explain everything, with a new belief in prejudi-
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